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Propositions (Stelllngen) 
1. Conflicts are increasing for many reasons in all societies. These conflicts not only pose problems in 
society but can also offer opportunities if managed constructively (Likert and Likert, 1976) 
2. Local negotiators, who know the history of a conflict as well the present action of the conflicting 
parties, do not feel restricted by legally binding procedures and rules in resolving natural resource 
related conflicts in a community (Chapter eight in this book). 
3. Formal conflict management procedures in Nepal are methodologically inadequate, financially 
expensive, administratively difficult, elite-biased and inaccessible to the poor and marginalized 
sections of society (Chapter eight in this book). 
4. Interactive conflict management is a people-centred, learning-based and action-oriented 
methodology which deserves more attention as an alternative approach for managing natural-
resource related conflict in the community (Chapter 9 in this book). 
5. Ideologically, a legal conflict-management approach focuses on interpreting the law as an ultimate 
instrument for social engineering and an effective means of homogenising a heterogeneous 
society. Therefore, a legal approach resolves conflict by legal enactment and the threat of 
punishment (Nader and Todd, 1978). 
6. Two schools of thought exist in contemporary conflict study. One negatively views conflict as 
'irrational, pathological and dysfunctional' and puts emphasis on its suppression. The other school 
of thought, to which this thesis belongs, considers conflict as a source of learning and a functional 
means for social change (Chapter 2 in this book). 
7. The inaccessibility of formal conflict resolution procedures to the weaker sections of society is 
seriously undermining the principle of justice and promoting inequalities in Nepal. 
8. Political allegiance is increasingly intruding into the creation and/or resolution of conflicts and 
overriding the traditional basis for allegiance in Nepal (Chapter 4 in this book). 
9. Feelings of group identity (i.e. elite, powerful, powerless, rich, poor, landlord, tenants, etc.) 
psychologically forces people to form alliances. Contending parties seek alliance with other people 
of similar characteristics, intentions and interests. 
10. Gender discrimination reflected in ideological, legal, political, religious, cultural, and social practices 
is hindering women from actively participating in conflict management. Though the Constitution of 
Nepal does not directly discriminate against any particular group of people, by declaring Nepal a 
Hindu State it still indirectly supports unequal power relationships. This is because the Hindu 
religion through various rituals, religious rules and customs is by and large discriminating. 
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Preface 
During my professional career in rural development and natural resource management, I have often 
been confronted with many conflict situations amongst and between villagers, especially for access to 
and control over the natural resources available in their area. While I was working with villagers in a 
Swiss funded integrated rural development project, they asked me to help them to resolve these 
conflicts. As a young extensionist I wanted very much to help them, but I had no idea how to help in 
resolving conflicts. The conflict issue itself was sensitive, and furthermore I had no skill and knowledge 
in handling such conflicts. I immediately decided to become involved in conflict-resolution activities at a 
community level. However, I was not able to become fully engaged in this issue straight away as I was 
awarded a scholarship for higher study from the project. When I had completed my study, the project 
was phased out and it was no longer possible for me to engage in local-level conflict resolution in that 
area. My new job as Co-ordinator in the agriculture/natural resource management programme of a 
Dutch funded integrated rural development project gave me the chance to engage in natural resource 
related conflict issues. However, when I became Training and Human Resource Development Officer, I 
had to shift my engagement from natural resource related conflict management to organisational and 
inter-personal conflict management. I was able to follow my keen interest in community level NR-related 
conflict when I was given a chance to follow a MSc course at Wageningen University. I decided to study 
conflict in the same area where the community had asked me to help them 12 years ago. The MSc field 
research in resource-use conflicts and their negotiations was carried out in this same area and was the 
basis for my PhD research project. This book is the result of the continuation of the same research 
project in the same area. 
Both my supervisors made the same critique when reading my initial research proposal; that the 
research project was ambitious and covered too many aspects. This view has often been put forward 
during my research right up to finalising the book. My professional carrier has been devoted to 
improving development projects. Therefore I was well acquainted with the development discourses but 
the legal anthropological perspective in general and legal pluralism in particular, were relatively new 
discourses for me. I was exposed to their theoretical and methodological merits in my PhD study while 
working with the Law and Governance Group particularly with Professor Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
and the late Ir. Joep Spiertz. Combining these two perspectives to study conflict was an extremely 
exciting prospect. I was constantly being asked how it was possible to integrate legal anthropology and 
social learning to study NR-related conflicts. In this I was guided by Professor Benda-Beckmann and 
Professor Roling who rescued me from straddling two theoretical paradigms. This involved them 
investing considerable time and effort in clarifying some of the complex issues. 
While carrying out the literature review, I was unable to trace comprehensive books dealing with conflict 
management in development studies/NRM nor did I find sufficient information on these subjects in the 
index of conflict-related books. Until recently, neither academics, students of NRM, professionals of the 
NR sector, sociologists, legal anthropologists or lawyers have given sufficient attention to community 
level conflict management from the policy-oriented development studies/NRM perspectives. I realised 
that this is an almost neglected issue in contemporary conflict study. Such studies may also have been 
deterred by the sensitivity of conflict. 
This study has demonstrated that legally engineered conflict management methodologies applied by 
governmental organisations are expensive, pro-elite, and inaccessible to the poor and are heavily 
influenced by power and position. Therefore, they are not able to properly address community-based 
NR-conflicts. I do not expect all readers to agree with my arguments and no doubt some will vehemently 
disagree with some of the issues raised in this book. However, I hope it will provoke useful debate and 
discussion to achieve sustainable management of natural resources. I share the merits of this book with 
all those who helped me in developing it, but I alone bear any responsibility for its shortcomings. 
Professor Dr Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Professor Dr. Niels Roling were my excellent 
supervisors. I have admired Professor Roling ever since he was my supervisor during my M.Sc. study. 
x v i 
He not only arranged for me to be awarded the WUR Sandwich Fellowship to continue my PhD 
immediately after MSc graduation, but also helped to get Professor Dr Franz von Benda-Beckmann to 
jointly supervise my research project. I very much appreciate his prompt comments and valuable 
suggestions to my draft thesis and quick action in settling all administrative and procedural matters 
related to my fellowship and resident permit. Professor Benda-Beckmann not only arranged the field 
research costs through his Ford Foundation Research Project but also always challenged me to be 
specific and dig deeper and bring up specific issues where I intended to sweepingly generalise. I would 
like to express my sincere gratitude to both of them for their endurance, helpful comments and guidance 
from the beginning of my research to completion of writing this book, despite their extremely busy 
schedules. Without their vivacious support and guidance, this book would not have appeared in this 
form. 
Professor Dr. A. W. Van den Ban sponsored my M.Sc. study through his Foundation, which was the 
corner stone of my present work. He thoroughly read the draft chapters of this book and gave valuable 
comments, made various books and reference materials available and provided other practical support 
during my stay in Wageningen. 1 would like to express my sincere appreciation to him for such great 
help. My appreciation goes to Hank and Jameke Temmerarends and Gie Seng Tan (Peter) and Anneke 
Tan for their hospitality and logistic support as contact family. 
This book is the product of collective efforts of several people in terms of contributions through support, 
comments, criticisms, collaboration, information and insights. I would like to express my sincere 
gratitude to all of them. During the field study period, people of the study area extended their full support 
and co-operation. I wish to pay special tribute to them for such co-operation and help. Special mention 
must be made of ENAP. I thank staff members of ENAP for their great support during the field study. In 
the course of preparing this book, I have also had the benefit of discussing the subject matter with 
relevant staff from the district court, DPO, DAO, DIO, and DDC. I express my deep sense of gratitude to 
all of them. I am also indebted to Rural Reconstruction Nepal, Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project 
and PACT-Nepal for giving me the responsibility to conduct research and to evaluate their project 
activities in Kaski, Chitwan, Dolakha, Ramechhap, Banek and Kanchanpur districts where I had the 
opportunity to compare the findings of my PhD research with various farmers/users groups working in 
NRM. 
I owe special thanks to Dr. Ganesh Shivakoti (AIT) for his continuous moral and intellectual support in 
my academic career. I am grateful to Professor Kanak Bikram Thapa and Dr. Rajendra Pradhan 
(FREEDEAL), Dr Tej Pratap and Prof. Suresh Raj Chalise (ICIMOD), Arjun Kumar Karki, Sarba Raj 
Khadka, Ratna Karki and Tank Prasad Upreti (RRN), Dr Ramesh Khadka and Bimala Poudel-Rai 
(Actionaid Nepal), SailendraThakali (The Mountain Institute), Karl Shuler, Robin aus der Beek and 
Khagendra Siktel (SDC-Nepal), Dr Umesh Parajuli and Purna Kumar Shrestha (DOI), Ananda Pokharel 
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organising a talk programme, that allowed me to share the findings of this study. I am indebted to Dr 
Bob Rayn (Lincoln University), Otto Bemsen, Dr Philip Scott Jones (University of Wolverhampton, UK) 
and Dr. Michael Warner (Business Partners for Development-UK) for sending me reference material (in 
response to my e-mail requests). I am grateful to Dr. T.M.S. Pradhan for his comments and 
suggestions. My colleagues Navin Devkota and Ram Acharya deserve special thanks for their 
comments and practical help in formatting the book. I thank Nepali collègues Shankar Poudel, Pranita 
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Chapter 1 
Conflict in Natural Resources: The Context 
1.1. Introduction 
The background tor this book is a study of negotiation practices in the use of natural resources (NR) at a 
community level, which I undertook as part of my MSc thesis. That study analysed three cases involving 
conflict about forest and pastureland, irrigation and drinking water. Subsequently, for my PhD a detailed 
study was undertaken in the same area in the mid-hill of Nepal to further explore the dynamics of 
conflict concerning NR. Natural resources in this book refer especially to land, water and forest/pasture. 
Similarly natural resource management (NRM) means appropriation, distribution, utilisation and 
conservation of natural resources and the legitimate way of controlling them. I selected five inter-
connected conflicts: two in irrigation systems and one each in GufW-land1, a spring water source and 
forest-pasture land. Of the two irrigation systems, one was jointly developed by a government agency 
and the users with financial assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the other system was 
fully developed and managed by farmers themselves. In both cases, conflict between villagers and local 
elite erupted due to misuse of externally obtained financial resources and the extension of an irrigation 
canal. The forest and pastureland case involved conflict between powerful village elite and common 
villagers about access and control of forest and pastureland. The spring water-source conflict is related 
to ownership, access and priority of water use. The GufW-land case concerns the conflict between the 
tenant farmers and the landlord over the ownership arrangement of a religious institution called Guthi 
Sansthan. This study is basically about access to and control over NR, power relations, the functioning 
of plural legal systems, and about existing approaches and mechanisms of conflict resolution. 
This book is not in itself about the normal concerns of NRM such as resource development and 
maintenance, functioning of user committees, people's participation, resource-use efficiency, use of 
technology, application of rules, sharing of benefits, etc. Nor is it about the financial analysis of NRM, or 
about the assessment of co-ordination and administration of the NRM sector. It is about what all these 
issues create: conflicts. Conflict study involves investigating almost all aspects of human activity and 
interactivity ranging from the behaviour of individuals to group characteristics. I have shifted the focus 
away from the dominant pattern of conflict study treating 'conflict' as a particular event in a particular 
point of time that needs to be resolved by using legal and regulatory interventions. Rather, I have 
focused on conflict as an inevitable process that can be used as a constructive means for social 
transformation and agrarian change. My research has taught me that quality and consequences of 
resolution - how fair the resolution is and what are the implications of the resolutions for NRM and 
society at large - are more important than the actual resolution of the conflict itself. I prefer to use the 
tern 'Conflict Management2 (CM) instead of Conflict Resolution (CR) because it is not always possible to 
resolve all conflicts but it is possible to manage them. Conflict resolution implies that conflict is totally 
resolved whereas CM may or may not totally resolve the conflict. Actions may be taken, which although 
they may not be able to resolve the conflict completely, keep the situation working and minimise tension 
and antagonism. Nourishing these actions enhances the favourable situation for the total resolution of a 
conflict. 
Resource-use negotiation is a deliberate process of submission and consideration of offers to share 
resources until the parties involved accept an offer. It can not be assumed that all conflict can instantly 
' The literal meaning of Gutt/'-land is 'land trust'. SuffiMand in Nepal is a religious land ownership arrangement. Such lands are 
either allocated by the state or by individuals, for a religious or philanthropic purpose. There is a special act and legal provision 
to manage Gutti-Iand in Nepal. 
2 Conflict management is making progress. A part of improving the conflict situation, progress may be develop in mutual gains, 
learning, achieving agreements, laying foundations for further negotiation or fully resolving conflict. Progress is a way of 
thinking about a conflict situation that recognises that conflict are inevitable and ongoing and management of these conflict 
comes from continual improvement in areas of substance and relationships (Daniels and Walker, 1997:35). 
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be resolved. Conflict management in this book basically focuses on negotiations about the use of 
resources at a community level. I focused on conflict as a source of learning3 to create opportunities for 
social change in society. When there is conflict it gives people opportunities to think, understand the 
causes of the problems and look for solutions. Natural resource-conflict in this book is seen in the wider 
context of historical, political, cultural, economic, institutional, organisational and technological 
dimensions that provide the basis for the creation, escalation, stalemate or management of conflicts 
which shape the results. Therefore, the description and analysis of conflicts over NR, their 
interconnections with other socio-political issues and their implications to NRM and society are the 
central concerns of this book. An attempt has been made to look at the inter-linkages of NR related 
conflicts with other broader social conflicts in the process of agrarian change. I have mainly used two 
analytical perspectives to study conflict and to design an interactive conflict management (ICM) 
approach. The first is a legal anthropological perspective, giving special attention to legal pluralism, 
which focuses on the plurality of state, religious or local customary legal rules that provide substantive 
criteria for evaluating conflicts, as well as providing procedures to manage/settle them. The second is 
social learning, a promising perspective to improve the conflict situation through collective learning, 
concerted action and negotiation. 
The importance of CM in natural resources and its linkages with other social issues are directly 
connected with the conceptualisation of conflict by communities and their response to it. This in turn 
shapes the ideological basis for the conduct, practices and behaviour of people in daily life. The fast 
changing socio-political situation and the pace of modernisation in Nepal have given new direction to 
NRM and the management of associated conflict (Adhikari era/., 2000). 
Land, forest and water are the most important resources for the economic development of Nepal 
(Pandey, 1999). Conflict is common in the use and management of these natural resources. Therefore, 
management of conflict is crucial to improve the performance of NRM and to achieve sustainable use of 
natural resources. 
In the context of natural resources the perceived inconsistencies between people about acquired rights, 
incurred obligations, or contradictions of two or more jurisdictions lead to conflict. In the legal sense CM 
is the application of the laws and regulations to ensure rights and provide remedies that reconcile the 
inconsistencies and decide which systems are to govern particular cases (Oli, 1998). Operationally, 
conflict in this study covers observable differences in opinion, misunderstandings, clashes of interest, 
disagreements, complaints in public, protests by argument and physical assault, antipathy, filing cases 
with the local administration4, police and courts. When the latitude of tolerance crosses the bottom line 
then conflict occurs. Feelings of unfairness, suspicion, injustice, mistrust, etc. ultimately lead to conflict. 
This study also attempts to develop an alternative approach to CM on the basis of understanding the 
existing causes of NR-related conflicts and their resolution practices. The contribution of this alternative 
approach will be to promote collaboration, among actors involved in NRM, in managing conflict. 
1.2 Issues raised 
1.2.1 Scarcity of natural resources: sources of present and future conflict 
A report of the Johns Hopkins Population Information Programme (JHPIP) states that nearly half a 
billion people worldwide are currently facing water shortages (JHPIP, 1998). By 2025, one in every three 
people will live in countries short of water. At present, thirty-one countries are facing water stress or 
water scarcity and by 2025 the number will explode fivefold. The World Water Forum (2000) also 
3 Learning is a complex activity, which manifests itself in a change in people's behaviour. It is rooted in the human capacity to 
improve their understanding and skills on the basis of day-to-day experiences (Engel and Salomon. 1997), external knowledge 
and surrounding environment. 
4 In the context of Nepal, the District Administration Office is the responsible government organisation, which keeps law and 
order functioning in the district, in co-ordination with the District Police Office. Popularly it is known as the CDO (Chief District 
Officer) office. Generally, all types of case go to the CDO first and if they are not solved there then they go to court. 
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stresses that more than one billion people in the world have no access to water of sufficient quantity and 
quality to meet even a minimum level of health, income, safety and freedom from drudgery. The World's 
projected total of 8 billion people in 2025 will enormously increase pressure on NR. and may cause a 
catastrophe. The competition between industrial, urban, and agricultural use for NR is mounting arid the 
per capita consumption of natural resources is increasing (JHPIP, 1998). Regional conflicts over NR are 
brewing and could turn violent as shortages grow. In all continents and countries, people are already 
bickering over access to NR and competition for their use can be fiercer in the future5. Due to the 
competition for available NR by an over-growing population, the vital ecosystems on which humans and 
other species depend are severely threatened (JHPIP, 1998; World Water Forum, 2000). The earth has 
lost 15 percent of its topsoil over the last 20 years due to inappropriate agricultural practices. Water 
logging, salination and alkalisation affect another 1.5 million hectares of mostly irrigated agricultural 
land. Desertification and drought are severely limiting the production potential of the global agricultural 
system and posing several ecological challenges6 (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). All these processes are 
creating conflict between different interest groups. 
Political and economic motives drive conflict in NR. Either international water conflicts7 or the conflicts 
such as in the Amazonian, Borneo and Sumatran forests, the Wlassai forest conflict, the Yellowstone 
National Parks conflict or land disputes8, they all are derived from political, economic or environmental 
motives. Internationally and domestically, the political wrangling and strife over natural resource is 
predicted as one of the fundamental issues of the new millennium. 
Globalisation is increasingly posing new challenges and creating new conflicts in Nepal (Adhikari ef a/., 
2000). For example, the conflict between Article 27.3b of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), increasing bio-piracy, uncertainties and threats caused by genetically modified 
organisms and terminator technology in the agricultural sector, etc. are all creating conflict. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that this new millennium will face severe problems due to 
scarcity of NR. If there is scarcity of resources, there is competition, so NR will be a continuous source 
of future conflict. In this context few sentences of the speech delivered by Fidel Castro on the occasion 
of the 50 th anniversary of the World Health Organisation is worth mentioning. "...The weather is 
changing, the seas and the atmosphere are heating up, the air and the water are polluted, the soil is 
eroding, the deserts are growing, the forest is disappearing, water is getting scarce. Who will save our 
species? The blind and uncontrollable laws of the market? Neo-liberal globalisation?(Idris, 1998:5). 
The complications associated with NRM makes it an exciting issue in which to be engaged. 
5 For example, serious conflicts are developing concerning large dams such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in the 
Malibamatso and Little Orange Rivers in South Africa and the Arun Hydropower Project in the Arun River in Nepal funded by 
the World Bank. For such projects the World Bank is not only facing an onslaught of criticism over its support for big dams, but 
also for creating severe conflict in the host countries. As world water scarcity bites deeper into economies dependent on cheap 
water supplies, there is conflict over river catchments and lakes. Dams such as the Three Gorges Dam in China have become 
symbols of official tyranny, with whole cities being flooded and engineers being given free reign to resettle populations who are 
inconveniently living in river valleys (Ohlsson, 1995). 
6 See Beak ef a/., (1994) for details about future risks, problems and challenges to modem societies. Also see Lubchenco 
(1998) for challenges to science to achieve sustainable future environmental management. 
7 such as the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan about the Nile with respect to flooding and water flow/diversion, the 
dispute between Belgium and the Netherlands about the Maas and the Schelde with respect to salination and industrial 
pollution, the conflict between France, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland about the Rhine with respect to industrial 
pollution, the conflict between India and Bangladesh about the Brahmaputra and the Ganges with respect to siltation, flooding 
and water flow diversion, the conflict between Mexico and USA about the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers with respect to 
salination, water flow and agrochemical pollution (Ohlsson, 1995) are some examples to mention. 
8 Between Israel and Palestine, the Kashmir land disputes, grazing land dispute between the Tibetan autonomous region of 
China and Nepal or the Kalapani land dispute between Nepal and India, land conflict between ethnic people and the white 
minority in Zimbabwe are just few examples of land conflict. 
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1.2.2 Problems In Nepalese NRM 
Population pressure and poverty are the root causes of NR-related conflicts in Nepal. Land and forest 
resources are over-exploited because of heavy dependence of the ever-growing population (both 
human and animals) in the NR base. Water and mineral resources however are under-utilised owing to 
a lack of financial resources and infrastructure (NPC, 1998; Pandey, 1999). Increasing NR degradation 
and its negative impacts on the environment and society is creating several conflicts. Due to a 
governmental and donor focus on economic development objectives there has been little attempt to 
effectively integrate poor people's concerns and conservation objectives in these economic objectives 
(Biaikie ef a/., 1983). These problems are therefore directly linked with governance, accountability and 
transparency (Shrestha, 1999; Pandey, 1999) as well as a historical power-skewed socio-cultural 
legacy. 
Water is one of the most important NR of Nepal. Nepal is theoretically the second richest country in the 
world with regard to water and possesses about 2.27 percent of the water resources of the world. It is 
estimated that there are a total of 6000 rivers (CBS, 1995). Principal forms of water use in Nepal are for 
drinking water, irrigation, hydropower and other industrial use. Nepal is drained by three major river 
systems. The country has a theoretical hydropower potential of 83,000 MW. Both surface and 
groundwater is used for drinking purposes. The physiographic and economic condition of the country, 
political conflicts and vested interests limit the proper utilisation of water in Nepal (Upreti, 2000d). Even 
considering the vast amount of water available, drinking water is scarce in many parts of the country. 
Industrial use of water in urban centres has created competition and conflict in inter and intra sectoral 
water use. Irrigation in mountain and hill regions, which contain 83 percent of the Nepal's total area, is 
difficult because of steep slopes and the fragile geography, which causes recurring landslides and soil 
erosion. Out of 26,41,000 ha cultivated land only 39 percent (10,55,617 ha) is irrigated. Of that irrigated 
area only 37 percent of the land has all round irrigation facilities available (NPC, 1998: 485). The 
growing population requires more food and growing more food requires more water. Physiographic 
characteristics and climatic factors affect such consumptive use of water but it varies spatially and 
seasonally. This leads to an unequal distribution. Nepalese water resource management (WRM) is 
therefore characterised by an unjust and insufficient use of water, contradiction and conflicts. The social 
dimensions of WRM are still getting little attention both in policy making and in practice. Water scarcity, 
competition and conflict are common characteristics framed under social, economic, political and legal 
issues in Nepal (Upreti, 1998a). 
The growing population, factories and farms in Nepal all need more water and other natural resources. 
Therefore competition between domestic consumption, industries, and farms is increasing and turning 
into disputes. Water pollution is another strategic issue of conflict. We can see examples in Kathmandu 
Valley where the river systems are almost collapsing because the river-water is no longer useable. 
Conflict between the needs of populations living upstream of river basins and those dwelling 
downstream is mounting. Natural resources in Nepal are now becoming a highly sensitive political issue 
and source of conflict. The Melamchi Megha Drinking Water Project is a prime example of such a 
conflict. 
Irrigation, a principal sector of water use in Nepal, intended to minimise the water scarcity in the field of 
agriculture, is creating its own conflicts and competition (Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1997). In total, farmer-
managed small scale irrigation systems serve more than half of all irrigated land in Nepal (Pradhan and 
Pradhan 1996). However, they are facing various problems such as poor maintenance, conflict caused 
by state intervention, siltation and canal damage, etc. Achievement compared to the investment made in 
the irrigation sector in consecutive five year plans is not satisfactory (NPC, 1998). The Nepal 
Agricultural Sector Review (1989) and Irrigation Master Plan (1990) reports indicate that irrigation-
project performances in Nepal are not satisfactory and require urgent attention (Gautam et a/., 1992). 
The land tenure system in Nepal has its roots in irrigation (e. g., high tax imposed on irrigated land), 
regulated by a feudal elite and landlords (Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1997). The history of irrigation in 
Nepal shows that most of the past irrigation systems were built at the initiatives of religious leaders and 
landlords. Even today, the descendants of the former feudal landlords have considerable influence on 
Chapter 1 6 
irrigation management. Irrigation issues nowadays are also linked to hydropower and more attention is 
given to down-stream benefits from hydropower development (MoWR, 1993). 
Forests are another important natural resource for economic and social development. Forest resources 
are one of the major resources directly contributing to the survival of rural people in Nepal (Malla, 1997; 
Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). Forest resources directly fulfil forest-related subsistence needs of women, 
poor and backward people as well as commercial needs of well-off people. They are providing inputs for 
agriculture, livestock, and supply medicinal herbs, timber and non-timber forest products. Forests also 
support irrigation, conserve watersheds, improve the condition of the soil, provide recreation for tourists 
through forest-based eco-tourism and national parks and wildlife reserves, provide a habitat for flora and 
fauna and provide raw materials for the forest-based industries (Upreti, 1999a). Much of the agricultural 
production systems of the country are directly and/or indirectly based on forest resources (NPC, 1998). 
However, the Nepalese forests are severely threatened by political and commercial interests. In 1964 
forests covered more than 45 percent of the total area of the country, this being reduced to 29 percent 
by 1998 (NPC: 1998:290). It is reported that the forest area of Terai is being destroyed at the rate of 1.3 
percent per year (ibid.). Smuggling of forest products is posing another serious challenge. The 
productivity of the forest sector is decreasing due to uncontrolled migration and encroachment, 
smuggling, illegal hunting, grazing, forest fire, and lack of scientific forest management, poor political 
commitments and bureaucratic performance. Deforestation is resulting in an increasingly loss of habitats 
for birds, wild animals and reptiles9. 
The decline of the forest resources at present has an adverse effect on water resources, productivity of 
agriculture and livestock. The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) 1989 planned to meet 
people's basic needs for fuel-wood, timber, fodder and other forest products on a sustained basis, and 
to promote people's participation in forestry resources' development, management and utilisation 
(HMG/N, 1989). However, the progress in this direction is very disappointing, with the exception of 
community forestry in the hill region. Nevertheless, recently, conflict is mounting between the 
government (bureaucrats in the forestry sector) and the Federation of Community Forestry Users-Nepal 
(FECOFUN) to take control of community forestry. Encroachment of forest and pasture areas by illegal 
settlers is another severe problem in the forestry sector. 
The land use systems in Nepal are rapidly changing, together with a changing social transformation 
process, due to the information revolution, technological advancement, and market intervention and 
globalisation processes. As a consequence, changes in land-use are promoting out-migration, over 
exploitation of natural resources and escalating several conflicts. The lack of a conducive land-use 
policy and planning10, weak institutional arrangements and a rapid population growth are exerting 
enormous pressures on land resources. 
Land is not only a crucial resource for Nepalese people who have their livelihood based in agriculture 
but also a basis of wealth and power. Major land use categories in Nepal include forestry, agriculture, 
grasslands and pastures and settlements. Land varies considerably in terms of its potential for different 
uses due to a wide variation in topography, soil composition, and climate. Due to the increasing human 
population and increasing numbers of unproductive livestock extreme pressure is being exerted on land 
resource (NPC, 1998). 
Internal migration is rapidly increasing the population in urban centres and putting additional pressure 
on fertile land in the urban areas (NPC, 1992). More than 90 percent of urban centres are located in the 
fertile agricultural areas. Huge quantities of land are used annually in building construction by 
government, semi-government, non-government and the private sectors (NPC, 1998). The increasing 
9 IUCN reported that 24 species of mammals, 9 species of reptiles, 27 species of birds, 2 species of insects and 13 species of 
plants have become endangered in Nepal (NPC: 1998:219). 
1 0 Well-planned land use is one of the most important aspects for economic and social development. If land is managed and 
used properly, according to its quality, type, capacity, physiographic characteristics, not only the agricultural productivity can be 
increased but also other social and economic benefits can be derived (Upreti, 2000e). 
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pace of rural to urban migration is deteriorating the productivity of the land in both rural and urban areas 
(HMG/N, 1992). The government is not able to develop mutual links between rural and urban areas and 
unable to provide equal opportunities in the rural areas. The regional imbalance, lack of infrastructure 
and employment opportunities and the unavailability of basic service facilities are the triggering factors 
for migration from rural to urban areas (MoF, 1998). Land encroachment and unplanned settlements are 
the result of such migration whereby an imbalanced situation develops between men and land 
resources. 
Soil erosion, fertility decline, sedimentation and floods have degraded and continue to degrade the land. 
Causative factors of soil loss are steep slope cultivation, use of marginal land, overgrazing, forest fires, 
and population pressure. Land is not only the main property of Nepalese people but also the paramount 
contributing factor to the creation of conflict. 
Land distribution is very skewed. Gross disparities in land ownership are one of the major causes of 
poverty, injustice and social discrimination (Shrestha, 1997). Due to such disparity, a large number of 
people have no access to productive land resources. More than 70 percent of farmers have less than 
one hectare (ha) of land (NPC, 1998). Substantial regional variations in the distribution of agricultural 
lands exist in Nepal. The Terai region occupies 17 percent of the total land area comprising 49 percent 
of the total agricultural land whereas Hill covers 63 percent of total land and accounts for 40 percent of 
agricultural land. Mountain occupies 20 percent of total land with 11 percent of agricultural land. The 
Human Development Report-Nepal 1998 shows that the bottom 40 percent of agricultural households 
use only 9 percent of the total agricultural land owning less than 0.5 ha while the top 6 percent occupies 
more than 33 percent of the total. These inequalities are manifested in the higher incidence of poverty. 
Owner-tiller is the dominant type of land entitlement in Nepal as 85 percent is owner operated and the 
remaining 15 percent is rented. The same report also highlights that the Nepalese land resource is 
besieged by multifarious problems such as duel ownership in land tenure, fragmentation, unequal 
distribution, institutional obstacles and unfocused government policies. Duel ownership is severely 
limiting productivity as neither owner nor tenants invest in the land11. The incidence of "landlessness" is 
increasing rapidly. Small holders are marginalised and transformed into landless people (Shrestha, 
1997). This means that a few landlords control a huge fraction of the country's land. Tenant farmers 
have no motivation to maximise the production potential of tenanted land due to dual ownership and 
insecurity. 
Fertile lands are increasingly used for non-agricultural purposes (i.e., urban settlement, industry and 
infrastructure). Land fragmentation is being increased due to cultural and legal provision to divide 
parental land between sons12. This has severe negative consequences for productivity. Legal measures 
to protect land fragmentation and promote land consolidation are ineffective (Ghimire, 1992; New Era, 
1988). Land in the Terai is facing extreme pressure due to migration of people from the hills and 
mountains. Because of a lack of effective land-use planning, the agricultural sector is not able to reach 
its potential by using specialisation and diversification. Erosion, landslides and floods in the Hill areas 
have seriously affected the river banks, lower slopes of the Hills and the fertile land of the Terai region 
and have had a negative impact on agriculture, irrigation, hydro-electricity, forest and bio-diversity, the 
environment, road systems, transport and tourism. Development of land according to the land-use plan, 
based on geographical features, diversity, structures, capacity and quality and its effective utilisation is 
still a widely ignored issue in Nepal. People are still not sensitive to the importance of land-use planning 
(agriculture, pasture, residence, urbanisation, and industrialisation) nor is the government sufficiently 
responsive to these issues. 
Although the 1964 Land Act was amended in 1997 to eliminate widely prevailing dual ownership (owner-
tenant arrangement), the act is not being effectively enforced. The same act has made provision for a 
" Rural Credit Survey of Nepal Rastra Bank (1994) has indicated that investment in land improvement in Nepal is less than 3 
percent of the household income. 
1 2 Seddon, 1984; Ghimire, 1992; Caplan, 1970; Regmi, 1976 discussed this issue in detail. 
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ceiling on land holding13. However, this is only limited, either in document or implementation, to those 
who have no power to manipulate it. Land administration is not able to serve its purpose due to 
corruption14 and miss handling. The astonishing example is the misuse and abuse of land under land 
trust (Guthi land). The Absence of a national land-use policy and programme, and a narrow sectoral 
approach, have led to land use problems and conflicts. 
Land management practices in Nepal are still insensitive to the negative effects on the wider 
environment, and become a source of conflict. For example, cultivation on the steep-slope land in the 
foothills of the Himalayas in Nepal is contributing to floods in the delta areas of Bangladesh (Tear Fund, 
1999). Highly fertile lands of Terai regions and urban centres are rapidly being covered by buildings as 
city centres expand (Upreti, 2000e). Land-use planning based on land efficiency classification is very 
weak (NPC, 1998). Proper information and mapping of the land is lacking. On one hand the available 
land resource in the country is inadequate to supply the facilities and social services for the ever-
increasing population, on the other hand available land resources are not utilised in an effective and 
productive manner and are becoming a continuous source of conflict. 
The land under Guthi (land trust) is still extremely controversial and conflict between tenants and Guthi 
Sansthan (Guthi Corporation Office) is long standing. The elimination of dual-land ownership is merely a 
slogan of the government and political parties. The number of landless farmers and Kamaiya15 are 
increasing (Ghimire, 1992), as is the encroachment of public land and forest. Due to all these land-
related problems, agriculture in Nepal is still far from being commercially successful. Keshav Badal, a 
noted politician and activist involved in the land-related movement in Nepal concludes that the 
fundamental cause of land problems is the feudalistic social system nurtured by the cultural and political 
system (Badal, 1999). 
The land reform campaign, although initiated in 1951, has so far been merely a political slogan rather 
than significantly contributing to its reform. The Sukumbasi Samasya Samadhan Ayog (Land-less 
Problem Resolution Commission- LPRC) is a political platform of ruling parties to reward their workers 
rather than solve the problems of landless people. All major political parties (NC, CPNUML, CPNML, 
RPP) have been incorporating the reform of land, agriculture, water and forest in addition to other many 
issues into their 1999 election manifestos, but none of them are fulfilling their commitments. 
Despite the fact that much more effort, time and money are being invested by the government, donors 
and local communities in NRM and despite the fact that several NR related offices have been 
established in all districts16, conflicts and disputes are still increasing (Upreti, 2000d). Several research 
findings show that conflicts are increasing due to the intervention of external development organisations 
without a proper understanding of local systems, lack of users participation in NRM and defective 
policies (IIMI, 1987; 1990; Ansari and Pradhan, 1991). For example, the policy of His Majesty's 
Government of Nepal (HMG/N) in its eighth (1991-1997) and ninth (1997-2002) five year plans gave a 
high priority to an integrated NRM approach. However, translation of these policies into practice has 
been weak due to political differences and conflict of interests among the actors. 
1 3 Land Reform Act defines the ceiling of land holding per family as: 25 bighas in Terai, 50 ropanies in valleys and 80 ropanies 
in hills for an agricultural purpose and 8 bighas in Terai, 8 ropani in Kathmandu and 16 ropani in hills for use as housing. (One 
hectare = 1.41 bigha or 20 ropani) 
1 4 Corruption is defiend as behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of behaviour regarding 
influence. 
1 5 Kamaiya is an inhumane bonded labour system existing in western Nepal (Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, Kanchanpur) where more 
than 15000 people were working as quasi slaves with landlords since August 2000. The government has now freed them. See 
K.C. 2001 for details. 
1 6 The District Im'gation Office (DIO), District Water Supply Office (DWSO), District Forest Office (DFO), District Land Reform 
Office (DLRO), District Soil and Water Conservation Office (DSCO), Land Survey and measurement Office, Electricity Office, 
District Land Revenue Office are instituted in each district. In addition to them, District Development Committee (DDC) and 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) are also actively involved in NRM. 
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The current debate among politicians, policy makers, bureaucrats, diplomats, water energy experts, 
engineers, social scientists, academicians, foresters, land-use planners, private entrepreneurs and 
farmers on the priority of macro v/s micro projects, multiple use of water, geographical preferences, 
community-led forest management, land use change, etc. is contributing to a re-think of the dominant 
NRM approach in Nepal. The dominant NRM approach means the approach adopted by the 
government in its policies and practices. Within the government policy framework the majority of donors 
and technical experts are promoting such NRM approach. Many donors in NRM (bilateral, multilateral 
and international non-governmental organisations (INGO), charity organisations etc.) have been 
supporting HMG/N departments, development banks, NGOs and the private sector in Nepal for more 
than four decades. Despite the efforts of the government on NRM in its eight successive five-year plans 
and donors' financial and technical support conflicts are mounting and interventions are not able to 
achieve the desired objectives. 
It is important to note that all NR-related conflicts are created in differentiated and specialised local 
environments across the country. The specific NR-related conflicts of the Terai are different from those 
of steep hills and mountains17. However, more common problems of both areas are resource 
degradation, conflict about access, rights and obligations, fair distribution, maintenance and benefit 
sharing (Ostrom and Benjamin, 1993). Various endogenous and exogenous factors such as population 
growth, globalisation of market, environmental and technological changes are imposing new conflict on 
the NR sector. Many large and small NRM projects implemented by different agencies are introducing 
new conflicts as well as having various negative impacts on society. For example, ignorance of the 
importance of indigenous knowledge in planning and designing new systems, extortion, alteration of 
local rights and regulations, replacement of old institutions by new ones, imposition of technocratic 
solutions, are some of the immediate implications of new interventions (Basnyat, 1995; Benjamin et a/., 
1994). These interventions have their own firmly fixed and uniform policy and a rigid procedure based 
on reductionist-positivist orientation. They are technocratic in nature and generally do not acknowledge 
local diversities. This is becoming one of the major causes of conflict in NRM. 
There are several factors causing conflict in NR. Conflict can arise if the new NRM policy of the 
government contradicts with local cultural practice. The economic motive of people to acquire more from 
the existing natural resources on a competitive basis also leads to conflict. Conflict is also growing due 
to the contradiction between environmental and economic interests. Changes in historical use patterns 
in natural resources can bring conflict into a community. Similarly, contradictions of legal arrangements 
and customary practices have promoted several conflicts. NR-conflicts produce both positive and 
negative consequences and alter existing social relations. They induce change in resource 
management and utilisation, policy process, livelihood strategies, land and agriculture, gender relations, 
power structure, and individual and collective behaviour. In most cases the combined effect of some or 
many of such factors can escalate or resolve a conflict. Moreover, the intensity and effect of these 
factors differs between communities and within a community depending on when the effects are felt. 
1.2.3 Social dimensions of natural resource management 
In this section I briefly discuss the social dimension of NRM and related conflicts. Social dimension 
refers to the more human related aspects of negotiations, such as knowledge, technology institutions, 
forums (platforms) (Roling, 2000). In the study of conflict it is important to understand the role of the 
human dimension in natural resources (Roling, 1997). In the contemporary development discourse NR 
is usually perceived as hard18 objectively fixed bio-physical facts (e.g., soil, crops, livestock, disease and 
1 7 Hill and mountain natural resources are facing different conflicts created by problems such as landslides, shifting 
rivers/streams, high soil losses, deforestation, etc. wheras NRM projects in Terai are facing problems of siltation and river 
shifting, land and forest encroachment, illegal harvesting of natural resources, deforestation, etc. 
1 8 Roling, (1997) illustrates the notion of soft and hard science in NRM in his commonly used term "Soft Side of Land 
Perspective'. It is important to look beyond the common categorisation of social science as soft science and technical science 
(biophysical) as hard science. It implies that positivist and consctructivist thinking exists within both sciences. For example, 
even within social sciences there are both positivist thinking such as the resolution of conflict by enforcing acts and regulations 
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pests, water, yields, erosion, caring capacity, bio-diversity, physical properties, etc.) and such factors as 
human goals, organisation and technological aspects (Roling and Maarleveld, 1999) are usually 
ignored. But conflict concerning natural resources is the outcome of societal arrangement, human 
intention and behaviour (Roling, 1997) framed within those biophysical properties. Therefore, both these 
dimensions of NR are essential for a better understanding of conflicts in NRfvl and their management. 
Resource management decisions and activities of resource users, performance of bureaucracy, 
functioning of user groups and associations, access to and control over resources, customary practices 
and state laws/regulations, livelihood requirements and the welfare of people are therefore important 
issues to be addressed in any study of conflict. 
In Nepal, most national planners and policy makers still treat technology as a black box1 and give little 
attention to human intentions and behaviour in managing natural resources. Responsive institutions, 
collective learning, negotiation and concerted action in my opinion are vital components to be studied in 
NRM. Several researchers and academicians (for example, Roling, 1997; Benda-Beckmann, 1999; 
Mollinga, 1998; Vincent, 1996; Uphoff, 1986, Chambers, 1988) have the view that NRM is not only a 
technical domain, but it is more importantly a social discourse, shaped and influenced by social 
processes and intentional human activities. A plural legal situation can create several conflicts because 
of its uncertain and manipulative nature. Most of the legal reforms related to natural resources have yet 
to be translated into real practices. If and when they are practised they are manipulated by power 
brokers and the weaker section of society still feels uncertain and insecure. Therefore, these processes 
and related human activities have to be examined carefully in any study on conflict. 
During my twenty years of practical experience in rural development and NRM sectors, I have 
increasingly realised that a government's policies and donor's strategies are more focused on 
management and control of natural resources through prescriptive technical solutions rather than a 
meaningful participation of people. This leads to conflict and disturbances in self-regulated ecological 
systems services. We are now entering the twenty-first century, where conflict between economic 
objectives and sustainable ecological services of NR is accelerating. Obviously the increasing problems 
such as the lack of pure drinking water, loss of bio-diversity, climate change, environment pollution and 
other ecological-challenges are the combined result of population growth and economic motives. These 
problems are not only disrupting self-sustaining NR systems but also creating severe conflicts in society. 
Therefore, an economically guided focus for these problems is in itself a source of further conflict. 
1.2.4 Research problem 
Natural resource management has been the subject of recurring discussions throughout the Nepal's 
post-Rana regime's history. Both before and after the restoration of democracy in 1990 issues have 
been raised and answers sought with regards to sustainable NRM. This apparent interest in NR, 
however, does not focus on conflict, one of the major issues in NRM. Several efforts have been made to 
utilise available NR to increase the economic growth of the country. As a part of this national policy, 
attempts have also been made to reform the land use pattern, the agricultural system, and forest 
management and to develop new irrigation systems while improving existing ones by increasing their 
productivity. During this process several conflicts have erupted at different levels and intensities in 
several parts of the country. Nevertheless, such conflicts are still not receiving proper attention at the 
level of researchers, policy makers and implementers. Physical and technical issues, lacking social 
dimensions, dominate research agendas of Nepalese NRM. This has tremendous implications for the 
sustainability of natural resources. Surprisingly, very few studies focus on the roles and impacts of 
conflicts in Nepalese NRM (Sukla ef a/., 1997; Pradhan et a/., 1997; Upreti, 1998a, Khanal, 1998, 
Shrestha, 1996a, 1996b; Khanal, 1996). Even these studies are not in-depth or comprehensive enough 
to understand the dynamics of conflict: causes and consequences, mechanisms and strategies of 
resolution and/or management, use of power and position, implications of conflict to NRM, environment 
and use of the courts and police and constructivist thinking such as the resolution of conflict through learning, negotiation and 
collaboration. 
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and society, etc. What is available from both professional and academic research is an 
acknowledgement of the existence of NR-conflict and a general prescription for its resolution, rather 
than a focus on how conflicts actually occur, how they are managed and what ought to be the future 
strategy for handling conflict. There are some studies on land conflicts mainly carried out by (legal) 
anthropologists but they do not suggest much on how these conflicts could be managed. Many research 
studies have indicated that conflict is prevalent in NR. However, there is little information (after an i 
extensive literature review) on how and why conflicts escalate, in what context conflict occurs, what ' 
factors are generic causes to create or resolve any NR related conflict, and how these conflicts can be 
managed or resolved. There are not many studies on conflict related to development interventions and 
their policy implications. Looking to the current status of the NR-conflict study (specifically from the 
Nepalese perspective) it became clear that there has been no systematic and in-depth study on 
community level NR-related conflicts, their impact on NRM and their contribution to agrarian social 
change in general and clear suggestion of methodologies for the improvement. This was the reason I 
began to explore these issues and dynamics of NR-conflict and their management practices in Nepal. 
Obviously, any single piece of research can not solve societal problems but it can hopefully improve the 
situation. 
1.2.5 Objectives and research questions 
The purposes of this study were threefold. Firstly, to understand and analyse the dynamics of conflict 
and its management practices. Secondly, based on the outcome of the first objective, to develop an 
alternative approach for community-level CM, if appropriate. Thirdly, to initiate a debate on conflict as a 
source of learning and collective action in NRM and contribute to agrarian change. My intention is not to 
misrepresent existing CM approaches. Rather, based on the study of existing practices, to develop an 
alternative approach to deal with conflict that will contribute to sustainable NRM. In doing so, I will focus 
on both regulatory and legislative resolution measures as well as local indigenous resolution practices 
applied in NR-related conflicts. I will not only consider the causes of conflict and their resolution but will 
also take into account the implications of conflict resolution for NR and society as a whole. 
This research is the result of my academic and professional background. Basically it focuses at a local 
level on land, irrigation, spring source for drinking water and forest-pasture related conflicts. It attempts 
to explore the causes and inter-linkages of conflict with local power and politics, external intervention 
and customary practices. It also attempts to look at the transformation of these conflicts into other social 
conflicts. To conduct the study three broad sets of research questions have been formulated together 
with a series of sub questions under each general heading. The first set of questions focuses on 
understanding of the genesis, causes, transfer, and management of conflict. The second set particularly 
focuses on understanding the implications of conflict in NRM and society. The third set of questions 
attempts to develop an alternate CM approach, for future improvement of the NR sector, based on the 
findings of the first two. However, the three sets of questions are not mutually exclusive, but are closely 
associated with and complementary to each other. 
1. What are the common conflicts in natural resources and their management practices in a community 
and why do they occur? 
1.1 What are the major issues of conflict? 
1.2. How are these conflicts managed, resolved or transformed? 
1.3 Who are the major actors19 involved in these conflicts? 
1.4 What processes, mechanisms, and forums are used to resolve these conflicts? Why are they 
used? 
1.5 What are the roles of state, state-instituted agencies (courts, police and district administration 
office, VDC, DDC, DFO, DLRO, DIO, etc. who are responsible for conflict resolution) and 
1 8 Long and Ploeg (1989) define actors as individuals or collective groups who are intentional (engage to realise objective), 
sense makers (construct their life world) and having agency (capacity to make difference in a context). 
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local institutions (users committees, purohits20, Dhaml-Jhakri, Mukhiya21, Jamindar, etc.) in 
resolving these conflicts? 
1.6 What are the qualities of existing CM practices in the community? 
1.7 How do power relations affect conflict and CM in a plural legal situation? 
1.8 What types of resources do people use to acquire property rights and how do such property 
rights and ownership issues affect conflict? 
1.9 How are NR related conflicts linked with and/or transformed into other social and political 
conflicts? 
1.10 How conflict can be used as source of learning to effectively resolve growing conflicts in 
NRM? 
2. What are the implications of these conflicts? 
2.1 What are the implications on NRM? 
2.2 What are the implications on society as a whole? 
3. How can NR-related conflicts be effectively managed at a local level? 
1.1 What is an alternate approach for effective CM? 
1.2 What are the opportunities for an alternate CM approach? 
1.3 What are the potentials and limitations to promote such an alternate approach? 
1.3 Structure of the book 
This book is divided into three parts containing nine chapters. The first part covers three chapters, the 
first one of which discusses the problem context, theoretical issues and gives the reader a glimpse of 
Nepal. The Second Chapter develops the theoretical framework for the study. This chapter provides the 
conceptual basis for analysis and helps to select methodological tools for the study. It gives conceptual 
clarity to the idea of treating conflict in NR as an inevitable part of the social process. In this chapter an 
attempt has been made to elaborate anthropological and social learning perspectives. Concepts such 
as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, adjudication, litigation, legal pluralism, property rights, forum 
shopping, constructfvist perspectives, soft system thinking, cognitive systems, communicative 
rationality, platforms for negotiation and adaptive management are discussed. The last section of this 
chapter briefly discusses the methodology used in the research period, describing the research strategy, 
selection of the research area, methods used and finally presents some conclusions. 
The Third Chapter basically introduces Nepal, presenting a brief socio-economic, cultural, political, and 
historical overview. This is followed by a discussion on the political economy of natural resources. A 
brief review of Nepalese NRM policies, laws and regulations is presented. Finally I have discussed 
general characteristics of the study area and villages. 
The second part is related to the empirical investigation and covers four chapters. Chapter Four 
documents general NR-related conflicts and their characteristics observed in the study area. It then 
presents conflicts specifically related to land, forests and water resources before describing general 
conflicts (other than natural resources) in the study area. Then it discusses the most common formal 
and informal conflict management practices used to resolve NR-conflicts. Finally a comparison of the 
characteristics and similarities of the studied conflicts has been made with other reference groups 
involved in NRM in different parts of the country. 
Chapter Five presents three cases involving land, water and forest conflicts. The first case involves an 
old farmer's managed irrigation system, which has led to severe conflicts between old and new users. 
The second case highlights the conflict between a powerful elite group and general villagers to control a 
part of forest-pasture land. The third case deals with the conflict between two groups of people to 
access and control a spring source for drinking water. The major factors affecting forest and water 
2 0 Culturally and socially recognised religious leader (only male) to perform religious activities. He generally has a very strong 
influence on his jajamans (clients) 
2 1 An unofficial local land tax collector authorised by the government. Generally, powerful people of the village who have 
access and a relationship with governmental offices, hold this position and rule the village with their formal authority. Although 
they now have no such formal power, they still have a strong influence. 
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conflicts are discussed. Power relationships, ownership issues, the role of external organisations and 
local institutions, the effects of temporal and spatial forces, the role of gender and social relationships 
are analysed. Finally some lessons are drawn from the conflict. 
Chapter Six presents a case of the Asian Development Bank funded irrigation project where severe 
conflicts erupted in the process of its planning and construction. This chapter shows that formal 
intervention, if implemented improperly, not only fails to develop the canal irrigation system but also 
implants severe conflicts in the community. Participation, decision making, transparency issues, 
functioning and performance of a water users committee, the role of technology, issues of corruption 
and the roles of communication and information were analysed as contributors to conflict 
The Seventh Chapter describes the conflict about religious agricultural land where landowners and 
tenants struggled to control ownership rights. The role of socio-political change, practical applications of 
rules and laws in reality, time and effects of context, people's initiatives, the importance of social 
relationships are analysed in relation to the escalation, transformation and the resolution of any conflict. 
The third part, covering two chapters, mainly focuses on analysis of the conflict and finishes by 
presenting an alternate method to manage NR-conflicts. In Chapter Eight overall analyses of all five 
cases are made based on broader theoretical references. Dynamics of NR-conflicts are discussed and 
common conflict management options and procedures used in the study area are presented. Different 
factors such as property rights and ownership issues, the role of formal and informal laws, caste, 
ethnicity and social relationships, power and politics, corruption, communication, information and 
networks, emergence of local organisations, leadership and gender issues are scrutinised. Finally 
implications of conflict are presented. This chapter is a synthesis of the whole book. 
Chapter Nine presents an alternative method called interactive conflict management (ICfvl). Based on 
the findings of preceding chapters, this chapter attempts to overcome the weaknesses of existing CM 
practices by proposing a learning-based, people-centred and action-oriented method of conflict 
management. This chapter analyses opportunities and challenges of ICM, its institutionalisation aspect 
and provides a general procedure to accomplish conflict resolution. Then it presents the limitations of 
ICM. Finally, a general discussion considers the research area, which is still in need of further 
investigation. 

Chapter 2 
A Framework for the Study of Natural-Resource Conflicts 
2.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I described the societal problems, the interrelationships between conflict and 
resource scarcity and the problem issue I chose to research. This chapter provides my perspectives 
and the conceptual basis used to analyse NR-related conflicts. Perspective shapes our understanding 
and guide the researcher in where and how to look for answers to their questions. In this chapter an 
integrative framework is developed to bring together two aims (understanding and improvement) in 
relation to conflict. In doing so various concepts are considered that are related to conflicts, legal 
anthropology and social learning. More precisely, anthropological theoretical concepts such as conflict, 
legal pluralism, notion of commons, property rights, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, 
litigation, forum shopping are discussed. Similarly, conceptual elements of social learning such as 
constructivism, soft-systems thinking, cognition, communicative rationality, platforms for negotiation and 
adaptive management are also discussed. Finally, the research methodology used in this thesis is 
outlined. The concepts used in this chapter may cause a lot of debate about their epistemology, 
ontology, and methodology. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to engage in this theoretical 
debate. I have used these concepts because of their practical significance in understanding problems 
and enabling possible solutions on NR-related conflicts to be put forward. 
2.2 Analytical framework to study conflict about natural resources 
An analytical framework helps in thinking about phenomena, to order data and to reveal patterns 
(Rapoport, 1985). Therefore, an analytical framework is a heuristic device designed to identify and 
analyse the relevant characteristics of a NR-related conflict. The analytical framework for this study is 
derived from my work experiences, theoretical background and field research. Two contemporary 
complementary perspectives have been used to analyse NR-related conflicts. A legal-anthropological 
perspective gives conceptual tools to explore the diversity of laws (plurality of state, religious and local 
customary rules) and provides substantive criteria to evaluate conflicts and their interrelationships as 
well as procedures to manage them. A social learning perspective provides conceptual roadmaps to 
look for improvement of the existing conflict. 
While analysing conflict I am looking at a wide range of issues, from misunderstanding, disagreement, 
hostility, verbal exchange, public complaint, filing cases, physical assault, personal and social 
dislocations, injurious social relations, to violence and civil unrest at different levels (between 
individuals, between individuals and group and between groups). To understand conflict in natural 
resources per se it is essential to answer the questions: what is conflict? Why and how do conflicts arise 
and what are the issues involved? What are the common conflict management (CM) practices? Who are 
the actors? What strategies, approaches, and forums are used to resolve and/or manage conflict? What 
factors govern conflict? What are the implications of conflict to natural resources and society as a 
whole? In any conflict, the issues involved, its cause, the role of temporal and spatial factors, strategies 
and the process of CM are some of the important components to be examined to explore the possibility 
for improvement. The analytical framework helps to examine these issues and is discussed under the 
following headings: 
• Understanding conflict, 
• Study of behaviour of the actors in conflicts related to natural resources, 
• Role of context, contents and time in conflict, 
• CM means, forums and practices, 
• Consequences of conflict to natural resources and society, 
• Scope for improvement in CM through social learning. 
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2.2.1 Understanding conflict 
Conflict22 is an active stage of disagreement between people with opposing opinions, principles and 
practices manifested in different forms (grievance, conflict and dispute) (Walker and Daniels, 1997). 
Grievance is an initial stage of conflict in which individuals or a group are perceived to be unjust, and 
provides grounds for resentment or complaints. This condition potentially erupts into conflict. When this 
stage turns into conflict antagonism is caused by a clash of cultural, political, social or economic 
interests between individuals and groups. At the final stage of conflict, people make the matter public 
and opting for confrontation (Buckles, 1999; Bush, 1995; Caplan, 1995; Walker and Daniels, 1997; 
Warner, 2000). Felstiner et al. (1981) coined the phrase 'injurious experiences' to describe the process 
of transformation patterns of conflict. According to the stages of transformation of conflict are: a) Naming 
(when unpercefved injurious feelings are transformed into perceived injurious experiences), b) Blaming 
(when it transforms into a grievance), c) Claiming (when people charge the responsibility to the opposite 
party and demand a remedy from them), d) Dispute (when the demanded remedy is wholly or partly 
rejected). Conflict occurs in any society and it may or may not be managed or resolved. It transforms 
over time and leads to different outcomes with a multitude of short term and long term effects (these 
may be positive but may also be negative to society) (Yordan, 2000; Rafia, 1991; Scimecca, 1993). 
Conflict has two stages i.e., latent conflict (a relatively permanent condition between conflicting parties 
with divergent and competing interests) or active (actual interplay of the disputants over a specific 
problem). Conflict can be categorised into four groups based on its solvability. They are: i) a terminal 
conflict that seems unsolvable by agreement and results in a win-lose situation; ii) a paradoxical conflict, 
which looks obscure and of questionable solvability having a lose-lose outcome, iii) a litigious conflict, 
which seems solvable and produces a win-win or a consensus result (Martinelli and Almeida, 1998) and 
iv) Illusory conflict where disputants want the same thing but fail to realise it. 
Two main schools of thoughts exist concerning conflict (Rubin ef al., 1994; Rubestein, 1993, Sanddelin, 
1997). One school of thought views conflict as 'pathological and dysfunctional'. In this perspective, 
conflict generally carries negative connotations and is interpreted as something irrational that needs to 
be suppressed because it is opposite to co-operation and peace (Warners and Jones, 1998). This view 
is mechanistic in its interpretation of conflict (Martinelli and Almeida, 1998). Another school of thought 
considers that conflict can also be a functional means for social change and acknowledges its 
prevalence. In this book I am deliberately distancing my arguments from the interpretation of conflict as 
'always' pathological and dysfunctional. My point of departure is to acknowledge conflict as an inevitable 
part of NRM in society. I accept the view that conflict could also be a constructive social process to 
establish group boundaries, strengthen group consensus, develop a sense of self-identity, and 
contribute towards social integration, community building and progressive economic and social change 
(Doughorty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Warners and Jones, 1998; Buckles, 1999). According to this 
perspective conflict is a continuous social process and has great influence in shaping and reshaping 
social relations and the power structure of society (Martinelli and Almeida, 1998). Unlike the mechanistic 
view, Warner and Jones (1998) argue that conflicts encompass adaptation by a society to a new 
political, economic and physical environment. New technologies, policies and procedures, laws and 
regulations, privatisation of public services, commercialisation of natural resources and local power 
relationships determine the causes and intensity of a conflict. Because of such changes it is not 
appropriate and even not possible to avoid or to suppress conflicts in practical life. These negative and 
positive aspects of conflict are described and analysed in chapters four to eight. Whether conflicts serve 
a useful social function for sustainable management of natural resources ahd non-coercive social 
transformation, is therefore a central concern. 
Conflict in society is also influenced by the social context (organisation and structure of society), 
patterns of interaction (escalation or de-escalation), mode (e.g., violence, disagreement), time (specific 
period of time), belief of conflicting parties and the degree of incompatibility of their goals and power 
2 2 The meanings of conflict in Nepali language are Jhagada, Kichola, Dusmani, Bibad, Satruta, and Bairbhab. However, the 
most common is jhagada. 
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structures. Conflict has many dimensions. It occurs at different levels (e.g., from interpersonal, family 
and community to international). It also varies in nature (e.g., from use of resources to personal identity). 
It follows different patterns under different conditions (e.g., from disagreement to physical confrontation) 
(Jandt etal., 1996). Implications of conflict can be different to different people, and different researchers 
with different theoretical backgrounds and perspectives (Sidaway, 1996). Anger, emotion and mistrust, 
can play a great role in escalation of conflict in society (Grey, 1989). Perception of reality by different 
people rather than the reality itself greatly influences conflict, because people behave according to their 
perception and interpretation. 
There can be several methods to study NR-related conflicts. The interpretative method (Bell etal., 1989) 
is used in this study due to its practical merits. The interpretative method helps to examine conflict by 
analysing structures, processes, functions and their relationships as well as the pattern of interaction 
among people. It focuses on questions such as; what are conflicts, why do conflicts arise and how are 
they resolved or managed? Opting for the interpretative method of analysing conflict has also 
implications for the methodology, as it relies on an ethnographic23 study. An ethnographic study focuses 
on understanding how conflicts arise (actual occurrence) and how they are subsequently handled, 
considering power relationships and the social context (Caplan, 1995). This means that both the 
personal, psychological and collective social dimensions of the parties in the conflict24 have to be 
analysed. The behavioural analysis of individuals considers anger, emotions and the response of 
individual actors in conflict and draws inferences based on them. In the analysis of the social behaviour 
of the disputants towards NR-related conflict the conflict needs to be examined at the level of groups, 
social classes, political movements, religious and ethnic entities, coalitions and cultural systems. This 
analysis basically focuses on the collective behaviour of the disputants. In a NR-related conflict both 
individual and collective behaviour is important. The following three methods of analysis are useful in 
studying conflict (Bell etal., 1989): 
1. Interpretative analysis is empirical in nature and describes how people behave: how they perceive 
uncertainties, accumulate evidence, and update perceptions; how they learn and adapt their 
behaviour; why they think the way they do. Interpretative analysis is mainly used by social scientists 
to analyse conflict without influencing the behaviour of people. 
2. Abstractive analysis deals with how an idealised, rational persons act. This analysis is more 
common in behavioural analysis of individuals involved in conflict. 
3. Prescriptive analysis is more advisory in nature and focuses on what people should do to make 
better choices, what thoughts, decision aids, conceptual schemes and methodology are useful, not 
for idealised, mythical people, but for normal people (Bell et a/., 1989; Kremenyuk, 1991). It is 
evaluated by its pragmatic value (i.e. ability to help people to make better decision). 
in the context of addressing conflict in NRM, two seemingly opposite views are common. The first more 
dominant view held by policy makers and planners assumes that there is a uniform single rational 
system for NRM. It is predominated by assumptions of experts' authority such as governmental 
departments and the imposition of their conceptions, rules and procedures (Pandey, 1999) to resolve 
NR-conflict. That can be observed in Nepalese policy and legal documents related to NR. Another view, 
which I agree with, despite it not being as widely accepted, assumes that all values related to NRM are 
situational, contextual and socially constructed, and therefore, a uniform single unitary approach in NRM 
can not function properly. This second view recognises that there is no single absolute technical solution 
in NRM (technocratic absolutism) (Anderson, et al., 1997). Technocratic absolutism is dominant in 
Nepal. However, this study adheres to the second view in studying NRM and related conflicts. 
2.2.2 Study of the behaviour of actors in conflicts related to natural resources 
It is very important to identify the key actors involved in the conflict and the reasons why they are 
involved. These questions directly lead to the study of behaviour and actions of these actors. A legal 
2 3 Ethnography is a process of close observation and interpretation of behaviour and function of people and organisations 
through intimate participation in a community (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). 
2 4 See Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, (1990) for the detail about psychological and sociological analysis of conflict. 
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anthropological perspective leads researchers to the key factors governing behaviour such as norms 
and ideology, power structure, etc. This perspective helps to clarify discrepancies between rules and 
behaviour, their interpretation, and enables social relations in actions and interaction to be seen clearly 
(Caplan, 1995). In recent days, legal anthropology focuses more on understanding the social practices 
in the frame of multiplicity of legal institutional arrangements and normative repertoires in society 
(Spiertz, 2000). The contribution of a legal anthropological perspective in conflict study is illustrated by 
Benda-Beckmann ef a/., (1997:222) as: "Adopting a legal anthropological perspective means giving 
primary attention to description and analysis of the current legal situation and trying to understand the 
significance of that legal situation for the actual forms and practice [...]. It means asking about the 
interrelation between law and social practice, rather than engaging in conventional doctrinal legal 
science". Caplan (1995) adds that a historical perspective is an appropriate anthropological framework 
to study conflicts in natural resources. This diversity logically brings one to the notion of legal pluralism. 
Legal pluralism in the study of natural resource-related conflict 
Legal pluralism covers different types of laws such as state law, folk law, customary law, indigenous 
law, religious law, etc. (Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1997). Therefore, it is an umbrella concept that helps in 
understanding the diversity in the role of cultural, social and normative practices in communities 
because it shows the condition in which more than one legal system or institution co-exist to deal with 
the same set of activities (Benda-Beckmann, 1999). It helps in understanding the legal order of society, 
as it is based on a pluralistic conception of the law (Griffiths, 1983). 
Natural resource management does not operate in a vacuum. Human behaviour determines the 
activities or conflict in NRM and its technical aspects depend on human decisions and activities. Hence, 
contradictions, confusions and conflicts are common in NRM due to the diversity and inconsistency in 
application of customary practices and formal legal procedures, different perceptions of ownership and 
rights and management differences. The actions and behaviour of people towards natural resources is 
not shaped and guided by a single comprehensive law. They are guided by several local norms, 
practices and beliefs, folk and legal regulations, which Benda-Beckmann calls 'Jungle of legal pluralism'. 
They are commonly different and even contradictory (Benda-Beckmann, 1999) and serve as a source of 
conflict. Even normat'rvely defined government laws are reshaped by actors and translated into practice 
differently according to local situations. Spiertz (2000) argues that legal pluralism means that in many 
life situations different people can make use of more than one normative repertoire to rationalise and 
legitimise their actions. Governments or customs determine the rights over natural resources, but 
practices may be different than these prescriptions. People are faced daily with different legal and 
customary practices and normative rules embedded in the multiplicity of native and legal systems 
(Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1997). 
Complexity and interwoveness of the legal environment is the source of both conflict and its resolution in 
natural resources. Access to and control over natural resources may be defined differently by different 
legal systems. These different legal constructions provide an additional potential source for conflicts. In 
reality, the existence of plural legal systems in a community is in itself a source of conflict in NR. State 
laws seek to regulate NR according to their framework whereas local and customary norms may or may 
not follow this framework. Many times the state laws are modified or changed in practice, by the actors 
themselves, to fit the local situation. This type of variation becomes a source of conflict in practice. 
Practically, NR users have different and even sometimes conflicting perspectives, values, objectives 
and knowledge systems. These differences are reflected in their behaviour. Their course of action is 
shaped by various normative and customary rules. In the context of NRM, the concept of legal pluralism 
leads to the conclusion that conflict is the inevitable product of plural legal situations (plural values, 
norms, and multiple interpretations). 
Laws and regulations administered by government are only one of the many forces to change human 
behaviour and action. There are other guiding factors such as customary practices, religious rules, local 
norms, economic opportunities and technological advancement, which considerably influence human 
behaviour in relation to control, use and management of NR. People adopt customary practices locally 
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to address the changing circumstances, which Benda Beckmann, ef a/., (1997) call 'local laws' the 
greatly influence NRfvl in society. Enforcing new laws by government may not necessarily resolve 
conflicts related to utilisation and management of NR. In this regard it is noteworthy to state that the 
Nepalese courts are only involved in settling a small number of the numerous conflicts over NR (Benda-
Beckmann ef a/., 1997). Other different, local forums and processes rather than courts may manage to 
settle the majority of such conflicts. Hence, legal pluralism is an element of the context in which conflict 
management of natural resources takes place. 
2.2.3 The role of context, contents and time in conflict 
The Origin, escalation and resolution of a conflict is highly influenced by its context. What are the 
conditions that determine or modify NR-related conflict? Historical, cultural, political, economic, 
institutional and social context, power relationships, norms, values, practices, and property rights and 
ownership issues play crucial roles in conflict. What are the issues of conflict and why? How does a 
conflict evolve? What are the sources of conflict? What are the outward and inward linkages of conflict? 
These are the important considerations in any conflict. The degree and intensity of the same conflict can 
change over time. The chronological background of a conflict and any effect of time on its escalation or 
resolution are important aspects in conflict study. All these issues need to be properly examined to fully 
understand a conflict. The Role of context, contents and time in conflicts related to natural resources are 
presented in the following subheadings: 
Issue of property rights and conflict In natural resources 
Basically conflicts over natural resources are about access and control and profit from their use. Access 
and control are greatly influenced by property relations. Property rights (PR) are therefore a central 
issue in NR-related conflict. Property can be considered as the rights and obligations of individuals or 
groups to use the resource base. Property rights are complex because resource tenure often involves 
bundles of rights, including users rights, rights to exclude others, rights to manage and the rights to sell 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Theoretically people can acquire rights over natural resources either 
using their' historical association or citing riparian rights or interpreting legislated laws in their favour 
(Bromley, 1992). 
Benda-Beckmann (1999:2) points out that "Natural resource property rights serve to legitimate control 
over the means of production, whether production is for market or for subsistence. They can be an 
important material basis for the social continuity of groups. They usually have political functions for 
states and non-state social organisation, and tend to be a source of individual power and prestige. 
Natural resource property often also has considerable cultural religious meaning [...]. Given this 
political, economic and ideological importance, legal property regulations and rights therefore constitute 
crucial social resources in people's strategies, negotiations and struggle over natural resources". 
Hence, it is important to analyse the context (e.g., the presence or absence of rules about the uses of 
natural resources, market forces, political dimensions, power dynamics, alternatives to exploitation of 
common resources, ways of monitoring and controlling the behaviour of others) to understand the 
conflicts in NR. 
To understand PR it is essential to look at the social nature of property and property institutions. As 
McCay and Acheson (1987) explained PR deal with sanctioned behavioural relationships between 
people that arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use. Property rights are closely 
embedded in the historical social context and their meaning can vary from community to community and 
the cultural context (Benda-Beckmann, 1999). To answer the question 'how do PR claims affect NR-
related conflicts, one needs to explore the use-pattern and the relationship between power and access 
to and control over natural resources. 
Natural resources such as forests or land, traditionally used for one particular purpose (for example 
religious forest or grazing) are now allocated to other purposes (such as the construction of a particular 
project). Therefore the rights over NR are also changing to address these needs and changes either by 
A Framework for the Study of Natural Resource Conflicts 20 
state induced forces (for example, Water Resources Act 1992, Forest Act 1993; Land Act 1964; Local 
Self Governance Act 1999) or by local practices. These changes are affecting or altering the existing 
access and control patterns as well as ownership rights and can ultimately induce conflict. A concrete 
example is the government-induced land measurement and registration programme, which gave rise to 
several conflicts in the community. 
The 'commons' as a source of confusion and conflict 
Natural resources are often interchangeably used with common property resources25 and common 
property is often confused with open access (res nullius). This misnomer originated from the human 
ecologist Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons260. This served as a basis for policy formulations 
that prioritize private or state control over resources and leads to contradictions and conflicts between 
resource users and the state (controllers). Hardin (1968) argues that the source of problems is common 
property, which poses an irreconcilable contradiction between individual and common interests. The 
notion "common" created confusion because Hardin fails to distinguish between common property 
management and open access (Steins, 1999; McCay and Acheson 1987; Benda-Beckmann, 1999; 
Richards, 1997). Critics argue that Hardin's generalisation is too vague, because all natural resources 
used by villagers do not have open access, but are used under special arrangement. Common property 
is controlled and managed by groups of resource users, with correlated duties, rights, rules and 
obligations that help to collectively regulate individual use (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). This occurs in a 
variety of cultural, institutional and ecological settings, and with different kinds of resources. In most 
cases these resources have been defined by different interest groups in different ways according to 
geographical, physical and cultural criteria (Steins, 1999) and this leads to unavoidable conflict. Before 
the emergence of contemporary nation states, people lived with the availability of plenty of natural 
resources and therefore there was no competition and conflict. At that time, all decisions related to 
access, distribution, control and management were framed within cultural, social and institutional 
mechanisms (Bhatya, 1997). The legacy of such a specific interface between natural resources and 
people still exists. However, over time, governments and several other interest groups have directly 
intervened to regulate these natural resources. People who were using these local natural resources 
want to continue these arrangements, but there are mounting economic pressures. All these 
contradictions lead to conflict. 
2.2.4 Conflict-management practices, forums and outcomes 
What strategies and processes are used to resolve conflict? Why do people prefer particular strategies 
(e.g., communication, pattern of interaction, learning, psychological forcing, adjustment, reactive, 
consensual, problem solving, contending, empowerment, inaction, avoidance, with-holding, etc.)? What 
forms and means are used to resolve or manage conflict? Answers for these questions are discussed in 
detail in chapters four to eight in this book and some basic concepts related to CM practices, forums 
and outcomes are discussed in the following section. 
Generally, both right-based (legal) and interest-based (alternate) approaches are observed in 
contemporary CM practices. Right-based approaches focus on litigation and adjudication procedures 
through the courts and police. In contrast, interest-based approaches look for mediation, negotiation 
and other collaborative methods to resolve conflict. However, right-based claims may also pursue 
particular interests and may be settled without reference to rights and interest-based conflict can also be 
settled according to rights (personal communication with Franz von Benda-Beckmann). Therefore, right-
based and interest-based approaches are not mutually exclusive in dealing with conflict. The redirection 
of behaviour and reallocation of resources are common strategies in conflict resolution. Other strategic 
2 5 Common property resources may not necessarily be all natural resources and vice versa. But community members may treat 
many natural resources as common property resources because of their mode of appropriation and management. 
2 6 The thesis 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin, 1968) emphasises that 'when CPR are used by an increasing number of 
people, often for different purposes, and agreement governing resource use are absent, collective use may lead to over 
exploitation, degradation and eventual ruin of the resource, which is attributed to the users' incentive to maximise their own 
utility,'(Steins, 1999:3) 
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factors may be retraining perspectives and realigning structural forces to be used in the resolution or 
escalation of a conflict (Fisher, 1997). In managing NR-related conflict, education and the appeal for 
appliance to rules are more pragmatic options than coercion and threats. Options such as force, 
withdrawal, collaboration, accommodation, compromise, consensus, passive acceptance, cheating, 
lying, requesting, entreating, manoeuvring, pressuring, threatening, demanding, monitoring, arguing by 
rules, staying neutral, exploiting are various strategies used in CM. In all these strategies disputants use 
some sort of forum to bring about a favourable outcome. The preference for a particular CM procedure 
depends upon the context and time. However, the following are common CM methods observed in 
contemporary CM study: 
Negotiation 
Negotiation is a voluntary process that deals with a conflict situation between the negotiating parties. 
Negotiation includes any instance in which two or more people meet, face to face and communicate with 
each other for the purpose of influencing each other's decision, to reach a mutually acceptable solution 
of the conflict issue. Negotiation takes place between parties (may be individuals, groups or 
organisations) to resolve incompatible goals. Hence, negotiation deals with diverse interests in conflicts 
(Pruitt and Camevale, 1993). Negotiation clarifies conflict situations. People have different and often 
conflicting interests and objectives. Therefore, negotiation is part of the problem solving processes 
(Gulliver, 1979). Leeuwis (2000) argues that the role of negotiation is increasingly widening and is not 
only limited to CM but it is also becoming a wider methodological principle and basis of organising 
broader participatory development efforts. The purpose of negotiation is to discover mutually acceptable 
outcomes in disputes through the means of persuasion or inducement. Gulliver (1979) explains that 
patterns of interactive behaviour in negotiation are essential despite marked differences in interests, 
ideas, values, rules and assumptions among negotiators of different societies. He argues that a fuller 
understanding of the negotiation process will be achieved when it is considered in its full socio-cultural 
context. Therefore, he focuses his attention on the process of negotiation, recognising that a conflict 
and its negotiation occur in broad cultural contexts and in social institutions. He compares joint decision 
making (negotiation) by seeking common patterns that characterise interactive behaviour with 
adjudication or unilateral decision making (using third party judges to adjudicate disputes). 
Negotiation can be categorised into two distinct forms i.e. distributive and integrative. Characteristics of 
distributive negotiation are to focus more on resource distribution (win-lose). The attitude of negotiating 
parties is firm with attention given to their own interests and a far-reaching consequence may be a lose-
lose situation. Characteristics of integrative negotiation are to create resources (win-win situation) where 
negotiating parties are open to alternatives and also give attention to the interests of others, through 
participatory problem solving. It leads to a collective decision and commitments by the negotiating 
parties to achieve an optimally collective solution (Moscovici and Doise, 1994). This type of negotiation 
is more important in the context of NRM. Integrative negotiation is a voluntary process in which 
conflicting parties meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable solution. 
Negotiations generally focus on the best alternative for a negotiated agreement, interest (issue, position 
and criteria), and process (they create a condition for effective problem solving). Existing power 
relationships play an important role in the negotiation process. Actor specific characteristics such as 
position, function and personality determine power relations in negotiation. The actual use of the power 
depends on the context. 
Pruitt and Camevale (1993) distinguished five broad strategies useful in negotiation. They are: 
concession making (reducing goals/demands), contending (trying to persuade the other party to 
concede or trying to resist similar efforts by the other party), problem solving (trying to develop other 
alternatives), inaction (doing as little as possible by putting off meetings and talking around the issues) 
and withdrawal (dropping out of the negotiation). 
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Mediation in conflict 
Mediation is the intervention in a conflict situation, of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who 
has no decision making authority, but who will assist contending parties to negotiate an acceptable 
settlement of issues in the dispute. The mediator's neutral role as facilitator involves assisting parties, 
privately or collectively, to identify the issues in dispute and develop proposals to resolve them. 
Mediators may meet privately and hold confidential and separate discussions with the parties to a 
dispute. In some cases mediation may be compulsory under the terms of laws or court rules. In other 
cases it may be voluntary, by agreement of the parties. Some jurisdictions have rules requiring 
mediation of disputes at some point in the litigation process. Mediation helps parties seek to resolve 
their disputes in a manner, which avoids hostility and preserves an ongoing relationship. 
Mediation holds an important place in CM because it is a problem solving approach and creates 
opportunities for mutually benefiting resolution. According to Bush and Folger (1994a), mediation has 
the potential to change the people themselves who are in the very midst of conflict, giving them both a 
greater sense of their own efficacy and greater openness to others. Mediation has transformative 
potential for recognition and empowerment (Bush and Folger, 1994b). It makes agreement possible, 
which the disputants find satisfactory and improves their relationships. Mediation focuses on reframing 
the process of changing how a person or party to a conflict conceptualises his, hers or anothers' 
attitude, behaviour, issues and interests and how a situation is defined (ibid.). In the procedural context, 
mediation involves a third party who makes it possible for conflicting parties to reach an agreement. The 
role of mediators is important in discerning interests from positions, reframing issues, and questions, 
giving fair consideration to different opinions, assisting in finding mutual gain and solutions and writing 
up an agreement in a contractual language for its effective implementation (Pendzich etal., 1994). 
Arbitration in conflict 
In arbitration both conflicting parties consent to the intervention of a third party whose judgement they 
agree to accept in advance27. The effectiveness of the resolution depends upon the quality and 
impartiality of the third party. Does it make sense to use arbitration in NRM conflict? This is contextual; 
arbitration can assure that a person who is familiar with the context decides why the dispute arose. Use 
of arbitration depends upon circumstances. 
Arbitration can be grouped into binding and non-binding (advisory). In binding arbitration disputing 
parties agree in advance about the decision (award) of arbitrator(s). Arbitrator(s) decide after hearing 
each party's presentation of evidence and argument. The decision of the arbitrator is final. Commonly 
disputing parties do not appeal against the arbitrator's award. Nevertheless, they may seek judicial 
treatment from binding arbitration if they feel that the arbitrator (s) exceeds the authority conferred under 
the parties' agreement to arbitrate, or if the arbitrators deny a fair hearing, or demonstrates bias or 
prejudice towards one of the disputing parties. Another type of arbitration is called advisory or non-
binding. This operates similarly, except that the award of the arbitrator is not intended to be final or 
binding. Instead, the award is intended to provide guidance to the parties so that they can consider the 
persuasive influence of their positions, as reflected by the advisory arbitrator's award. Alternatively, 
arbitration may be mandatory under the terms of rules or agreements to which the parties have agreed 
in advance of any dispute (Denzalay and Garth, 1996). In other cases, arbitration may also be voluntary, 
which means disputing parties voluntarily submit disputes to an arbitrator by agreement in order to 
minimise any expense and delay. In voluntary arbitration, parties consensually enter into an agreement 
to arbitrate. Parties may also agree to arbitrate a dispute at the time a dispute arises, or at any time 
before a final judgement is entered in a court proceeding (Sangraula and Gurung, n.d.; Pruitt and 
Carnevale; 1993). 
2 7 Disputing parties agree to perform an ordeal or a divination and accept the outcome as a decision (Nader and Todd, 1978). It 
is an informal process by which all parties agree, in writing, to submit their disputes to one or more impartial persons authorised 
to resolve the controversy by rendering a final and binding award. So, arbitration is a self enforcing conflict resolution strategy. 
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In what sense does arbitration differ from litigation? Arbitration entirely avoids all the technical pleading 
requirements of litigation. Arbitration can be conducted in private, and its records can be kept private. 
Litigation is open to the public and documents, unless sealed by the court, become public documents 
(Denzalay and Garth, 1996). In court, judges deal with matters of conflict. In arbitration the arbitrator(s) 
decides on the case to hear. In arbitration agreements, the parties may determine the extent to which 
the arbitrator will attempt to mediate the dispute. Courts typically use formal rules of evidence and 
require certain formalities in the presentation of evidence. In most cases, witnesses will be required to 
come to the hearing. In litigation, post-hearing briefs and post-trial briefs are required (Sangraula and 
Gurnung, n.d.; Denzalay and Garth, 1996). In arbitration, the parties can agree (either in the arbitration 
agreement or at the time of the hearing) as to whether they wish to file post-hearing briefs. In litigation, 
the decision is apt to take the form of a general verdict, which simply indicates the party who prevailed 
and the amount owed. In contrary, in arbitration, the parties may specify that the arbitrator provides a 
written decision explaining its rationale. In litigation, parties may obtain provisional remedies whereas 
such remedies are generally not available in arbitration (Denzalay and Garth, 1996). 
Adjudication in conflict 
In adjudication a third party who has the authority to intervene in a dispute whether or not the disputing 
parties wish it, intervenes and renders a decision with the means he/she has at his /her disposal, and 
furthermore enforces compliance with that decision (Nader and Todd, 1978). However, even if the third 
party exerts his or her authority to resolve the conflict, there are several other factors and actors play 
roles to enforce the decision on the conflicting parties. Adjudication is ideologically based on law. When 
other soft strategies and methods do not work this strategy is the best option to resolve conflict related 
to natural resources. 
Third party intervention 
Conflicting party ^ ^Conflicting party 
Figure 2.1 A simple model of adjudication (adapted from Griffiths, 1983) 
In adjudication, cases are brought to court by mobilisation of other agents of the state (e.g., the police, 
public prosecutor) or sometimes individuals. Characteristics of such cases are highly legally formalised 
procedures, reference to (some) law as the relevant criteria for decision-making, and the power to give 
and enforce judgement even against the wishes of the parties involved. In well-developed plural 
systems, there may be different processes of adjudication using different courts and different legal 
systems (personal communication with Franz von Benda-Beckmann). 
Litigation in conflict 
Litigation is a formal process, which looks for legal solutions when one of the conflicting parties files a 
case in court. It is also a conflict management strategy applicable to all legal conflict management 
methods. A litigation perspective helps to analyse the behaviour and interactions of conflicting parties 
(Griffiths, 1983). This perspective focuses on social relationships, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, ideas, 
and interpretation of conflicting parties in a specific situation. Hence the object of litigation theory is a 
social phenomenon and normative claims, which looks on how social facts are involved in the litigation 
process. 
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To properly understand conflict in the community, litigation structure, process and system behaviour and 
their interrelationships need to be analysed. How does litigation behaviour take place within the existing 
norms and institutions? How litigation processes proceed within such structures and how litigation 
proceeds as a system behaviour are important questions in the study of conflict because conflict itself is 
a function of system relationships (ibid.). To approach litigation from the perspective of legal pluralism 
opens the way to the analysis of litigation in relationship to pluralistic social structures and relationships, 
instead of to the monolithic court structure in NR-related conflicts. There are normative structures, which 
deal with the litigation of conflict. Understanding the process of litigation requires an understanding of 
society. Analyses of conflict from a litigation perspective focus mainly on three aspects: litigation 
structures, the litigation process and output of the litigation system (ibid.). The litigation process is 
generally a single flow system leading to an ultimate entry into a litigation institution: court. Some 
scholars say that prevention of conflict must be regarded as an alternative to litigation. 
Forums shopping and shopping forums 
In which forum people prefer to resolve conflict and why they do so is an important issue in conflict 
study. Benda-Beckmann (1984) calls this phenomenon "forum shopping". She states that "disputants 
have a choice between different institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the outcome 
of the dispute will be". (Benda-Beckmann (1984:37). In the discourse of conflict, not only disputants 
engage in forum shopping but also different institutions may look for possibilities to engage in CM. This 
is called 'shopping forums'. Not only do parties shop, but the forums involved use disputes for their 
own, mainly local political ends. These institutions and their individual functionaries usually have 
interests different from those of the parties, and they use the processing of disputes to pursue their 
interests. That means that as well as disputants "forum shopping", there are also "shopping forums" 
engaged in trying to acquire and manipulate disputes from which they expect to gain political advantage, 
or to fend off disputes which they fear will threaten their interests. They shop for disputes just as 
disputants shop for forums (Benda-Beckmann, 1984:37-39). 
Various forms of social networks, shopping forums and platforms exist locally to manage or resolve 
conflict. Social variables such as trust, norms, customary behaviour and networks can improve the 
efficiency of the society to resolve conflict by facilitating co-ordinated actions. Working together is easier 
in a community blessed with a substantial stock of togetherness and social integrity, which facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit. Where there is lack of trust and no-reciprocity in the 
behaviour of resource users, local efforts to resolve conflict are constrained. Hence, existing social 
organisations, based on norms of reciprocity within interconnected and overlapping associations in 
community need to be analysed in the light of forum shopping and shopping forums to resolve conflict. 
Factors such as access to forums, relationships with particular groups of people, local context, power 
relations, etc. influence the choice of forums. The shopping procedure may be mediation, negotiation or 
a lawsuit in court. 
2.2.5 Outcomes and consequences of conflict for natural resource and society 
Outcomes and consequences of conflict need to be critically examined to seek an improvement in a 
conflict situation. Often the outcome of conflict resolution may be an increase in the gap between 
powerful and powerless. This means that the quality of the outcome and its social implications are more 
important than the resolution itself. What are the achievements and why are they achievements in 
natural resources and society as a whole? What are the weaknesses and strengths of existing CM 
approaches and how can they be improved? The answers to these questions will greatly help in 
devising a proposal for the improvement of an effective CM. There are generally three types of outcome 
viz.: lose-lose (negative), win-win (positive) and win-lose (one party gains). All three types of outcome 
depend upon the severity, complexity and managerial approach of the conflict. It is not always possible 
to bring about a win-win outcome, although a well-planned facilitation may increase its chances. Time is 
another important factor to determine the quality of any outcome. Here outcome means the result of the 
conflict resolution, who gains and who loses at different levels, from an individual to society as a whole. 
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2.3 Scope for improvement of CM through social learning 
The foregoing discussion has presented ideas on what and how to look at the causes and complexity of 
conflicts, and CM practices adapted by actors. While understanding the dynamics of conflict and the 
existing status of CM methods and their outcomes, it is logical to discuss some theoretical concepts to 
explore the possibility of improvement of the CM situation in natural resources. The social-learning 
perspective discussed in the following section gives an idea on how to manage conflict in NR. I am 
going to use the concepts discussed in this section to design an alternative ICM approach in Chapter 
Nine. 
2.3.1 Conceptualising social learning in conflict management 
Social learning (SL) is an alternate, action-oriented perspective, which deals with the complex problems 
related to NR by using participatory processes. Social learning encompasses a positive belief in a 
potential social transformation based on critical self-reflection and effective communication (Roling and 
Wagemakers, 1998). Social learning basically emphasises multiple perspectives. Social processes such 
as the creation of a common platform (forum) for collective action, interactive goal setting, 
accommodation, shared learning, vision building from multiple realities, leadership development, 
resources mobilisation and concerted action are important elements of SL. 
Social learning emphasises collective learning (Roling and Jiggins, in press) for the improvement of the 
situation. It comprises a collection of phenomena which include: learning through observation and 
interaction with their social context, learning by social aggregates, learning pertaining to social issues, 
and learning that results in recognisable social entities such as collective decisions, concerted action, 
etc. (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon, 1999). Social learning focuses on the procedures and incentives that 
promote dialogue among planners, policy makers, researchers, politicians, managers and resource-
users to minimise the conflict and to sustain the ecological capacities of natural resources. It, therefore, 
structures learning to produce human behaviour that will achieve desirable societal outcomes. Hence it 
is emerging as an alternative paradigm28 to improve a situation. 
Social learning thus helps to promote alternate CM since it makes a difference to the behaviour of 
people in a conflict situation. Hence, it aims to find the potential of people within themselves and their 
relationships within and outside their community that will enable them to resolve conflicts by negotiation 
(Goldstein, 1981). Conflict management in the context of social learning is experiential learning (Kolb, 
1984). Rather than focusing on an individual agency or structural incentives as determinants of human 
behaviour it emphasises on how people collectively learn and gain insights. It predicts and controls the 
way their actions help to manage conflict to sustain natural resources. A constructivist perspective, soft-
system thinking, a cognitive system and communicative rationality are the guiding principles of social 
learning (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon, 1999; Roling and Jiggins, in press). Social learning helps CM in 
two ways: firstly, it enables people to modify their accustomed behaviour, and secondly, it helps them to 
develop new forms of adaptive behaviour. It focuses on the personal, symbolic and social construction 
of reality (Maarleveld, etal, 1997). 
The goal of social learning in the context of CM is to bring people together for collective decisions and 
actions to resolve NR-related conflicts. It views learning as a heuristic processes and does not only limit 
itself to scientific-academic knowledge. It exists among the people concerned and adapts to constantly 
changing circumstances. It is a combination of finding ouf and taking action' to resolve or manage NR-
related conflicts collectively. The process involves feelings, attitudes and values that markedly affect the 
disposition of the actors. It is a process of adjusting to circumstances for negotiation. It helps to resolve 
conflict through new experiences both by adapting oneself to change and by using new understanding 
2 8 Paradigm encompasses three elements: epistemology, ontology and methodology. Epistemology asks, how do we know the 
world? What is the relationship between the inquirer and the known? Ontology raises basic questions about the nature of reality 
and methodology focuses on how we gain knowledge about the world (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:185) 
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in the situation people are experiencing (Lee, 1993). It is a dynamic process of adaptation and action to 
resolve conflict. People learn by action and adaptation, in relation to changes in their environment. They 
change their environment by their acts and thereby produce knowledge for themselves. Therefore, the 
basis for managing conflict is experience, observation and the experiences of others. Over time, 
learning becomes a process through which experience is transformed into knowledge of how to tackle 
the conflicts (Wilson and Morren, 1990) in a society. 
2.3.2 Building blocks of social learning 
Constructlvist perspective in conflict management 
A constructfvist perspective adopts an epistemological position where multiple realities emerge from 
interaction (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). These constructs are based socially and exponentially. 
Constructivism assumes multiple and conflicting social realities as the product of human intellect and 
adaptation (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Berger and Luckmann (1967) vividly explain the social 
construction of reality. There are, however, limitations to such a social construction of reality29. What 
people take to be objective knowledge and truth is the outcome of the perspective they developed 
(Schwandt, 1998). Roling (1996) explains the constructivist perspective as: "overtime, groups of people, 
through discourse, develop an inter-subjective system of concepts, beliefs, theory and practices that 
they consider to be reality. Based on their intention and experience, people construct reality creatively 
with their language, labour and technology. The same people change their reality during the course of 
time in order to adjust to changing circumstances." In NRM multiple actors are involved and therefore 
they construct multiple realities. Hence, this perspective helps to look at things on the basis of potential 
multiple realities constructed by people through negotiations and agreements. The differences between 
legal provisions and actions and behaviour of people discussed in section 2.2.2 are based on multiple 
realities. 
As noted earlier conflict is the outcome of human activity due to differences in interests, objectives and 
world views30, which therefore need to be analysed through the systems' thinking (Checkland, 1981). A 
constructivist perspective emphasises looking for improvement of NRM through effective CM. To tackle 
conflicting goals of the actors, especially when the conflicts are on ecological services and 
environmental issues related to natural resources, people need to agree to interact and act according to 
the negotiated and shared goals (Roling, 1997). To achieve this joint learning and concerted action, 
adaptation to change by local initiatives using various platforms for negotiation (Roling and Jiggins, 
1998) is essential. 
Soft-systems thinking in CM 
Soft-systems thinking was developed as an alternative way of thinking in response to the failure of the 
hard systems approach to deal with societal problems (Holling, 1978; Checkland, 1981; Gunderson, ef 
a/., 1995; Roling and Wagemakers, 1998). Hard-system thinking is based on reductionist and positivist 
assumptions. In contrast, soft systems are constructs with arbitrary boundaries (Checkland, 1981). 
According to soft-system thinking the world around us is structured as whole entities i.e. systems, with 
each system having properties different from the sum of its own parts, as well as from other systems 
around it (Bawden, 1995). Soft-system thinking gives perspective in understanding the dynamics of 
conflict and in seeking solutions within the existing social system, due to its holistic focus on a broader 
social and natural-resource system. According to Roling (1997) soft systems are constructs with 
arbitrary boundaries, which emerge as a result of collective learning and action. So NR-related conflict 
needs to be considered bearing this in mind. In the context of NRM, many conflicts emerge due to lack 
2 9 Benda-Beckmann differentiates claim making from the social construction of reality. He argues that it can be based on a 
specific interpretation of reality in the sense of a factual situation image. People can construct different claims by different 
interpretations of the value/legal system yet have the same interpretation of reality (personal communication with Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann). 
3 0 See Chandhoke (1995) and Rau (1991) for the details about diverse interests, objectives and Worldviews in developing and 
strengthening civil society and social systems. 
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of proper attention to soft-system aspects and too strong a focus on hard systems (such as carrying 
capacity or technical aspects) alone. 
Social learning has a pragmatic importance in improving a conflict situation because of its focus on the 
knowledge network, and creation of a platform mechanism for concerted action to enable rural people to 
manage conflict themselves in a collaborative way. This process is called soft-system methodology. 
Human activity analysis is the centre of soft-system methodology, which explores messy, complex 
problematic situations with fuzzy goals and ill-structured problems to achieve purposeful action for 
improvement (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It brings people together for collective learning, joint 
decisions and concerted action (Roling, 1997) when they face similar problems. People develop 
common understanding when they accommodate different objectives. In the First Chapter we saw that 
the relationship between humans and natural systems and their interplay are characterised by conflict 
and uncertainties. Therefore, social learning mobilises the human agency for collective action, through 
shared, self-reflective understanding, to manage natural resources. 
Cognitive system in CM 
Cognition is the process of perception, emotion and action (fig. 2.2) (Capra, 1996, Maturana and Varela, 
1992, Roling, 1999). The notion of cognition thus helps to examine the potential for creating a collective 
agency for ecological rationality (Roling and Jiggins, in press), a collaborative management of conflict in 
this context. 
Figure 2.2 The Cognitive System as domain of existance (Adapted from Rôling, 2000) 
The interrelation of cognition (process of perception, emotion and action) is a basis for organisation of 
human action. The concept of cognition provides opportunities for purposeful collective redesigning of 
human interaction and behavioural modification in pursuit of the effective management of natural 
resource conflicts. 
As cognition is being emotional, perceptive and reflective, when people perceive injustice or conflict in 
their society, they assess it with emotions and act and or react accordingly. Consequently, such reaction 
or action forces change in any conflict situation (either resolves or escalates). When they obtain 
feedback they again receive information for further adaptation and action. Therefore, it is a cyclic 
process of learning and action to manage conflict. The only resolution of conflict arises from purposeful 
cognitive human interaction. 
The four components viz. values (effective management of conflict in natural resources), context 
(people create conflict, which poses challenges that need to be managed), action (management of 
conflict through collective action) and theory (by using social learning) are important in conflict 
management. From the social learning perspective of CM contemporary conflict should be used as a 
valuable source of learning for non-coercive social change and effective management of conflict to 
achieve sustainability of limited natural resources. What is important in this issue is the role of people in 
conflict. To achieve sustainability of natural resources through effective CM, collective action is needed 
which has to be informed by soft-system thinking. This is the heuristic conceptual framework for seeking 
an improvement in the conflict. 
Emotion 
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Communicative rationality31 
Communicative rationality applies when people realise shared goals on the basis of convergence of 
their multiple realities towards arguments about concerted actions (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). 
Communicative rationality (Habermas, 1989) is a deliberate strategy for interaction through dialogue to 
identify the root causes of conflict and explore solutions. Collective decision-making and concerted 
actions are the next subsequent steps based upon shared understanding and commitment of people. 
Habermas (1989) says that in communicative action, participants are not primarily oriented to their own 
individual goals so they can harmonise their plan of action on the basis of common situation definitions. 
Communicative rationality emphasis peoples' ability to solve problems on the basis of agreement for 
concerted action. This perspective helps in realising collective action in CM. Communication is one of 
the crucial factors in conflict (Jandt, 1973; Likert and Likert, 1976). Communicative rationality highlights 
the role of communication in concerted action (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). Communication in this context 
is defined as transmission and reception of ideas, facts, opinions, attitudes and feelings through one of 
more information media that produces a response' (Hellriegel ef a/., 1999). 
2.3.3. Platforms for negotiation In conflict management 
A platform can appear in various forms. It may already exist in a community as social capital32 or be 
newly created to negotiate resource-use conflicts. The aim of a platform is to create favorable 
circumstances to negotiate collective decisions and concerted actions (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 
1999; Roling 1996). It is demonstrated by: Integrated Pest Management (IPM) in Indonesia, Landcare 
Movement in Australia, Chipko Movement in India, Integrated Arable Farming in the Netherlands, 
Community Forestry and Ecotourism in Nepal that creating appropriate platforms to manage natural 
resources is possible (Campbell, 1992; Leeuwis, 1999; van der Fliert, 1993; Upreti, 1999a; Gilmour and 
Fisher, 1991). Creation of a platform is an interactive process and arises from multiple perspectives and 
goals and communicative action (Ramirez, 1997). A platform helps to bring different actors involved in 
conflict together to understand the social dynamics of conflict, actors' networks and ability. It 
concentrates on different strategies of the actors in the areas of struggle, focuses on negotiation 
between conflicting interests and accommodates differences. Natural resource management 
encompasses both hard ecosystems (i.e., natural laws defining outcomes) and soft system (social 
processes that govern the outcome). The interface (Long, 1989) between hard and soft systems helps 
to create platforms for interaction, action and negotiation. 
Platforms can demonstrate the impact of humans on natural resources, social interdependence of 
resource users and encourage collective decisions, facilitate a joint learning process and promote 
concerted actions on NRM. When natural-resource users feel negative consequences of conflict they 
search for solutions: create new concepts and ideas and negotiate a course of collective action. The 
interfaces between natural resources and users who have different interests, incompatible goals, 
differential access to power and information are important in the platform creation process. Social 
interdependence (due to the increased use of limited natural resources) leads to conflict and struggle 
that needs to be negotiated through appropriate platforms. 
2.3.4 Adaptive management: basis for alternate conflict management 
Adaptive management is emerging as a guiding principle for sustainable NRM. It focuses on designing 
an interface between society and natural resources (Roling, 2000). It shifts from a dominant linear-
economic-goal seeking management strategy to social learning about complex systems. Holling 
3 1 Habermas (1989) explains instrumental, strategic and communicative rationality. 
3 2 Social capital is vaguely used and interpreted in the contemporary development discourse. However, social capital in the 
context of CM is used as defined by Uphoff (2000:1): 'an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural, 
cognitive, institutional and related assets that increase the amount (or probability) of mutually beneficial co-operative behaviour' 
to resolve conflicts, that yield benefits from natural resources being more productive, more efficient, more innovative and more 
sustainable. All cultural and religious customs and values are not social capital, if they do not promote mutually beneficial 
collective behaviour to deal with NRM-related problems and conflicts. 
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(1995:30) says "the release of human opportunities requires flexible, diverse and redundant regulation, 
monitoring that leads to corrective action, and experiential probing of the continually changing reality of 
the external world". He further argues that "the essential point is that evolving systems require policies 
and actions that not only satisfy social objectives but also achieve continually modified understanding of 
the evolving conditions and provide flexibility for adapting to surprise (Holling, 1995:14)". To show the 
importance of learning in adaptive management, Lee (1993:9) emphasis that "adaptive management is 
an approach to natural resource policy that embodies a simple imperative: policies are experiment, learn 
from them". The interactive process associated with adaptive management requires good facilitation and 
negotiation skills, institutionalised interests (of organisations), and flexibility to seek for new ways and 
innovative strategies. To translate adaptive management principles into a concrete form of 
multidisciplinary action (e.g., conflict resolution or management) is essential. In Chapter Nine I will be 
translating the design principle of adaptive management into concrete ICM to address the NR-related 
conflicts. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Research methodology entails the course framework of research. In this section, I briefly describe how I 
approached this research, and my motives and choices concerning the research methods used to 
answer the research questions. To investigate the dynamics of conflict a methodology is required which 
facilitates analysis of behavioural patterns, perceptions, causes, interrelations and interactions among 
the actors. Hence, my methodological approach is a sociological interpretative study based on the 
fundamental connection between context and practice over time. Therefore, the most basic guiding 
factors in selecting research methods were the practices of everyday social life of the actors and their 
strategies, manoeuvres, discourses, and struggles. In order to explore the dynamics of conflicts in 
society, methods and techniques of qualitative research33 were used to collect the required information. 
2.4.2 Setting up the study: research strategy 
The theoretical perspectives and the research problem itself influenced the choice of the research 
strategy. The strategy focused on 'what information most appropriately answers specific research 
questions and which strategies are most effective for obtaining it (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). To 
understand how conflicts evolve in NRM and how they are resolved, it is necessary to appreciate the 
intricacy of the social system within which they are happening. Hence ethnographic, exploratory case 
studies were conducted to collect such information. A case study is a method of sociological analysis of 
socio-cultural phenomena to draw inferences and to formulate propositions (Mitchell, 1983). It provides 
sound ways of understanding the dynamics of conflicts in NR. Natural resource-related conflicts involve 
different actors embedded in social processes. These actors create discourses through interpretation of 
the conflict situation. It is therefore important for the researcher to integrate different social 
interpretations of conflict into the inquiry process. The integration of a local perspective, empirical 
knowledge and different theoretical perspectives into a research process is complicated. Furthermore, 
studying conflict management in natural resources from both the legal-anthropological and social-
learning perspectives is more complicated because of their different aims and focuses. Therefore a 
3 3 Qualitative research is a field of inquiry which crosscuts disciplines, fields and subject matters and it is surrounded by 
complex and interconnected terms, concepts and assumptions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:2). Denzin and Lincoln (1998) argue 
that qualitative research is a set of interpretative practices that entails semiotics, narratives, content discourse, archival, 
phonemic analysis, discourse analysis, ethnographies, interview, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, survey research, participant 
observation and even statistics. Qualitative research places the emphasis on process and meaning and does not focuses much 
on rigorous examination and measurements (if measured at all) of the casual relationship in terms of quantity, intensity, amount 
and frequency. Rather it stresses the socially constructed nature of reality, the relationship between the content, context and 
spatial and temporal factors and seeks answers to how social experiences are created and given meanings (Ibid.: 8). 
Qualitative research is a process because it interconnects sets of theory, methods and analysis. In this research process 
researchers approach with a set of ideas and frameworks (theory, ontology) that specify a set of questions (epistemology) that 
are examined (methodology, analysis) (ibid.: 23). In general four major interpretative paradigms structure qualitative research: 
positivist and post positivist, construotivist-interpretative, critical (Marxist, emancipatory) and feminist-post structural (ibid.: 26). 
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flexible set of guidelines is used as a strategy for collecting and analysing empirical materials. This 
strategy led me, as a researcher, to specific sites, persons, groups and institutions having relevant 
interpretative material. The meaning of human behaviour, motivation, interaction and action are 
expressed in daily practices of actors. A qualitative interpretative approach of conflict study is more 
appropriate to explore such behaviour, which can not be captured by quantitative methods (Alasuutari, 
1998; Silverman, 1993; Seale, 1998). A case study was my preferred strategy in examining 
contemporary conflict events. The strength of a case study is its ability to deal with the full variety of 
evidence: documents, interviews, observations, etc. (Yin, 1984). From the field study I realised that a 
case study is most suitable when a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events, over which the investigator has little or no control (Silverman, 1993). The strength of a case 
study is that it has no pre-packaged research design. Rather, different information collection techniques, 
sampling and analysis techniques can be used throughout the research process (Yin, 1984). This 
method is useful in understanding the local dynamics of access and control of resources, knowledge 
and power (Seale, 1998). A case study allows an investigation into an on-going phenomenon with a real 
life context, in which the investigator has no control over behavioural events. It also better explains the 
decision process, why and how decisions are taken and implemented. Hence, an extended case study 
was the most preferred method used in this research to explore the dynamics of NR conflicts. 
Selection of the research area and the cases 
The Dolakha district was selected as a study area based on my previous professional association. The 
case studies were carried out in the Pawoti and Saiiungeshwor Village Development Committees 
(VDCs)34 of Dolakha district of central Nepal. 
Criteria used to select the study site: 
1. Presence of different conflict cases, in a cluster, 
2. Involvement of multiple layers of actors in NR-related conflicts (villagers, NGOs, GOs and 
politicians), 
3. Presence of relatively old and new conflicts, 
4. Involvement of more than one VDC in the conflict (transboundry conflict), 
5. Manageable geographical coverage to conduct the research, 
6. The continuation of research in the site where I studied conflict for my MSc research. 
These criteria were interrelated. The first and the second criteria, presence of different conflicts and 
involvement of multiple actors, are fundamental in any conflict study. The third criterion, old and new 
conflicts, was important to assess the effect of the temporal factor in escalation or stalemate of conflict. 
The fourth criterion, transboundary conflict, was useful to see the role of local governments in the 
management of larger conflicts. The fifth and sixth criteria were more pragmatic in order to carry out the 
research within a specified time frame. The starting point of this study was the inventory of all conflicts 
that occurred in the study area. In 1997,1 conducted six months MSc fieldwork in Pawoti, one of the 
researches VDCs to study negotiation on NR-related conflicts. I wanted to use the well-established 
rapport with the local community to carry out further research and use the information gathered earlier. 
In addition to the information collected in 1997, with the help of two research assistants I documented all 
the different types of conflict in the study area by using key informant interviews, focus group 
discussion, and observation. A total of 54 focus group discussion meetings and 230 key informant 
interviews were conducted to document the conflict. I also conducted semi-structured interviews using 
check lists with politicians, bureaucrats, and conflict case winners from formal organisations and the 
general public involved in conflict to record some quantitative information. During the exploratory 
3 4 VDC is the lowest political and administrative unit. Before 1990 this unit was called Village Panchayat. Panchayat was an 
autocratic party-less political system that existed in Nepal before 1990 when all political parties were banned and democratic 
values were suppressed. The crown was the source of power and was above the constitution. In this system there was a 
provision of Village Panchayat (smallest political unit), District Panchayat (district level government) and Rastrya Panchayat 
(central parliament). Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and nine members represented district Panchayat from the nine regions 
within the district. District Panchayat was replaced by District Development Committee and House of Parliament replaced 
Rastrya Panchayat after the restoration of democracy in 1990. 
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research period villagers informed us abouf conflict in their villages on the basis of their memory and 
some historical documents. That not only gave me a broad overview of the conflicts and a larger list for 
selection of the specific cases for the detail study but also caused difficulties in deciding which cases to 
study. With the help of local leaders, staff of GOs and NGOs working in that area, VDC officials, 
teachers, social workers and a review of available literature (mainly project reports) I selected 5 conflict 
cases for the in-depth study using the following specific criteria: 
• Representation of water, land and forest related conflicts and their interconnection, 
• Representation of historical relationships of the conflict (old conflict transferred to the new 
generation), 
• Involvement of the courts, police, CDO, VDCs, NGO in conflict resolution, 
• Active involvement of local people in conflict resolution. 
The following five cases were selected on the basis of these criteria: 
1. Conflict in a farmer-managed irrigation system, 
2. Conflict on a forest/grazing land, 
3. Conflict on a spring source for drinking water, 
4. Conflict in a donor funded and government developed irrigation system, and 
5. Conflict on a religious agricultural land. 
When the specific cases were identified respondents were selected purposefully: those who were 
someway involved in these five cases, in order to explore specific information related to conflict. So all 
people involved in the five conflict cases were primary respondents of the study. The detailed narrative 
of these cases is presented in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Chapters. 
Reference sites 
Map 4. Map showing the research site and the reference sites 
While the main case studies were conducted in the two VDCs of the Dolakha district, the general 
findings of the cases were compared with 11 reference groups35 of six districts involved in NRM 
activities. The purpose was twofold. Firstly to compare the characteristics of NR-related conflicts with 
the case-study findings and secondly, to document the specific conflicts related to land, forest and water 
(irrigation and drinking water). Of these 11 groups 2 were from Kanchanpur district (Mahendranagar 
Municipality and Jhalari VDC), 2 from Banke district (Kohalpur and Bageshwori VDCs), 2 from Chitwan 
district (Bhandara and Piple VDCs), 2 from Kaski district (Arbavijaya and Bharatpokhari VDCs), 1 from 
Ramechhap district (Ramechhap VDC) and 2 from Dolakha district (Bhimeshwor Municipality and Kavre 
3 5 These are the groups organised in a village by community members to accomplish functions such as management of forests, 
irrigation, pasture land, trials and bridges, seed production, etc. About 10-30 households are organised into each group. Many 
such groups are supported by NGO, donor-funded projects and government agencies. 
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VDCs) (see Map 4). The criteria used to select reference groups were involvement of those groups in 
NR-related conflicts with their activities supported by some organisations. To find the appropriate 
groups, I got a list of groups involved in conflicts from the organisations supporting them and made a 
selection considering geographical representation, caste, ethnicity, and economic status and gender 
aspects (some women groups were deliberately selected). 
Methods used in information collection 
Selection of the cases for the study was guided by the objective of improving the understanding of NR-
related conflict dynamics at a local level. This obviously had implications on the selection of methods 
and techniques. Focus group discussions, life histories, informal observation/discussion, informal/semi-
structured and key informant interviews, transacts, archival study, participation in national seminars and 
workshops were the main techniques used to collect information via the ethnographic study36 (Spradly, 
1979). Some quantitative data were gathered from contacting people especially involved in conflict 
issues and from secondary sources. Checklists were used to guide the research process. Secondary 
data were collected from different documents and reports and reviewed extensively. However, 
community level CM practices in Nepal are extremely poorly documented. Due to that single reason 
there is very little evidence available for the study and analysis of local level NR-related conflicts. I have 
collected information related to conflict at three levels. The first 
level was the case study VDCs and reference sites where we 
have collected more in-depth information. The second level was 
the district and the third level was the national level where I have 
collected more general information. At the district level the main 
sources of information were people coming from different VDCs 
to district headquarters to settle conflict cases in CDO, court, the 
police station, DFO, land related offices, water related offices, 
political leaders, lawyers, staff of different offices, human right 
Fig. 2.3 Collection of information activists, police personnel, workers of NGOs and trade unions, 
through focus group discussion A t t n e n a t i o n a | | e v e | | n a v e c 0[[ ected information, documents/ 
reports from researchers, central NR-related departments, INGO 
staff, national politicians, senior bureaucrats, social workers 
users federations, District Development Committees, District Irrigation Offices, District Forest Office, 
District Water Supply Offices, District Police Offices, District Administration Offices (DAO), District Court, 
District Agriculture Offices, District Land Reform Offices, Survey and Trigonometric Offices, and other 
relevant organisations. The political conflict between the government (and other followers of the current 
constitution) and Maoists is not directly dealt with in this book because of the different nature of that 
conflict. 
I have compared the general characteristics of NR-related conflicts observed in the study sites in eleven 
reference groups in three Hill and three Teari districts. These groups were used as a point of reference 
to compare and generalise the characteristics of conflict noticed in the study villages and to enhance 
representativeness of the study. The comparision was made after the collection of information in the 
research sites. I have visited each group for one to two weeks and discussed with the group members 
about the common conflicts they have exoperienced in their area. The findings of the research sites 
were used as checklists (or comparision indicators) to compare the similarities and differences of the 
characteristics of conflicts. The general description of each group is given in the appendix. Subsequent 
meetings for group discussion in each group were made with representatives of the groups. In some 
groups I also visited disputed geographical areas (forest, land and water bodies) together with the group 
members to get an insight to compare with the case study area. The focus of any comparison was to 
understand their response in reference to the issues presented to them from the findings of the case 
studies. 
3 6 This refers to a social scientific analysis of social forms, which gives attention to culture and issues of social identity 
(Pecock, 1986) and therefore, is also called descriptive anthropology (Vidich and Lyman, 1998). 
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Feeling of uncertainties in the field due to the wave of intensive Maoist activities caused some difficulties 
during the fieldwork. To accomplish the research work in an insecure situation, two research assistants 
with a sociological background and practical research experience were selected. Several other 
assistants were also recruited on a daily-wage basis to assist the research team as they were needed. 
All case studies were primarily geared to explore, describe and analyse conflict phenomena at a local 
level. This was the corner stone of the research process. Well-established relationships of mutual trust 
between researchers and villagers and the representation of local research assistants in the research 
team became fundamental in obtaining sensitive information related to the conflicts. The role of the 
female-research assistant proved to be crucial in getting important information from women and in 
obtaining their response and perspective on NR-related conflicts. Both research assistants and myself 
attended several conflict resolution meetings and the ongoing negotiation process in the village 
organised by villagers themselves, by NGOs and VDCs. I also observed the conflict resolution process 
accomplished in the district headquarters by different governmental organisations. On the spot 
observation gave me fresh ideas on how different actors in general, and powerful elite in particular, play 
a role in CM. Observations also served as a good source of material to discuss in interviews and 
meetings. In this way issues were explored in greater depth and new insights gained about information 
collected by other methods. In the midst of the research process 15 elderly people, who were actively 
involved in the conflict, were selected to recall their life histories. The information obtained from the life 
histories was used as reference material to discuss in meetings and group discussions. 
Observation was also made on the confrontation, emotional expression, public-private behaviour of 
actors during the research period. Institutional interviews with representatives of various organisations 
were also collected. Close attention to specific events was particularly enlightening. I applied an optimal 
ignorance strategy to avoid irrelevant and unnecessary information. The analysis is based on 
constructivist37, descriptive and interpretative38 methods with illustrative quotes (Lamers, 1994). The 
analysis focused on searching out the common characteristics, causes and relationships in NR-related 
conflict and resolution process. There was a continuous interaction between the collection and analysis 
of information, seen as an interaction process in the field. Analysis and interpretation of the information 
by people themselves was one of the important aspects of data collection. During the process of 
analysis I have visited overseas Development Institute, London, Department of Human geography, 
University of Zurich, SDC-Bern and Centre for Development and Environment, University of Bern to 
discuss the issues related to management of NR-conflicts. These discussions became extremely useful 
to develop the ICM method. 
2.5 Conclusion 
I have endeavoured in this chapter to discuss various theoretical concepts and perspectives to develop 
a conceptual understanding in conjunction with ongoing empirical research. I call this an 'integrated 
framework' because it combines different perspectives, which compliment each other to implement the 
research strategy and answer the research questions stated in section 1.2.5. I have sketched an 
overview of the research strategy, selection of research sites and methods used in studying community 
level conflicts related to natural resources. I recognise that integration of different perspectives into an 
3 7 In terms of analysis constructivist paradigm assumes a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist 
epistemology (knower and subject create understanding) and different set of methodological procedures. It focuses on 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability instead of positivist criteria of internal and external validity, reliability 
and objectivity (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:27). 
3 8 Schwandt (1998:221-259) vividly explains about these methods in the chapter called 'Constructivist Interpretivist Approach 
to Human Inquiry*. 
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operational form is inevitably difficult but not impossible. Finally I would add that the research strategy 
and methods defined before going to the actual fieldwork can change in practice. So reflection, 
adjustment and modification are an integral part of the research methodology. 

Chapter 3 
Understanding Nepal and the study Area: The Setting 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to briefly introduce Nepal and the study area to provide a backdrop to the 
empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. The introduction is followed by Section 3.2 that briefly 
presents a general overview of Nepal, its socio-economic condition, cultural aspects, political dynamics, 
and its historical background. In Section 3.3 the political economy of Nepalese natural resources is 
discussed. Section 3.4 deals with NRM policies over the past few decades and their impact on the 
livelihood of Nepalese people. In Section 3.5 major legislation related to water, forest and land are 
presented including an overview of other general laws related to NR. In section 3.6 legal pluralism in 
Nepalese society is discussed. The final section describes the general characteristics of the study area 
and the reference groups. 
3.2 About the country: Nepal 
Nepal, four times the size of the Netherlands, is a country of almost bewildering topographical, ethnic 
and linguistic diversity. This country has a history of more than three thousand years during which it has 
existed both as a single united state, then as a collection of independent but interrelated petty kingdoms 
and finally, since the 1770s as a united kingdom under the present Shah dynasty (New Era 1988:2). 
Nepal is a landlocked mountainous country surrounded in the East, West and South by India and the 
North by the Tibetan autonomous region of China. It is situated in South Asia, between a longitude of 
80°4-88°12 East and a latitude of 26°22-30°27 North (CBS, 2000). The total area of the country is 
147181 Sq. Km which covers 0.09 % of the global land surface. Topographically, Nepal is divided into 
Mountain, Hill and Terai regions running across the country from East to West. Physiographically 83 % 
of its land lies in hills and mountain ranges and the remaining 17 % belongs to Terai (CBS, 2000). The 
altitudinal (elevational) variation ranges from 60 meters in the southeast to the 8848 meter Mount 
Everest, the highest peak in the world, in the north. Nepal, situated in the Central Himalayas, is a 
country having large and unique variations in terms of physiography and agro-ecology (CBS, 1996). The 
country's economy depends largely on the use of its NR base. 
Among the least developed countries of the world39, Nepal's economic growth has been hampered by 
the lack of commitment, economic opportunities and infrastructure (NPC, 1998). Growing poverty and 
environmental deterioration has further exacerbated the problems. Environmental problems in the 
country emanate from excessive dependence on the use of NR (EPC, 1993). Despite a magnitude of 
foreign aid (both grants and loans) to enhance economic development of the country the wellbeing of 
Nepalese people has not increased. Instead the gap between the rich and the poor has increased 
(Acharya, 1998). A persistence of poverty is the outcome of inappropriate use of foreign aid and 
misallocation and abuse of national resources by the government. 
3.2.1 Brief historical background 
Originally, the Kathmandu Valley was called Nepal. Before unification, there were several small states 
headed by local kings and functionaries. Sharecropping and tenancy systems were developed by that 
time to collect revenues to run the states. The historical context of Nepal is concisely presented in the 
SNV-NepaPs Evaluation Report 1985-1995 (p. 14-17). This report states that three times in the history 
of Nepal a single principality grew into a sizeable state and promised to provide some degree of unity. In 
the 10th century, the Malla kings in the far West started their expansion, which led to a period of growth 
in a considerable part of present Nepal. The Mallas achieved their golden age in the middle of the 14th 
century, but by the end of that century the prosperous kingdom was broken into 30 petty states. The 
Nepal stands as the poorest country in the world with a per capita income ot around US $ 200 (Acharya, 1998). 
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Sen dynasty then took power from the Mallas and ruled in Nepal. It soon also disintegrated and the 
Malla dynasty returned. By that time Rajput warriors from India started to play a vital role in the politics' 
of Nepal and later came to rule the Gorkha region of central Nepal. Prithvi Narayan Shah was one of 
these Rajput kings ruling Gorkha, who had expanded his power and conquered the Kathmandu Valley 
in 1769. With his continuous and rigorous efforts over 30 years he laid the foundation of modem Nepal. 
After 70 years of growth and expansion, Nepal faced the Anglo-Nepal war in 1814-16. Consequently, 
Nepal lost considerable parts of her lands as a result of the Sugauli Treaty with the British and became 
confined to its present borders. With the support of the British, the Rana dynasty ruled the country in the 
name of the king, from 1846 to 1951, usurping all power and appointing themselves as hereditary Prime 
ministers. The people and the king became unhappy with the performance of the Ranas and the Rana 
regime was ultimately overthrown in 1951 with a tripartite agreement between Rana, the Nepali 
Congress Party (NCP) and the Indian Government. Nevertheless, even after the Rana regime, 
democratic institutions did not develop well. The first general election took place in 1959 and the NCP 
gained a majority in parliament. However the democratically elected government did not perform well. 
Furthermore the interpersonal conflict between former King Mahendra and the then Prime minister B. P. 
Koirala escalated and virtually ended with the dismissal of parliament in 1960, imprisonment of the 
prime minister and a ban on political parties. A new constitution was promulgated in 1962 with the 
introduction of a new Party-less Panchayat Political System40. The King was above the constitution with 
enormous power. This political system also failed to fulfil the aspirations of the people. Popular uprisings 
brought the collapse of the Panchayat system in 1990. Since then different political parties (mainly NCP) 
are governing the country with an extremely poor performance in terms of economic growth, poverty 
reduction, human rights, social security and development. 
Since the beginning, the relationship with India was conditioned by security and economic concerns. In 
this respect Nepal is persistently struggling to establish her own independent national identity. India 
wants to maintain free entry and employment of Indian nationals in Nepal, intervention in internal affairs 
of Nepal, economic exploitation of Nepalese natural resources for the benefit of India and virtual control 
of the Nepalese economy. However, Nepal wants to be free from Indian dominance. Such conflict 
between two countries has great policy implications. The 500 miles of open boarder between India and 
Nepal also complicate the problems. 
3.2.2 Brief cultural background 
Nepalese culture is characterised by Tibetan cultural tradition in the high hills and mountain areas and a 
strong influence of Indo-Gangetic civilisation in the southern part of the country. The mid-hill regions 
have an admixture of the two (NFN, 1999). The intrusion of a Hindu caste41 society into a Tibeto-
Burman society has led to a whole range of ethnic groups and castes in Nepal. Nepalese society is 
characterised by the vertically stratified Hindu caste systems and different Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups 
(Hoftun, 1999; Bista, 1991; Stiler, 1976). Although there are still a number of geographical regions and 
villages of homogenous ethnic affiliation, generally most settlements in Nepal are ethnically mixed and 
shared by Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar, Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups42 and the traditionally untouchable 
occupational43 caste groups. Racially Nepalese people, can be grouped into two: Mongolians and 
4 0 Government distributed several thousand radios to all members of the Village Panchayat in order to explain the philosophy of 
this political system and government policies and programmes. 
4 1 The caste structure is based on the Hindu Varna System which divides people into four categories according to their 
occupational activities viz.: Brahmin (learned people, priests), Chhetri (warriors), Vaishya (traders, agriculturists), and Sudras 
(engaged in menial services). Originally it merely meant the type of work one does but gradually it became hereditary (SNV, 
1998). This hereditary transformation of Varna (from parents to offspring irrespective of their work speciality) distorted into the 
present complex and rigid caste system in Nepal. Though, untouchability and discrimination on the basis of caste was formally 
outlawed by the 1963 National Code and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, it still prevails widely in Nepalese society. 
4 2 There are 53 ethnic groups recognised by the government in Nepal. Some major ones are Tamang, Sherpa, Gurung, Magar, 
Rai, Limbu, Thakali, Jirel, Bhote. 
4 3 The untouchable occupational caste group includes Damai, Kami, Sharki, Chamar, Pode, Satar, etc. People from other 
castes and ethnic groups do not eat food and water touched by them. In the recent days they are called 'Dalit'. 'Dalit' is a more 
respected word used to recognise the untouchable groups in Nepal. 
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Aryans. The Mongolians came originally from Tibet with their Tibeto-Burnam language and cultural 
tradition and scattered in mountain regions before Aryans entered from the South. State polity and inter-
ethnic relations, then and now, are dominated by a feudalistic mode of socio-cultural structure (Bista, 
1991; Stiler and Yadav, 1979; Gellner etal., 1997). A hierarchical structure of the caste system and 
ethnic groups exists in Nepal with high Hindu caste groups at its apex. The Brahmin and Chhetri caste 
groups and the Newar ethnic group44 are socio-economically and politically dominating in the country. 
Such stratification is reflected in the political structures (parliament, government bureaucracy) as well as 
the highly uneven distribution of the agricultural land and other economic resources of the country. It is 
estimated that the top 5 % of the population control 40 % of agricultural land and the bottom 60 % 
control only 20 %. About 50 % of the households own less than 0.5 hectare of agricultural land (NFN, 
1999). 
Family structure is mainly compound and patrilineal with an extended family (Bista, 1991). Women 
suffer from unequal power relations due to their subordinate position created by the prevailing culture. 
They suffer more than men from a low literacy rate, lack of property rights and asset ownership, limited 
decision making roles, low access to political and bureaucratic positions, etc. Women bear the major 
burden of domestic and agricultural work, working more hours than men, suffer from social harassment 
and get less food and less attention during illness (Upreti, 1995). Women and children from 
economically poor households suffer the most. Karma, a fatalistic belief that the control of personal life 
circumstances of an individual is determined by divine force, not by ownself is still influential in Nepal. 
This belief undermines personal responsibilities and displaces it to a supernatural force. This is one of 
the major factors hindering the progress of women (SNV, 1998; Bennet, 1983). 
3.2.3 Brief socio-economic background 
Nepal's current population is 22.9 million (CBS, 2000). Out of that 90 % of the population resides in 
villages (NPC, 1998). Rising population pressure on NR and a sectoral-development approach have led 
to the deterioration of the environment (EPC, 1993). The major part of income in Nepal is spent on food 
and other essential goods. Nepal has yet to create a foundation for sustained economic growth and 
development. It has experienced a high rate of Hill-Terai migration since the 1950s, due to the declining 
productivity in the Hill regions and better economic opportunities in the Terai (Seddon, 1987). Urban-
growth rate is currently 7.6 % of which 40 % is through migration. Over 80 % of Nepal's total population 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood and the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is 40 % (Ministry of Finance, 1998:5) without any substantial support of the 
government (Karki, 1998). Agriculture and related activities account for 82.2 % of the rural and 34.4 % 
of the urban employment (NPC, 1995). This phenomenon has created pressure on the NR base and 
has resulted in further fragmentation of agricultural land. Of the total population, 49 % is estimated to be 
below the poverty line (NPC, 1998). Nepal has a land to man ratio of 0.2 hectare/capita and has 
predominantly a subsistence agricultural economy. The Nepalese farming system is characterised by 
strong crop-livestock-forest integration. The Mountain-farming system is dominated by livestock 
production whereas in the Hills and Terai crop production dominates the farming system. 
Poverty incidences increase with the remoteness of the country. People living in inaccessible areas are 
more entrenched in poverty and fall into the deprivation trap. Urban poverty is mainly the by-product of 
increased rural deprivation. The vicious circle of rural poverty is created by the cumulative effects of 
small and fragmented land holdings, low and stagnating agricultural productivity, little or no savings, lack 
of employment opportunity off the farms, a feudalistic vertical social stratification and a lack of 
governmental commitment (Dahal etal., 1999; Hoftun, 1999; Pandey, 1999). This is further aggravated 
by the large size of families, natural calamity, and culturally determined social obligations such as 
marriage, birth and death ceremonies which force the poor to make extravagant expenditures (NGO 
Forum Nepal-NFN, 1999). 
4 4 Some people argue that Newer does not belong to ethnic group. But the state has included Newar in the category of Janajati 
(ethnic group). 
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Despite the country's planned development efforts since 1950s, the basic indicators of life and the 
economy have in most cases deteriorated or remained almost unchanged (NFN, 1999; Khadka, 1994; 
Pandey'1999; Shrestha; 1999). The literacy rate is low (40 %), access to modem health services 
remains very limited, especially in rural and remote areas. Major social indicators show that the average 
life expectancy is limited to 57.52 years (CBS, 1998), the infant mortality rate is 74.4 per 1000 live 
births, the child mortality rate 118 per 1000, the crude death rate is 10.7 per 1000, the crude birth rate is 
34.54 per 1000 and the total fertility rate is 4.43 (CBS, 1998). Malnutrition, diarrhoea, pneumonia and 
respiratory infections remain the major causes of death in children. The majority of the people suffer 
from food deficiency, which ultimately forces them into out migration. The Human Development Index 
ranks Nepal 144th out of 174 countries. 
3.2.4 Current political background 
Since the restoration of democracy in 199046 a Westminster style of parliamentary system is governing 
the country with a constitutional monarchy where three components viz.: Legislature, Executive and 
Judiciary exist independently. The country's administrative system is composed of 21 ministries under a 
politically appointed minister from among the elected or nominated parliamentarians. A secretary from 
the civil service heads the bureaucracy of a ministry under the leadership of the minister. The country is 
administratively divided into five regions, seventy-five districts and 3913 VDCs and 58 municipalities 
(CBS, 2000). Districts are the substantive unit of governance, most of the ministries are represented at 
this level. Some ministries are extended even up to VDC levels. The District Development Committee 
(DDC) is the locally elected body that governs districts. The VDCs in rural areas and municipalities in 
urban areas are the lowest administrative unit in every district. They are directly elected, based on the 
adult suffrage. The village political structure is basically a reflection of socio-cultural stratification and 
guided mainly by the social status and economic power of local elite. Socially and economically powerful 
elites are at the top of the political decision making (NFN, 1999). Therefore, allegiance to such power 
centres is an inescapable compulsion to poor people. Given this extremely skewed power relationship, 
exercising an independent political judgement is still far from possible (Pandey, 1999). 
Despite the facts that: a democratic political system is operating in the country, democratically elected 
political parties are ruling the country and a progressive constitution exist in Nepal, the governing 
practices are still undemocratic (NFN, 1999). Most voters are poor, ill informed and illiterate and 
therefore, money and muscle powers are the determining force for winning elections. Consequently, 
bureaucracy is becoming highly politicised, deprofessionalised, non-responsive and increasingly corrupt 
(NFN, 1999; Pandey, 1999; Shrestha, 1999; Propublic, 2000). As a result, most of the government -
implemented development programmes have failed (Propublic, 2000; Pandey, 1999). Nepotism and 
favouritism46 are the glaring characteristics of Nepalese politics. After 1990, political feuds and fractions 
have severely divided people (SNV, 1998; Upreti, 1998b). Consequently, an increased sense of ethnic 
isolation to establish their own identity, has emerged with a defensive reaction against the domination of 
the Brahmin and Chhetri (Bista, 1991:56). The public schooling system in Nepal is fully politicised, as 
teachers are active members of trade unions and or different powerful political parties. 
Commercialisation of the education system is deliberately isolating poor people, those who are not able 
to meet the financial requirement to educate their children in private school (NFN, 1999). This situation 
is creating an immense social divide and severe conflict in the society. 
4 5 The popular movement had overthrown the party-less Panchayat political system, which ruled the country for three decades. 
After the restoration of democracy, the name of the smallest political unit called 'panchayat' in the former political system was 
replaced by Village Development Committee. 
4 6 The manifestation of bare patronage called Chakari (institutionalised flattery) and having one's own people (who are 
trustworthy, loyal and to be helped) from an inner circle of associates who can be approached whenever need arises. Strengths 
and weaknesses of anyone in Nepal are measured in terms of quality and quantity of circles of Afnomanche of which he or she 
is part (Bista, 1991:98). An Afnomanche circle is developed by family connections, loyalty to particular persons, affiliation to 
political parties, bribery and commission and increasingly establishing informal sexual relations (Karuna Management 
Technology 4, quoted in SNV, 1998). The phrase source-force is also interchangeably used to denote Afnomanche. 
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Despite excellent constitutional provisions there has been a great deal of frustration about the 
performance of the government and political parties. They are seen to have failed to deliver the services 
envisioned by the constitution and the raised expectation of the people during the popular movement to 
overthrow the party-less Panchayat political system (Dahal et a/., 1999). The general public is 
disillusioned with the functioning of the multiparty political system as it has failed to ensure political 
stability (AAN, 1997). The past decade has witnessed a failure of government to ensure democratic 
values. This situation is clearly outlined in the report of Electronic conference (25th January to 1 s t 
February, 2001) organised by the Harvard programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. 
The report entitled 'Conflict Prevention Initiative: Setting Priorities for Preventive Action in Nepal, Final 
Report of the Web Conference' describes the contributing factors to instability in Nepal as: frustrated 
democratic expectations, inequitable political representation, corruption and loss of credibility of 
government, inability of government to address the human insecurity, social inequalities, lack of 
confidence in financial institutions and outsiders interference (PHPCR/HSPH, 2001:2). Governments 
led by different political parties have spent considerable time and resources on prolonging their own 
regime rather than grounding and shaping democratic principles and processes (Baral, 1998). Though 
freedom of expression is ensured, political dishonesty and moral turpitude is seen as rife (Badal, 1999). 
During the 10 year period of functioning democracy the major political parties [Nepal Congress, 
Communist Party of Nepal (united Marxist-Leninist), Rastrya Prajatantra Party, Nepal Sadbhawana 
Party, Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)] have captured power and ruled the country by 
heading the government, either in coalition, or in a majority/minority status. Nevertheless, intra and inter 
party wrangles are an inherent characteristic of all the parties. Fabulous promises by all parties in their 
election manifestos and public speeches, to miraculously transform the country's economy, to uplift the 
socio-economic condition of the destitute millions of people, to develop basic infrastructures in rural 
areas and to eliminate monstrous corruption have remained only promises for a decade (Pandey, 1999; 
Khanal, 1999). 
The problem is further complicated by the Maoist People's War17 in Nepal. Since 1997 major political 
parties, who support the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, raised their voice to bring the 
Maoist movement under control. The government and the ruling party should have had a paramount 
role in this process. However, they have been marginalised in favour of the individual interests of 
powerful political leaders of these parties. A common practice in Nepal is the use of political gimmicks 
by political parties such as "BP among the Poor", "Ganeshman Peace Campaign", "Afno Goan Afai 
Banaun (Build our village ourselves)", "Gramin Swablamban (rural self-help)", "Nau Sako Karyakram 
(Nine point programme)", etc. In reality, the poor are finding it more difficult to maintain a bare 
subsistence level (Khanal, 1999). Owing to various experiments in economic policy, which are 
essentially detached from the harsh realities confronting people, economic hardships have increased. 
Beneficiaries of all these economic reforms are not the downtrodden masses, but a few people without 
whose blessing no government or political parties can survive in the country (NFN, 1999). In the past 10 
years, the country has witnessed a despair in democracy due to the extremely poor performance of the 
government and the political parties (Baral, 1998). Prices of essential commodities are greatly 
exceeding affordable limits of the general public. Law and order is worsening and outstanding issues 
with neighbouring countries have been shelved. Moral laxity among leaders holding public responsibility 
is on the rise, the magnitude of corruption among public figures is alarming. The objective of the political 
leaders is to cling to the corridors of power at any cost. Normless politics and habitual dishonesty are 
the major characteristics of political leaders (Khanal, 1999). Apparently, the indomitable opposition 
seems to have fallen a hapless victim to political megalomania. The amount of corruption cited by 
various media reports and the expression of dissatisfaction with politicians practically dwarfs those cited 
as taking place during the party-less regime (Propublic, 2000; Pandey, 1999; NFN, 1999). Those who 
are at the helm of power seem to have already realised that their degenerate political milieu has 
rendered them incompetent to deliver anything substantial. They are desperately looking for easy 
4 7 Maoist People's War is a political movement initiated by the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) since February 12,1996 to 
change the present political system in Nepal and to establish the people's democratic republic. Earlier it was only in few 
districts, but within four years it has spread all over the country. The web conference report states that "Maoists have found 
considerable support among those dissatisfied with the corruption and lack of development under parliamentary democracy 
(PHPCR/HSPH, 2001:3). 
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scapegoats to whom they can attribute their dismal failures (NFN, 1999). This is clearly reflected in their 
public statements as symptoms of political psychosis. It is overwhelmingly realised that the colossal 
promises on economic development, to uplift the poor and to restore law and order given by the 
government and leaders of political parties are simply dreams the Nepalese people have to live with. 
Nepalese politicians all have their moral standards custom-made (Khanal, 1999). It is often discussed 
and debated that a substitute for democracy is hard to find, but it is questionable whether the 
Westminster system will serve as an effective model to tackle the economic depravity and 
insurmountable social problems (NFN, 1999). 
In Nepal, even professional politicians holding high public office have irresolute moral principles that 
change depending on the circumstances (Khanal, 1999). Political ripples created by alleged moral laxity 
on the part of responsible members of national political parties are still being felt. Whether or not the 
conduct of political leaders of this country befits the norms of democracy, the way they are exonerated 
is definitely deplorable (ibid.). It is true that in a Nepalese feudalistic society, to a certain degree, moral 
turpitude is an accepted phenomenon and a tragic reality. However, when politicians have gained a 
popular mandate from the people on issues such as the eradication of corruption, economic reform, etc. 
it is not easy to condone. In a real democracy, such degenerate morals would have been extinguished 
from active politics. Moral decadence and wanton extravagance are common phenomenon amongst 
political leaders (ibid.). What is alarming today is the proportion and style of unethical conduct amongst 
the leaders of political parties and public figures (Badal, 1999). Leaders of the democratic political 
parties and the elected representatives are responsible for nurturing social decency and democratic 
culture in the country. If their own moral standards are deteriorating, the characteristics of society are 
likely to be the same. It is doubtful how many politicians have followed the proper code of conduct and 
not been involved in corruption and political manoeuvring. How are politicians accumulating enormous 
wealth within such short periods of time? The answers to these questions all indicate the moral standard 
of Nepalese politicians and ultimately the state of democracy in Nepal. If the present trend in moral 
laxity continues unabated the social situation will deteriorate. The present pseudo-democratic rhetoric in 
Nepal (Khanal, 1999) will lead to social disintegration. Statements of Nepalese politicians also reflect 
how democracy is functioning in Nepal48. It is noteworthy to state the assessment of the United Nations 
Development programme (UNDP) on the performance of political process in Nepal. The UNDP (1998) 
highlights that 'it is not only the government that is found wanting by popular judgement, the political 
process itself as a mechanism for articulating and aggregating interests and resolving conflicts is now 
under increasing threat. The growing sense of insecurity and wide spread public apathy against 
government, politics, the elite and even the professions is indicative of the nature and extent of 
afflictions in the polity1 (Chapter 12-Human Development Report). 
4 8 The Prime Minister and the Chairperson of the Nepali Congress Party Girija Prasad Koirala while addressing a central-level 
seminar on Reforming the Electoral Procedure said "democracy is yet to establish firmly in Nepal" (The Kathmandu Post, 12 
July, 2000). General Secretary of CPNUML and the Leader of the Main Opposition Party Madav Nepal said "there is a gap 
between the democratic system envisaged by the constitution and the one currently in vogue. The democracy in practice is just 
an elite democracy even though elites not satisfied with the achievement during the past ten years, in order to become 
inclusive, the poliy must orient towards the poor and its fruits to the grassroots. The system cannot be deemed democratic 
unless it maintains peace, enhances public good and promotes equality". The Speaker of the Parliament Tara Nath Ranabhat 
said "The State has been unable to deliver the expected level as political parties failed to forge a national consensus on 
matters of public interests. The result is that people at the grassroots level have been deprived of the fruits they deserved. The 
state on the one hand has been unable to make laws promised by the constitution while many of the laws have been 
superfluous on the other." National Assembly Chairman Mohammed Mohasin said "It is time to review if the system is moving 
ahead as desired by the people and correct it if it is on the wrong track.' (The Telegraph, 28 June 2000). Lawmaker Mr Suresh 
Malta says "The government has become the prisoner of non performance. The tale of curbing corruption is like making castle 
in the air. Any clean parliamentarian becomes corrupt no sooner he holds the portfolio of Ministry of Works and Transport. This 
has become the tradition of Nepa/* (Propublic, 200:15). "I have had no works done yet without bribing,"says Rajendra Khetan, 
a renowned industrialist. "Those sitting on top of bureaucracy, the secretaries, department chiefs and politicians are the root of 
corruption in Nepal," says Krishna Ballav Sharma Kafle, Commissioner of the Commission of Investigation of Abuse of 
Authority (Propublic, 2000:2). I am not arguing that all politicians and bureaucrats are corrupt. Some bureaucrats and politicians 
are proficient, ethical, hard working, scrupulous and sincere. But they have not much influence in the existing political and 
bureaucratic culture. This situation clearly calls for attention to be given to political and bureaucratic restructuring in Nepal. 
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3.3 Political economy of natural resources in Nepal 
Political economy refers to the public power or decision-making over access to and control over 
resources. The basic questions are who gains, who loses, who has control and how? While discussing 
the political economy of natural resources it is important to discuss how politics function in a particular 
social setting. In agrarian societies such as Nepal, though people use the land, the true owner is the 
state and a feudalistic mode of production exists. Society is not a mere sum of individual acts, but rather 
a complex totality of interacting individuals tied up with specific social and economic relationships and 
interdependent structures. Individuals in society are embedded to particular class-relationships and 
class interests. Political life is an expression of dependency and state domination. The elite, particularly 
formal power holders, have an interest in maintaining such a dependent structure so as to get the most 
benefit from the system (Bista, 1991). This is truly reflected in Nepalese rural societies where there are 
hierarchies of chains of relationships, which have an exploitative structure. There is a formal power 
structure that is represented by the elite at different levels, i.e., at the political level, top civil servants, 
businessmen, religious leaders, etc. At the local level these elite fulfil their interest through power. They 
share certain common ideologies and political positions, values and perspectives (Rana and Dhungel, 
1997) and act accordingly to maintain the existing mode of resources management and utilisation. 
Investment of resources in the development is organised accordingly. 
History of the Nepalese political economy of NR shows that prior to 1734, when present Nepal was a 
fragmented groups of petty states, people were deliberately encouraged to cultivate as much forest and 
pasture land as possible. This ensured them a good living and increased the productivity of land. They 
then paid a certain portion of their return to the state (fvlalla, 1997; Regmi, 1978a). Until 1950 it was 
common for the state to grant tax-free land to officials, religious organisations and individual favourites 
of the kings or rulers (Regmi, 1978b). Traditionally land was considered as the property of the state 
[state landlordism] and this land is called Raikar49 (Regmi, 1976). Only the state had the right to alienate 
land through sale, mortgage or bequest (Ibid.). Using this right of alienation the state granted cultivated 
or uncultivated state-owned Raikar lands to individuals in the form50 of Jagir, Birta, Rakam, Sera and 
Rajya and charitable or religious organisations in the form of Guthi (Regmi, 1963; 1976). The Guthi 
land-tenure system also included the endowment of private lands (obtained from the state) by individual 
landlords for religious purposes. KipaF1 was another communal land-tenure system where individuals 
derive kipat-land rights, from their association with particular ethnic groups, located in a particular area 
4 9 M.C. Regmi argues that there were mainly two types of land tenure system in Nepal, i.e., Raikar and Kipat. All other tenured 
forms of land were derived from Raikar (Regmi, 1976; 1978a; 1978b). The meaning of Raikar land has changed since 1951, 
from crown-land to land owned by individuals. Raftar-land ownership denotes an ultimate state ownership over those lands, 
which were actually cultivated by individuals as direct tenants of the state. The tenancy of Rraikar land has two categories, i.e., 
the actual tenant-cultivators and the tenant owner. The later category of tenants are those who paid rent to the state, but who 
could sell or bequeath their Raikar land where as the former category (the tenant cultivators) had no right to sell sublet or 
otherwise alienate the land which had been allotted to them. The usufructary assignment of Raikar land to individuals and 
institutions as a deliberate means of rewarding and insuring their loyalty, paying them for services rendered and promoting 
social and religious activities. The flai/carland grant was practised in several forms viz.: Birta, Jagir and Guthi, Rakam, Rajya, 
and Sera. 
5 0 A Birta grant was given to a noble as a reward for a service rendered to the state. It had no time limits and it could be rented 
out or, inherited until confiscated or recalled by the state. Birta owners usually had full rights to possess, occupy, sell, lease, 
subdivide and bequeath their lands. Most Birta lands were not taxable. It has become the foundation of the modem, private-
land-property arrangement. Jagir land holding was more conditional and subtle and often granted to government servants 
rather than to members of the ruling elite. A Jagir assessment was usually an assignment of the income from Raikar lands in 
lieu of a salary and it could not be assigned or sold. Jagir rights lapsed together with the cease of employment, or at the 
discretion of the government. The Birta and Jagir forms were abolished in 1959, with the enacting of the Birta Abolition Act and 
converted to Raikar land (New Era, 1988; 28-31). Sera was a form of land tenure explicitly used by the royal palace to meet the 
food-grain and other land-related requirements. Rakam is another form of land tenure where cultivators have to compulsorily 
provide unpaid labourers to the government as carpenters, masons, and postmen. Rajya was another modified form of land 
tenure granted as the princely state award for members and relatives of Royal families. This land-granting practice was 
common, up until the Rana regime. Rulers granted large portion of lands to soldiers as Jagir to keep them under their control. 
Rana rulers confined the land-grant practices to their relatives and key officials. 
5 1 It was an ancient type of communal land tenure where ethnic community was granted land by their king in recognition of 
traditional communal traditional tenure. Headmen had the authority to grant individuals the right to cultivate certain areas and 
collect forest products from other areas (Regmi, 1978a) 
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(Regmi, 1963). Regmi (1972:27) states that "individuals who cultivated land in their capacity as a 
member of a Kipat-owing ethnic group owed allegiance primarily to the community, not to the state". 
Almost one third of agricultural and forest land of the nation was granted to private individuals by 1950 
and the remaining belongs to Rana themselves (Regmi, 1978a: Malla, 1997). Local functionaries, all 
favourites of Rana, implemented the land-grant policy in the village and were able to assure most 
benefit for themselves. They obtained a great deal of land from the state through Jagirand Birta grants 
and rented these lands to peasant farmers under tenancy arrangements. In this way local functionaries 
turned into landlords. Peasant farmers had to pay half of their crop yield as rent to the local landlords. 
Gradually, to ensure their rent, landlords introduced the kut (contract) system where only those tenants 
who were able to pay high rents could get a contract. Irrespective of the performance of their crops, 
even if the crops failed, farmers had to pay rent as Kut Eventually these peasant farmers effectively 
turned into slave labourers of the Jag/rand Birta holders (Regmi, 1978a; Stiller, 1976). After 1951, the 
government nationalised all the forest in Nepal to release land from Birta holders, especially from Rana 
familiers (Regmi, 1978b). However, this did not function well in practice. Historically land resources in 
Nepal played a crucial role in socio-economic and political change and were used by principalities and 
national governments for their political goals (Regmi, 1978b). 
Large portions of all these forms of land tenure were cultivated under tenancy arrangement, in the form 
of share cropping. Some landlords were entrusted by the government as Mukhiya® (Talukdar and 
Jimuwat) in the Hill regions and Chaudhari and Jimidar in Terai regions (pradhan, 2000) to work on land 
administration. They had the authority to establish settlement in new areas, to collect tax and pay part of 
it to government (Regmi, 1976). The emergence of a unified nation was the outcome of the 
consolidation of small kingdoms, fiefdoms and principalities. The state began to regulate the available 
NR to generate revenue to run the country. This led to the establishment of control mechanisms: 
different departments and regional offices, policies, acts, rules and regulations to systematically control 
the available NR. It can be seen from the above brief history of land tenure systems in Nepal that the 
rulers used land as a means of maintaining functionaries for the consolidation of power and maintaining 
good relations with family members, close allies, members of the nobility, military personnel, civil 
employees, royal courtiers and potential foes (Acharya, 1993). The mode of production in and 
distribution of NR was very much feudalistic in nature. The landless people and bonded labourers are 
not able to be involved in the movement to acquire land (Karki, 1999). Large segments of Nepalese 
society is still promoting an unjust socio-cultural system (Dahal et ah, 1999). Therefore, conflict is not 
only ubiquitous between landlords and landless but also between state v/s poor and state v/s landlords 
(Ghimire, 1992; Zaman, 19973; Upreti, 1988). Because of theses reasons the existing regulatory 
measures do not justify their existence. 
In the history of Nepalese development (especially between 1951 and 2000), development intervention 
as a means of agrarian change had three complementary objectives: i) to raise production and 
productivity ii) to raise livelihood63 and iii) to sustain the existing NR base. The emphasis given in 
national policies and planning [for example, The Ninth Five Year Plan (NFYP), Nepal Agriculture 
Perspective Plan (APP)j was to increase production, achieve a trade balance and increase employment 
opportunities in the NR sector and enhance national economic growth by effectively utilising the 
available NR. However, the performance level of such interventions through NRM in alleviating poverty 
in Nepal has not yet reached expectations. There is evidence that productivity-oriented achievements 
are not fully able to address problems, such as the widening gap between rich and poor, unemployment 
and degradation of the natural resource base. These problems are not only creating inequality but also 
creating fundamental conflict between the rich and the poor. The growing Maoist movement in Nepal is 
an example of such conflict. The implications of such conflicts are long term and are dividing society, 
5 2 Mukhiya is a traditional institution, recognised by the government ot that time to collect land revenue. Mukhiya is a general 
term to represent a Taluk (responsible for upland-revenue collection) and a Jimuwal (responsible for low-land revenue 
collection). If they take responsibility for both types of land then they are called a Mukiya. The literal meaning of Mukhiya is the 
main person of the village. Up until the mid seventies the Mukhya was very powerful in rural Nepal. Gradually this position is 
becoming weaker and weaker and recently the government also removed their legal authority to collect land revenue. 
5 3 Chambers (1988) explained the first and second objectives in detail in the context of South Asia. 
Chapter 3 44 
disrupting social harmony and cohesion. In this context Chambers (1988:7) explains that "the problem of 
poverty in South Asia at least is not now a problem of production, or of food availability: it is a problem of 
who produces the food and of who has power to obtain if. In contrast to seeing production and 
productivity as an end, a livelihood perspective sees production as a means of enhancing the well being 
of rural people. According to Chambers (1988:7), livelihood thinking "is assessed in terms of the 
adequate and secured livelihoods it generates and sustains, putting antipoverty efforts, and people, 
before production per se". Raising productivity54 still dominates thinking in Nepal. Natural resources 
have strong and diverse impacts on different categories of people (land-less farmers, wage labourers, 
tenant farmers, women, landlords, powerful elite, etc.) depending on time and other changing 
circumstances. The sustainable contribution of NRM in reducing the vulnerability of impoverished 
people, sustaining ecological services from natural resources, stabilising social mobility and improving 
the quality of life of the rural poor is yet to materialise. It can only take place through a strong political 
commitment, clear vision, fair and responsive administration, protection from malpractice such as rent-
seeking (Wade, 1982), expansion of institutional understanding (Ostorm, 1990), and embracing 
collective learning and concerted action (Roling and Wagemakers, 1998). The economic transformation 
of more than 49 %of Nepalese people, who are below the poverty line, is still more wishful thinking than 
a reality. In contemporary Nepal ethics and responsibility (providing livelihood to the burgeoning 
population) do not drive NRM objectives, rather they are driven by the accumulation of wealth and 
power. 
3.4. Natural-resource management policies, practices and achievements 
Since the mid-1970s, emphasis has been given to land use based on regional and ecological potentials 
such as livestock development in the Mountain regions, promotion of horticulture in the Hill regions, and 
cereals and cash-crop promotion in the Terai (NPC, 1998). Explicit concerns were expressed about 
environmental degradation and a number of policy measures for conservation and sustainable 
management of NR were stipulated (Chapagain ef. a/., 1999). These concerns were reiterated in the 
successive five-year plans. Community participation in NRM was emphasised in the Sixth Five-Year 
Plan (1981-85). The Seventh (1986-1990) and Eighth (1991-1995) Five-Year Plans also emphasised 
NRM by users (for example, the community forestry programme (CFP) hands-over government forests 
to local communities). The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) has also focused on appropriate 
management and utilisation of NR by maintaining the balance between environment and development. 
Land-use planning is supported by irrigation, technology and other inputs to maximise the production 
level. In this plan His majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG/N) has focused on holistic water resource 
development and its tie with the Twenty-Year Agriculture Perspective Plan (1995-2015) (NPC, 1998: 
483). Government policy gives priority to 'holistic river basin approaches and the link between irrigation 
development and the APP. Promotion of the role of NGO's and users' associations, the handover of 
NRM to users, NR-related training for farmers, monitoring of technical, social, environmental and 
economic impacts of NR and people's participation are just a continuation of past rhetoric. The MPFS 
198955, APP, Irrigation Policy, Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan, all are rhetorically focusing 
on community-led resource management (NPC, 1998). Critics say that the current NRM policy is supply 
driven and guided by hidden economic and political interests. To-date in Nepal the effects have not 
been considered of making and executing policies on complex social dynamics and of breaking the 
isolated sectoral focus on NRM (Upreti, 1999a & 2000a; Pandey, 1999; Khadka, 1994). 
5 4 Both the Ninth Five-Year Plan and Agriculture Perspective Plan fully focused on economic growth of the agricultural sector 
through effective NRM. 
5 5 MPFS categorised forestry into six major components. They are Community and Private Forestry, National and Leasehold 
Forestry, Wood Based Industry, Medicinal and Aromatic Plants and other Minor Forest Products, Soil Conservation and 
Watershed Management, Conservation of Ecosystem and Genetic Resource Programmes. MPFS clearly articulates the 
primacy of community forestry. The MPFS gave clear policy framework to meet people's basic needs for fuelwood, timber, 
fodder and other forest products on a sustained basis by promoting people's participation including women. Community and 
Private Forestry Programme were placed in top priority. As a result Community forest management is increasingly recognised 
as a suitable approach to the sustainable management and utilisation of forest resources. This approach is based on the 
philosophy of participation of users in management activities. 
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National Planning Commission (NPC) in its Eight Five-Year Plan's Review states that the low economic 
growth rate of Nepal is due to political instability (NPC, 1998:3). In public finance, regular expenditure is 
increasing by 44.21 %. The budget deficit over the eight five-year plans has increased. In development 
expenditure, large portion is obtained by foreign aid56. The annual, average percentage change in the 
consumer price index is 8.3. In foreign trade the annual average percentage-growth rate of exports is 
10.4 compared to a 26.6 percent growth in imports (NPC, 1998:51), which is leading to a big trade 
imbalance. The statement of the NPC, government's central planning and monitoring body, "despite the 
planned development efforts of more than four decades, high economic growth rate has not been 
achieved, and plans have been unable to make expected impact on the living standard of general 
people" illustrates the situation. The latest critical assessment of planned development of Nepal has 
been made by the noted development planner and economist Devendra Raj Panday in his book 
"Nepal's Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies" (1999) that gives a 
comprehensive idea about the Nepalese development policies and programmes. 
Effective devolution of power still remains a mirage despite the provision made for it in the constitution. 
Acts and regulations further limit this delegation of power. Centralised planning has persisted as the 
basis for national resource allocation. It is inherently incapable of responding to the specificity of local 
needs and priorities, especially of people below the poverty line (NFN, 1999; Acharya, 1998). Spending 
large amounts of scarce national resources has failed to make a significant contribution to the reduction 
of poverty and an improvement in the well being of Nepalese people. This is mainly because of misuse 
of resources and political and bureaucratic corruption (Shrestha, 1999; NFN, 1999). Despite the re-
establishment of a democratic political system in the country a decade ago the legacy of the autocratic 
Panchayat regime is not over. Nepalese society, especially political parties are not operating according 
to the ideals of democracy (SNV, 1998). Despite the availability of the progressive constitution to 
exercise democratic ideals, it is witnessed embracing opportunism and corruption in public life. 
Corruption continues to be rampant at all levels and is becoming part of the culture of the Nepali political 
system. The Maoist's insurgency and counter actions by the government mean that atrocities against 
ordinary citizens are becoming more common. Several foreign and Nepalese political scientists, thinkers 
and analysts say that the eruption of the Maoist movement is the result of successive failure of the 
government to govern the country according to the ideals of the constitution (PhPCR/HSPH, 2001:1-18). 
Several development programmes were implemented since 1951 with no positive impact on poverty and 
livelihood67. The majority of them have been donor-driven or donor-initiated. Interference and influence 
by donors in economic policies and financial regulations is clear as the Word Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNDP and other bilateral and multilateral 
donors dictate governmental macro-economic policies and development programmes. For example, in 
1999 and 2000 they forced the government to increase the price of basic needs such as electricity, 
petroleum, water, chemical fertiliser and to remove food depots from remote rural food-deficit areas. The 
donor community has often warned the Nepalese government about its failure to check misuse of 
resources and rampant corruption (Propublic, 2000). The promotion of energy production, rural 
infrastructure development and industrial development is weak. The effect of globalisation and 
economic liberalisation, is to sharply widen the gap between the rich and poor, making basic facilities 
inaccessible to poor people. The national economy and financial policies are completely guided by the 
giant Indian economy and interests of bilateral and multilateral donors. 
5 6 The share of foreign loans in the total foreign aid is 68.5 %. The share of foreign assistance in development expenditure in 
Nepal is high, i.e., 90,80,55,46,48,51,71, 66 and 59 % in first to ninth plans, respectively (Thapa, 2000) 
5 7 For Example the Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP), a dominant development programme of the late seventies, 
eighties and early nineties, has a history of grand failure in Nepal (Pandey, 1999; Upreti, 1995). However, there are some 
successful programmes such as the Community Forestry, farmers self-help groups, Farmers-Managed irrigation Systems, 
community resource management. The major reason for these successes is not because of government support but mainly 
because of local initiatives. However, these local-initiated successful programmes are not getting sufficient attention and are 
facing continuing problems. The current attempts by the Forestry Department to control community-forestry are an example of 
such problems. 
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The mushrooming of NGOs (about 40,000 is estimated) in Nepal is also trapping and misusing huge 
resources in the name of poor people, while trying to operate in parallel with the government. The Role 
of NGOs in Nepal is very ambiguous. The majority of politicians, senior bureaucrats, present or former 
members of the NPC or their family members and relatives have registered NGOs and collect money 
using their position, influence and linkage. The vast majorities of these NGOs are indirectly affiliated 
with one of the powerful political parties and are mobilised as a mean of winning elections or expanding 
party politics. Some of them are working for the religious interests of international missionaries. 
Conservationists and activists have consistently expressed their bitter opposition to big NR-related 
projects, especially hydropower projects in Nepal. These projects are seen as a source of illicit revenue 
for politicians to gain votes. Critics say that these political projects largely serve the economic interests 
of international companies, political leaders and senior bureaucrats and remain a continuous source of 
conflict. Environmental lobbyists and NGOs argue that the social dislocation and environmental damage 
caused by such large projects is high. Some disgruntled planners and politicians are also pointing out 
the confusion and ambiguity in the long term NRM-strategy of the government. They blame the water 
authorities, who for political reasons, are merely selecting a few large projects such as the Karnali-
Chisapani, Arun, and Kaligandaki projects, which cause conflicts later. The Arun and Tanakpur 
hydropower projects are evidence that Nepal has entered into the era of water politics and water 
conflicts (Himal, 1995). 
To effectively resolve conflicts to advance the outcomes from NRM, a deeper understanding and 
appreciation of local dynamics and power relationships that characterise community-based NRM 
activities are needed. There needs to be an appreciation of economic and social status, local knowledge 
systems, values and understandings and objectives of the users (Anderson et a/., 1997). Coping with 
the strategies and actions of these users determines the success or failure of CM in NRM. Successful 
NRM is that which promotes equity, increases the standard of living of users, provides ecological 
services and uses conflicts as a source of learning. How conflicts are managed in a collaborative way to 
attain these goals, depends on collective learning and adaptive action based on negotiated agreement 
at group, community, regional and national levels. Indigenous NRM is, in most cases, successful in 
Nepal. Nevertheless, hands-on NRM policies and programmes the state bureaucracy is viewed as the 
only suitable approach in Nepal. 
Together with emerging landlordism and exploitation of peasant farmers, the struggle for land rights by 
landless peasants has increased. As a result, the government initiated land-reform measures such as 
land consolidation, resettlement, land reform (Karki, 1999). Evidence shows that rural landlords, senior 
civil servants, political leaders and ruling elites, got maximum benefit by exploiting such governmental 
initiatives and very few real landless people benefited. Bribery in land transactions is a common 
characteristic in these initiatives (ibid.). Rhetorically, the Landless Problem Resettlement Committee, 
started in 1976, was expected to be a landmark in securing land for landless people. In practice the 
land-settlement and reform processes in Nepal, then and now, is highly politicised and works to 
safeguard the economic and political interests of politicians and senior bureaucrats. 
The increasing concern for sustainable development in recent years has raised the issues of economic, 
social and cultural development through effective land-use planning. This orientation has added a 
critical dimension to the rapid pace of urbanisation in Nepal and has effected land-use practices. 
Indigenous knowledge-based specific land use and management patterns, agro-ecological practices 
and conservation and management of land resource have been overlooked. Fast changing land-use 
patterns are not adequately valuing local land-management systems and agricultural practices. A painful 
example of the adverse effect of urbanisation on land resource degradation can be seen in the 
Kathmandu valley and other major cities, where large areas of very fertile land have quickly been 
covered by buildings and other infrastructures. Due to weak governmental policy people are purchasing 
pieces of these fertile lands and keeping them fallow to sell for housing. This is severely reducing the 
productivity of the land. Squatters and landless people are encroaching onto the land for residential 
purposes. A serious threat to the fertile land in urban centres is the brick industry, which is using the 
topsoil of thousands of hectares of fertile land and riverbeds to meet the ever growing demand for brick 
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for construction. The construction industry is also responsible for damaging thousands of hectares of 
fertile land to supply sand. The political distribution of land, based on vested political interests, through 
the politically motivated organisation, the Landless Problem Resettlement Committee is creating much 
conflict. 
Nepal has a highly unequal society in terms of land distribution mainly due to its feudalistic socio-
political structure, a weak institutional framework and policies, a lack of commitment by and 
determination of the politicians and poor performance by the bureaucracy (Ghimire, 1992). Nepal's 
present socio-economic structures show that land is the main property and source of income for 
Nepalese people. Due to the vertical social structure and highly stratified economic condition, large 
portions of land have been accumulated by local elite (Karki, 1999). The present land-tenure 
arrangement in Nepal is still unfavourable to vulnerable groups of people. The execution of stable-land 
rights granted by the Land Act is weak and customary land rights are heavily slanted in favour of the 
elite and restricted to maintain patron-client relationships between landlords and tenants. Control of the 
land by women is minimal and they even have no rights to parental land. Landlords and the village elite 
class have largely controlled the new land-property regime. They are close to political power centres, 
well informed about any legal provisions on the land and able to influence bureaucracy, either in an 
open fashion or in more indirect and subtle ways. Private appropriation and sale of lands by powerful 
politicians and privileged local landlords, which were traditionally under communal control are negatively 
affecting land management. Land fragmentation is further increased by the cultural and legal provision 
of dividing land between the sons of a family. No effective legal measures have yet been taken to 
protect land fragmentation and promote land consolidation. Land-use planning based on land-efficiency 
classification is weak (NPC, 1998). There is little land-related information and the states lack agro-
biodiversity documentation and land-use maps. The available land resource in the country is inadequate 
to supply the facilities and social services for the ever-increasing population. Migration is rapidly 
changing the land-use patterns and cropping systems of the Terai (alluvial plains) and this is being 
further complicated by landless and land poor migrants (popularly known as Sukumbasi) (Ghimire, 
1992). Several uncultivated areas (especially forests) which are potentially suitable for agriculture are 
being encroached, devegetated and cultivated. Expansion of cultivation to forest, marginal land and 
grazing land has several direct effects on land use. 
The policies and programmes of both government and donors have not been successful in reducing 
poverty in Nepal. The government is spending only 2.5 %of its national income on the social sector 
while the donors share is only 6.5 %, which is much less than the recommended minimum (AAN, 1997). 
The bulk of the resources (both natural and financial) go to the rich and powerful, while the poor suffer 
from the problem of daily survival. Nepal's food productivity index has not increased in the last 20 years 
and food insecurity is increasing over time. Trie food insecurity situation is further enhanced due to the 
removal of half of the total food depots from remote rural areas under the pressure of Asian 
Development bank (ADB)" says Yamuna Ghale, Co-ordinator of the National Alliance for Food Security-
Nepal. The existing acts and regulations have many loopholes and weaknesses, which are not able to 
ensure the interests of the poor. Most NRM programmes and projects did not specifically address 
poverty alleviation and hence failed to meet the needs of the poor. The structural adjustment 
programme, which started in 1985 in Nepal with the objective of industrial and trade liberalisation, 
domestic resource mobilisation, financial sector reform and poverty alleviation did not bring any 
significant positive impact on the Nepalese economy. The annual economic growth rate remained 
stagnant, below 4 %, but an enormous rise in outstanding debt led to a rapid increase in prices and 
double-digit inflation. The liberalisation policy enhanced the privatisation of some of the social services 
such as health, education and transport. These tend to be marginalised and sidelined to the poor due to 
their inability to access these expensive services. The Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) highlights that 
per capita food grain production is decreasing (376 kg in 1974/75 to 277 kg in 1991/92) and there is an 
increasing trend in poverty incidence (40 percent in 1976/77 to 49 percent in 1991/92). There is also an 
increasing trend in the ratio of agricultural import to agricultural export (one-half during the period of 
1975-79 to two-and-a-half during the period of 1990-93) (APROSC and JMA, 1995). This poor 
performance of the agricultural sector is directly affecting the poor and marginalising farmers. The 
fragmentation of villagers along party political lines has drastically increased with a multiparty 
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democracy and is seriously causing conflict in communities. Civil organisations, which have become 
politically split, have been totally occupied with matters within their own constituency without any 
broader involvement in social development. The rapid changes in the NRM sector indicate that 
conflicting interests will continue to cause problems and the need for strengthening our ability to 
manage such conflicts is evident. 
3.5 State laws and regulations related to natural resources 
In this section I briefly present major state laws and regulations related to land, water and forests. The 
origin of many of these laws and regulation lie in the historical dynasties of Shah, Malta, Lichvi and Kirat 
(Khadka, 1997). The following table shows the major laws. 
Table 3.1 Overview of major laws related to land, water and forests (Oli, 1998; Belbase and Regmi, 
1998; Khadka, 1997; Chapagain etal., 1999; Pradhan, 2000) 
General laws related to Land-related laws Forest-related laws Water-related 
NR laws 
Constitution of the Public Roads Act 1974 Forest Acts 1993 Water Resources 
Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 Land Acquisition Act 1977 Forest Regulations 1995 Act 1992 
Muluki Ain (National Nepal Mines Act 1966 Environment Protection Water Resources 
Code) 1963 Soil Conservation and Act 1996 Rules 1993 
Local Administration Act Water Management Act Environment Protection Fixation of 
1971 1982 Regulations 1997 Electricity Tariffs 
Public Offence and Land Act 1964 Buffer Zone Management Rules 1993 
Punishment Act 1970 Birta Abolition Act 1959 Regulation 1996 Vehicle and 
Local Self Governance Trust Corporation (Guthi) National Parks and Wild- Transportation 
Act 1998s8 Act 1976 life Conservation Act Management Act 
Solid Waste Tenancy Right Acquisition 1973 1992 
Management and Act 1963 Private Forest Aquatic-Animal 
Resources Mobilisation Land Survey and Nationalisation Act 1956 Protection Act 
Act 1987 Measurement Act 1963 Environment Protection Trekking and 
King Mahendra Trust for Land Tax Act 1961 Act 1996 River Rafting 
Nature Conservation Act Mines and Minerals Act Regulation 1984 
1982 1985 
Arbitration Act 1981 Pasture Land 
Nationalisation Act 1973 
Land Revenue Act 1977 
The first codified law is the Muluki Ain of 1854 that was revised as New Muluki Ain in 1963. This codified 
law is still influential in Nepal. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 foresees people as the 
source of power. Article 26(3) of the constitution requires the State to pursue the policy of mobilising the 
nation's NR. Similarly, Article 26(4) stipulates special arrangements for the protection of rare wildlife, 
forests and vegetation. The constitution ensures access to water and any other public utilities as a 
natural right of Nepalese citizens without any discrimination. Article 17 of the constitution explains that 
all citizens have the right to property and private property can not be confiscated without paying due 
compensation. Water resource situated on private land, according to the constitution, can be considered 
as the private property of owners so far as its use is mingled with the use of the land (Khadka, 1997). 
Article 126 of the constitution states that ratification by parliament is necessary for accession to, 
acceptance or approval of a treaty or any agreement about NR and its distribution to users. Any 
agreement or treaty related to NR, which extensively or seriously affects the nation in the long term, 
5 8 Village Development Committee Act 1992, District Development Committee Act 1992 and Municipality Act 1992 have been 
replaced by Local Self Governance Act 1998 (Chapagain et a)., 1999) 
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should have ratification and approval by a two-thirds majority of the members present at a joint sitting of 
both houses of parliament. This article created great controversy in Tanakpur Barrage case when the 
government claimed that the Tanakpur deal with the Indian government is only an understanding 
between India and Nepal, but not a formal agreement. However, The Supreme Court, finally decided it 
was an agreement and so needed the approval of a two-thirds majority of the parliament. Many of these 
acts contradict each other and do not encompass the spirit of the constitution. For example, the LSGA 
1998 is contradicted by 51 other acts of Nepal (Saptahik Bimarsha Weekly, 16 June 2000). 
3.5.1 Water-related laws 
The Water Resource Act (WRA), 1992 specified water utilisation issues and states that water in the 
kingdom is state owned. However, the right to use water is granted to the public with certain provisions. 
Water rights relate not only to consumption, but also to discharge, destruction, pollution and related 
conservation work (Oli, 1998; Khadka, 1997). The WRA is intended for the judicious and effective use of 
water. The emphasis has been placed on harnessing the country's immense hydro-energy resource. 
The WRA does not recognise the existence of individual or community ownership of the water resource 
of Nepal, irrespective of its origin, place, mode of use, or the nature of its management (Khadka, 1997). 
According to this act any water source located on private land is the property of the state and negates 
the constitutionally awarded property right to use it by the Nepalese people. 
According to the WRA, individuals are entitled, without obtaining a license, to utilise water for their own 
drinking and domestic use, to irrigate their own land, to run local water turbines, for personal transport 
by boat, etc. without causing damage to others. However, they are not able to use water freely for any 
reason. According to section 3 and 4 of the WRA, no person is entitled to use the water resource, 
except for the purposes listed above without obtaining a license. Rule 8 of the water-resources 
regulation made provision for a District Water Resource Committee (DWRC) under the chairpersonship 
of the CDO in each district. This committee has representatives from the DADO, DFO, DWSO, DIO, 
District Electricity Office/project, Local Development Officer and the DDC, all bureaucrats except the 
DDC representative. Persons willing to use water for the collective benefit should be able to obtain a 
license from the DWRC. The WUC registered by the DWRC, then it becomes an autonomous corporate 
body. The license obtained under the act, can be sold or transferred to others. The licensee is liable 
under the WRA to pay a charge/annual fee to HMG/N to utilise the water resource. HMG/N may 
prescribe the necessary quality standard or tolerance limit of the water resource and may totally prohibit 
water pollution. The license can be cancelled when the licensee acts contrary to the WRA and its 
regulations or does not comply with an order given by the responsible officer (Khadka, 1997). Priority for 
obtaining a licence under the WRA is given in this order drinking water and domestic use, irrigation, 
agricultural/animal husbandry enterprises, hydro-electricity, cottage industries/industrial enterprises/ 
mining, navigation, recreational use and other uses. 
3.5.2 Forest-related laws 
Forests are classified into private and national, based on the ownership of the land on which the forest 
biomass stands. Forest grown on private land is private but although ownership of the land in the case 
of national forest lies with the state, management responsibility may be assigned to different institutions, 
for example community forestry. The Private Forest Nationalisation Act, 1957 was enacted by HMG/N to 
eliminate private Birta ownership59 and to control the destruction of national forests. This act 
unintentionally miss-interpreted the problems (Belbase and Regmi, 1998). Forests managed by 
indigenous systems were appropriated and their traditional rights were curtailed. This nationalisation of 
the forests led to people purposefully deforesting private forestlands to protect them from 
nationalisation. Communal forest management responsibilities became dysfunctional and open access 
to forest resources resulted in serious destruction of them, that the government was not able to control. 
The Forest Act of 1961 defined forest categories, listed forest offences, prescribed penalties and 
5 9 Approximately one-third of the valuable land/forest of the nation given to individuals by the feudal Rana regime as reward for 
military service 
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defined the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Forest (DoF). In this way, the Act restored 
governmental control over forest resources. The poor performance of nationalised forests led to this act 
being amended in 1978. Provision was made to hand-over degraded forest to Panchayat unit in the 
form of the Panchayat Forest and the Panchayat Protected Forest. The Panchayat Forest and 
Panchayat Protected Forest were collectively termed community forests. In this transition process, 
forest policies, laws, regulations and operational guidelines were revised, user's participation was 
encouraged, and donors changed their funding priorities. Users, NGOs, and Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) became involved in forest management. 
The Forest Act 1993 was enacted to meet the sprit of the Constitution. Revised Forestry Regulations 
came into existence and emphasised the hand-over of government forests to particular user groups. 
The Forest Act, 1993 and The Forest Regulation 1995 recognises Forest Users Groups (FUG) as a 
legal entity and emphasises the importance of their institutionalisation. A FUG registered according to 
Section 41 of the Act is an autonomous and corporate body with perpetual succession. According to rule 
29(1) of the Forest Regulations a user's group must submit an application to the DFO fulfilling the 
conditions prescribed by HMG/N to take over community forests. The DFO grants legal certificates to 
FUG of community forests. Section 25(1) entitles users to develop, conserve, use and manage CFs, to 
sell and distribute the forest products and fix their prices according to the Operational Plan. The 
operational plan of any FUG has to be approved by the DFO. According to rule 26(2) a FUG can even 
develop, manage and utilise forests on public lands after getting approval from the owners and 
acceptance from the DFO. The boundaries of villages, towns and districts have no effect on handing 
over a forest area as community forest. The FUG is authorised to impose penalties to any of its 
members who breach the rules or the operational plan. However, it is not clear who has authority to 
pose penalties on the offender other than other FUG members. The Forest Act (first amendment 1999) 
authorises the DFO to penalise the officers of a FUG if they are working contrary to the Forest Act, 
Regulation and operational plan. The Act and regulation also gives authority for having a separate fund 
for the FUG, obtained from grants, donations, assistance from individuals/institutions and sale of forest 
products. At least 25 % of the FUG fund must be spent on forest management activities. Activities 
prohibited in community forests by Rule 31 are: functions restricted by the operational plan, to destroy 
forest or transfer land ownership of community forests, to clear forest areas for agricultural purposes 
(cultivation of annual crops is not allowed), to build huts and houses, to take any action which may 
cause soil erosion, to capture or kill wildlife in violation of prevailing laws and to extract or transport 
rocks, soil, boulders, sand, pebbles, charcoal, lime and herbs protected by prevailing laws. According to 
Section 27(1) of the Act, the DFO has the authority to cancel the registration of a FUG if it is considered 
to be not respecting its operational plan or not fulfilling the conditions of the Act and Regulations. 
According to the Forest Act a FUG does not have direct ownership rights to the community forestland. 
Users entertain only usufruct rights of management of the forests. There are several inherent 
contradictions between the Forest and Local Self-Governance Act about the control of NR. For example, 
according to LSGA, the authority to control forests held by the VDC, remains with VDC. However, 
according to the Forest Act, FUGs are authorised to decide matters effecting community forests 
irrespective of the authority of VDC. The VDC has the authority to hear complaints about pasture, grass 
and fuel wood in a VDC area, but the Forest Act does not recognise such authority. The Local Self-
Governance Act places DFOs under the control of the DDC, but DFOs are reluctant to acknowledge this 
arrangement. However, the forest act says little about the forest, which has been managed by the 
community for a long time without being taken over from the government as community forest. Several 
contradictions and ambiguities have arisen relating to demarcation of forest boundaries, usufruct rights 
etc. (Chapagain etal., 1999). 
3.5.3 Land-related laws 
The Tenancy Right Acquisition Act was introduced in 1952. However, the Land Act 1957 was the first 
regulation giving tenants security against eviction in Nepal. As part of the land reform process the Jagir, 
Birta, Rajya and Rakam tenure systems were abolished in 1952, 1959, 1961 and 1963 respectively 
(Acharya, 1993). The Land Act 1964 and Land Rules 1964 introduced a ceiling on land holdings and 
land consolidation measures. Consequently landlords transferred any land above the amount allowed to 
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fictious persons or put them in the name of agricultural industries, in order to keep ownership (Zaman, 
1973). The Land Survey Act, 1963 classifies agricultural land into different categories according to 
cropping practices. The Land Administration Act, 1967 states that only those lands registered with the 
government are considered cultivated land. The Pasture Land Nationalisation Act, 1973 empowers the 
government to nationalise alpine, pasture-land under traditional ownership with provision for delegating 
the use and management of such land to local village boards. The Soil and Water Conservation Act, 
1982 gives the government a wide range of powers to regulate land use practices for conservation of 
natural resources and the environment. The Birta Abolition Act, 1959, Agriculture Development Act, 
1966, Land Acquisition Act, 1977 and Land Revenue Act, 1977 were enacted to reform land resources 
in Nepal. Currently, based on property ownership land can be grouped60 into government lands (Sarkari 
jagga), public land (Sarbajanik jagga) and private land {Nijijagga) (Pradhan 2000). However, the state 
has the right to acquire private and public lands for the benefit of the public by paying compensation 
(ibid.). 
The Civil Code, 1962 made several provisions related to the land. Chapters on land cultivation (Jagga 
Aawad Garneko Mahal], encroachment of land (Jagga Michneko Mahal}, building houses (Ghar 
abnauneko Mahal), partition (Ansa Bandako Mahal} and succession (Aputaliko Mahal} deal with land-
related conflicts. The Birta Abolition Act, 1959 was intended to abolish the feudal system of utilising land 
without paying any revenue to the state (Oli, 1998:35). The Nepal Mine Act, 1966 stipulates that any 
minerals located in the land of any individuals within the kingdom of Nepal shall be the property of the 
government. Any person or organisation must obtain certification of eligibility to mine those minerals 
(ibid.:40). The Guthi Corporation Act, 1976 and the chapter on Guthi of the 1963 National Code deal 
with guthi lands. Section 2(C) of the act defines guthi as: 'endowment made by any philanthropist 
through relinquishment of his/her title to movable or immovable property or any income-yielding fund, for 
the construction, operation or maintenance of any temples, rest-houses, road-side shelter, inn, well, 
tank, bridge, school, houses, or institutions in order to run a monastery or celebrate a religious occasion, 
ceremony or festival or any religious and philanthropic purpose' (Ibid: 41). Section 3 of the same act 
establishes a Guthi Corporation to manage guthi property. Sections 55, 56 and 57 deal with the 
punishment of anyone who registers the guthi land as raikar, who misappropriate ornaments or subverts 
the norms of traditional religion. Section 59 (1) empowers the Guthi Corporation to take action against 
those who commit the actions specified in sections 55 to 58. Section 60 gives judicial power to the 
Corporation to record statements, summon witnesses, and produce evidence. The guthi property has to 
be used for the purpose for which it was originally established. According to the decision of Supreme 
Court of the Kingdom of Nepal the right of guthi holders of guthi property handed down from ancestors 
is only to own and utilise it in accordance with the terms and conditions, by continuing the worship and 
religious festivals. No individuals shall have the sole right to it and no one can destroy or misappropriate 
the same (ibid.: 41-42). 
The Land Act, 1964 was intended to divert inactive capital and pressures of the growing population from 
the land to other sectors of the economy. This act defines tenancy conditions, ownership rights and the 
ceiling for holding land. The revised act makes it possible for tenants to have 50 % legal ownership of 
tenanted land without making any investments. According to the act any land held by a person in access 
of the ceiling set forth in section 7 devolves to the government and any individual's rights to it terminate. 
However, this still has not properly been translated into practice. It is reported that more than 35 % of 
the NRM related-conflict cases in Nepalese courts are related to land disputes (OH, 1998:44). 
The Arbitration Act, 1981 makes legal provision for arbitration in disputes. Section 3 of the act states 
that any dispute under bilateral or multi-lateral agreement may be settled through arbitration. This 
means that it is not possible to have arbitration in those conflicts, which are not covered by contract or 
agreement. This act is mainly for commerce, trade and industry-related conflicts, not for community level 
NR-related conflicts. 
6 0 Most of the cultivated and residential lands are private. Private land is the land owned by individuals or groups by paying tax 
to the government and can be sold, leased or bequeathed. Forests, mountains, grasslands, wetlands, areas covered by roads 
and water bodies are either government or public lands (Pradhan, 2000). 
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3.6 Legal pluralism and natural resource management in Nepal 
Formal laws and regulations are not the only set of rules and legal principles that govern the actions and 
behaviour of people towards NR-conflicts. In reality people are confronted with a wide range of co-
existing, multi-layered formal and informal legal phenomena. In practice the legal system is extremely 
complex due to it's multiple structure and local adjustments. In practice, not only state laws but also 
religious, customary, and local laws influence NRM and NR-related conflict. To understand 
management of NR-conflict it is crucial to understand the role of legal pluralism, which does not limit the 
solution of all natural-resource conflicts to the interpretation of statutory laws and governmental 
regulations. The interpretation of natural-resource rights, the social and economic functions of natural 
resources and their management practices are different in these plural legal systems in society 
(Pradhan et al, 1997). Mere origin of laws and regulations from the state does not necessarily ensure 
the anticipated results in NRM. All the actors (those who develop and execute laws and those who 
follow the laws) have to respect these laws and modify their behaviour accordingly when involved with 
NRM. This is a huge challenge for contemporary NRM in Nepal. These legal rules and laws are used by 
people to legitimise their claims and counter claims in natural resource conflict. During this process local 
people interpret these rules differently generating new informal, unofficial rules. In this respect all laws 
(generated from the source of state power and authority, custom or religion) become intermingled in 
practice and state law alone can not govern natural resources. 
Different local innovations, in the form of customary practices, may exist in a community to sustain the 
resource base and resolve conflict. Handing these down to successive generations and people is strictly 
adhered to. For example, Oli (1998) in his study in the Lamjung district found that primary users of 
grazing and forest lands have customary rights to appropriate, manage and control them. However, they 
allow secondary and tertiary users to collect or harvest resources, as defined by them, in return for 
nominal payment. Such practices are also found in the high hills of the study district. The aim of 
regulating resources in this way was to maintain a balance between socio-economic and ecological 
benefits through local management systems. However, such traditional rights and resource 
management systems are increasingly weakened by the government through the introduction of new 
systems of users' rights. This has not only led to enormous conflicts between new and old users but 
also to the disappearance of indigenous community led NRM practices (Malla, 1997; Oli, 1998; Upreti, 
1998b). 
According to both formal and customary laws, many of the community based NR are interpreted as CPR 
of the state (res publics) but used by community as communal property (res communis). None of the 
resources in village are interpreted as no-one's property (res nullis). According to the respondents of 
both research sites and reference sites, access to NR was not open to all in their community, rather they 
were shared, managed and developed according to their local customs. It is interesting to note that 
people have been adopting and adjusting these local management practices to external changes by 
gradually modifying their customs which have developed since ancient time. 
High-hill and mountain farmers in the study area, especially from the northern part of the district still 
mainly practice a transhumant system (migratory practices) of animal rearing. In this system farmers 
adopt the indigenous practice of shifting animals to the high altitude up-side grazing area (locally called 
Unbauli) by March and returning them to the down side grazing area (locally called as Undauli) in early 
October. They even have defined harvesting limits of some of the most commonly used plant species 
such as Anindrinaria spp., herbal plants, wild oilseeds and the Nepali paper-making plant61 (Daphne 
bholua) to prevent them from over use. The rotational grazing rules are strictly followed by herders to 
prevent deterioration of grazing lands from overgrazing, and enable regeneration in trampled areas. 
Those who disobey these rules are punished. These rules do not allow herders from other areas to 
graze in their common area or harvest forest products. These rules, protection practices and 
6 1 This is a special plant called Tokta" which has been used by local people since time immemorial to make indigenous Nepali 
paper. This was a regular source of income for rural people in earlier times. Later, after the imposition of government rules the 
indigenous paper-making industry became run by commercial traders. 
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management systems were working properly before the intervention of the government. The provision of 
licensing for hunting and NTFP harvesting, the development of transportation (road) and 
telecommunication facilities are affecting these indigenous management systems. The issues discussed 
above have shown that legal centralism is not the solution for natural-resource conflict and the 
importance of legal diversity needs to be acknowledged. 
3.7 About the study area 
3.7.1 Glimpse ofDolakha 
The study area is the Dolakha District which is situated in the central mountain-region of Nepal, from 
27°28" to 28°0" latitude North and 85°50" to 86°32" longitude East, 133 km North East from 
Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal. The total area of the Dolakha district is 2191 sq. km with the 
district headquarters in Charikot. Forests and meadow densely cover the district and it is very rich in 
flora and fauna. 
The altitude range of the district is from 763 to 7137 meters. Of the total land area 35% is high Himal, 
40% high hill and 25% is mid hills (Dolakha District Development Committee-DDDC, 1999). The climate 
in the lower parts of the district is sub-tropical to temperate with the temperature range from 8° to 17° 
Celsius. The average annual rainfall is 2043.5 mm. The land use pattern of the district is 14% cultivated, 
7% fallow, 16% grazing, 44% forest and 19% other lands out of the total 214278 ha in the district. This 
district is the frontier area between central Nepal and the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. 
Total population of the district is 191073 (in 1998) with 39554 households. The population density is 
87.2 persons per square km (National Research Associate-NRA, 1999). However, the population is not 
uniformly distributed over the district. The southern parts are much more densely populated than the 
northern belts. The population growth rate is 1.4% per year and family size is 4.8 per household (DDDC, 
1999). The literacy rate is 41 % (NRA, 1999). The percentage of children below 10 years is 29.2%. The 
percentage of landless and marginal farmers is 48.22. The population composition of the district is 
heterogeneous and made up of Chhetri, Brahmin, Damai, Kami, Sarki caste groups and Tamang, 
Sherpa, Jirel, Surel, Newar ethnic groups. The majority of the population is Chhetri (34.2%) followed by 
Tamang (16%), Brahmin (11.4%) and others (38.4%). Hindu (76.76%) and Buddhist (23.13%) are the 
most common religions in this district. Only 0.11% of the people follow other religions. The drinking 
water coverage in the district is 57.87 % whereas percentage of irrigated area is 8.62. The percentage 
of the are with slope above 30 degree is 69.65. The per capita forest area is 0.43 ha. The percentage of 
cultivated area is 11.2 (NRA, 1999). 
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Map 5 Dolakha district showing case study VDCs 
The district is politically divided into 51 VDCs, one Municipality and two electoral constituencies tor 
parliamentary election. The major political parties found in the district are The Communist Party of 
Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), Nepali Congress (NC), The Rastrya Prajatantra Party (RPP) 
Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and The Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist Leninist (CPN-ML). The 
CPN-UML dominates the elected political representatives (more than 95%). The economy of the district 
is based on agriculture on which 91.9 % of the population depends (DDDC, 1999). The remaining 8.1% 
of the population are engaged in services, business, labourering, etc. Rice, wheat, maize, finger millet, 
potatoes, legumes, fruits and vegetables are the major agricultural products and cows, buffalo, sheep, 
goats and pigs are the main animals reared in the district. The productivity of the major cereal crop is 
less than 2 tons per ha. Food deficiency is a major problem. Rural roads and telecommunication are 
gradually improving in the district (DDDC, 1999). Tamakoshi, Khimti, Chamawati, Rolwaling, Dolti, 
Gumu, Ghyang, Andheri are major rivers. Kharidhunga Orient Magnesite and Khimti Hydro Power are 
the two main projects operated in the district. 
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Table 3.2 Relative indicators of development in Dolakha district-1997 
S.n. Indicators Rank* Remarks 
1 Overall composite index of development 24 Worst1 
2 Poverty and deprivation index 23 Worst1 
3 Women's empowerment index 29 Intermediate2 
4 NR endowment index 43 Intermediate2 
5 Socio-economic infrastructure development index 18 Worst1 
6 Gender imbalance ratio in literacy status 54 Worst3 
7 Educationally disadvantaged population 42 Intermediate2 
8 Percentage of landless and marginal farm households 61 Worst3 
9 Per capita food production 72 Worst3 
10 Overall literacy rate 43 Intermediate2 
11 Infant mortality rate 10 Best3 
12 Drinking water coverage (in %) 36 Intermediate2 
13 Percentage irrigated area 47 intermediate2 
14 Road density (in %) 35 Intermediate2 
15 Bank coverage 62 Worst1 
16 Co-operatives 17 Best3 
17 Health institution 49 Intermediate2 
18 Per capita regular budget allocation 31 Intermediate2 
19 Per capita development budget allocation 34 Intermediate2 
20 Percentage of area with slopes above 30 degrees 53 Worst3 
21 Per capita forest area (ha) 30 Intermediate2 
22 Percent cultivated area 56 Worst3 
23 Gross rural-population density 21 Best1 
24 Gender discrimination index 24 Worst1 
25 Health and development index 49 Intermediate1 
26 Infrastructure development index 27 Intermediate1 
27 Post office 53 Worst3 
Source: National Research Associates, 1999 (Adapted). 
•Rank among the 75 districts of Nepal 
1= The highest rank starts with the 75* position of the district (75-51 best, 50-26 intermediate and 25-1 worst) 
2= Between 26* to 50* and 501" t 0 26* position of the district 
3= The highest starts with first position of the district (1-25 best, 26-50 intermediate and 51-75 worst) 
The main development programme activities currently implemented in the district by various GOs and 
NGOs using governmental funds and or with the support of donor communities are: 
• Rural Self Help and Electoral Constituency Development programmes, 
• Marginal, Backward and Dalit Community Promotion programme, 
• Suspension Bridge and Drought Mitigation Support programmes, 
• Social security, irrigation, drinking water, rural road development, special area development, 
livestock service, education, women's development programmes 
• Cottage and small scale industry development, community and leasehold forestry, soil conservation 
programmes, 
• Agriculture loan service, family planning, public health and sanitation and rural energy. 
The four district-level co-ordination committees namely the Agricultural Committee, Health and Social 
Committee, Industry, Forest and Environment Committee and the Development Committee are 
responsible for co-ordinating different development programme activities in the district. In addition, there 
is also an umbrella committee called the District Development Programme Committee headed by the 
DDC chairperson. 
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Watershed and water-source conservation, erosion and landslide control and riverbank and cultivated 
area protection are niajor water-related activities implemented in the district. Rehabilitation of damaged 
and degraded lands, community afforestation and natural regeneration of forests, solar and biogas 
promotion and water-turbine promotion are other major development activities. Drinking water and 
irrigation construction and rehabilitation, cadastral survey and land mapping, pasture development and 
private plantation are some of the major MRM related ongoing activities in the study area. 
Main donors supporting different development activities in the study area are: 
• Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) in integrated rural development, forest, 
health, road and trade school programmes, 
• UNDP for local governance and rural energy programmes, 
• NORAD for the electricity sector, 
• Dutch-DGIS for bio-gas and Chhyorolpa river control, 
• Asian Development Bank for irrigation and the leasehold forest programme, 
• International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) for agricultural loans and leasehold forest, 
• World Bank for drinking water programmes. 
• German Development Cooperation for rural road 
3.7.2 The case study sites: Pawoti and Sailungeshwor VDCs 
Before 1982, Pawoti and Sailungeshwor both were under one village panchayat. Because of political 
reasons it was divided into two in 1982. Demographic settings and socio-cultural characteristics of both 
VDCs are similar and therefore only one description is given to cover both. The research VDCs are 
located in the southern part of the district and therefore, relatively densely populated. 
Table 3.3 Population composition of case study sites 
S.n Population characters Pawoti Sailungeshwor Total 
1 Total population 4786 4039 8825 
1.1 Male 2295 2034 4329 
1.2 Female 2491 2005 4496 
2 Total households 925 813 1738 
3 Household size 5.03 4.97 -
Source: NRA, 1998 (Pp. 267-278) 
The case study site is relatively densely populated with 1738 households and a population of 8825. 
These villages are situated in the south of the district, 5 hours walking distance from the district 
headquarters. The socio-political history of this area goes back about 300 years. One Brahmin family62 
came and settled there from the Kumaon area of India via western Nepal. Gradually this family enlarged 
and expanded to a larger area. Later, at the time of the Rana regime, one member of this family got a 
chance to work directly with Rana as a Subba. He received many favours from the Rana regime and 
managed to recruit his family members in their service. Later he emerged, as a local functionary of 
Ranas to rule the village and his extended family became very powerful. The sons and grandsons 
continued to serve Rana in the same way untill the end of the Rana regime in 1951. Even after 1951 
there was still a strong hold of these families in the village because they were Mukhiya, Jimuwal and 
feudal landlords. Local people who were in the village before that family settled there were suppressed. 
The Kaluman Thalif3, another feudal landlord emerged in the Sailungeshowr area when the severe 
conflict escalated between the brothers of the Subba family. At the same time, another Bramin Koirala 
family64 from Dumja came and settled there and expanded their influence in one of the villages in the 
Pawoti VDC. The Koirala family was also extended and became powerful when the head of the family 
became Mukhiya of that area. These families developed as strong powerful centres in the study area. In 
short, until 1990, the study sites were dominated and exploited by a few powerful people. Since 1980 
Now this single family is spread up to 400 families 
A designated position to indicate the person is involved in government service 
This single family is now increased to 50 families 
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economic opportunities have increased, due to governmental-development interventions in rural 
development, made possible by the financial and technical support of The Swiss government. A number 
of poor people got better-paid, wage-earning work in The Lamosanju Jiri Road project and The 
Integrated Hill Development Project. They then became less dependent on local landlords. This led to 
the local landlords suffering from a shortage of labour during the peak agricultural season. With this 
economic empowerment the bargaining power of villagers was increased and they started to ask for a 
better wage. The situation completely changed when the political system altered. The powerful elite of 
the research area were not only suffering from a decline in their power and authority by being 
marginalised by the new political system, but also by the aggressive behaviour65 of the local people who 
had previously been suppressed and exploited. The earlier respect and obedience had entirely 
disappeared and completely changing the social organisation of the village. With the collapse of the 
traditional power structure together with a change in the political system there was a drastic shift from a 
rigid feudal social organisation to a more fluid and political ideology-based power relationship (Upreti, 
1998b) 
Major caste and ethnic groups in the study sites are Brahmin, Chhetri, Tamang, Damai, Kami, Sarki and 
Newar. Although the Brahmin caste is not the major part of the population, they dominate almost all 
social and development activities in the study sites. This is especially true for the descendants of the 
three feudal families mentioned above. They are relatively rich landlords, who have access to power 
centres and are educated and resourceful compared to other caste and ethnic groups. They have 
accumulated a large proportion of the land and control most of the available NR. The Chhetri is the 
second-most powerful caste group in the study area. Damai and Kami, so-called untouchables, are 
extremely exploited by the local elite. Women are still in a subordinate position in all caste and ethnic 
groups in the study area. 
The size of land holdings, wealth and education are major factors explaining social variation in the study 
area. Land is the single most important resource for survival and a symbol of social prestige. The land-
holding system in the study area is quite distorted. In both VDCs less than 10% of people own more 
than 60 % of the cultivated land. About 40% of "middle-level" people own 30% of land and the remaining 
50% of the population own less than 10% of the total land. The social disparity is greater in the 
Sailungeshwor VDC. However, the number of landlords has drastically been reduced over the past 
three decades because landlords have sold their land in order to invest in cities, deposit money in 
banks, and maintain their social status. 
The wide gap between rich and poor started to reduce from the early 1980s when the Swiss funded 
Integrated Hill Development Project and the Lamosangu-Jiri Road Project came into being. The former 
project helped to reduce social differences by supporting non-formal education, primary and secondary 
school education, giving scholarships to support higher education and assisting in school building. They 
also supported drinking water and irrigation-infrastructure projects, income generation, livestock 
development and the development of small-scale cottage industries. Though there was criticism of the 
huge inappropriate infrastructure (mainly office buildings) and expenditure of this project, it is the first 
project in the study area to reduce social differences. The Road project gave direct employment 
opportunities to poor people66 and reduced economic variation. Later other infrastructure projects such 
as the Busti Khimti Road project and the Khimti Hydro power Project also gave more employment 
opportunities. All these helped to reduce the social differences and economic gap between the rich and 
poor people in the village and altered the patron-client type of feudalistic social relationship. 
6 5 Some Damai families violently attacked one of the most powerful elite families, killed one son, and severely wounded five 
other family members. The people who had been oppressed could not cope with the pace of change. Several conflicts, 
confrontations and acts of revenge and counter-revenge increased in the villages. A strong sense of hostility developed 
between two groups of people. With the emergence and functioning of political parties the intensity of the conflicts and 
confrontations decreased. 
6 6 This 110-Km road was mainly constructed by using physical labour. Large numbers of poor people got employment 
opportunity. The daily-wage rate of the project was 3-5 times more than what they were getting in the village. The project also 
gave them weekly rations so that they also had food security. 
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The literacy rate in the study sites is only 23% (DDDC, 1999). Of the total population almost 90% of the 
people are Hindu and the remaining are Buddhist. The majorities of the inhabitants survive on 
subsistence agriculture and are hardly able to fulfil their annual food requirement. Many of them go to 
the nearby market centres and cities to earn a wage. There is tension between powerful people and 
tenants about land rights so proper utilisation of the land is lacking and the production potential of the 
agricultural land is limited. Farmers rear local breeds of livestock mainly cows, buffalo, sheep, goats, 
pigs and poultry. Potatoes are the main staple food for the people of the upper belt of the case-study 
sites. There are few primary schools, only one secondary school, a sub-health post and a post office. 
However, these organisations are not able to provide proper services due to political interference and 
lack of resources. As seen in the district politics, the CPN-UML, NCP, RPP, CPN (Maoist) and CPN-ML 
are the major political parties active in the study sites. In both VDCs the ruling party is the CPN-UML. A 
few powerful district level politicians are also from this area and they have greatly influenced several 
NR-related activities. The persistent tension and conflict between two powerful political parties, the 
CPN-UML and the NCP is a common characteristic of the study sites. Irrigation and drinking-water 
projects, a local governance programme, community forestry, rural road construction and water turbines 
are major development activities implemented in the study sites with the financial support of foreign 
donors and government agencies. 

Part TWO 
Empirical Investigation: Putting Conflict into 
Context 

Chapter 4 
Conflict as an Inevitable Part of Society: An Overview of Conflict in Nepal 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I explained the historical, cultural, socio-economic and political contexts and 
legal framework that affect NR-related conflicts in Nepal. In this chapter, major conflicts observed will 
be presented. Characteristics of these conflict and their management practices as well as dierent 
constellations of conflicting parties i.e., individual v/s individual, individual v/s group, group v/s group and 
individual/group v/s agencies of the state are discussed. The observed conflicts ranged from simply 
perceived injurious experiences to transformation of them into disputes. Many related issues are 
discussed, such as: internal, external and contextual causes, specific ways of dealing with the conflicts, 
legal aspects, performance of state instituted conflict resolution mechanisms and the role of spatial and 
temporal forces in conflict. All recorded conflicts are categorised into those related to natural resources 
and others. The purpose of this chapter is to give general overview of the conflicts in Nepal that will be a 
reference point for subsequent chapters. 
4.2 Common natural-resource conflicts and their characteristics 
Since the Rana regime, conflicting interests between demands of the state revenue, commercial 
exploitation of NR, local community's need, and conservation objectives are the centre of conflict in 
NRM (Malla, 1997; Regmi, 1972; Oli, 1998; Upreti, 2000e). Changes in legislation, policies, and 
strategies together with the changes in the political system have provided fertile ground for emerging 
conflicts. Many conflicts have arisen as a response to conflicting NRM agendas; policy clashes, 
competition over access to NR, jurisdictional overlap among the government agencies, political and 
commercial interests and pace of exploitation of these resources (Shfvakoti ef al., 1996; Oli, 1998; 
Malla, 1997). The Nepal Mediation Study Report (Kaplan, 1995) indicates that land, water and forest-
related conflicts are the most frequent in Nepal. 
Most of the NR-related conflict cases reported were related to the appropriation, use, and control of 
land, forest and water, which is hardly surprising in a country where more than 80% of the population is 
based in the agricultural sector. Both the national statistics and field data confirm that the majority of 
non-criminal disputes are dominated by land issues. The earlier research finding of New Era (1988) also 
showed that 27% of the total number of conflict cases were land related. 
'Numerous land and forest-related conflicts were created mainly due to the unsystematic and incomplete 
land-registration and record-keeping process (Chapagain, ef al., 1999) and contradictions in the 
respective acts. (Thapa and Weber, 1994; Upreti, 1999a; Oli, 1998; Khadka, 1997). It was already 
mentioned in section 3.5 that several policies and regulations related to land, agriculture, forests and 
water contradict each other. For example conflict exists between the Forest Act, 1993, Water Resources 
Act, 1992 and Local Self-Governance Act, 1998 on control of forest and water resources. In a key 
informant interview one of the law experts says: 'NR-related laws and regulations are not only creating 
numerous conflicts but also virtually failing to govern the NR sector. A lack of a sincere commitment to 
execute laws and manipulation of them for individual benefit are omnipotent characteristics of the 
Nepalese legal sector". Conflict between: national parks/reserves and local people, industries and civil 
society, larger NR-related projects such as the Kaligandaki Hydropower Project or the Melamchi 
Drinking Water project and local people, government agencies and NGOs and those between forest 
bureaucrats and FECOFUN are just a few examples among the thousands of NR-related conflicts67 
observed in Nepal. Major conflict related to land, forest and water is presented in the following section: 
6 7 The legacy of the long existence of the top-down approach is still strong and devolution of power is easier said than done. In 
any NR related projects and programmes' interventions, bureaucrats from central, regional and district levels, as well as DDC 
and VDC first seek their authority and power within such interventions. They try to manoeuvre these projects and programmes 
in their favour, entangling them in a power struggle rather than giving support to local communities. 
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4.2.1 Land-related conflicts 
Several land-related conflicts were observed in the study area. Conflicts over boundary and 
demarcation between different individual landowners and between government and individuals were 
common. The issue of ownership and land rights was another important area of conflict. The legality and 
legitimacy of the right and ownership is often questioned and challenged by people in different land-
ownership arrangements. Tenancy rights and tenant eviction were other major conflict issues in the 
study area. The Land Act of 1964 (and its various amendments) has made provision for tenancy rights 
and the abolition of dual ownership. This is also highlighted in different land-related policies and 
legislation. Tenants, especially after the restoration of democracy in 1990, wanted to establish their right 
to the tenanted land. Landlords were very fearful about the potential decision of the government to 
transfer ownership rights to tenants58 and therefore, wanted to evict their tenants. That raised several 
tenancy-related conflicts. Alignment of new canals, roads, trials and drinking water systems over land of 
particular individuals were other issues in land conflict. Obstruction of existing paths and public land 
(pastures, forests, wastelands, etc.) encroachment was another common land-conflict issue. Conflict 
over mortgaged land, with the failure of payment resulting in the land being seized was also common in 
the study area. Control of the Guthi land and its revenues, classification of land quality69 and 
share/contract amounts were other area of conflicts. Looting of crops, crop damage, redemption, land 
registration and cancellation, fraudulent sales, reclamation, partition and order of succession and gifts 
were still more serious areas of conflict in land-resource in the study area. In the land-conflicts major 
actors were landlords and tenants struggling to protect their ownership and rights, to establish new 
rights, to prevent and to execute the legal arrangements favouring tenants and poor people. Other 
actors involved were staff of various land-related offices of the government, local politicians, and the 
general public. 
Several land-related conflicts simply erupted due to the weaknesses of the present land-related acts 
and further weakneses in their implementation in Nepal, as they were unable to ensure the rights and 
interests of tenants and poor farmers. Execution of stable land rights granted by the Land Act was weak 
and manipulated by powerful people. Conflicts were also enhanced by customary land rights because of 
their exploitative nature in maintaining the patron-client relationship between landlords and tenants. 
Control over the land (be it Guthi or any tenural forms) by women is minimum and even when they have 
access, they still have no right to parental land. The patrilineal transformation of land and the exclusive 
inheritance rights of males is keeping women away from having land rights. This women's land-right 
issue is now one of the main areas of conflict. Parental lands have to be shared by the sons, not by the 
daughters. If parents give some land to their daughters and their brothers oppose it, this will lead to 
conflict. However, there is now a strong debate in Nepal, on the 'right of women' to parental property'. If 
the landowner is socially weak, absent from village or unaware of the details of his parental land and if 
the tenant is powerful, then the case for de facto land ownership is strong70. 
6 8 After the overthrow of the autocratic Panchayat political system, people, mainly poor and tenants, were enthusiastic to 
establish their ownership rights in the tenanted lands and to see a fair deal against land related exploitation by powerful people. 
That was further accelerated by the election manifestos and slogans of the major political parties, especially those of the 
communist parties (The Communist Party of UML promised in the 1991 election that their government would give land to the 
landless and homes to the homeless). Gradually all the optimism and hopes were shattered as there was no change in the 
land-based exploitation. 
6 3 Legally, land is classified by government into Abal (best), Dwoyam (relatively good), Sim (normal) and Char (worst) on the 
basis of land quality (fertility status, availability of irrigation and texture and structure of soil) and economic valuation. 
7 0 Villagers explained that one villager, had been out of the village for 40 years when his father died. His 0.25 ha land was 
cultivated by a powerful member of the elite of the village. When he came from India and requested that his land be given back 
to him to cultivate, the elite member claimed tenancy rights. The District Land Reform Office granted him the tenancy right and 
this land was legally divided. This was the first and the last case in this village to grant tenancy right to the tenant since the 
execution of the Land Act in 1964. It was allowed to happen because the tenant was a powerful elite member. It was not 
possible for the landowner to survive, as the remaining half of the land (0.25 ha) was not viable, and he returned to India. The 
same person then also bought the rest of his land. 
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As a part of the land-reform programme, the government carried out the land-measurement programme 
(Nap/) for better land-use planning. This single project created more than 5000 conflicts71 in the study 
district. Common conflicts created by the Nap; are related to boundaries, land of one people/household 
(generally weak, illiterate) being recorded under the name of another person (generally resourceful), 
public lands recorded in an individual's name and not recording an individual's land, etc. 
In this paragraph I describe how land survey and measurement (Nap/) creates conflict in the community. 
To begin a land survey in the district, the Survey Office requests the relevant documents from the DLRO 
(Malpot Adda). The LRO provides the documents as well as instructs the Mukhiyas to make their 
records available to the surveyors. The land measurement starts with the establishment of a benchmark 
in the field for which the landowner is meant to receive compensation although this generally failed to 
happen. This is the beginning of manipulations and conflict. Notice of the impending survey has to be 
given to the VDC concerned and it also has to be posted in public in designated conspicuous places to 
inform all concerned people. This ensures that land owners and tenants who claim ownership or some 
rights to lands such as communal grazing, irrigation or religious places have a chance to make their 
claim known to the surveyors within the given period stated in the notice. Such a notice and the 
presentation of claims are extremely important as the survey regulation states that if claims are not 
presented within the given time (some weeks), unclaimed land will be recognized as ailanijagga (land 
owned by the government). It was reported in the study area that those people who were clever and 
aware of these rules made claims on public lands, lands of people whose household heads were away 
or had died. They were able to record these lands in their name by offering bribes to the surveyors. 
Some people were not aware of the notice and were not able to make their claim in time. Parts of some 
people's lands were deliberately omitted by the surveyors to use to bargain for bribe. The role of the 
elite (both neo-elite who emerged after restoration of democracy and the older elite of the panchayat 
regime) was crucial in manipulating the land measurement. Even when people noticed that their land 
was omitted, or recorded under someone else's name a simple objection and counter claim was not 
sufficient. Claimants have to present evidence such as testimony of neighbours, tax payment receipts 
obtained from Mukhiyas and the traditional record kept by Mukhiyas in support of their claims. Here 
again manipulation can occur as party politics may influence neighbours' testimony and Mukhiya can 
manipulate/falsify records and receipts. The survey team, who was suppose to investigate the validity of 
various claims and conflicts, were also involved in bribery. The surveyors, authorised to grant land 
ownership rights to people on the behalf of the government, enforce their authority over the disputed 
lands to meet personal interests72. After completion of the survey, the Survey Office distributes 
ownership certificates popularly known as lalpurja (red seals, which were used as sign of their 
legitimacy). The lalpurja contains information on the identity and the residence of the owner, the plot 
number, location, size and identity of its tenants, if any (New Era, 1988). Tenants are also supposed to 
be awarded a certificate attesting to their testimony. However, the respondents are often informed that 
they have to pay a bribe to receive lalpurja and tenancy certificates. Otherwise, it may take weeks and 
months to receive these certificates, and paying a bribe is cheaper for the villagers than staying in the 
expensive district headquarters. Another provision made by the law is that tenants have to have written 
receipts of the payment of their share from the landowners to qualify for the tenancy claim. All the 
tenants contacted during the research period said they had received no such receipt from the 
landowners. They said: "how do we get the receipts If the falsing (land owners) do not give us them?" 
4.2.2 Forest-related conflicts 
The most common conflicts related to forests were: ownership issues between individuals and the local 
community and/or government, identification of users and access to forest products. Other frequent 
conflicts were royalty payments, illegal exploitation and export of NTFPs, hunting and poaching of wild 
7 1 Chairman of the Dolakha Bar Association, Mr Saroj Uprefj explained that more than 200 conflict cases in each VDC were 
observed during the period of land measurement. However many were settled locally in the village. Some were resolved by 
VDCs, some by semi-judicial organisations and onlyavery small portion of the total conflict cases came to court. 
7 2 There is a provision to go to court within 35 days if one of the parties is not satisfied with the decision of surveyors. However, 
the decision of the court is based on the legal evidence, which is mainly the available documents, prepared by DLRO, 
Mukhiyas and surveyors and obviously favouring the surveyors. 
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animals and animal products from the forests. Forest encroachment, collection of firewood for 
funerals73, use of trees from the forest to build wooden bridges over rivers and streams, leadership of 
forest users groups (FUG) and implementation of and deviation from the operational plan, were also 
frequently reported in the study area. These conflicts are between FUGs, between individuals and FUGs 
and between FUGs and the DFO. Conflict is common when the forest is spread over more than one 
administrative unit and geographical and political boundaries. It is also related to how the forest 
products are used, the purpose of their use (subsistence v/s commercial interests), degree of 
participation and contribution (who does how much), confusion on policies and the intervention of 
different organisations in the same area. Due to the growing poverty in rural areas, many poor people 
are involved in illegal harvesting of forest resources for their survival. Powerful people may use this 
illegal action as an opportunity to force them to work on their farms (Khadka, 1997) and junior forest 
professionals use it as a source of income. The main forest related conflicts are described below: 
Conflict in identification of users 
Community forestry74 is currently dominating the forestry debate in the study area. Many conflict cases 
related to national forests in general and community forests in particular, were observed. In case of 
community forestry, poor and especially low caste people were not included when forming community 
FUGs. Neither the governmental forest staff nor other members of the community informed them about 
formation of the FUGs. Likewise people living far from the forest, perhaps not using it regularly, who are 
called secondary users (Shrestha, 1996b), such as charcoal makers, were often excluded from the FUG 
list. Later they were not allowed their occasional use of forest products and this served as a source of 
conflict. 
Conflict in sharing benefit 
This is the major cause of conflict in community forests. Based on the size of their family members and 
how many animals they own, powerful and rich people take more forest products, irrespective of the 
equal contribution of all members of the users groups in forest management. These issues give rise to 
conflict amongst the users. Provisions made in the operational plans and the constitution of FUGs did 
not work in these situations. Conflicts were also observed in sharing forest products such as grass, 
fodder, timber and other edible products from government forests. The frequent conflicts in several 
communities were observed when licensed traders from outside the community collected medicinal 
plants from higher altitude forests managed and used by villagers. When the boundary of the VDC is 
changed and the existing forest-use by villagers falls under the jurisdiction of another VDC, then conflict 
is inevitable. Existing users make their claims on the basis of their traditional use of the forest and new 
villagers claim on the basis of forest belonging to their VDC (Shrestha, 1996a, 1996b; Khanal, 1998). 
Frequent conflicts are occurring in community forests due to the ignorance of VDC boundaries in 
dealing with community forest issues (hand-over of the forest to the community for example) according 
to the new forest rules which are contradictory to the Local Self-Governance Act. If a piece of national 
forest lies in more than one VDC when people from both VDCs request its change into a community 
forest, then conflict on boundary demarcation for the better part is inevitable. 
Conflict in participation and contribution 
If the same people use more than one forest it can cause problems in its management and protection, 
which invite conflict between users. All FUG members studied were not equally active in participating in 
meetings, contributing voluntary labour for surveillance and other forest management functions often 
because of their physical absence (job outside the village, head of the family away for some reasons, 
7 3 Mourners collect firewood from (national) forest without permission of DFO (practically it is not possible to obtain permission) 
for cremation of dead body but foresters arrest them charging them with unauthorised collection of wood from forests. Similar 
problems are also observed in building wooden bridges over the rivers and streams. 
74 Community forest refers to a part of a national forest, which is handed over by the government to a forest users group for its 
development, conservation and utilisation for the collective benefit of users. The ultimate ownership of such forest rests with 
government. 
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etc.). Active members in such cases did not allow equal benefits to be given to less active ones. Lack of 
participation and contribution was more prominent amongst widows and marginalised, poor families who 
had to earn a daily wage for their survival and were not able to actively participate. Those members who 
lived close to the forest were more vigilantly involved in forest protection, since they can see potential 
forest offences being committed by outsiders even if they are not on duty. Such unassigned surveillance 
duties make them claim more resources from the forest although this had not been agreed by the 
community (Shrestha, 1996b). It is interesting to note that users from higher social-status and caste 
groups did not often physically participate in the surveillance of the forest, despite there being a 
provision that all members should do this on a rotational basis, including during unsociable hours. 
Despite this, they receive equal or even greater benefits from the forests. Due to their social status, 
other users did not openly complain, which led to resentment, injustice and the development of negative 
feelings towards forest management. 
Conflict in leadership 
One of the frequent sources of conflict in community forests is the leadership. The position of 
Chairperson of a community forest is prestigious in a village and is sought by many people. It is further 
exacerbated by the political interest of various parties (Shrestha, 1996b; Khanal, 1996). People, who are 
interested in active politics, use this position as a stepping ladder. This creates a lot of conflict in the 
community, which then turns to political conflict. More detail about leadership conflict is presented in the 
second case study in Chapter Five. 
Forest users groups' written arrangement v/s practice 
The operational plan and constitution are the core of a community forest. All activities to be carried out 
by FUGs have to be clearly defined in the operational plan and be according to the frame of the 
constitution. However, deviations have often been found due to lapses or laxity of the forest staff or the 
zealous pursuit of group members to get more income from the forests, which have led to several 
conflicts (Shrestha, 1996a). The operational plan defines the numbers of trees to be removed or 
specifies the amount of forest products to be appropriated. However, users do not always follow the 
plans. In some cases, forest staff are guided by hidden interests suggest to deviate from the operation 
plan (Shrestha, 1996b). This is more common on valuable forests where high value wood is abstracted. 
The DFO then seize the timber which has been illegally harvested leading to continuos conflicts, unless 
they are solved by bribes or settled through the exercise of power or legal measures. 
The majority of the FUG members are unaware of forest-related legal provisions. Only a few people, 
mainly local teachers and political workers, are aware of the rules and regulations. They are able to 
manipulate the rules, in collaboration with foresters, to obtain more personal benefits from the forest 
resources. 
Recently, the severe conflict between FECOFUN and the governmental forest department escalated 
when the government altered the existing community forestry provision and restricted the authority of 
users in community forests given by the forest act. FECOFUN wants forests to be managed by the 
communities themselves but bureaucrats are reluctant to transfer forest management to local 
communities, especially where high value forests are concerned, because of the conflict of interests. 
This conflict is not only leading to political debate but is now being considered in court. In the national 
forests, the conflict between forest officials and traders/commercial logging companies is very common. 
Such conflicts are resolved through negotiated kickbacks within the political-bureaucratic circle. 
4.2.3 Water-related conflicts 
Different kinds of water-related conflicts were reported in the study area. Source disputes, sharing of 
water for different purposes (for example, use for drinking water, irrigation, water turbine), payment of 
compensation for damage caused while constructing canals and laying drinking-water pipes, were 
frequently reported. Similarly, conflict over contribution for maintenance of the irrigation and drinking 
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water systems, ambiguous roles and responsibilities of watchmen and their payments and role conflict 
among water users associations committees were other common water-related conflicts in the research 
area. Damage caused by the over flow of water from canals and conflicts due to the ambiguous roles of 
water technicians and officials were also quite frequent. Earlier studies (IMC, 1990; Pradhan ef a/., 
1997) have shown that water conflict is a normal phenomena if the same source is used for more than 
one purpose in the absence of clear provision of water rights. The occurrence and intensity of such a 
conflict is high when the water becomes scarce in the dry season. Inequitable and unreliable water 
distribution and excessive use of water in head section limits the supply (in terns of time and quantity) in 
tail section and often cause frequent conflict concerning the irrigation system. This is particularly serious 
when several irrigation systems operate upstream and downstream with limited water availability. The 
demand for irrigation water Is increasing in the study area due to the introduction of improved varieties 
of rice, winter crops and changes in the cropping systems. The cropping intensity and cropping patterns 
are changing, together with technological innovations and the process of globalisation. In periods of 
water scarcity the frequency as well as the intensity of the conflict is high. It was also noticed that 
conflict resolution over two irrigation systems was easy when the same farmers own lands in the 
command areas of both irrigation systems. It is reported that the frequency and intensity of conflict is 
greater in joint managed irrigation systems than in ones fully managed by farmers (Gautam ef a/., 1992; 
IIMI, 1990; 1997; IMC, 1990). The main cause of conflict in such systems was an unreliable water 
supply to tail end farmers during the winter and spring crop seasons due to an inability to implement 
proper water scheduling (IMC, 1990; Pradhan, 1989; Shfvakoti era/., 1996). 
Earlier studies also showed that agency intervention in existing irrigation and drinking water systems 
worsens the water supply and gives rise to numerous conflicts (Pradhan ef a/., 1997; IMC, 1990; Upreti, 
1998b). This situation is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. The improper design of structural work and 
the quality of the construction result not only in inefficient delivery of water but can also lead to several 
conflicts (IMC, 1990). This type of conflict is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Technical matters such 
as steep gradients of canals and laid pipelines caused an excess of water in a particular area and an 
inequitable supply. Flat gradients also caused silt deposits and reduction in water flow. Such technical 
difficulties had turned into the cause of conflict. In the agency developed systems constructed under 
contract arrangement, contractors are the major cause of conflict not only in new systems but also in the 
operation and maintenance of existing irrigation and drinking-water systems (Pradhan ef a/„ 2000). 
In the study area most of the farmers managed irrigation systems (FMIS) practice some form of 
distribution rules and rotational water sharing, particularly in the peak water demand period. Therefore, 
they are effective in minimising potential conflicts. Community coherence among the water users is high 
in the FMIS and community managed drinking water systems and therefore community-managed 
systems are more effective in monitoring water distribution, maintenance and operation and in resolving 
conflicts, if any (Pradhan, 1989; Pradhan ef a/., 1997). In the case of agency developed systems, users 
are generally unwilling to contribute to operation and maintenance (IMC, 1990; IIMI, 1990) because of a 
lack of any feeling of ownership and accountability. Within the particular irrigation or drinking water 
system conflict is frequently observed between tail-section and head-section users in sharing water 
particularly concerning the amount used and the time period. Basically, water availability determines the 
occurrence and frequency of conflicts. Generally, conflicts in the head-section, unlike those in the tail-
section were not because of lack of water. Conflicts in the tail-section, in winter and spring were mainly 
due to water shortage. The magnitude of a conflict grows as the gap between the demand and supply of 
water increases. Unequal water distribution is generally linked with inadequate monitoring that allows 
greater access to head-section farmers. This is one of the major determinants of conflict concerning 
irrigation and drinking water. 
In general, socio-economic, agricultural, organisational, and technical factors contribute to the 
emergence of conflicts. More precisely, availability, reliability, equity and seasonality of the water supply 
determine the occurrence and intensity of conflicts concerning irrigation systems that can have a direct 
impact on the performance of irrigated agriculture. Earlier research shows that there is clear relationship 
between irrigation conflict and crop yields. Conflicts and cropping intensities are also positively related 
as both are affected by the availability of water (IMC, 1990). Nevertheless, it is not always predictable. 
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In some case farmers changed their existing cropping patters due to scarcity of water and increased 
benefits whereas in other cases their yields were decreased. 
Local people use specific rules to determine the use of water. For example, if the water source is 
located in an individual's land, then they have full autonomy to use it themselves, but they have no 
authority to dictate who can use it for irrigation and how much to use within the community. However, In 
the case of stream water, which is common to all members of community, there is rule that all 
community members have equal rights to use it on a rotational basis. One of the respondents explained 
that: "Kapure Baje (source owner) use Kuwapanikomul (a perennial water source located in his land) 
whenever he like. Only after he finishes his rice transplanting, then we get chance to use this water 
source. But we all community members share water from Chharekhola (a common stream) on the 
rotational basis'. 
In several externally funded drinking-water projects conflicts have erupted after a few years due to 
scarcity of water when the population increases in the village. While designing these systems, 
technicians generally ignore the potential future need for water75 citing financial and technical reasons. 
Another major conflict in externally funded drinking water projects is the location of the tap stands. Due 
to the influence of politicians76 or for their own hidden interests technicians locate the tap-stand close to 
the house of particular people (mainly rich and powerful, sometimes negotiated with a bribe), despite 
other villagers not agreeing. Similarly, sharing the source is another problem in such projects as they 
are decided on the basis of technical justifications ignoring the existing use patterns and social context. 
People may damage structures built in the source and cause the conflict to escalate. 
4.2.4 other Natural-Resource-related conflicts 
Beside the three most common categories of NR-related conflicts mentioned above, there are several 
other ones observed in the study area. Prominent conflicts were one on environmental and social 
dislocation issues and some between: local people and the Orient Magnesite Company; local people, 
government and contractors on slate stone excavation and trade; DDC and contractors about river 
fishing, local people and the Khimti Hydro Power Project on negative social impacts, villagers and 
development organizations on the alignment of a seasonal road and between DDC and illegal collectors 
of sand, stone and gravel from river beds. 
4.3 Other conflicts observed in the study area 
In addition to NR-related conflict there were also several social conflicts observed in the study area. 
These conflicts were related to borrowing and transactions, caste and ethnicity, external development 
interventions, family matters, party politics, character defamation, prostitution and sexual abuse, 
religious clashes, etc. However, all these conflicts were interwoven and linked with natural-resource 
conflicts, making it impossible to draw a clear demarcation between them and other conflicts in practice. 
Some of the other major conflicts observed in the study area are given below. 
Transaction-related conflict 
Common transaction-related conflicts reported in the study area were lending and borrowing77, 
repayment, fake documents and forgery, receipt of loans, extending credit, wage payment (between 
7 5 Engineers from the DWSO explained that they provide for future needs in their designs and estimates. However, in practice 
such provisions were not observed. Local people say that overseers refuse to consider the future water requirements of the 
community while constructing drinking-water projects in the village basing them on budgetary limitations. 
7 6 On the issue of political interference in development projects, one Member of the Parliament explained me that there would 
be no interference if the bureaucrats worked according to the bureaucratic rules, norms and ethics. Unfortunately they do not 
do so. If politicians do not interfere, then the poor and backward people suffer more from bureaucratic manipulations in 
development work. Therefore, to minimise these manipulations, politicians have to interfere in development projects 
implemented by bureaucrats in their village or district. 
7 7 Village moneylenders charge up to 60% interest rate (5% per month). If borrowers fail to pay the principal amount and or 
interest within the agreed time then they take the property (land, gold, animals and other valuable materials) from the house of 
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wage labour and landlords), share of livestock and results of the sale of animals and grain. The failure to 
repay a debt in time was the most common cause of conflict in lending and borrowing. Conflict also 
arose due to changes in an original document or the preparation of fake documents. Delayed or lack of 
payment for animals sold on credit was another common transaction-related conflict. In most such 
cases, the conflicts were managed locally, usually in favour of well-off people, without escalating into 
serious disputes. In a close society such as that in the study area, people, especially the weak ones, do 
not want to ruin the established relations. They adjust their dissatisfaction. However, since the early 
1990s such a pattern of tolerance has become socially redefined. These conflicts are therefore 
becoming a means of adjusting the existing pattern of relationships to changing conditions. 
Caste and ethnicity-related conflicts 
Ethnic identity and the superiority felt by higher caste groups were major causes of ethnic/caste-related 
conflicts. People from the Tibeto-Burman ethnic group, who are also called Matuwalis (as they 
traditionally prepare liquor and drink regularly in their home), are prone to taking part in open conflict 
and are also quick in resolving them. This trend is also observed in drunken Brahmin, Chhetri and 
Newar people. In general, Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar try to hide conflict and keep it in a latent stage 
until they think they will benefit from it. Main forums creating conflicts and their negotiations among 
Matwalis were fairs, religious occasions, festivals and marriage ceremonies where conflicts about 
molesting girls, borrowing and lending or for drinking excessively without reason are common. Over the 
last few decades Brahmin and Chhetri have also become increasingly involved in such activities. 
Recently, some people, mainly untouchables, are protesting against the caste-bias injustices such as 
untouchability, prohibition to enter temples and other religious and public places, which lead to conflict 
between orthodox Hindu religious groups and activists. It is observed that conflicts within a caste, clan 
or family are, as much as possible, settled internally. Making liquor and selling it in the community is 
increasing conflicts in the study area. Even some Brahmin families78 are involved in the liquor business, 
which gives rise to a lot of conflict within the Brahmin caste people and between the villagers. Love 
marriage for love, from cross caste groups79 has caused several conflicts in the village. 
Conflict related to family matters 
Several family-related conflicts were reported in the study area. Conflicts between a wife and husband 
due to: polygamy, carelessness to their wives knowledge, child marriage, inter-caste marriage, 
fraudulent marriage, separation, alimony and divorce were common. Similarly, pregnancy and abortion, 
paternity, conflict between parents and sons and/or between brothers for parental property partition 
were also observed. In polygamous families feuds often took place between wives especially for 
recognition, respect, property holding and alimony. People generally do not report cases related to rape 
and molestation due to shame and the severe negative consequences on the remaining life of the 
women. 
Children can be a source of conflict as well as an effective means of its resolution and a means of 
developing relations. Children are normally responsible for grazing cattle in the study area. If the grazing 
animals damage crops in the surrounding fields while the children play, then crop owners often catch 
the borrowers. That creates severe conflict. In the study area there is still a practice of lending cereal grain measured with 
smaller utensils (paffir) and receiving payment measured with a bigger one. The lender adding a zero to the amount lent in the 
signed written document is still prevalent. One respondent anonymously, explained that several years ago he received 500 
rupees from his neighbour Mukhiya and paid the interest every year in terms of kind (paddy grain). But after 7 years the 
Mukhiya asked him to pay 5000 rupees as a principal amount. When he refused to do so, saying that he had only borrowed 
500 rupees then he was shown the agreement document with 5000, which had his fingerprint. The 'zero' had simply been 
added to the 500 in the document. 
7 8 According to the Hindu custom Brahmin families are not allowed to make and drink liquor. 
7 9 There was severe conflict when the daughter of the most powerful Brahmin elite, Lapton was taken by an untouchable 
Matwali-Kalesarkiko chhoro. A similar situation was observed when a higher caste Brahmin married the daughter of the 
powerful Mukhiya. The Mukhiya banned all religious functions in the village performed by the close relatives and family 
members of the bridegroom. He also threatened to attack and socially reject them, if they did not obey his authority. In both 
cases the children of their daughters became instrumental in bringing the families into negotiation, resulting in a normal 
relationship. 
Chapter 4 70 
the animals and punish the children. This has led to conflict between parents and crop owners. Fights 
between children also lead to conflict between their families. However, some sever conflicts between 
families were eased and brought to the negotiation stage by the children. By the children going to each 
other's homes, eating together, playing together and sharing their parent's regret for disputes, 
interaction is initiated between the elders for negotiation. 
External-development intervention-related conflicts 
Development interventions have introduced several conflicts into the study area. Work of some NGOs 
and activists have created conflicts as their support focused on a particular group, mainly disadvantaged 
people, leaving the local elite feeling ignored and humiliated. Conflicts created by development 
interventions are not only causing obstruction to successful implementation of such projects but also 
creating social misunderstanding and tension in society. The consequences of such conflict result in the 
loss of faith, loss of property, physical fights, migration, etc. Several NR-related conflicts erupted simply 
because of technocratic, positivist top-down development interventions. Most of them were designed to 
fulfill the vested interests of the vicious circle of technocrats-bureaucrats and politicians. The most 
common conflicts related to development interventions reported in the study area were misuse of 
externally obtained financial sources (cash and kind) and abuse of authority. It was pointed out that 
conflict due to nepotism in the allocation of development funds to party supporters, elite, relatives, and 
influential people is a well-established reality in villages. Some time this was arranged differently, by 
dividing the total amount of such a fund among different political parties by mutual consensus to 
minimize the conflict between them. 
In 1999, a wider conflict arose in the Pawoti VDC due to the initiation of seasonal road construction. 
Initially, the VDC who decided to construct a seasonal road to its headquarters from external financial 
support as well as by its own resources, obtained no objections from landowners for the alignment of 
the road. Later two groups of people within the VDC confronted to bring the road to go to their village in 
the opposite direction. Then the landowners who had previously agreed to provide land refused. This 
conflict was linked with forest (which route causes more damage to forests), water (destruction of 
canals, drinking water ponds/sources) and land (landslide and loss of fertile land). Development 
interventions from external agencies such as the World Bank (WB), UNDP, ADB are creating serious 
conflicts, mainly due to their ignorance of local dynamics and top-down decisions based on normative 
legal and policy frameworks. For example, Kaplan (1995), citing the land measurement and registration 
programme of the government, argues that when outsider organisations enter the village setting, the 
number of conflicts enormously increases. In the Sixth Chapter, I will discuss in detail how external-
development intervention creates conflict. It is interesting to note that the same irrigation and drinking 
water schemes are being financed/supported by different development programmes (e.g., DDC 
programme, Agricultural development Bank-Nepal (ADB-N) loan, DIO, DWSO, VDC) for maintenance 
and repair. Even more interesting is that technicians force users to demand high cost structures in their 
rehabilitation systems while farmers prefer simple structures. 
Party politics and conflict 
Political arguments are one of the major causes of conflict in the study area. The Nepal Mediation Study 
Report (Kaplan, 1995) shows that allegiance to political parties is intruding enormously and overriding 
other traditional forms of allegiances. This is more common in high caste groups, people close to city 
centres and educated ones. After the restoration of democracy, society divided into rightist (NC, RPPs) 
and Leftist camps. They are interpreting issues according to their ideology and political interests. Leftist 
communist groups are further divided into leftist and ultra leftist. The Communist Party-Maoist represent 
the ultra-leftist group and they have been struggling for 6 years to establish socialism through class 
struggle80 and a people's revolution. Other leftist and rightist political parties are working under the 
8 0 The term used mainly in Marxist conflict theory for an inevitable struggle between social classes, which result from their 
conflicting interests. It implies that the process of social stratification endangers potential or actual attempts on the part of whole 
social classes, or segments of them, to maintain or redistribute existing arrangements of power, wealth and prestige. 
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framework of multiparty democracy in Nepal. This ideological conflict between Maoist and other political 
parties is becoming a major threat to peace and security in the country. 
Other Conflicts 
There are several other conflicts in the study area, which do not belong to any of the above groups. 
These are: theft, looting, physical fights and damage of property, character defamation, drug and girl 
trafficking, prostitution, sexual abuse (harassment, rape and molestation), blame of religious (between 
Hindu and Christian) and cultural (between Brahmin/Chhetri and other ethnic groups) invasions and 
caste biased injustice and witch hunts. 
4.4 Common conflict management practices 
Conflict is of national importance in any country and therefore the state has different ways of dealing 
with them. Courts, conflict resolution bodies and anti-corruption bureaus and the police are examples of 
these. In addition to state-led conflict management mechanisms, there can be several informal, 
unofficial local practices and procedures to deal with conflicts in society. Based on this framework, this 
section deals on both formal and informal common CM practices adopted in the study area. Formal 
practices are those which involve official procedures, guided by governmental rules, regulations and 
laws and handled by paid government staff. The most common formal practices in the study area are 
the activities carried out by the courts, police, district administration, NRM-offices (land, forest, water 
related offices) and VDCs. On the other hand, informal practices are those, which are locally developed 
and practiced and enforced by communities. Informal practices may, or more likely, may not follow the 
governmental regulatory procedures. They are generally undertaken by locals or unpaid volunteers and 
the decisions are often not legally endorsable. However, both practices are directly and/or indirectly 
guided or influenced by each other, making it difficult to separate them completely. 
It is noticeable that the intensity of conflicts as well as people's responses to them is changing over time 
and with changing circumstances. In the study area the willingness of local people to be actively 
involved in dealing with NR-conflict was directly related to the interdependence (intensity of use) of 
these natural resources. Such an interdependent relationship between the actors and resources was 
also demonstrated by several earlier studies (Upreti, 1998b; Thapa and Weber, 1994; Shivakoti, et al., 
1996; Rhoades, 1997)81. 
Informal conflict practices were generally formulated by local people discussing the issues in public 
meetings. Sometimes such meetings became tense and even counterproductive. The whole 
environment became too emotionally charged to reach a solution. However, the same conflict was 
settled in the next meeting, after a time for reflection. For any negotiation local people use different 
strategies and options. Disputants' preferences for a particular forum to resolve conflict mainly depend 
upon their knowledge, affordability and interests at a specific time and in the particular circumstances as 
well as the availability and readiness of such forums (shopping forums). Different agencies or people 
became involved in conflict resolution when they saw some direct or indirect benefits from their 
involvement. It was observed that it was difficult to reach final negotiations when conflict cases were 
backed-up by political parties. The intensity of the conflict is also another important factor in drawing the 
attention of people to become involved. If the conflict is severe and seriously hampering the society then 
its members show their concern, but if the conflict is of a less severe nature people are generally less 
8 1There is a positive relationship between the active involvement of actors in managing natural resources and associated 
conflicts and the degree of their direct dependence on those resources. Successful management of community forests by 
FUGs, farmer-managed irrigation by WUAs in Nepal, forest resources conservation by Chipko Movement (hug tree campaign), 
local seed management by Beej Banchawo Andolan (Save Seed Movement) in India and the farmers field-school for integrated 
pest management in Indonesia are some of the prominent examples of community capacity to manage local resources. The 
globally the renowned Dutch water-management history is another example of how people use innovative sustainable 
management systems if and when they feel that their survival is closely associated with the success or failure of management 
of a particular resource. 
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concerned. The jurisdiction of the forums also varies with the nature of the conflict (Benda-Beckmann, 
1984). However, manipulation and local adjustment is common to establish the jurisdiction. Resolution 
of conflicts is also a means of establishing power and influence in the community. People only consider 
arbitration when the intensity of conflict is high and unmanageable, through mutual understanding, at 
their level. However, the majority of conflicts were resolved locally by mutual agreement and 
negotiation. 
4.4.11nformal conflict management practices 
In this section the common informal conflict-management practices adopted in the community to resolve 
NR-conflicts are discussed. These informal methods and practices include the activities of Dhami-
Jhakri, Purohit12, Mukhiya, local leaders, and elderly people. The procedures applied in these practices, 
the quality of the resolutions, the implications and their relations with formal practices are discussed. 
The role of the specific time and context in informal conflict-management practices is also highlighted. 
For example, several conflicts were settled and several more erupted in the time of local and national 
elections. Likewise, fear of potential punishment from Maoist has drastically altered the intensity of 
conflict in the community in recent years. 
In the study area the majority of conflicts (except complicated conflict cases such as rape, suspected or 
attempted murder, etc.) were resolved locally in informal ways. Local elderly people often work as 
mediators to deal with conflict, though they have no legal status. Villagers commonly accept their 
settlements. Such informal CM practices are a blend of local customs, a sense of justice and religious 
feeling rather than official procedures. Generally no written records are maintained in informal CM 
practices. Elderly and socially respected people, traditional landlords, teachers, Jhakri (faith healers), 
Purohit, and Mukhiya are principal actors in resolving a wide range of local conflicts. These people do 
not only mediate conflict as neutral third parties but also generally decide terms and conditions for the 
negotiation process. They are not only mediators or negotiators as discussed in Chapter Two. The 
criteria to resolve conflicts were not legal evidence and documents, but religious faith (Dharma 
Bhakaune, Tamo-Tulsi, Geeta and Saligram samaine), historical considerations and practical realities. 
Only complicated conflicts, which were not possible to settle by informal means, go to the VDC. The few 
cases, which can not be resolved by the VDC or for which they have no legal authority, are dealt with by 
the police, other sectoral offices, and the DAO. Only those cases that can not be settled by these 
organisations, or are legally bounded to go to the court for resolution. 
Most local negotiators do not charge a fee for their service in resolving conflict. However, they often 
expect some physical labour from the 
negotiating parties, perhaps for them 
to work on their farm. Some 
negotiating parties also voluntarily 
give them presents in kind such as 
ghee, chicken, vegetables, fruit, etc. 
Generally the winner party gives such 
presents and voluntary labour. 
Disputants from ethnic groups such 
as Gurung, Mangar, Tamang strongly 
Figure 4.1 Informal meeting to settle conflict prefer negotiators from their own 
ethnic group. They only approach 
others "if it is not possible for their 
ethnic leaders to solve the conflict. Matwalis are quickly drawn into conflict and immediately negotiate 
locally in contrast to upper-caste Bramin/Chhitri groups. Generally, conflict in extreme cases in Matwali 
8 2 The Purohit is a culturally and socially recognised person to perform religious ceremonies and also acts as a bridge between 
villagers for information and communication. He (there is no provision of female purohit) has frequent house-to-house contact 
and good relations. Generally, his clients did not prefer to go against his arguments. 
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groups turns into a physical fight. However, after negotiation they have no feelings of inferiority, hostility 
or deep-seated feelings of revenge. In contrast, Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar (other than the Matwali 
group) keep the conflict alive, even after negotiation is in a latent stage and look for future revenge. The 
majority of people, especially poor and backward ones, involved in conflict did not posses even a basic 
knowledge of formal laws and legal procedures. Only neo-elite such as school teachers, the VDC 
executive body and political leaders have such knowledge, which they use to manipulate conflict in their 
favour. 
People learn negotiation skills through practice while being involved in community-level conflict 
management practices. Those who had the time, credibility, temperament, willingness, articulation and 
vested interests were more involved in community level CM. Generally they carefully listen to the conflict 
story from both conflicting parties. They also inspect the place of conflict, if relevant, they also assess 
the past conflict tract records of the conflicting parties and consult neighbours as eyewitnesses, if 
applicable. If necessary they call meetings in public places (or some times in their own homes or even in 
the house of one of the conflicting parties, if the parties agree), to get the opinion of neighbours. Then 
on the basis of their assessment and judgement, they make their decisions. Conflicting parties in most 
of the cases accept such decisions. They use many cultural, religious and political proverbs (which 
highlights the importance to resolve conflict locally rather than to go to a formal process) to convince the 
conflicting parties. According to the context and situation, they also threaten, harass and even some 
time beat offenders to reveal the truth and/or to force them to accept the prescribed settlement. 
Occasionally, they also integrate their resolution measures with formal process. For example, 
sometimes the police are invited to execute the decision if the proven offender does not abide by ft. 
Even in formal mechanisms sometimes the police or the VDC take the help of local mediators to resolve 
conflict instead of settling it themselves. 
The main reasons expressed by people in preferring informal mechanisms are, trust in mediators, ease 
of settlement, maintenance of social harmony and lack of resources (money, knowledge and time) to 
use a formal conflict-resolution process. Nevertheless, particularly after 1990, the credibility of such 
informal conflict CM mechanisms is eroding fast, due to social and political changes (Khadka, 1997). 
Now even many people affiliated to political parties do not believe in these local negotiators/mediators/ 
arbitrators, questioning their fairness due to their potential bias to supporters of the particular political 
party with whom they are associated. Local CM capacity is also inhibited by the formal system. 
In informal CM practices, male domination is common. However, the role of women is often instrumental 
in bringing conflicting parties to the negotiation table. In many conflict cases women had forced male 
members of their family to compromise to end the conflict. At local level, women are directly and actively 
involved in conflict and its management. In some cases, women acted as a mediator between husband 
and or other family members when they fell into conflict with neighbours. It is also found that women 
were used by male members of their families, as a means to get sympathy and favour from villagers. It 
was thought that if women were sent to the elderly people, local leaders and VDC heads to report the 
case that would make their case stronger83 (Khadka, 1997). When people get into conflict each party 
tries to win the support of neighbouring villagers by telling the weaknesses and wrongdoings of the 
opposition. These types of misinformation and deceit may turn into malicious gossip and character 
assassination. Ultimately this creates an atmosphere of distrust, disrespect, and paranoia (Sandelin, 
1997). 
In several cases husbands were in a deep-seated conflict, whereas their wives have maintained a more 
normal relationship. It was also shown that men bring more conflict cases to a formal process of 
resolution than do women. The reasons expressed for this were socio-cultural restriction, fear of 
defamation, lack of decision-making authority and resources among the disputant women. However, 
women are frequently entangled in minor conflicts about crop damage by animals, children's quarrels 
and being suspected of cheating by their husbands. Women, generally from Matwalies, prepare and sell 
local liquors that often give rise to the arguments among the local drunkards. When customers have too 
It is a common belief in the study area that women do not report problems unless they are really victimised. 
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much liquor, they may start to tease the women, antagonising their husbands or other members of their 
family or even occasionally their community, which often results in a physical fight. Due to several such 
incidences, women have banned alcohol in their village to minimise conflict and harassment of women. 
In both VDCs women were also harassed84 for being witches, leading to endless conflict in the 
community. Harassment to women is also clear from accounts of informants. Bhage Khatri explains: 
"several women are witches in our village, damaging our crops, making our children suffer and creating 
problems with the livestock. They have to be seriously punished but they are freely moving around". An 
example of the local way of dealing with witch allegations (witch-hunt) by faith healers is described in 
the following paragraph. 
Use of Jhankri rakhne (exploration by faith healers) is a method based on the belief that faith healers 
(witch doctors) have super-natural power from god to control particular problems, most commonly 
conflicts related to allegations of witchery. The faith healers usually treats the culprits inhumanly 
(burning hairs, pouring hot water on the body, severely beating, etc.). Women are generally accused of 
being witches and men are always faith healers. This is the offensive method of conflict resolution in the 
study area. Jhakri also acts as a local doctor to treat several diseases and problems related to villagers 
in general and children in particular. In NRM jhakris are used to forecast rainfall, control or prevent 
forest fires, landslides, cure crops affected by different diseases and insects, etc. 
New Era (1988) from their conflict study in two districts show that the vast majority of conflicts were 
settled within the village by mobilising relatives, traditional leaders, village heads and friends. It was 
shown that several conflicts were deliberately kept active in a stage of grievance or hostility to maintain 
social relation. However, such unexpressed feelings of injustice hinder people's active participation in 
NRM. The approaches, strategies, procedures and results of local level CM vary according to the 
characteristics of the actors involved in the conflict, such as gender, caste, social status, networks, 
interpersonal relationships (Kaplan, 1995). 
The importance of informal CM practices is reflected by the local saying: "Deskalagi rajako niti 
chahincha tara goanko kam ma prajako riti thiti ko badi mahatto chha" (King's policy is needed for the 
whole country whereas values and customs of local people are more important for managing village 
resources). Several CM activities carried out at local level are traditionally based on their values and 
customs (riti-thiti), which play a powerful role in binding people together for collective actions. The 
following paragraph presents a local custom-based method of resolution of conflict called Sagun Game 
(reconciliation). Sagun game (reconciliation) is a method based on cultural tradition. In this method, a 
gift is exchanged between disputants, in the presence of villagers, as a form of reconciliation. This 
exchange is performed after discussing the matter in meetings where villagers, negotiators and 
conflicting parties are present. When they reach a settlement then they start 'sagun game'. The conflict 
is declared as settled when both parties accept the gift. Then there is small celebration where all people 
take some Jaad (a type of fermented liquor). However, there are no written documents of such a 
settlement. The villagers, who are present at the sagun game ceremony, are witnesses to the 
settlement. This practice is most common in Matwalis (Kami, Damai, Sarki) and Tibeto-Burman ethnic 
groups (Gurung, Mangar, Tamang, Jirel, Surel). The gifts are usually liquor, eggs, meat, etc. (Khadka, 
1997). Some occasions are particularly important for informal conflict-resolution and reconciliation. For 
example Dashairr* is traditionally used as an occasion to reconcile and strengthen relations by visiting 
each other's houses, exchanging gifts and good wishes. Likewise Tihar (another important Hindu 
festival) is also used as an important occasion to promote harmony and reconcile conflict. Ghewa36 is 
8 4 For example, one woman (anonymity maintained) was severely harassed and almost discarded from the community as it 
was said that she was a witch, because her tongue was black, thought to be the perfect sign of witch. She said, "I am poor, 
ignored by my husband who has taken another wife and is living far from me, isolated, living alone without support of any one, 
helpless and walk around in tatters. So all blame me, nobody speaks the truth. Neighbours behave inhumanely to me. I am 
seriously hurt but I have no choice other than to accept. I am treated as an outcast woman and people do not even drink water 
in my house. My two sons are labelled as witch's sons so they are very humiliated..." 
8 5 A major Hindu festival where all community members gather in public places and resolve pending conflicts, unsettled issues 
and decide collective community works. 
8 8 This is a Tamang death ritual where people from the village gather and settle conflict between their community members. 
An Overview of Conflict in Nepal 75 
another occasion to reconcile conflict. Many of the conflicts resolved in villages are verbal and not 
supported by written documents. When powerful people reactivate these cases the weaker party usually 
loses when the case goes to the formal process of the CM. The efficiency of the local procedure is 
context specific and mixed, some times effective and some times exploitative and ineffective. 
Local customs are not static. They are dynamic and responsive to wider social change and often 
congenial in promoting harmonious social relations (Oli, 1998). Other jurisdictions such as grazing land 
used by defined groups of users, the harvest of grasses, litter and wood from forests used by a 
particular community, upon which they have established their rights over time are respected by such 
customs. Nevertheless all customs are not effective in terms of equity and justice. Some of them 
maintain an unequal power structure in community. 
The picture that emerges from this discussion is that dynamic, complex, successful and enduring local 
NRM and conflict resolution systems legitimately operated in community based collective values, visions 
and actions are disturbed by state intervention. It will be worth-quoting the conclusion of the research 
findings of Oli (1998:75) that "fundamental conflicts between the local people's perceived views and the 
government's view in regulating resource management is increasing. This is likely to continue until the 
government stops ignoring and impairing the role of local community in managing their resources". 
Way of determining the truth: An example of informal conflict-management practice 
Dharma Bhakaune (sacred test) is a common informal method of determining the truth in managing 
conflict. This method is based on the principle of 'oath of innocence'. It is common when there is lack of 
other evidence. Common methods observed in this test are: taking contending parties to the local 
temples and asking them to undergo a test, asking conflicting parties to touch sacred materials such as 
saligram (a sacred stone), copper, sacred plants such as Ficus religiosa (peepal), Ocimum sanctum, 
(basil), Cynodon dyctolen (dub grass) sacred books and take an oath of innocence. Some time 
conflicting parties are asked to hold their children while performing such vows (Khadka, 1997). These 
tests take place in the presence of villagers, negotiators and conflicting parties. A feeling of sin, if the 
matter is falsified, plays a strong role in this method to find the wrongdoing. This method is also used 
occasionally in formal CM practices. 
Different form of punishment in informal conflict-management practices 
Various types of punishments were used in local conflict-management practices. Three examples are 
discussed here on how people punish wrongdoers in the community. 
1. Matt magne (public apology): A public apology by the guilty party for wrongdoing is a common 
method in the study area. The guilty party, in the presence of villagers and local elite, begs for 
pardon and swears not to repeat the offence. This is also sometimes accompanied with an 
additional fine and other punishments. This method is also widely used in the formal conflict-
resolution process. 
2. Jariwana (fine) and chhetipurti bharaune (compensation): This practice involves 
reimbursement of loss (generally cash, and sometimes kind) by the guilty party and some extra 
punishment in the form of fines. This is very common in conflict related to crop damaged by 
animals, canal and drinking water-pipe damage, destruction or damage of public paths, physical 
fights, etc. If the community realises that one party has a considerable loss in property or sustained 
injury from the other party then the wrong doer has to bear cost for losses, other associated costs 
and medical treatment, if needed. In addition to the compensation for loss, a fine is generally 
collected, for use at the temple, school, guthi, or to repair a path or the drinking water. 
3. Pan! kadne (ostracise): This is a severe punishment, grounded in the orthodox caste system 
backed up by Hindu spiritual feeling. Though this is not applied in NR-related conflict, it is still 
common in villages to deal with sexual conflicts. In this practice, the offender and his/her family are 
declared out caste and no-one maintains a social interaction and relationship with them. People 
stop visiting and eating in their houses and inviting them to their homes. This is a strong public 
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sanction against the offender and common in molestation and illegal and immoral sexual 
relationships between unilateral kin groups based on either matrilineal or patrilineal descent. This 
punishment is legally prohibited by the law but still common in practice. Local people say that the 
threat of being ostracized is maintaining social harmony and limiting immoral sexual offenses. 
Geographical distance is also a crucial factor when opting for different forums for conflict resolution. If 
villages were from more remote areas, more traditional patterns of CM prevailed. This is also linked to 
network and social support. Those who have strong networks and social support get more benefits from 
conflict. The role of literacy in a conflict is more important in financial transactions. It is possible for those 
who can not read and write to be exploited by landlords and moneylenders when they make the relevant 
documents. 
In the last few years, the Local Governance Programme, FECOFUN, Environment and Population 
Awareness Programme (ENAP) and Himalayan Grassroot Women's Natural Resource Management 
Association (HIMWANTI) like non-government organizations and projects are managing conflict 
differently than the former models and legal measures. FECOFUN is emerging as one of the important 
platforms in dealing with forest conflicts and defending interests and rights of the forest. In collaboration 
with different forestry-related projects FECOFUN is organising various activities in managing conflicts. 
HIMWANTI is another emerging forum created by women working in NRM to address their problems. 
Several NGOs are also being trained by various projects in conflict management. They are developing 
the capacity of people through learning and mobilising them to minimise conflict and resolve it locally. 
They are quite successful in managing conflicts in this way but scaling-up is the difficult and constraining 
part of these innovative practices. 
4.4.2 Formal conflict management practices 
This section discusses common conflict management practices accomplished by formal organisations 
responsible for NR-conflict resolution. The discussion considers issues of quality and efficiency of 
resolutions and their implications to poor people and NRM. This section also reports the role of power, 
influence of money and networks in resolving conflict. An effort is made to look at the assessment of the 
performance of the organisations responsible for conflict management, by different section of society 
such as people involved in conflict, politicians, general public, bureaucrats, etc. 
Formal CM practice involves two major categories. The first category includes the court system and the 
second category includes VDC, governmental NR-related offices, the police and the District 
Administration Office. These are all formally working under a governmental regulatory framework. Since 
1998 the LSGA has empowered VDCs to formally deal with conflict cases and they are actively involved 
in CM. In the case of NR-related conflicts, in addition to the Local Self-Governance Act, several other 
organisations are instituted by the government to look on sectoral issues such as DWSO for drinking 
water, DIO for irrigation, DFO for forest, DLRO for land, DADO for agriculture and DLDO for livestock 
related issues. In every region (between 3-5 VDCs) there are police posts to settle conflicts. The CDO 
and police have a mandatory responsibility to address all types of conflict issues. These organisations 
settle a large number of conflicts and only those conflict cases, which are not possible to solve there, go 
to the court. 
National arena 
The national arena gives a bird-eye view of the situation of conflict in Nepal. Conflicts, which have 
eventually ended up in the courts, are discussed in this section. At the village level, there is no court and 
therefore, conflict cases go to VDC. Table 4.1 gives the overview of conflict in Nepal. This table 
demonstrates the filing of more than a hundred thousand conflict cases in court by their type and nature. 
This is a clear indication of the growing number of conflicts. It also indicates the weak performance of 
the informal CM system to resolve conflict locally. The conflicts presented in Table 4.1 are both civil and 
criminal cases. Natural-resource conflicts generally fall under civil cases and only occasionally turn into 
a criminal case. Land-related conflicts are the most serious in terms of occurrence in the civil cases. If 
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disputes related to partition and inheritance, which are invariably related to land, are consider under the 
land-related conflict category the numbers are extremely high. The same Table shows that the trend of 
corruption related to conflict is in increasing. This trend suggests that the prevalence of corruption87 in 
Nepalese society is increasing over time (234 corruption cases were filed in 1995, which is more than a 
100% increase, i.e., 486 in 1999). 
Table 4.1 Total number of conflict cases filed in all Nepalese courts 
Types of conflict 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Total 
Land 20978 31147 30712 27014 109851 
Transactions 11678 14789 13970 12094 52531 
Partition and family cases 14622 22278 20888 19825 77613 
Forgery and cheating 9517 12621 12064 9367 43569 
Looting 5806 6324 6017 6567 24714 
Defamation 5282 3831 2969 2708 14790 
Election 7 203 270 198 678 
Assault 3868 5721 5390 4522 19501 
Murder 2748 5301 4984 4953 17986 
Theft 2381 3451 3413 2584 11829 
Sexual offences 445 706 682 639 2472 
Corruption 234 477 482 486 1679 
Juvenile delinquency 21 12 3 23 59 
Criminal abortion 90 159 203 376 828 
Miscellaneous 16217 22765 23196 25660 87838 
Total cases 93894 129785 125243 117016 465938 
Source: CBS, 2000, P. 256 (adapted) 
Though the figures in Table 4.1 indicate the wider existence of conflict; it is only a small part of the total 
conflicts. As explained earlier, only legally complicated and selected conflict cases reach to court. Large 
numbers of conflict cases are resolved locally or by other sectoral organisations such as DFO, DIO, 
DWSO, DLRO, etc. in districts, which are not reflected in this Table. A similar trend can be seen in the 
districts too. Though Dolakha is a relatively small mountain district with plenty of NR, large numbers of 
conflicts are observed. The following Table depicts the wide existence of conflict in this district. 
Table 4.2 Number of dispute cases registered in the Dolakha District Court 1995-1999 
Types of conflict88 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Total 
NR-related 401 552 425 176 143 1697(41.12%) 
Other 501 448 400 542 538 2429 (58.88%) 
Total 902 1000 825 718 681 4126(100%) 
Source: Compiled from different records of the Dolakha District Court, 2000 
Table 4.2 shows that conflict cases related to natural resources were increasing between 1995 and 
1997 in the study district. About 41 % of the total cases were related to NR. Large proportions of the NR-
related conflicts are land-related cases. This is mainly due to the cadestral survey conducted during that 
period. The conflict cases filed in court are only a small portion of the total as many cases were solved 
locally. However, after 1996, the trend is less. The decreasing trend is reported to be not due to the 
8 7 CDO, special police and Commission of Investigation of Abuse of Authority are primarily responsible for dealing with 
corruption issues and therefore only extremely complicated small numbers of cases not possible to resolve in these 
organizations go to court. It is interesting to note that almost all the corruption cases are won by the defendants because of 
faulty legal provision (these anti-corruption organisations have to present the evidence of corruption rather than evidence of 
innocence being presented by the defendants. It is not likely to have evidence of corruption by the defendants. Other factors 
affecting verdicts are political influence, money and power. 
8 8 The registration book of the court has categorised conflict cases into Dewani (civil) and Faujdari (criminal). However, NR-
related conflicts belong to both categories. Therefore, I have categorised conflicts into 1) NR related and 2) others, which 
include all the civil and criminal cases from the court's registration book. 
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efficiency of the courts but due to the completion of the land survey and measurement programme in the 
district. 
In the case of research VDCs, secretaries of both of the study VDCs reported that 87% of households of 
Pawoti and 82% households of Sailungeshwor VDCs were engaged in conflict in 1990-91 when 
democracy was just restored. Occasionally such conflicts escalate to become violent when ignited by 
other forces such as political biases or personal revenge. For example, in 1991, the son of a powerful 
elite in Pawoti VDC was killed and 4 other family members were beaten mercilessly to death by a crowd 
of poor untouchable (Damai) people because the wife of a powerful member of the elite had acted 
callously (feeding human excreta to one of the Damai women) against them. These Damai were heavily 
exploited (routinely threatened, harassed, forced to work without wage, etc.) by these people in the 
Panchayat political system. Then, in the recently changed political situation they took revenge. 
According to the respondents, however, in recent years the frequency of conflict is decreasing in the 
study VDCs, mainly due to the frustration of people (disputants) with their respective political parties. 
Earlier, many of the conflicts were created for political benefit but as the disputants got no benefits from 
them, they now do not want to politicise their conflicts. 
Table 4.3 Number of complaints made in the study VDCs during 1995-1998 
Types of conflict cases Pawoti VDC Sailungeshwor VDC Total number 
NR related conflicts 
• Irrigation 
• Drinking water 
• Pasture/forest 
• Land 
380 (55.15) 
60 (15.80) 
75(19.74) 
70(18.42) 
175(46.00) 
328 (51.99) 
35 (10.68) 
60 (18.30) 
69(21.00) 
164(50.00) 
708 (53.64) 
95 (13.42) 
135 (19.07) 
139 (19.63) 
339 (47.88) 
Other conflict cases 309 (44.85) 303(48.10) 612 (46.36) 
Total 689 (52.20) 631 (47.80) 1320 
Source: Compiled from various records of the VDCs. Numbers in parenthesis are percentages. 
Table 4.3 shows that out of total number of conflict cases (1320) observed in the study VDCs 52.2% 
were reported in Pawoti and the remaining 47.8% in Sailungeshwor VDC. In comparing types of 
conflicts (NR-related and others), 53.64% of conflicts are NR-related in the study VDCs and the 
remaining 46.36% are other conflicts. Within the NR-related conflicts, almost half are related to land, 
followed by forest and pasture (19.63%), drinking water (19.0%) and irrigation (13.42%) respectively. A 
comparison of VDCs shows that 55.15% of conflict cases in Pawoti and 51.99% in Sailungeshwor are 
related to NR and the remaining 44.85 and 48.10%, respectively, are other conflicts. It confirms that NR-
related conflicts are widely and inevitably prevalent not only in the study area but also as whole in 
Nepal. Based on the figures presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 it can be conclude that Nepalese 
society is deeply interwoven with conflict. 
\ From direct interviews with litigants coming to court, it was found that most of them were not aware of 
1 their legal rights and duties. Similarly, the majority of disputants did not contact lawyers because they 
could not afford the cost. Lawyers had rejected legal assistance to some disputants who were not able 
to pay legal fees. Often, even simple conflict cases take a long time, ranging from 2 to 5 years, to 
resolve which drastically increases the cost (New Era, 1988). There are no effective mechanisms for 
summary proceedings, which eventually limits access of poor people to the courts system (OH, 1998). 
Nepalese courts are heavily clogged with pending litigation. The following statement of the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court indicates the situation. Addressing a three-day meeting of judges of the Supreme 
Court and appeal courts the Chief Justice Mr. Keshav Prasad Upadhyay said "over 82% of appeal 
courts' decisions ended up in the high court. Some legal and court procedures need to be simplified" 
(The Rising Nepal, 25 July 2000). This issue raises a logical question why appeal courts' decisions are 
challenged in the Supreme Court? Are they unfair? Nepalese courts have a backlog of 64,700 cases89, 
including 16,000 at the Supreme Court, 14,000 at the appellate courts and more than 33,000 cases in 
It attracts the popular statement in legal discourse that 'Justice delayed is justice denied' (Pickles, 1987). 
An Overview of Conflict in Nepal 79 
the district courts. The pending cases increase by almost 13% each year (ibid.). Recent research 
conducted by the Centre for Legal Research and Development shows that police and judges directly 
ask for bribes from litigants (Kantipur Daily, 11 Sept. 2000). From this evidences it can be argued that 
the legal service is not easily available to poor people and that it is slow and costly. 
Earlier studies (OH, 1998; New Era, 1988) also showed that court proceedings are quite lengthy and 
tedious. The following process noted by Oli (1998: 59) explains how complicated and lengthy is the 
Nepalese court procedure: If there is a conflict related to natural-resource management, or jure in re the 
parties set their case in what are called pleadings. The plaintiff files a particular claim. The defendant 
then files a defense and in some cases also a counter claim. The plaintiff then files a reply and defense 
to the counter claim. The defendant may blame party and bring into action through third party notice. 
The third party files a defense to that. The other side may ask for further and better particulars of any of 
these pleadings and this cause delaf. From this explanation it has become apparent that the time taken 
for a trial of a conflict case in court is remarkably lengthy, complicated and costly for poor and marginal 
people in terms of knowledge, time, and resources. 
It was pointed out by the respondents that disputants have to wait up to five to seven years to settle 
disputes in court, by which time both plaintiffs and defendants have had to bear enormous physical, 
financial and psychological stress. Only lawyers gain remarkable benefits from such a lengthy process. 
It is also observed that lawyers and solicitors deliberately work in a complacent pace to maintain a 
continued source of income form the lengthy cases. Judges also support such lingering, as Pickles 
(1987) says 'we ail are lawyers together and must stand togethef. There is not any evidence of persons 
responsible for delaying court proceedings being punished or being made to pay compensation to their 
clients for deliberately caused delay. In this context it will be relevant to quote that: "hundreds and 
thousands of people spend sleepless nights in their homes and many more live in jail, anxiously 
awaiting the resolution of a conflict on natural-resource management (Oli, 1998:60). Other research 
findings (New Era, 1988; Kaplan, 1995) also demonstrated that wealthy and educated people obtained 
justice, from the formal system, more easily than poor people. The frequent and widening gap between 
rhetoric (rules, laws, policies) and real practices, the effect of differential legal knowledge, the high cost 
involved in obtaining justice and suspicion of fairness by the disputants are common problems in the 
formal legal system. 
It has been observed that several formalities and technicalities in judicial administration caused an 
overload of conflict cases in court. Furthermore, court personnel lack the required technical knowledge 
and information related to natural-resource conflicts, which undermines credibility of the verdicts. 
Sangraula and Gurung (n.d.:3) state that "In ordinary court house, a judge because of his/her legal 
background may not be familiar with the technical aspects of the case in hand. Half of the trial may be 
taken up explaining the technical aspects to a judge. Parties are lucky if, the judge is able to understand 
half of the issues explained. [...]. Technical expertise is not usually available in court proceedings". This 
situation makes for delay in rendering courts' decisions. In the legal system there is no efficient, 
amicable, expeditious and inexpensive mechanism to manage conflict and narrow down the areas of 
future potential disputes. 
The settling of disputes by individuals appointed by disputing parties was formally started in 1956 under 
the Development Board Act, 1956. Enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1981 further strengthened 
legislation on arbitration. However, it is strictly limited to trade and commerce. Because of inappropriate 
and vague provisions, the arbitration act is not able to address the objectives for which it came into force 
(ibid:2). Litigation calls for frequent adjournments that make for delay in court process. The court, as 
stipulated in the Arbitration Act, is not able to maintain list of panels of arbitrators. Moreover, the 
tribunals constituted for arbitration are composed of lawyers, retired bureaucrats from governmental 
judicial services and retired judges, instead of being balanced by including experts in the fields 
concerned. It is also observed that there was no counseling in the conflict cases decided by courts, the 
police or the general administration. 
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From the reaction of the villagers arriving in district headquarters to accomplish different official tasks in 
different government organisations it was known that to obtain tok-aadesh (order-directive) to get things 
done it is necessary to mobilise afnomanchhe (afnomanchhe is a circle of family connections and 
relatives, externally developed by being extraordinarily loyal to a particular person, and with strong 
connections and interpersonal relationships with powerful people, who can be used if needed). It is also 
observed that a person having authority knows that there is no way to accomplish things other than by 
issuing addesh or paying bribes, regardless of their impacts, it is common to say to the customers in the 
government offices that "addesh khai, mathiko tok aadesh chaincha, Hakim sable tok iaunu parcha, aile 
hundaina, bholi aaumf (Where is order? We need order/directive from the boss. It is not possible to do 
this work today, come tomorrow). This sort of dialogue is a veiled demand for a bribe/kickback. If 
customers offer a bribe to the official, then the necessary action is taken, but if not then he or she keeps 
them waiting for up to several days even for something that could be accomplished in a few minutes. 
At the time of the local election, politicians and party cadres show an unexpectedly soft attitude towards 
disputants and therefore, many politically backed, unresolved conflicts were resolve instantly. For 
example, at the time of the parliamentary election in 1999, 155 unresolved conflicts were resolved 
locally in the study VDCs. Out of those 90 were NR-related. All resolved conflicts involved disputants, 
who were the supporters of the candidates of the parliamentary election. Similarly, 64 new conflicts 
were deliberately ignited to distract the voters from other candidates, in order to win the election. These 
new conflicts were between the voters from unidentified political affiliations or voters of other 
candidates. The VDC is becoming an increasingly important formal forum to resolve local conflict as the 
LSGA gives jurisdiction and defines the judicial procedures it has to follow. Most of the key informants 
(politicians, government officials, and local people involved in the conflict) stressed that the VDC is the 
most appropriate formal organization to deal with community level NR-elated conflict. However, VDCs 
are not yet properly aware of their statutory authority, sometimes going beyond their jurisdiction and 
often being unable to use their statutory authority. If they work according to their jurisdiction, VDCs are 
the most efficient (in terms of access, familiarity, expenses and time) of the formal CM systems. 
Provision of user groups and associations, made by different acts are used as legitimate forums to 
obtain financial and/or political benefits by different interest groups such as NGOs, political parties and 
local neo-elite groups. In practice, user groups and associations are not operating according to the 
ideals of these acts. For example, water is not used in the community according to section 7(1) 'priority 
order on the utilisation of water resources' of the Water Resource Act. Neither are conflicts related to 
water being settled according to section 7(2), nor are the payments of compensation90 to individuals, 
made for the use of their lands as stated in the act. All forest disputes are also not settled according to 
the provision made in section 29 of the Forest Act, 1993. Well-informed people can manipulate the 
situation in their favour by use of the provisions of the acts. If people were better informed about these 
acts, policies and regulations, there would be less conflict and less exploitation. Some NGOs have 
started promising awareness raising activities but the scale is very small and therefore of little influence 
in terms of the wider impact. Even NGOs are marginalised and ignored by government offices. There is 
mistrust between NGOs and governmental officers as both blame each other for misuse of resources. 
Referring to the earlier land measurement conflict, the Land Measurement Act (seventh revision) makes 
provision for demarcation and measurement of government and public lands, before the demarcation 
and measurement of private lands. However, in practice, measurement of public and government lands 
at the time of survey, under the name of powerful individuals was common. Those people who were well 
informed about the legal provisions and familiar with survey procedures could influence surveyors by 
bribery and were able to ensure that communal and governmental lands were measured under the 
names of their relatives and themselves. During the cadestral survey and land mapping in the study 
district between 1991 and 1996 these practices meant that large areas of communal and government 
lands were legalised under private ownership. The registration of public lands to powerful individuals 
was often supported politically and technically (using technical jargons and arguments by technicians). 
8 0 The WRA makes provision for compensation to individuals to use or acquire their lands to construct dams, barrages, canals, 
ditches, water tanks, or for laying pipes, etc. 
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This has been shown by the more than 1300 cases on the land survey, filed in the district) court. Article 
10 of the Land Act classifies land into four categories91 based on the quality of land. However, the 
surveyors, in consultation with local landlords and local politicians determined the category of land 
based on the amount of bribe instead of quality of land. The first category of land is that with a high 
valuation and the fourth category is that with a low valuation. Powerful people, wishing to have 
mortgages with banks or financial companies therefore want to raise the value of their poor quality 
lands. These practices demonstrate how government organisations responsible for NRM issues, 
operate in reality. 
4.4.3 Assessment of performance of formal conflict-management practices by actors 
In interview with litigants coming to the different offices responsible for settling NR-conflicts at district 
headquarters, a negative response was received on the performance of these organisations. To further 
understand the situation in reality, a simple-checklist type of questionnaire/survey-cum interview was 
carried out with different government officials, politicians and local people directly involved in conflict. 
They were requested to assess the performance of the formal CM system against nine given 
indicators92. By and large their responses in this regard, which is presented in the following Tables (4.4, 
4.5, 4.6) were frustrating in terms their performance. However, using the same assessment indicators 
the opinions of the people involved in the conflict were even stronger than that of government officials. 
The majority (70%) of them think that political intervention, influence of money and power and elite 
domination in CM is high (Table, 4.4). The vast majority of the respondents agree that there is a strong 
need to reform the existing formal CM system. Likewise, both groups acknowledge that the informal CM 
is more effective than the formal one, due to the tatter's inherent weaknesses. Furthermore, local people 
actively involved in conflict are not happy with issues of transparency involved in the formal CM 
systems. 
Table 4.4 Assessment of performance of formal CM system by villagers involved in conflict. 
Assessment indicators Response Total 
Yes No No judgement 
number % Number % Number % 
Political intervention in conflict 70 70 20 20 10 10 100 
Good performance of judiciaries 10 10 60 60 30 30 100 
Easy access to judicial system 10 10 70 70 20 20 100 
Influence of money and power 70 70 5 5 25 25 100 
Ambiguous role of GOs 40 60 30 30 10 10 100 
Elite domination in CM 75 75 12 12 13 13 100 
Transparency of CM process 6 6 74 74 20 20 100 
Effectiveness of local CM practices 75 75 20 25 - - 100 
Need for reforming existing formal 
CM system 
70 70 20 20 10 10 100 
Source: Primary Data, 1998-2000. 
Table 4.5 shows that government officials themselves are not satisfied with their role in CM. However, 
most of them do not want to speak openly on sensitive issues such as performance of the judiciary and 
political interventions. The data indicates that there is lack of transparency in the dominant formal CM 
practices. More that 66% of respondents consider that the influence of money, power and elite 
domination in the formal CM system is common and therefore the performance of informal CM practices 
9 1 The first category of land is called Abal (having irrigation facilities all year round, productive and fertile land with at least two 
crops a year). The second category is Sim (land with seasonal irrigation facilities, fertile soil with the potential for 2 crops a 
year). Third category is Sim (land with no irrigation facilities and based on rain-fed irrigation, a single crop per year). The fourth 
category is Chahar (dry poor quality soil, non-irrigated and only one crop a year). 
9 2 The quantitative information presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 is not based on the random selection of sample and 
standard questionnaire survey procedure. The respondents included in this assessment were those people who were directly 
involved, in one way or another, in dealing with conflict (conflicting parties, mediators, negotiators, etc.). The 9 assessment 
indicators were given to them in a format with three options to choose (yes, no and no judgement). 
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is viewed as more effective. Respondents acknowledge that the formal system, particularly the judicial 
system, is lax and not easily accessible to poor people and these people prefer the informal system. 
Table 4.5 Assessment of performance of formal CM systems by officials 
Assessment indicators Response Total 
Yes No No judgement 
Number % Number % Number % 
Political intervention in conflict 10 33.3 10 33.3 10 33.3 30 (100) 
Good performance of judiciaries 5 16.6 10 33.3 15 50 30 (100) 
Easy access to judicial system 10 33.3 20 66.7 - - 30 (100) 
Influence of money and power 20 66.7 10 33.3 - - 30 (100) 
Ambiguous role of formal GOs 5 16.6 15 50 5 33.3 30 (100) 
Elite domination in CM 20 66.7 7 23.3 3 10 30(100) 
Transparency of CM process 12 40 15 50 3 10 30 (100) 
Effectiveness of informal CM 
practices 
20 66.7 10 33.3 - - 30 (100) 
Need for reformation of existing 
formal CM system 
25 83.4 5 16.6 30(100) 
Source: Primary Data, 1998-2000. 
Table 4.6 shows that political leaders are also not satisfied with the performance of the formal system 
responsible for dealing with conflict. They unanimously expressed the need for its reform to make it 
more responsive and effective. The potential reasons given for the poor performance were the 
excessive influence of money, the blatant exercise of power and source-force93, elite domination and / 
party politics in the current system. More than 90% of respondents thought that the current formal 1 
system is not easily accessible to the general public. As can be seen in Table 4.6 the fair resolution of a 
conflict was a shattered hope or even a nightmare in the study area. 
Table 4.6 Assessment of performance of formal CM system by politicians94 
Assessment indicators Response Total 
Yes No No judgement 
number % number % Numbe 
r 
% 
Political intervention 40 80 5 10 5 10 50 (100) 
Good performance of judiciaries 15 30 30 60 5 10 50 (100) 
Easy access to judicial system 5 10 45 90 - - 50 (100) 
Influence of money and power 45 90 5 10 - - 50 (100) 
Ambiguous role of formal GOs 30 60 15 30 5 10 50 (100) 
Elite domination in CM 40 80 10 20 - 50 (100) 
Transparency of formal CM process 25 50 20 40 5 10 50(100) 
Effectiveness of local CM practices 25 50 25 50 - - 50(100) 
Need for reforming existing 
formal CM system 
50 100 - - - - 50(100) 
Source: Primary Data, 1998-2000. 
Table 4.7 has an even more interesting story to tell. A total of 50 people who had won their cases in the 
formal CM system were asked to indicate the means they used to win the cases. Only 4% of the 
8 3 One of the government officials said that if the civil servants do not follow the instructions of politicians, instead sticking to the 
rules and regulations they have to face punishment or transfer into remote and difficult (mostly Maoist affected parts) areas. 
Immediately, politicians complain to more senior politicians of their party and/or concerned ministers to take action against the 
officials who have disobeyed their instructions. Ministers immediately take action if the person concerned has no countervailing 
power through Afnomanche in political and bureaucratic circles or does not offer a bribe. Such transfers have happened within 
48 hours in some cases. So, it is better for the officials to obey illegal instructions instead of facing such punishment. 
9 4 Politicians include: Members of Parliament, ex-ministers, DDC executive members, heads of the local political parties and 
chairpersons, vice-chairpersons and members of VDCs. 
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respondents won the cases without using any illegal means. The remaining 96% used illegal means 
such as bribes, the use of power or the mobilization of afnomanchhe to win conflict cases. Among the 
different means used to win the case, the most common was a combination of bribery and mobilisation 
of political power and afnomanche, especially for complicated cases. Twenty percent of those who had 
won their cases only used bribes to win the case, 30% mobilised political power (leaders of the political 
party to which they are affiliated) and 6% mobilised their afnomanche to influence the case in their 
favour. This confirms that fair judgement and real justice is in serious question in the existing formal CM 
system. 
Table 4.7 Means used by to win the cases from the concerned formal CM organizations. 
Means used to win cases Number Percentage Remarks 
Use of Bribes86 10 20 
Use of political power 15 30 
Mobilisation of Afnomanche 3 6 
Combination of all three 20 40 
Fair, without any illegal means 2 4 
Total 50 100 
Source: Primary Data, 1998-2000. 
During my interview, some staff of the offices responsible for formal conflict-management explained that 
Brahmin, Chhetri and well-informed people are more involved in conflicts in the district. Tamang (16%) 
is the second largest population group after Chhetri (34.2%) and Brahmin (11.4%) in the district (DDDC, 
1999) but Chhetri and Brahmin are more involved in conflict. The main reasons according to them are 
the level of awareness, affordability, and having afnomanche. The Tamang is third major group using 
the formal process of conflict resolution. I met a group of people in the district headquarters who had 
come to hear the verdict of the court on their land conflict with a local landlord. One of the group 
members expressed his frustration when they lost the case saying that "Afno manchhe chaina, source-
force chalcha, hami kharcha gama sakdainau ani ke mudha jitnu, gayyo tetiramro namarijagga sittaima. 
Tettiko tank bokiyo insaf paiyela ki bhanera, faisala fa aarkai po bhayo" (We have no people in power of 
our own, source-force is common and we can not invest money (for bribes), so how could we win the 
case; we lost our best land. We made regular appearances in court to get justice but the verdict was 
unexpected). 
Source-force and afnomanchhe are very common practices in formal dispute-resolution practice in 
Nepal. Source-force is defined as having a contact (friends and relatives) who has the power to do what 
is needecTThe strong belief is that every rule, law and procedure can be bent to one's purpose if an 
adequate source were at hand (Stiller and Yadav, 1979:120). If a person has afnomanchhe in authority 
or power he or she can force things to happen in their favour or negotiate when things get difficult (SNV, 
1998). This can result in the opening of doors, instantly obtaining information, the completion of paper 
work on time, the bypassing of bureaucratic hurdles, saving unnecessary hassles and achieving a result 
in one's favour. In Nepal, source and force is universally applied for employment, promotions, transfers, 
scholarships, to win dispute cases, training, in fact for almost any activities. Competence, evidence of 
rights and wrong and justice become secondary in the face of source-force (ibid.). One intellectual 
person in this regard expressed his frustration with the Nepalese administration system saying "one no 
longer believes that the Nepalese administration operates on the principle of what is fair and just but all 
believe that it is operated on source-force and corruptiorf. 
One of the respondents explained the role of source force and Afnomanche in local NRM. He said: 
"Tirtha Prasad and his sons using their knowledge and source-force legally transfened, without any 
payment, the land of one poor Shivakoti, who was not familiar with the legal process, to their ownership. 
Similarly, Bhunta Pandit won a land case at the court using fake documents and a network of 
9 5 Bribes include both cash and kind. Kind includes, dehusked rice, fruit and vegetables, animals and animal products such as 
hides, ghee, milk, fish, honey, furniture, forest products such as wood, herbal medicines, clothes, gold and even occasionally 
land. 
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Afnomanche, which was purchased by the weak Tamang several years ago. Now Maobadi (Maoists) 
are asking both of them to either immediately return these lands, won by falsified documents and 
source-force, or to be ready to bear action96". 
New Era reports that causes for the poor performance of the legal system such as high attorneys' fees, 
a low level of legal knowledge and the complex judicial administration were also accepted by the court 
staff. The fairness of the Nepalese judiciary also depends on the personalities involved. In districts, 
politicians and administrators let the judiciary to know their wishes then these wishes are 
accommodated by the judiciary as much as possible (New Era, 1988). 
It has become apparent from the expression of the Chief Justice, reactions of politicians and people 
involved in conflict, earlier research findings (Kantipur, 11 Sept. 2000; New Era, 1988; OH, 1998; Upreti, 
1998b; Kaplan, 1995; Bhatiya, 1995; Khanal, 1998; Khanal, 1996; Shrestha, 1996a; 1996b) and 
empirical evidence of this study that the Nepalese formal CM system in general and the legal system in 
particular, is inefficient in timely resolving conflict cases and giving fair justice. This is due to several 
reasons such as the overwhelming numbers of conflicts arising due to faulty policies and procedures of 
the government and development organisations, lack of sufficient manpower, bribery and kick-backs, 
the complicated litigation process, lack of transparency, influence of power, politics, money and 
afnomanchhe, ambiguous and contradictory laws, regulations and tasks of government officials. 
4.5 Comparison with reference groups 
The comparison of the findings from the study area with reference groups confirmed that the sorts of 
community level CM practices are largely identical. It became clear that attempts to politicise conflict for 
political benefit, elite domination in NRM and conflict resolution, inaccessibility and complications of the 
formal conflict management in general and the court system in particular to poor villagers were similar in 
all reference sites. The comparison also indicated that the accommodative nature of people engaged in 
NR-related conflicts, the change in the social organization and power relationships in the village after 
democracy and their impacts on NR-related CM are largely similar. Intensity of conflicts and their 
transformation were affected by time. This characteristic was common in both research area and 
throughout the reference sites. In the reference groups of ethnic homogeneity, an accommodative 
strategy of CM was higher than in heterogeneous groups. 
Changing pattern of dominant power forms overtime, influencing conflict in the study area 
As I discussed earlier, the post Rana period (1951 to 2000) in Nepal experienced the following power 
forms, which are more influential in dealing with conflict and CM practices in the study area. Due to 
rapid political (3 major political changes in 1950/51,1996,1990), economic and technological changes 
the power forms have also changed accordingly. 
a) Cultural and religious power was more influential before 1970. During that time people were using 
cultural norms and religious rules to deal with most of the conflicts. However, this means was also 
used to exploit poor people. Religious rules were strictly applied and violators were severely 
punished. Social relations were based on cultural and religious norms. 
b) Economic power was more influential during 1970-1990. Gradually the religious power in the study 
area was reduced and the influence of money and wealth was increased and that became the basis 
for the development of social relations and resolution of conflict. Rich people influence poor people 
9 8 Some key informants, in the condition of strict anonymity (as they fear being accused by the police) explained that Maoists 
are favouring poor and powerless people abused by local elite in the village. They threaten the wrongdoers, verbally or in 
writing, to correct their bad practices. Due to the fear of any potential action from the Maoists, wrongdoers often change their 
behaviours. For example, some schoolteachers who could not be controlled by the governmental District Education Office, as 
they were a member of a political party, were not teaching in school. They were in fact working as contractors or having other 
business but were obtaining a regular salary from the school. These obediently attended school regularly after being 
threatened by Maoists. Some people, who had two wives but were neglecting one by not taking care of them or not giving 
alimony, promptly provided half of their resources to the neglected wife after getting a threat of action from Maoists. 
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by lending them grain and cash. The determinant factors to escalate and/or resolve conflict then 
become money and grain. 
c) Physical power was more influential during 1990-1992. During the popular movement in 1990 and 
immediately after that the physical force became more prominent in villages. Physical attack and 
fear of physical fights greatly shaped social relationships and the pattern of conflict. 
d) Knowledge, information and party political power was more influential during 1992-2000. The 
physical power base has changed to knowledge, information and ideology based social relations in 
the community after 1992 when the political parties took control over from a "free riding" situation. 
The election was accomplished, majority government started to rule the country. The escalation 
and resolution of conflict as well as exploitation and discrimination all were based on party ideology. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Several conclusions may be drawn based on the quantitative data and qualitative information presented 
in this chapter. Similar characteristics of NR-related conflicts across the country is by far the most 
important explanation for the observed widespread prevalence of political intervention and the influence 
of power and money in CM. Fairness, ethics, the rule of law and judgement play minor roles in 
determining CM. This suggests that the existing socio-political system, more than anything else 
determines the outcome of conflict. In other words, the formal CM system is not responsive enough and 
needs prompt reform. 
At the same time there is no assurance whatsoever that the formal conflict management system 
assures a fair resolution of conflict. The conflict analysis alone, without reference to the broader socio-
political system and social organisation of the society, does not provide a real image of the dynamics of 
power and politics in CM. It also provides no real evidence of a fair role being played by state instituted 
organisations or of fair dealing by the political leaders and party workers to resolve conflicts. 
The multi-temporal comparison of influential power forms that created or escalated conflict between 
1950 and 2000 shows that traditional power structures are changing fast and new power forms are 
emerging and influencing CM. There appears to be little supportive evidence of the claimed, 
effectiveness (NPC, 1998) of the existing linear top-down approach of CM through huge rigid structures 
and legal procedures. Given the large numbers of conflicts observed and the ineffective roles of existing 
organisations dealing with CM, an alternative approach for more effective CM (Chapter 9) is definitely 
needed. In agreement with the thinking of Warners and Jones (1998), Doughorty and Pfaltgraff (1990) 
and Buckles (1999), the evidence put forward in this chapter suggests that a new means of CM is 
essential for positive social change and sustainable NRM. However, there seems to be little evidence of 
an alternative CM emerging to break the rigid socio-political impasse. Neither are there any indications 
that the existing conflict management approach is changing 'its pattern to adjust to changing needs. 
What makes the alternative CM responsive to address these issues and contribute to enhancing non-
coercive positive social conflict is the topic of Chapter Nine. The Forth Chapter also examined 
indigenous CM practices in their religious and cultural contexts. Some of these practices can be 
improved for lager scale situations. Specifically, positive aspects of local CM practices can be integrated 
into an alternate CM. This chapter also demonstrated that the dynamics of conflict in society do not 
allow for linear, specialist based conflict resolution procedures. 
Embeddedness is a distinct characteristic of NR-related conflicts, as they are directly and/or indirectly 
,), interwoven with other social issues. Based on the socio-cultural context, people use their own criteria to 
); classify conflict. The major criterion is the effect of conflict on social relationships. Conflict is only 
categorised as severe when it disrupts social relationships. 
Chapter 5 
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5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the general situation of natural-resource conflict in Nepal and their 
management practices. Chapter Four shows that conflict is an integral part of society and influenced by 
the socio-cultural, political and economic situation and temporal and spatial factors. In this chapter I 
present three specific conflict cases, one related to farmer-managed irrigation, one related to forest and 
pastureland and another related to drinking water. These three cases are closely interrelated and 
changes in one case also have direct and/or indirect effects on the other cases because many of the 
actors in the conflict are from the same or nearby areas. This chapter not only explores how and why 
conflicts arise, but also analyses their interlinkages and transformations. It demonstrates that conflicts 
create problems but can also promote co-operation, generate alternative resources and change unequal 
social relationships in society. Diagnostic symptoms of conflict were reflected in distorted 
communication and information, anger, aggressive and defensive actions and other unusual social 
behaviour. The nature and causes of conflict suggest that it is a part of a dynamic process of social 
change. 
5.2 Conflict on a farmer-managed irrigation system (Case one) 
The 2.5 km Andherikhola Farmer-Managed Irrigation System98 (AFMIS) was constructed in 1934 by the 
Janashramdan (what is known as people's Voluntary labour"). It was initiated by a member of the village 
elite. Its original command-area was 150 ha in the fifth, sixth and seventh Wards99 of the Pawoti VDC. 
Farmers had managed this canal themselves, abiding by some specific rules and regulations (as stated 
in the Figure 5.2). The function of daily management was assigned to the Kulo Rekhdekh Samiti. There 
were no major conflicts concerning the irrigation system and the water turbines. 
This irrigation system was expanded later in 1970, to cover an additional 200 ha, using a governmental 
development grant. Earlier 70 households had been using the canal, but a further 100 households were 
added after the 1.5-km extension. This extension introduced severe conflicts in village due to the misuse 
of financial resources and water sharing by head- and tail end farmers. After the external intervention, 
poor operation and maintenance, weak management, an unreliable water supply, inequalities in water 
distribution, seasonal migration and misuse of funds were observed which had not been noticed earlier. 
The new beneficiaries, the old users and the local politicians became locked into a long lasting conflict. 
In 1970, a powerful local political leader, who was also the Mukhiya, in consultation with the then 
Pradhanpancha100, obtained a government development grant and extended this canal to make 
irrigation water available in this area. The hidden aim of the extension was twofold, to terrace and sell 
public grazing and forestlands and to irrigate their unirrigated land located in the extended section. The 
sale of public lands by powerful people (generally from the Brahmin and Chhetri caste groups) to poor 
people was common at that time. Their position as elected political leaders and the fact that they came 
from a higher social strata, meant that the (unhappy) head-section farmers (mainly from the Tamang 
ethnic group and some Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar) did not openly oppose their decisions. The 
9 7 Earleir version of this chapter is published in AgREN, Overseas Development Institute's Network Paper No 95 July 1999. 
9 8 This irrigation system is commonly known as Sainlamukhiyako Kulo or Dillinathko Kulo. Dilli Nath was the Mukhiya in the 
village. He was the grandson a very powerful elite, Ram Nath Subbha (an administrator appointed by the Rana ruler) and son 
of a local elite, Nara Nath Ditha. Using his power he has had the canal constructed from voluntary labour. He himself has also 
invested additional resources (cash and kind) to voluntary labour to construct the canal. 
8 9 A VDC is divided into 9 segments for administrative purposes and each segment is called a Ward. Each ward is headed by 
an elected chairperson who is the executive member of the VDC. 
1 0 0 Head of the Panchayat elected by eligible voters. VDC chairperson replaced the term Pradhanpancha after 1990. This 
project was the grand design of both leaders. However, the Pradhanpancha remained in the background and the Mukhiya was 
seen as the main player. 
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extension of the canal was completed mainly by induced Volunteer labour" from the tail-end farmers. 
After its completion several upland farms at the tail-end section were converted into irrigable lowland 
farms. There was fast encroachment of pasture and forestlands by powerful people, which until then 
had been used by the community. These were cultivated and sold by local political leaders. As the 
political leaders and village elite had a strong relationship with staff of the Land Reform and Land 
Revenue Offices in the district headquarters, they made the necessary legal documents for these public 
areas to be sold to the individuals. A small amount of the money earned from selling these lands was 
sufficient to keep these staff in their support. Because of the increased area under irrigation due to such 
terracing, large volumes of water were diverted to the tail-end section to meet the increased water 
demands. This led to the head-end farmers having water shortages in the peak agricultural season. 
Then the head-end farmers raised issue of water shortage and their riparian and seniority water rights. 
The tail-end farmers argued that the extension of the canal using government funds, gave equal rights 
over this AFMIS to all farmers within the command area, in contrary to the claim of the head-end 
farmers of riparian, seniority and investment rights. 
f f N 
Figure 5.1 Alignment of the canal before and after formal intervention 
Those farmers whose lands were used for the alignment of the canal made several access outlets in the 
canal and opposed sharing water with tail-end farmers. They also blamed the tail-end farmers for 
damage to their crops by water leakage, due to the large volume of water being taken to the tail section. 
However, the head-end farmers maintained good personal relationships with some powerful people of 
the tail end, by not protesting when they took water. This meant that most of the general tail-end farmers 
faced water scarcity problems. When the head-end farmers blocked the water supply, it escalated into a 
lasting conflict. In the prolonged drought in May and June the conflict escalated and led to frequent 
water stealing, physical confrontation and damage to the intake of the canal. These confrontations were 
concerned with access and control of water for water turbines, down-stream canals, and were between 
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the head and tail end farmers of this irrigation system. In this way the previously, effectively managed 
irrigation system became dysfunctional. Rules of the Kulo Prabandha Samiti101 were not respected. 
Before the extension of the canal the Kulo Prabandha Samiti was composed of representative of all 
local farmers and all local farmers were themselves involved in the repair, maintenance and distribution 
of the water. 
Figure 5.2 Rules made and executed by the Kulo Prabhandha Samiti betore 1970 
• Farmers of the head section have to finish their rice transplanting before the last week of June, 
after which other farmers have access to the water (from the first to the last week of July), 
• Before every rice transplanting season all users must compulsorily repair the canal 
• Chairman of the Kulo Rekhdekh Samiti should regularly monitor distribution of water, using a 
sancho (wooden water gate) in periods of water scarcity, 
• Every user should pay four Path! rice (approximately 14 kg) per hectare of rice field irrigated by the 
canal to pay for the caretaker, 
• If conflicts arise amongst the users, they should report first to the Kulo Rekhdekh Samiti. If the 
Kulo Rekhdekh Samiti fails to resolve the conflict then they should go to the formal authority, 
• If any one violates the rules for the first time (s)he should pay a fine, decided by the Kulo Rekhdekh 
Samiti. If (s)he repeats the same violation a second time (s)he will not be allowed to take water 
from the canal 
Source: Primary information from the respondents 
After the extension, operation, maintenance and water allocation activities were assigned to the 
Kuruwa™ appointed by the local leaders. Due to the conflict with the head-end farmers, regular 
surveillance was felt necessary to bring water to the tail end. Otherwise, the head-end farmers could 
frequently stop the water supply. However, this did not function properly, due to non co-operation from 
head-end farmers. The existing conflict escalated again over the repair of the canal when its intake was 
damaged by flood in 1980 and the head section of the canal was damaged by big a landslide in Kamare 
area in 1986. 
The tail-end farmers called a meeting between themselves and head-end farmers to settle the problem. 
At the meeting they agreed to share the water. They also organised a meeting with the users of 
downstream canals and water turbines to resolve the water scarcity problem. They made an unwritten 
agreement to share water rotationally. It was agreed that in the peak rice transplanting time water would 
not taken by the water turbines (as they need large volumes of water to run the turbines). This did not 
function properly because the owners of the water-turbines took water, when their customers came to 
grind grain, in disagreement with the negotiated agreement. 
In 1986, the Upapradhanpancha (vice-chairman of the Panchayat) received forty-three thousand 
Nepalese rupees103 from the development grant104 of the District Panchayat to repair the problematic 
parts of the canal. He shared this money with another elite, Ratna Prasad from the head section, to 
minimise the pressure from his political opponents and to mobilise the head-end farmers for volunteer 
repair. Consequently, only a small amount of the total budget was invested in repairing the canal. The 
real problem concerning the canal, which had caused conflict, was a lack of proper rules and regulations 
for access, distribution and rights over the water rather than repair and maintenance. The chairman and 
the Mukhiya were politically in opposition of the vice-chairman and therefore they brought the issue of 
misuse of money into the public domain. The vice-chairman was severely criticised for giving money to 
• 1 0 1 A forum to take responsibility of general management of the canal. Literal meaning is Irrigation Management Committee. 
102Caretaker appointed by the Kulo Prabandha Samiti. It is also often known as Heralu, Choukidar, Naike, etc. 
1 0 3 Equivalent to US $ 632, at the exchange rate of Rs 68 per US $ in 1999 
1 0 4 It is a common practice to provide money as development assistance to the supporters and followers of the leaders of DDC. 
The hidden agenda in giving money under this arrangement is to financially support their followers. Some critical development 
examiners say that more than 90% of such a budget is misused. 
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other people instead of fully invested it in repair work105. After some years, the canal at the tail end was 
not able to support a full flow of water. Only a few active and powerful people from the tail end, who 
received water, were interested in being involved in further repair of the canal. 
In 1995, the VDC again provided one hundred thousand rupees (US $ 1470, Rs 68 per US $ in 1999) 
under the popular Afno-Gaon-Afai-Banaum programme to repair the canal. An active member of the 
ruling political party from the VDC got the repair contract. Repair was extremely badly needed at the tail 
section of the canal but work was carried out at the intake where there was no major problem. By doing 
this he saved a large portion of the total budget, which would have all been needed if the tail section 
had been repaired. Apparently, opposition leaders and villagers strongly raised the issue of misuse of 
money, which then turned into a political conflict. The opposition lodged complaints against the 
contractor to the VDC but no action was taken. Opponents also approached the DIO. The DIO avoided 
the problem citing that this project was out of its mandate. The DIO argued that their own technicians 
should monitor the fund provided by the VDC. In this case, the reaction of the contractor was different. 
He says: "According to the grant condition, local people have to contribute to the project. It was 
absolutely impossible to complete the repair work without the participation of local people but they did 
not co-operate. In such a situation how is complete repair possible? The problem was only created for 
political gain and was a clash of personal interests. Whatever work has been done is according to the 
prevailing laws and regulations of the government. The misuse of resources is only a reflection of 
Nepalese political culture". 
Some frustrated tail-end farmers changed their cropping patterns and some farmers looked for 
alternative sources of irrigation and constructed other small canals from these sources instead of getting 
entangled in the AFMIS conflict. Some farmers even started rainwater-harvesting practices and others 
stopped working in the agricultural sector and migrated107 seasonally to Kathmandu and other areas to 
earn a wage. A few farmers from the middle section bartered their turn of water for grain with poor 
farmers of the head section. Eventually, the remaining tail-end farmers negotiated with head-section 
farmers and made an agreement to share the water. According to this agreement tail end farmers were 
allowed to take water from the last week of June. Nevertheless, this agreement also did not function 
properly. 
One of the respondents explained that: "... Before the extension the users of the head section were 
united and acted together. All canal-related works were performed from Janshramdan. Leadership was 
unanimous. The Kulo Rekhdekh Samiti has properly solved all water-related conflicts. When political 
leaders received money the first time and extended the canal to irrigate their land, to sell grazing and 
forestlands in Matarkopakho, Mahangkal, and Kolchaur then the problems started. Because of the 
money obtained several times for the extension and repair, not only the performance of the functional 
canal became poor (also in head section) but also several conflicts escalated in the village. The village 
elite and elected leaders used their power and position to force us to volunteer a contribution but they 
misused the budget obtained for this purpose. This situation made us prudent towards their activities. 
Many times we villagers have raised our voice against the misuse of money but nobody was ready to 
listen us, neither the district administrators, VDC, nor politicians. We are tired of the repetitive misuse of 
resources obtained from external sources. This has even increased after the restoration of democracy, 
which was supposed to improve this situation. So far, all major political parties have ruled the country 
but none of them show their responsibility to the poor rural people. They are not even ready to listen to 
the voice of villagers. Many small farmers and tenants have left agriculture and seasonally migrate to 
1 0 5 Due to this case the political career of the vice-chairman was severely damaged. 
1 0 6This was a very popular (political) development programme presented by the CPN-UML government during its nine-month 
first ruling period in 1995. Afno-Gaon-Afai-Banau stands for Built-Our-Village-Ourselves. This was the first time in Nepalese 
history that local government had received financial resources directly from the central government to undertake a 
development programme 
1 0 7Heavy seasonal migration had already begun in the mid eighties when the Swiss funded 110 km Lamosanghu-Jiri Road 
Project was constructed mainly by using manual labourers. Labourers got far more wage from this project, which strongly 
encouraged people to change to wage labour. Khimti Hydro-Electric Project, Busti-Khimti Road Project, Arniko Road 
Maintenance Project, Kharidhunga Oriented Magnesite Project, etc. like big infrastructure projects in surrounding areas also 
used heavily pooled labour forced from the agricultural sector in the study area (Upreti, 998b). 
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cities. Even after the negotiation some of the head-section farmers are reluctant to share water 
according to agreement. The big conflict in the Matarkopakho forest and pasture land was the direct 
result of this extension". 
Again in 1999, the VDC chairman from the same political party (who gave a grant to party workers to 
repair the canal earlier), planned to repair the extended section of the canal and submitted a proposal to 
the DIO to obtain funds from the ADB funded Second Irrigation Support Project (SISP). All the 
documents were already prepared and the project was in a stage of negotiation, when his local political 
opponents arranged a delegation of villagers to oppose this project and lodged a complaint at the DIO. 
They argued that it was not necessary to invest money in the canal, which was entangled in several 
conflicts. They proposed to repair another canal above the AFMIS that had not been functional for 25 
years. However, the VDC chairman did not accept the alternate proposal citing the possibility of 
escalating the earlier resolved conflict about the canal alignment. The DIO decided to keep the 
proposed project pending and asked the interested parties to negotiate and come with a unanimous 
proposal. Since then there have been several arguments and counter arguments, blame and lobbying 
about this proposal which so far has not moved any further. 
5.3 Conflict and negotiation in forest and pastureland (Case two) 
This case describes the local dynamics involved in a conflict related to pasture108 and forest resource 
and the process of negotiation. The conflict in this case was related to the ownership issue and access 
to and control over of the community-managed109 forest and pasture land. The disputed forest and 
pasture site is popularly known as Matarkopakho. This 50 ha forest land surrounded by farms has been 
virtually always used by 40 households for grazing, collection of litter for animals, alignment for irrigation 
canals and as a place of worship. They possessed valuable knowledge about the management and 
utilisation of this land for a common purpose. 
In 1971, a powerful politician who was also the Mukhiya (the same person involved in the first case) 
terraced and cultivated the Peepalkobot, Bhotekokuwa, mahankalkopakho and Tirtirekodharo, different 
segments of the Matarkopakho forest-pasture area, with the intention of selling them after first using 
them for cultivation. The Mukhiya and the Pradhanpancha extended the 
Andherikhola Farmer-Managed Irrigation System up to this area to increase 
the value of the newly terraced areas. The Mukhiya and his joint family 
members claimed that this land was the property of his forefathers. Earlier, 
110 years ago his great-uncle had terraced this land for cultivation because 
of his ownership rights over this land. But after a few years, when he fell ill, 
he left it uncultivated. He believed the terracing of the grazing land was 
cause of illness and he kept the land for grazing as usual. Some elite 
people of the village supported the Mukhiysls argument. However, the 
farmers who had used this forest and pastureland for a long time claimed 
-» i that this land was fully common pasture, owned by the community and that 
i the great- uncle of the Mukhiya had encroached it for cultivation. They had 
Fiqure 5 3 Children obtained the Lalmohor (special approval from king or his designate) 100 
carrying firewood y e a r s a g o , 0 u s e t h i s f o r e s t a s c o m m u n a l 9 r a z i n 9 l a n c L 
forest Dasture l ^d ^ t n e r PeoP.'e w n o w e r e supporting the encroachment also started terracing 
" p a n the remaining segments of that pasture area adjoining their fields. During 
that period it was common for local powerful people to encroach public 
lands. This case became more complicated because the villagers protested the intrusion. Such 
opposition was not common in the village at this time, due to fear of the powerful people. The protesters 
1 0 8 Historically, the majority of pasturelands were governed under a common property regime, co-operative management of 
pasture by local communities who used that resource for their livestock. The Pastureland Nationalisation Act, 1973 empowers 
government to nationalise pastureland under traditional ownership with provision for delegating the use and management of 
such land to local village boards. Since then the dominant communal pasture arrangement has changed. 
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appealed to those encroaching the land to leave part of it to stop the conflict but this proposal was not 
accepted. In fact the protesters were threatened and tension between the two groups mounted. Due to 
the availability of irrigation from the Andherikhola Farmer-Managed Irrigation System extension, the 
value of land as well as land transaction had been increased. The Mukhiya wanted to get maximum 
benefit from this situation selling more barren, grazing and forest lands. 
In the 3 years following the first encroachment the protesters made several unsuccessful attempts to 
negotiate with the invaders. Ultimately the protestors opted for a legal solution. Among the protestors 5 
households were not ready to protest the encroachment because of potential risks, 7 households had 
morally supported the protest but did not wish to be actively involved and the remaining 28 households 
strongly opposed the invasion. After a series of confidential meetings and discussions they formed a 
Sangarsha Samiti110 under the guidance of the Kaitebuda, an elderly and respected member of the 
community. Finally, the protestors lodged a written complaint to the Sarba-Sampana-Daudaha111 (a 
governmental senior administrator). He immediately decided the case in favour of the protesters and 
issued a warning to the Mukhiya to leave the encroached public land straight away. However, 
Mukhiya's lineage brother was the head of the District Panchayat, his father was a powerful Laptan (a 
title given by Rana Prime Minister, the literal translation is lieutenant) and his relatives were in various 
powerful positions. By using this family power-network the invader did not leave the disputed land. The 
protesters changed their strategy to take the land back through compromise. They approached the 
Mukhiya's mother, elder brothers, pandits (master of religion) and purohit and mobilised them to force 
him to leave the invaded land. Heavy religious pressure was exerted over him. At the time of local 
election the users also mobilised other villagers in their favour forming a coalition. There were many 
dissatisfied land taxpayers under the Mukhiya's tax administration because they had not only to supply 
free labour during the agricultural season but also had to pay milk products, fruit, vegetables, potatoes, 
goats, etc. regularly to the Mukhiya as Koselim and Mukhiyoli113. Taking advantage of this situation, the 
Sangharsha Samiti discussed issues with these taxpayers to form a concerted alliance. They 
announced that they would only vote for the Mukhiya's allies if he left the invaded land. Ultimately, from 
the pressure of his relatives, religious leaders and election tactics an agreement between the protesters 
and the invader was made in 1976 in which he had to return the major part of the encroached land. He 
was only allowed to keep a small part of land near his farm to limit crop damage from the grazing 
animals. This agreement also exempted any of the land he had already sold. 
Before the intrusion, villagers were following the norms they had developed to use and manage this 
forest and pasture land. There were no major problems in the use of the forest and pastureland. They 
had not considered an invasion of their grazing land was likely because once before another invader 
had left the invaded land due to religious beliefs. The following parable of a member of the Sangarsha 
Samiti reflects the situation: "All of a sudden, our pasture land was terraced and cultivated. Thorn was 
kept in our doorstep114 by invading our pastureland, which we had been using since time immemorial. 
We were totally dependent on this land for grazing and fodder collection. It was not our intention to go 
against the Gaonko Malik115 though we did because we had no alternative. Many people were very 
afraid when we decided to protest the action of powerful politicians, Mukhiya and landlords from higher 
social strata. The Mukhiya felt insulted due to our protest and threatened us. But due to the creative 
ideas of my uncle Kaitebuda, and our continued protest over five years we were successful in having 
our land returned. That was one of the great successes in my life. If we had not fought for this land, it 
could have been turned into rice fields before 30 years." 
1 1 0 Local name of a forum formed specially to take action against land invasion. 
1 , 1 Most powerful administrator appointed by the central government to inspect districts and settle the local people's problems 
on the spot. He had authority to punish any wrongdoers instantly. Later, this provision was replaced by the Zonal 
Commissioners. After restoration of democracy in 1990 the arrangement of Zonal Commissioner was also abolished. 
1 1 2 Koseli is an unofficial arrangement where the taxpayers have to give presents to the Mukhiya every season. Koseli items 
are generally goats, milk products, fruit and vegetables. 
1 1 3 Mukheuli is an informal norm developed by the Mukhyia for all taxpayers under his land tax administration to contribute 
physical labour for his farm. 
1 , 4 To keep throne in the door is a strong superstition causing a loss of all property and one's home and a collapse of future 
generations. 
1 1 5 A local term which indicates the respected position of local elite in the village. Its literal meaning is the boss of the village 
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Several times during the conflict the Mukhiya and his supporters threatened the members of the 
Sangharsha Samiti and once even the leader of the Sangharsha Samiti Mr Dhakal was physically 
attacked in a public place. They were constantly creating different legal and practical problems for the 
protesters. The Mukhiya refused to accept the land tax from these users. The problem faced by one of 
the protesters is quoted as:"/ had to purchase a rice field. I decided to sell my other land to make 
money. I approached him to get clearance but he refused to receive the land tax. Then I went to district 
headquarters and paid the land tax. At the beginning Malpot Addaka Karmachari (staff from the Land 
Revenue Office) harassed me and tried to force me to go back and pay the tax to the Mukhiya, but later, 
after listening to my problem, they accepted it. I obtained a tiro tireko rasid (land tax clearance 
certificate) and purchased the intended land. Next year, I again approached him to pay the tax 
respecting his position but he refused. However, now we have a normal relationship". 
While I was discussing this conflict with him, the Mukhiya was open in explaining his perspective 
about this conflict. He said: 'At that time there was an increasing trend to cultivate barren public land. 
The Pradhanpancha and Upapradhanpancha sold more than 1000 ha public land and almost half of 
the forest that existed in the VDC. Many people encroached and fenced barren lands adjoining their 
farms. This land was the property of my great-uncle. He left it uncultivated because, after dreaming 
that a white cow grazing in there had kicked him in his face116, he left it uncultivated to graze cows. 
But the ownership did not cease. Of that land I had cultivated a small portion inserted in my field. The 
section of land, which I terraced, was not suitable for grazing because it was surrounded by cultivated 
land on three sides. Many time animals grazing in this part of land severely damaged my crops. 
Villagers had suggested me to cultivate this inserted part but only a few had created problems. Being 
a senior politician of the VDC it was not appropriate for me to go against my own villagers and 
therefore I was ready to compromise locally. However, they complained to the Sarba-Sampana-
Daudaha but did not get any satisfaction. Nevertheless, because of my compromising strategy 
negotiations took place and the conflict was settled locally." 
The Pradhanpanch was reluctant to talk about this conflict. He said:"/ have faced more than 100 cases 
of this type in my 45 years of political life. This was only one small case in the past 30 years, which I can 
no longer remember fully. What I remember is that part of this grazing land was cultivated by the 
Mukhiya. From our efforts, part of the cultivated land was returned to its original use. The Musalman 
(local name of the leader of the protection committee) was responsible for unnecessarily creating and 
prolonging the conflict but due to the understanding of other users and efforts of Kautebuda, negotiation 
became possible". 
During the process of negotiation, animals of the members of the Sangarsha Samiti damaged standing 
crops of the Mukhiya and other farmers. Children from the age of 8-14 were given the task of grazing 
their animals and collect firewood together. When the children gathered in one place to play, animals 
damaged the crops of the surrounding farms. On several occasions the farm owners caught the animals 
and punished the children, which led to conflict between the owners of the animal and farms. To resolve 
this conflict all household heads including the Mukhiya gathered in the ChautaW17 to discuss the 
problem. After several meetings they came to a unanimous decision to take turns (Gai Heme Palo11s), 
one adult going daily as a cowherd to guide the children and watch properly to prevent crop damage by 
the animals. This platform created a congenial environment to discuss the forest and grazing-land 
related conflict with the Mukhiya and significantly contributed to the successful negotiations. The 
success of returning land from the Mukhiya weakened the deep seated patron-client relationship, 
established a sense of group identity and disqualified the 'might is right' type of control of local NR" says 
Durga Prasad, an elderly man (user of this disputed land and brother of the invader). 
6 According to local legend if a cow kicks in the face of someone this means something very bad, such as death of the 
dreamer happens. To prevent this happening part of their own land should be kept uncultivated to graze cows. 
7 A place with social and cultural value where people gather to discuss problems and pertinent issues in the village. 
8 Local term to indicate the adults taking turn to go as a cowherd to monitor the activities the cowherd children to prevent crop 
damage by animals. 
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After the successful negotiations, as a second step, the forest and pastureland users looked for a long-
term solution to protect the land from future invasion and to regenerate the forest. Therefore, they 
decided on afforestation of the land. Their motive for afforestation was to involve government agencies 
and so minimise the risk of invasion119. During the 1980s there was strong governmental emphasis on 
afforestation and all forestry-related projects, the IRDPs and government offices were heavily involved 
in this task. This was a massive programme came to address the forest destruction crisis created by 
political leaders and smugglers in 1979/80 to protect the partyless Panchayat political system. Almost 
half of the valuable forest of the nation was destructed and exported to India. In 1984, Integrated Hill 
Development project (IHDP) provided seedlings, fencing, watering materials and technical support for 
the afforestation in the disputed land. During the afforestation, the son of the Mukhiya protested against 
transplanting forest seedlings in the part of the land returned earlier. A meeting was called and both 
parties agreed to transplant forest seedlings in all the disputed lands without considering the voice of the 
son of the Mukhiya. Then the elder son of the Mukhiya removed some plants from the land, which he 
had formerly protected. 
Aftr that event, the project and the users decided to control the forest area by appointing a watchman 
(Chaukidar). The project sponsored to appoint one Chaukidar. The Chaukidar ms appointed from the 
nearby village for strict surveillance of the forest area. This proved unsuccessful because even for very 
minor cases such as the removal of a few forest seedlings from the boarder of farmlands to construct a 
boundary, the Chaukidar submitted written complaints to the DFO to take legal action120. As a result the 
conflict between farmers having lands surrounding the forest areas and the Chaukidar himself increased 
due to his biased intention to take legal action against the villagers. When the project was phased out 
and the DFO took responsibility for supporting this forest, it did nothing except threaten villagers, based 
on earlier reports of the Chaukidar. Ultimately, the Forest Protection Committee changed the earlier 
approach of forest protection and asked ENAP, a local NGO to support them. The ENAP helped them 
through different training programmes, meetings and problem solving discussions. They also ran 
courses to develop leadership whereby people got an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership 
qualities and the ability and capacity to handle local level conflict and manage the forest. They have 
developed rules and regulations themselves for the management and utilisation of the forest. To 
overcome the contested ownership claims, this disputed land was counted as public forest and 
pastureland during the time of land survey and measurement in 1994/95. Although the wife of the 
Mukhiya objected to this action raising the issue of her ownership to the negotiated land, her voice went 
unheard because of the domination of her opponents in the decision making process. 
In 1996, conflict among the users was instrumental in obtaining the chairpersonship of the Forest 
Protection Committee. Many people were interested in holding the position, as it was a good means to 
motivate villagers, and persuade them to give their support in elections and other public activities. 
Potential candidates for ward chairperson and other positions, of different political parties were 
interested in being included in the protection committee. New users (other people from the same 
community who had not previously participated in protesting the land invasion) were pushed by political 
workers to claim inclusion in the beneficiaries group. However, old users, who had fought to conserve 
the land, had planted the forest and taken care of it, were not ready to recognise them as users and 
share benefits with people who were originally against their land protection campaign. Political workers 
wanted to include all the people hoping to obtain their votes to win the election. In the midst of the 
conflict the ranger from the government's forest office verbally granted primary-users' rights to new 
users against the claim of old users. The tension erupted when there was strong competition for the 
position of chairperson of the FPC in February 1997. Both groups (new and old users) presented 
candidates for the election of chairperson. Though the candidate supported by the old users won the 
election the conflict between them remained unresolved. By using the conflict situation as an 
opportunity, the wife of the Mukhiya cut a few trees and cultivated a small part of the forest area, which 
she had contested earlier. She forced her husband and relatives to claim their ownership in that part of 
1 1 8 When the government is involved, villagers generally do not go against its action. Afforestation was a government-initiated 
programme and the DFO had the authority to give severe punishments in cases of offences in the afforestated or forest areas. 
1 2 0 At that time DFO was very powerful in law having the authority to fine, jail and even to shoot forest offenders on the spot. 
This power was very much abused by the forest authority to collect illicit revenue. 
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the forest. She was able to do this by using the situation of a changing power structure in the village and 
this was a small success for the Mukhiya family. 
Earlier local leaders of the CPN-UML had a strong hold in the village and had been against the land 
encroachment. However, all family members (except one younger son) of the Mukhiya were supporters 
of the NC party, the main opponent of the CPN-UML. When the younger son (who was a UML 
supporter) of the Mukhiya was nominated by the CPN-UML as the candidate for the post of VDC 
chairperson, then the Mukhiya and his wife supported the CPN-UML. The son of the Mukhiya in his 
election campaign declared to the voters that settlement of the conflict over forestland encroached by 
his family would be his first priority if he won the election. After winning the election he did little to settle 
the conflict due to the pressure of his family. When the CPN-UML was divided into two fractions 
(CPNUML and CPNML), the hold of the CPN-UML became relatively weak in the village and the 
situation became favourable for the Mukhiya family. The tensions between new splinter groups 
increased and the people who were earlier protecting the forest politically divided into two groups, 
working against each other. The VDC and the DDC, both ruled by the CPN-UML were not ready to 
listen to the complaints of users because the majority of them were in the splinted fraction, i.e., the 
CPN-ML, which had become a serious opponent of the CPN-UML. 
5.4 Conflict and negotiation in spring source for drinking water (Case three)121 
This case deals with the conflict between people of two hamlets in sharing a water source for drinking 
water. This case is basically the by-product of the forest-pasture land conflict described in section 5.3 
and it demonstrates how one conflict links with another, how people deal with such conflicts and how 
they learn to negotiate locally for the effective use of the available water resource. 
Narrative description of the conflict case 
This conflict is related to a spring-water source locally known as Gofle Bhoteko Dharo located in Ward 
seven of the Pawoti VDC. The people entangled in this conflict were Brahmin, Chhetri and Tamang. The 
area was densely populated (500 people per square km) and only three spring sources provided 
drinking water for more than 100 households. Among them, Gotle Bhoteko Dharo was a spring-water 
source located in the land of an individual and serving only a few households (hereafter referred as the 
"permanent users") mainly for drinking water and partly for irrigation. The source owner belongs to the 
Chhetri caste group with a relatively weak economic position. Villagers from the lower part of the village 
(who until then had no access to the water from this source and are hereafter referred to as the 
"claimants") who were all economically relatively well off and socially from higher strata, suffered from a 
lack of sufficient drinking water. The educational level, access to information and power centres of the 
claimants was higher than that of the permanent users. Water scarcity became more prominent when 
the number of households in the village increased. In 1970, two rich households from the claimants 
group decided to take part of the water from that source. The father of the source owner agreed to 
provide part of the water. However, due to the high investment required to construct the tank and lay 
down the pipe they cancelled the project. Later in 1989, the claimants again explored the possibility to 
appropriate part of the water from this source and discussed this issue with the source owner122 and the 
permanent users. In the beginning, the source owner and the permanent users agreed. Accordingly, the 
claimants decided on location of the tap stands, collected stones, transported the hardware fittings and 
construction materials such as cement, polythene pipe, and fittings, given by the District Panchayat from 
the district headquarters. They also dug out the position for laying pipes from the water source to the 
area of the claimants. Due to the democratic movement in the country to overthrow the Panchayat 
political system the construction process was stopped for about 2 years. In early 1992, the claimants 
again started to construct the project. 
1 2 1 Modified version of this case is published in The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 2000.7(1): 11 -20. 
1 2 2 His father had earlier agreed to share the water source, but as he was already dead the source ownership in this book 
denotes his son. Land invaders and many potential users were supporters of the panchayat political system, which made it 
easy to obstruct negotiations. 
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At that time, the source owner refused to give water. He cited the problems of water shortages in the dry 
season for irrigating his field surrounding the source. The hidden reason behind this disagreement was 
rooted in the earlier forest-pasture conflict between villagers. The source owner was the nephew of the 
chairman of the forest-pasture land protection committee; the majority of the claimants were relatives of 
the land invader whereas the majority of the permanent users were relatives of the source owner. 
Therefore the son of the protection committee chairman pushed the permanent members and the 
source owner to protest at sharing water123. A few people from another area, who wished to take water 
from this source and had different political allegiance from the leaders of the claimants, also supported 
the son's action and convinced the source owner to refuse to share water. In the midst of the conflict, 
one of the claimants threatened the source owner by saying they were determined to appropriate water 
from this source at any cost. The resulting anger of the source owner and the permanent users 
contributed to escalation in the conflict. 
The political differences among the villagers have greatly accelerated the conflict. According to other 
neutral villagers this water source was sufficient for both groups of people for drinking water as well as 
for irrigation. Lack of water was not the real cause of the conflict. The root cause of the conflict was the 
forest and pastureland conflict and exacerbated by misunderstanding and political differences between 
the permanent users and the claimants. The claimants argued that drinking water should get priority 
over irrigation. They had used this argument with the district authorities, DDC, and VDC. However, 
these organisations were not interested in getting involved in this conflict because of the political 
backing of the case. They decided to seek a local solution and approached the Ward Chairman (WC) to 
start negotiations about the conflict. Then, as a problem solving strategy, to technically disqualify the 
argument of the permanent users and the source owner about the lack of water in the source, the WC 
invited a technician (overseer) to measure the capacity of the source. The overseer verified that the 
source was sufficient to meet the needs of both groups of users. 
One of the active women from the claimants group, who was also the initiator of the negotiation process, 
said that fetching water was the main responsibility of women. Women from every household have to 
daily collect approximately 200-400 litres of water for household consumption. Generally, it takes about 
50 minutes to collect water from the source. The available water source was small and far from their 
area. The drinking water problem was primarily related to women. Therefore, the women of the 
claimants informally talked several times with the wife of the source owners and the permanent users 
and convinced them of their arguments. The women had intensively discussed this problem on various 
occasions, during Mela-pa/ma (an exchange of labour to perform main agricultural activities) and Pani-
pandhero (every morning and evening many women gather at a water source to fetch water). They also 
discussed the issue during Ghans-daura janda (villagers go together to the forest to collect firewood and 
grass) and Hatbazaar (an informal forum where people weekly or fortnightly gather to sell or buy 
different goods and to settle many practical issues). The occasion of Bibaha-bratabandha (religious 
ceremonies for marriage (bibaha) and sacred thread (bratabandha) given to the male to be eligible for 
marriage) were other forums where women made intensive efforts to convince the wife of the source 
owner and the permanent users. Women also have to work together to prepare materials for these 
occasions. 
To resolve the conflict, ENAP was invited by the claimants as a third party mediator. ENAP organised 
different training on communication, problem solving, source conservation, community participation, and 
conflict resolution as well as formal and informal meetings and discussions. Relatives of the permanent 
users and religious leaders were also mobilised to convince them to negotiate. The Brahmin priest 
called Pure-hit was actively mobilised by the Ward Chairman and ENAP to convince the permanent 
users. All these efforts made it possible to form a Mediation Group-MaoftesfMa Samuha (MG) from 
within the community. The MG proposed the following suggestions to resolve the conflict on the use of 
the water source: 
1 2 3 The situation was very favourable to manipulate or obstruct development work at that time because of the freedom due to 
political change. 
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Either the source owner sells the land where the source is located to the claimants on condition that the 
source would be accessible for both groups of users, or the owner allows water appropriation under the 
following conditions: 
1. The claimants should construct a reservoir tank close to the source to collect water, 
2. Water should be collected in the reservoir tank mainly at night time, 
3. If, in case of water shortage for rice transplanting, water should not be collected in the reservoir tank 
during that time, 
4. The claimants should take the responsibility for the conservation of the source, 
5. The source owner and the permanent users should inform the claimants and the MG before using 
the water for rice transplanting, 
6. Both groups should apologise for the past blame and misunderstandings, 
7. If misunderstandings emerge, then the users have to inform the MG. 
This proposal was thoroughly discussed in successive meetings with the permanent users, the source 
owner, staff of the ENAP, other villagers and the claimants. After almost two years of efforts the 
proposal with the above conditions was accepted and an agreement was made to use the source by 
both groups of users under the second category of conditions. During the negotiation meeting it was 
also agreed to explore the possibility of another drinking water project. As a result, representatives of 
both groups together with VDC approached the Drinking Water Supply Office and DDC and were able to 
obtain large drinking water project enough for four villages in this area. 
5.5 Analysis of conflict 
This section analyses the issues raised by conflicts. The open and hidden causes for the emergence of 
conflict were rights to resources, power, political support, government money in connection with 
government intervention, etc. These conflicts were inter-linked with each others and were transformed 
into other social conflicts over time. The process of conflict management and their outcome were 
governed by various factors. They are discussed in the following sections. 
5.5.1 Issues In conflict 
Basically all conflicts were manifested in the issue of access to and control of natural resources. The 
hidden reasons behind these conflicts were different, ranging from obtaining money from government 
grants to establishing rights over resources. However in all cases the issue of ownership was important. 
In the first case head-end farmers claimed their riparian and seniority right and the tail-end farmers also 
wanted to establish their rights. In the second case a member of the powerful elite wanted to establish 
his ownership rights in the pastureland, whereas the villagers wanted to prevent loss of their community 
ownership. In the third case the claimants wanted user-rights over the spring source against the claim of 
the source owner. These issues are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs: 
The cases demonstrated that the entitlement of rights are generally related to an individual's 
involvement in managing natural resources, or in creating infrastructures such as expansion of the 
canal, or have an historical association such as grazing rights in the community owned forest and 
pasture land. When existing rights are not taken sufficiently into account while recognising or creating 
new rights, conflict is inevitable (Pradhan ef a/., 1997). These cases illustrate that while political 
intervention is a generic problem and resource scarcity pertinently exists, their manifestation frequently 
changes and negotiation is required not only on use of resources but also on power sharing. Ownership 
and property right issues are dynamic concepts and change over time due to changes in the social 
structure, political process and power relationships. 
Both physical factors as well as political forces are crucial to create and maintain rights over natural 
resources based on negotiation and re-negotiation. For example, the water turbine owners needed to be 
entering into negotiation in order to obtain water to run their water turbines and to minimise the feelings 
of uncertainty of their clients about the operation of the turbines. Similarly, the changes in land-use 
patterns in the tail-section in the first case also changed the claims for water rights. 
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In the context of community based NRM the important issues are who have access and who have 
control, how much and when one can appropriate resources (Bromley, 1992). They are generally based 
on the rules that relate to rights and benefits and obligations. Importantly, communal right (in the first 
case) was the general right to use the forest and pastureland by a certain group of people, which itself 
became a source of conflict. However, if grazing land is abundant this may not create conflict. In the 
case of grazing land the property right issue was associated with the authorised use of grazing land 
agreed upon and recognised by a group of people and the community. The claim of users on the 
pastureland was based on the agreed pattern of use in the community, accepted since time immemorial. 
This claim was also based on their efforts to protect and invest to sustain and manage the forest-
pastureland. 
All these three cases show that property rights are not only between people and natural resources, but 
are also a social relationship between people, because who uses, who controls and who are excluded is 
defined by social arrangements and sanctions. It was shown in all three cases that the claim of rights 
was changing over time with the change in local context, social organisation and power relationships. 
Those seeking new rights contest the existing rights in the changing circumstances. 
The cases show that legal rights, like existing users have senior right and priority over new users. The 
vicinity of the water source land has a prior right (Khadka, 1997) but this does not always function 
rigidly. Rather, rights function on the basis of negotiation and agreement (Benda -Beckmann, 1999). It is 
important to note that the context (e.g., the presence or absence of rules about the uses of resources, 
alternatives to appropriate resources, ways of monitoring and controlling the behaviour of users, etc.), 
content and time factors alter rights. A matter of debate among the villagers was the control of water by 
individual on the basis of land rights or the right to use water publicly. Therefore, the debate is not only 
about water rights but also related to land rights. In the case of the spring water source conflict villagers 
wanted to transform the private ownership to communal access rights whereas they wanted to protect 
the communal access right in the forest and pastureland case. 
In the irrigation case upstream farmers claimed their seniority right to use the water as sabik (old) as the 
water source belonged to their chauhaddhi (command area). They were therefore reluctant to share the 
water with other farmers. They also took care of the canal against potential damage of floods and 
landslides, which gave them a further reason to claim their rights. Many head-end farmers claimed their 
rights based on land rights since the irrigation canal passed through their lands. Similarly, tail-end 
farmers claimed their rights based on their physical investment during the time of expansion and also 
based their argument on the legitimate decision of the local government to extend this canal. 
In the forest and pastureland case the property claim of both groups was based on historical 
association. All these arguments and counter arguments of farmers about access and control of 
resources make the property rights issue complicated and greatly contested. This implies that no clear 
property rights in NR can be deduced straightway from a single legal principle (Pradhan ef a/., 1997). 
Acquisition, allocation and distribution of NR and their procedures are crucial factors, since they 
delineate these resources to users in terms of time and adequacy. They determine how much resource 
is available to supply to individual users in relation to their need and demand. 
As noted by Benda Beckmann ef a/., (1996), the behaviour of people towards access, control and 
transfer of resources and resolutions of associated conflicts are not completely regulated by state 
regulations alone. In practice, local people have their own cultural, social and customary practices, 
organisations, laws and procedures to address these issues. Customary practices and regulations, 
religious rules, local norms, economic opportunities and technical advancement have a great deal of 
influence on human behaviour in relation to control, use and management of NR. In the second case 
when new users became the primary users after the interference of rangers and politicians, these new 
users did not have much of an affinity with the forest. They contributed less to forest management and 
harvested more than allowed by the rules made by the previous old users. In this way, ignoring the 
traditional system, formal agencies are not only introducing conflict in the community but also promoting 
an unsustainable use of existing common property resources, previously sustainably managed by the 
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communities themselves. Not recognising traditional rights of existing users' and excluding them from 
the decision making process does not achieve sustainable management of common property resources 
(Ostrom, 1990; Oli, 1998; Bhatiya, 1997). 
5.5.2 Factors affecting processes and outcomes in conflict management 
Several factors played a role in the emergence, escalation and resolution of conflict. Among them the 
role of the local power structure and social relationships among the disputants and formal organisations 
and informal institutions played a crucial role in this process. In addition to these factors non-social 
issues of seasonality, scarcity of water, topographical proximity, and natural calamities such as 
landslides were important factors affecting the conflict management process. 
Power relations 
The role of power is complex and problematic in these cases as the community was divided into factions 
based on power, family relationships and political ideology. The cases show that power relationships 
determine success or failure of management of community level NR-related conflicts. Differences in 
wealth, gender, caste and ethnic background influence power relations in the community. Political 
preferences, differential access to power centres, rights and obligations of the community members 
determines collaboration or conflict over natural resources (Upreti, 1999b; Warner and Jones, 1998). 
Local political processes, values and differential power exercises influenced conflicts in all the three 
cases. That conflict should be triggered by the relationships of power is hardly surprising (Warner, 2000) 
Villagers consider long-term effects while negotiating about conflicts. Local people only considered 
arbitration if the conflict became intense. The primary sources for arbitration were neighbouring 
villagers, local leaders, relatives and religious leaders. Only if negotiation is not possible at a local level, 
they do approach formal sources such as the VDC and DDC, police, district administration and courts 
for resolution. Some people and organisations become involved in conflict resolution for their own future 
benefit (for example, the members and head of the VDC become involved in a negotiation to gain 
support in an election). Nevertheless, the magnitude and dimensions of a conflict increase when people 
handle the cases with political interests. In such situations, the conflicts usually remain unresolved 
because the actions of local powerbrokers in dealing with the conflict are controversial and directly 
affect the established local interests. 
The institutional basis of power possessed by overseers, local elite and the Ward Chairman gave them 
legitimate authority to influence the situation. Two characteristics of a person play an important role in 
issues surrounding any conflict (Warner, in press). The positional character of the person, which an 
individual has by virtue of their particular social position (e.g. as the authority to take certain decisions) 
and their personal idiosyncratic character (features of personality, personal biography e.g., linkage with 
influential elite, etc.). The cases studied demonstrated that the idiosyncratic characters of local leaders 
and politicians played an important role in creating conflict. Power relationships within a community 
have certain characteristics, existing or evolving over time and space. It is important to realise that there 
are deliberate interventions of power brokers to influence or alter the conflict situation. In contrast to the 
role of power brokers, general villagers do not get entangled in conflict for the sake of power. Even 
when villagers are engaged in conflict, they show collective, associative and bonding behaviour. All 
these cases demonstrate that unequal power, legitimised in the established social system hinders 
resolution and promotes status quo and eruption of conflict. 
Political allegiance is increasingly intruding into the creation and/or resolution of conflicts in Nepali 
villages (Kaplan, 1995, Shrestha, 1996a, Upreti, 1999b). Earlier conflict studies show that several 
conflicts may have arisen simply because the individuals involved belong to different political parties. 
Party politics serve to focus power alliances, which are an endemic part of Nepal's rural life (Bhatiya, 
1995; Kaplan, 1995). Political allegiances are overriding the traditional basis for allegiance. Choice of 
alliance is not solely influenced by particular situations but also by the intention and pre-existing 
characteristics of the individual. Feelings of group identity (i.e. elite, powerful, powerless, rich, poor, 
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landlord, tenants, etc.) psychologically torces people to form alliances. Contending parties seek alliance 
with other people of similar characteristics, intentions and interests. In 1970, the owner of the spring-
water source agreed to provide part of that source to two powerful people because of their strong 
influence in the village. Allegiance to political parties in Nepal is an important condition for enhancing 
and/or inhibiting the processes of conflict resolution. Earlier studies also noted that political allegiance is 
the dominant and decisive factor in creating or resolving conflicts in Nepal (Khadka, 1997; Oli, 1998; 
Upreti, 2000b; Khanal, 1998; Shrestha, 1996a). When they fall into serious conflicts with others, people 
learn to ally themselves with strong political groups if their own position is weak. When they are active 
members of a strong political party and an unfavourable outcome is anticipated they can exercise 
political power to modify the outcome in their favour (Upreti, 1999b; Kaplan, 1995). 
The political power of a disadvantaged group grows at the time of an election when they are able to 
vote. They can use this voting right as an opportunity to bargain with powerful people (generally only 
powerful people stand in elections). Social change through work of NGOs and civil society organisations 
are also empowering disadvantaged groups of people. Such empowerment efforts are also gradually 
being incorporated into the political process. 
Social relation and conflict 
Social relationships are an important factor in the resolution of community level NR-related conflicts. 
The cases studied demonstrated that relationships are based on socially shared values and power 
structures. Community level negotiation and re-negotiation are the central pivot of the water, forest and 
pastureland conflict conflicts. These negotiations in themselves are criteria that can be used to analyse 
CM in the power-unequal situation. Negotiation at the community level on resource use is predominantly 
a concrete social process defined by the relationships between the actors concerned. These three 
cases all show distinctly that there is not a well-defined single procedure or criteria to deal with CM. 
Many locally evolved situation-specific criteria help in community-level negotiations about the use of 
resources. These criteria are developed, tested and adapted in a specific social, ecological and cultural 
situation. 
The cases show that the social relationships have a direct and influential role in CM. If social relations 
are good among the community members the greater the possibility of resolution of conflict. The cases 
have identified that the resolution of conflict is difficult if greed, vested political interests, and vertical 
power relationships dominate over altruism, generosity, co-operation, and tolerance. In such a situation 
CM is essentially a challenging and tedious task. An effective and lasting resource-use agreement is 
very difficult to declare and agree upon or implement in such a situation. Community conflict 
management is a constant learning and building process through unceasing efforts to encourage 
solidarity, altruism, civic spirit and respect for diversities and different social realities. Nevertheless, the 
cases have indicated that there are many threats to the accomplishment of successful resource-use 
negotiations. They are constantly under siege by power brokers and local elite, who wish to manipulate 
and distort them for vested interests and political gains. 
Formal organisations and informal institutions 
The effectiveness of management of NR-related conflicts depends to a large extend on the way in which 
farmers, technicians, politicians and bureaucrats are involved (Sidaways, 1996). Farmers usually co-
operate with any external interventions if they are assured about the benefit (such as reliable and 
predictable delivery of water or ensured grazing) (Rhodes, 1997). Supply-led development interventions 
(the extension of the canal, for example), generally do not espouse the principle of democracy, equity 
and social cohesion (Pandey, 1999). Often, they support an unequal power structure within a 
community and ultimately they often fail on that social ground (Rhodes, 1997). The role of formal 
organisations in resolving the conflict in all three cases was not conducive in creating a win-win 
situation. 
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When there are multiple actors with their own interests, perceptions and objectives in any CPR then it 
becomes difficult to resolve the conflict. In all these cases political leaders wanted political benefits 
whereas general farmers wanted undisturbed access to resources (e.g., regular availability of water to 
irrigate their field, availability of grazing land, undisturbed access to drinking water). Political 
organisations were looking for a political advantage and a strengthening of the positions of their own 
party workers. The role of the Sarba Sampana Daudaha in the first case seems important in resolving 
conflict but the solution did not prove to be effective in the long term. In the second and third cases the 
role of the project, local NGOs and indigenous institutions were crucial whereas the roles of 
governmental organisations were ambiguous. It is may be concluded from all the cases that the role of 
the state instituted agencies in CM was ineffective compared to their official task and were influenced by 
local power relations and vested interests. 
The religious connotations imbedded in the perception of people could help in resolution of some 
conflicts. Local norms, values and beliefs sometimes appear ubiquitous and usually have a practical 
significance in the conflict resolution process (Deutsch, 1973; Furtze and Stafford, 1994; Bottomore, 
1996). Drinking water and pastureland were very much religious and cultural concepts in the study area. 
These cases demonstrate that the role of local customs in management of conflict related to NR is still 
significant. Indigenous institutions such as Chautari, Mukhiya, Pako Manchhe, Sangharsha Samlti, 
Purohit, Mela-paima, Bibaha-bratabandh, Hatbazaar still have important roles in the conflict resolution 
process. 
Legal provisions dominate the government's approach to conflict resolution in Nepal and therefore the 
importance of local knowledge is less acknowledged. Culture is a source of local knowledge that is 
developed overtime by sharing and interpreting experiences (Brenes, 1994). Local knowledge is the 
knowledge possessed by local people and contains a rich and untapped source of information about CM 
strategies and practices. Local knowledge encompasses specific characteristics and qualities, methods 
and ways of processing or transforming information for effective CM for sustainable management and 
utilisation of available NR. In the study area, not to provide drinking water or to encroach grazing lands 
are considered sins. As a norm, it does not matter who owns the source, drinking water should be 
accessible to the general public and should get priority over irrigation. Strong religious beliefs promoted 
by the Purohit that to provide drinking water is to pave the path to heaven and to create obstacles to 
drinking water and damage the grazing land of cows is to prepare to go to hell after death' are still 
shaping the behaviour and actions of many villagers towards these resources. 
Local approaches use tools and procedures that are moulded by the local people's own particular 
economic, social and cultural contexts. They provide a range of techniques with logical meaning and 
conditions for their own self-realisation. These cultural and social conditions are inherited from previous 
communities. I am not arguing that all indigenous and customary practices are better than the formal 
ones, but it should be emphasised that the positive aspects of indigenous approaches need to be 
properly utilised to manage conflict effectively. 
Temporal and spatial forces 
Spatial factors are one of the prime sources of conflict where resources are scarce. Proper resource 
allocation and distribution procedures and monitoring mechanisms minimise conflict and ensure fair 
access and control over NR in these situations (Axinn and Axinn, 1996). Physical proximity gives 
farmers more access and control of resources (Mollinga, 1998; Chambers, 1988). For example, in the 
first case farmers from the head section because of their closer access to the source were able to use 
more water by making extra outlets from the canal (both frequency and amount) at the cost of the tail-
end farmers. 
Time (seasonality) is another important factor in NR-related conflict as there are no problems concerned 
with access to water during the water abundant period. The frequency of conflicts increases in the 
summer when the need for irrigation water in the paddy fields reaches a peak. Therefore, the differential 
access demand for water between farmers of different geographical areas, lack of proper control 
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mechanisms and disproportionate access to irrigation water (improper water scheduling, uncontrolled 
water allocation, unreliable water supply, etc.) in times of water shortage are major sources of conflict. 
Siltation, landslides, intentional damage to canals, seepage and leakage all contributed to escalating 
conflicts in the AFMIS but the effects were not severe and gradually ceased within a few weeks. Water 
distribution, in principle, should be based on matching the crop water requirement (Mollinga, 1998; 
Parajuli, 1999). However, in practice proximity and power, are more important factors determining water 
distribution than the water requirement of the crops. Furthermore, water requirement is a subjective 
judgement and influenced by factors such as the soil condition, efficiency of water application, the 
season and the specific crop variety. These are open to different interpretation (IMC, 1990; Parajuli, 
1999). Water availability and frequency of conflict are correlated, the degree of water availability 
determining the occurrence and frequency of conflict, if other factors remain the same (Sukla et al., 
1997). Farmers have their own strategies to cope with water scarcity124 in the study area. 
At a time of water shortage, in the absence of a clear arrangement for water distribution, conflict seems 
to be a normal phenomena when the same source is used by more than one system (within and 
between irrigation and or drinking water systems), or for more than one use (drinking water, irrigation, 
water turbines, etc.). However, the occurrence and intensity and/or severity of the conflict varies with the 
seasonality, local power relations, availability of alternatives, contradiction of norms and regulations, 
cropping systems, etc. As was explained in Chapter Four, unlike other social conflicts, NR-related 
conflicts, even though the frequency is high, do not generally turn to violence. Rather, they commonly 
limited to dissatisfaction and disagreement and generally locally negotiated and re-negotiated to keep 
the situation working. In all three cases temporal and spatial factors played important roles in escalating 
as well as managing the conflict. In the first case the deep-seated conflict became weak and 
transformed into an opportunity to opt for exploring alternatives. In the second case the time factor 
significantly contributed not only to resolving the conflict but also to creating a dense forest resource. In 
the third case the time factor played a crucial role in escalating and resolving the conflict. In all three-
conflict cases the degree and intensity became less, as the conflict became old, but increased again 
with changing power relationships in the village. 
5.5.3 People's strategy In managing conflict 
People involved in conflict use various strategies and options to influence the outcome in their favour. In 
all three cases the conflicting parties mobilised their networks, local institutions, indigenous knowledge, 
community norms and values as well as formal legal regulations. Mobilisation of Purohit, religious 
arguments, complaints to the governmental mobile administrator, mobilisation of relatives and friends to 
convince the opposition, approaches to projects and NGOs all were example of diverse strategies used 
by people in a conflict. In a conflict situation people use laws and rules as resources to influence the 
outcome. The local norms such as seniority rights were used to justify their arguments. Formal laws 
were also equally used in the process of making arguments and counter arguments in all three cases. 
5.3.4 Gender role In conflict management 
The role of gender itself is a social construct, which has to be seen in the particular social and cultural 
context. The important issue of who have access to resources and more importantly, who controls them 
is governed by social and cultural framework (Upreti, 1995). Gender discrimination in Nepal is clearly 
reflected in ideological, legal, political, religious, cultural, and social practices. These cases have also 
indicated that women had very little role to play in CM except in negotiating in the spring-water source 
conflict. Though the Constitution of Nepal does not directly discriminate against people, it still indirectly 
m For example, to prevent prolonged drought they worship the Wag (snake) on serpentine day (Nagpancham!) and Indra (king 
of the haven) believing that they give rain. Indrajatra and Serpentine day are the rituals of the ancient Hindu religion to bring 
balance to rainfall and to overcome water related calamities, which are still prevalent in the study area. Nagpuja and Indrajatra 
express people's gratitude to divine energy. Farmers also alter cropping patterns, the land-use system, rain water harvesting, 
delay cropping, change crop varieties and land management (mulching, early hoeing, minimum tillage, etc.) to cope with water 
scarcity. 
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supports unequal power relationships by declaring Nepal a Hindu State. This is because the Hindu 
religion through various rituals, religious rules and customs is by and large discriminating. The 
respondents explained the causes of low involvement of women in CM as: i) not being able to express 
their feelings because of social suppression, ii) being afraid to go against Thulomanchhe (local elite and 
village landlords were respected in the village because of their wealth, power, exposure, relationships 
with politicians, police and government bureaucrats and coming from higher social strata), iii) not being 
allowed by their family members to go to the meetings and discussions and fv) being very busy with 
household chores. Some of the men strongly suppressed women's opinions saying Pothi Baseko 
Ramro Hundaina (a local legend which explains the superstition that 'if hen produce the same sound as 
a cock this will be unfortunate'). Because of such restrictions women have very little decision-making 
power. Even if women participate in meetings their opinions are not listening to or respected and the 
reaction of their male partners is more important). 
processes (for example, the wife of the Mukhiya who became a key decision-maker in the later stages 
of the conflict). Sensitivity to gender issues was an external concept and at the beginning, contradictory 
to the customary norms of the majority of users. Several studies (Rhodes, 1997; Bhatiya, 1997; Thapa 
and Weber, 1994; Ghale and Gurung, 1998; Upreti, 1995) as well the cases described here, have 
shown that over time the concept of gender issues is gradually being incorporated in NRM strategies 
and practices. 
In the hill and mountain regions, women are the key persons and a rich source of indigenous knowledge 
and skills for NRM (Ghale and Gurung, 1998). If they are given the chance they effectively utilise all 
available options to resolve conflict. For example, the third case indicates that women used different 
forums to discuss their drinking-water problem and were able to create a favourable situation for water 
use. Many women also participated in the training provided by the NGO. Especially older married 
women were far more co-operative than the male members in resolving local level conflicts because of 
their ability to accommodate differences. Women respondents explained that men were less sensitive to 
drinking water problems than to those related to irrigation because they do not fetch drinking water. The 
male members were involved in the conflict, but the women were creating a positive social pressure to 
resolve it. The political groupings and biases were less important for the women compared to male 
members in the community. Party-led political bias did not hinder women from sharing ideas and 
discussing the problem. However, social status such as the higher position of their fathers or husbands, 
caste and class (education, economic condition, etc.), marital status, and other positional socio-cultural 
characteristics greatly influence the role of women in CM. 
5,5.5 Learning from conflict 
Several researches have shown that rural communities in Nepal are far more capable than 
governmental organisations, in sustainably managing their natural resources (Upreti, 1999a, 1999b; Oli, 
1998; Bhatya, 1997, Rhodes, 1997). Successful CM empowers local people based on social justice and 
utilises local institutions or creates new ones, if necessary, based on local conditions (Pendzich ef a/., 
1994). It can indeed be concluded that conflict can be a means of learning and a source o i l 
empowerment of villagers in general. These cases have shown that effective management of natural \l 
Figure 5.4 Participation of women in conflict 
resolution meeting 
Key women informants said that, earlier 
women had only shared their opinions with 
their husbands in their own houses, but did 
not participate in any meetings and 
discussions. The overwhelming 
predominance of men and the limited role 
of women in CM can explained some of 
the disruptive social practices in rural 
areas. The second case clearly indicates 
that as time and context changed the role 
of women also changed and they gradually 
became more involved in decision 
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resources is mainly determined by needs and interests, coping strategies, adapted procedures and the 
initiatives of resources users. Despite the investment of local government (DDC, VDC) in water (in both 
irrigation and drinking water) in the study area, such efforts are not able to give satisfactory outcomes. 
Rather they are exploited by power brokers and are implanting and enhancing conflicts. 
The cases have illustrated that conflict can teach people how to manage resources. The afforestration in 
the second case, the exploration of alternative sources for a larger drinking-water project in the third 
case or the rain-water harvesting initiative in the first case are evidence of local people's ability to learn. 
The harnessing of such local collective learning by institutions is vital in addressing natural-resource 
conflict. 
All the cases demonstrated that even though the villagers become entangled in conflict they do not opt 
for violence and serious fight because they have learned from their own experience and from their 
ancestors to live in coexistence in their community. That can be seen from the commonly used local 
parable in the study area: "Desko Deuta Bhanda Gaon ko Bhut Kamlagchha" (the ghost of one's own 
village is more useful than the god of far distance). Villagers were adaptive and accommodative in their 
behaviour and make utmost efforts to negotiate locally. 
The facilitation of a persuasive extension approach (which develops the capacity of conflicting parties to 
solve conflict by learning and adaptation) is crucial in CM, as was demonstrated by third case. Here the 
approach followed by a local NGO in mobilising people for collective learning and action was most 
effective in resolving the conflict. In such cases not only the local people learn to co-operate but also the 
facilitating organisation learns (Van den Ban, 1997) how to facilitate negotiation. The ENAP facilitator's 
role in negotiating the drinking-water conflict proved that facilitation' is a pragmatic approach to 
enhance flexibility, adaptation and interactive learning (Roling, 1996; Roling and Wagemakers, 1998; 
Maarelveld ef a/., 1997). The facilitation process either starts locally or from the help of external 
organisations. Many learning theorists highlight the fact that 'learning provides alternatives for problems' 
(Roling, 1996; Hamilton, 1995) and therefore learning is the means of problem solving. 
When parties in a conflict realise the cost of it is too high and the benefits too low the length of it can be 
shortened. Among many positive changes brought by conflict in the study area, an important one was a 
change to the feudalistic relationships. The cases show that challenging the existing social structure and 
practice promotes reform. However, it is important to note that if conflict is not handled properly it not 
only wastes time, energy and resources but also causes the disintegration of harmonious social 
relationships, promotes insecurity and in extreme cases causes violence. The democratic methods of 
conflict resolution and normalisation of relationships through participation of both parties involved in 
conflict, the capacity for local mediator and leadership development, transparency, learning, 
communication, fair application of laws and regulations are vital for alternate CM which is described in 
detail in Chapter Nine. 
All three cases show that villagers are not only active negotiators and mediators of conflict but also 
active managers of natural resources. They seek relationships with different people to exchange 
knowledge, information and experiences and to build alliances to develop and implement new ways of 
managing conflicts, even in a hierarchical unequal society. Local people, although not always 
recognised as such in Nepal, are the principal managers of local natural resources (Rhoades, 1997) and 
negotiators of the NR related conflicts. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined 3 conflict-related cases and examined the strategies, mechanisms and 
practices of local-level management of conflicts concerned with the use of resources. These conflicts 
may erupt for several potential reasons such as diversity and inconsistency in application of customary 
practices and formal legal procedures, different perceptions of ownership and rights, management 
differences, top-down external interventions and other social variables. The chapter reveals that local 
people have their own strategies, mechanisms and approaches to utilise the available limited natural 
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resources and resolve conflict. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the role of norms, values, beliefs, 
knowledge, power, communication and facilitation, feeling of ownership and property rights and 
temporal and spatial factors which have a profound effect on CM in Nepal. 
I realised that learning from experience, joint decisions and purposeful collective action, communication 
and (in)effectfve use of information and local networks highly affect local CM. These cases have 
indicated that different groups (local elite, general villagers, and government officials) react very 
differently to the same problem. This leads to the conclusion that conflicts on natural resources are not 
neutral, but culturally and socially defined. It logically follows that a community is not guided by a unitary 
legal system and rules do not always shape the behaviour of people (Benda-Beckmann et a/., 1996, 
Spiertz, 2000). These rules are modified locally by people to adjust their needs and claims. 
Based on the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, I argue that NR-related conflicts create a 
lessening of mutual regard, disagreement, hatred and hostility but society does not disintegrate. Many 
times conflict strengthens truth and explores realities and opportunities. The cases show that usually the 
repressed parties bring conflicts to light but they keep within the tolerance limits whereby armed 
violation or seduction is prevented. Although many conflicts remain unsolved for extended periods of 
time a workable relationship between the parties involved is common. Major sources of conflict in 
natural resources are changes in traditional use pattern, vagueness of laws, misunderstandings among 
users, political interference and external interventions. Greed is the most important factor that 
aggravates conflicts. The study shows that conflict is more common if the parties involved belong to 
different political, caste/ethnic and economic groups. Such associations are a triggering force in conflict. 
It is obvious that the duration of the conflict and its resolution depends on the severity and complexity of 
the problem. Such resolutions are influenced by the skill and approach of the mediator/negotiator and 
the benefit derived from the conflict. Effective communication and use of network/linkages promote 
willingness of conflicting parties to negotiate. 
Local level resource-use negotiation and CM are not just issues of a formal mechanical arrangement but 
more importantly the process of accommodation of multiple interests and power differentials. It is 
important to realise that every one is biased and has their own perspective and interpretation of a 
particular conflict, which is based on their own social background, understandings and intention. These 
perspectives and world-views provide direction, help to explain and give order and perceive to the 
conflict and provide the potential for negotiation. Being aware of their own perspective allows them to 
agree or refuse to negotiate. Parties in conflict bring with them a whole range of rational, emotional, 
corporal and sensual diversities. They negotiate and become involved in the process of conflict 
resolution, not only because there are rational reasons to do so, but also because they get hunches, 
insights, have preferences, visions, dreams and hopes (Brenes, 1994). 

Chapter 6 
External Development Intervention and Conflict in an Irrigation System 
(case four) 
6.1 Introduction 
In the Fifth Chapter I discussed the dynamics of conflict in a farmer-managed irrigation system, a 
community managed forest-pastureland and an individually owned drinking water source. That chapter 
clearly demonstrated that external development Interventions, if not implemented properly, could 
introduce new conflicts into a community. This is discussed in this chapter, together with the role of 
various interest groups in igniting the conflict. To examine conflict created by external intervention I took 
the case of the Asian Development Bank funded irrigation development project called the Upper 
Andherikhola Irrigation System (UAIS). This chapter explores the extent to which an intervention without 
assessing the local socio-technical feasibility and social settings can make an irrigation-development 
project a complete failure. This chapter also analyses the effects external intervention can have on local 
social relationships within a community causing conflicts. 
Recently there is growing governmental interest in the increase in food production through expansion of 
irrigated areas (NPC, 1998). Hence the government is increasing assistance to develop new irrigation 
systems as well as rehabilitate FMIS to enhance agricultural production and productivity by increasing 
the water supply and improving its reliability. It is expected that such intervention will result in expansion 
of the irrigated area and crop intensification. To achieve this objective the government has obtained 
foreign loans and grants from ADB, WB, and several other donors to develop several large and small 
irrigation projects, one of which is the UAIS. 
Table 6.1 General overview of the upper Andherikhola irrigation system 
S.n Parameters Characteristics Remarks 
1 Date of Survey 1990 byDIO 
2 Start of construction 1993 by DIO-WUC 
3 Date of completion 1996 
4 Total investment Rs. 8109959 ($119264) Revised from original Rs 6575883 
5 Command area 447 ha Pawoti and Sailungeshwor VDCs 
6 Target farmers 540 households Pawoti and Sailungeshwor VDCs 
7 Length of canal 6 KM 
8 Financial support Asian Development Bank Irrigation sector Support project II 
9 Implemented by District Irrigation Office WithWUA/C 
10 Current status Non functional Severe conflict existed 
Source: DIO Record, 1998 and primary information from the field. 
The case study area is situated at an altitude range of 1500 to 2250 metres above sea level. The 
communities of the research site are different castes and ethnic groups such as Brahmin, Chhetri, 
Tamang, Damai, Kami, Sarki, and Newar. The socio-economic status of the people in the study area is 
very diverse with a large segment of population composed of the economically poor and some people 
being very rich. Economic status and feudalistic social arrangements mainly dominate social 
relationships. 
6.2 Conflict in the Upper Andherikhola Irrigation System: a narrative description 
In 1982 a powerful member of the village elite group, with the recommendation of the Pradhanpancha, 
formally applied to the Department of Irrigation (Dol) to construct an irrigation canal from the 
Andherikhola126. The Dol conducted a survey and prepared a report. However, due to a lack of follow-up 
1 2 5 Respondents explained that the motive behind this was to irrigate his newly purchased semi-irrigated land. 
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in getting approval from Kathmandu, this project was not executed. When the District Irrigation Office 
was established in the district headquarters in 1989, the Department of Irrigation forwarded them the 
survey report. As a newly established office, the DIO found this one of the suitable projects to start 
immediately. Therefore this project was activated. The ADB provided a loan to the government to 
develop the irrigation sector through the Irrigation Sector Support Project (ISSP). 
Sailungeshwor VDC > v v 
Figure 6.1. Figure showing the relative location of the disputed canal 
Dolakha was also one of the districts covered by ADB-funded irrigation project (ISSP). An active local 
politician (hereafter referred to as the initiator) from the Sailungeshwor VDC had started to work with 
DIO as a contractor in another irrigation project whereby he established a 'relationship of special 
intimacy126' (Wade, 1982) with DIO-engineers. The DIO engineers suggested the reactivation of the 
UAIS with a fresh application, linked with the former one, to be submitted by another member of the elite 
with the earlier recommendation of the Pradhanpancha. Accordingly, the initiator submitted the 
application to the DIO with signatures of some villagers. The DIO conducted a detailed survey and 
made a budget estimate under ADB/ISSP and forwarded it for approval. The Regional Appraisal and 
Approval Committee127 (RAAC) granted approval without any difficulties. 
The first conflict between local villagers and DIO/initiator concerned alignment of the canal, when local 
people found out that the originally proposed alignment of the canal was changed at the time of the 
survey by the DIO-technician on the suggestion of the initiator128. Many people were not aware about 
the survey of this project, so no organised efforts had been made to construct the canal from an earlier 
proposed alignment. The villagers only objected later when they realised about the change in alignment. 
However, the feasibility study of the project was already completed so their opinion was ignored and the 
conflict between local people and the DIO remained unsettled. Immediately the project was approved, a 
1 2 6 Bargaining for bribes is more direct and surreptitious between contractors and engineers who have developed a 
relationship of special intimacy (Wade, 1982). 
, 2 7 RAAC is formed under the chairmanship of the Director of the Regional Irrigation Directorate to appraise and approve 
irrigation projects which cost less than Nrs 10 million, on the basis of the recommendation of the District Appraisal Committee 
(DAC) and to provide guidelines for the smooth implementation of the project. The DIO chief is the convenor of the DAC. 
1 2 8 According to the respondents the motive for the change in alignment of the canal was to increase the total cost of project. 
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WUC was formed of supporters of the initiator in 1992, under the guidance of the irrigation technician, to 
meet the criteria129 of the Irrigation Sector Support Project without discussing this with the other 
villagers. The person, who had earlier initiated the process for this project, was nominated chairman and 
the initiator himself became secretary of the WUC. The VDC chairmen of both Sailungeshwor and 
Pawoti VDCs were not consulted during the whole process. After the formation of the WUC, the DIO 
released 1.5 millions rupees (22059US $ § 68 rupees per dollar in 1998) for the first year to start 
construction. When local leaders and chairmen of the two VDCs knew that 1.5 millions rupees was 
released for this canal they were anxious to be actively involved in the WUC because it had the 
authority to take all decisions related to the project. However, the WUC did not respond to their sudden 
interest. The VDC chairmen felt their roles were being undermined if such a big project was 
implemented in their VDCs without their active involvement. They therefore raised the issue in public 
and deliberately created problems for the WUC. Their supporters from the down-stream canals of Fasku 
and Pawoti VDCs then actively raised the issue of water rights (prior or seniority rights) and water 
scarcity in the existing downstream-irrigation systems (2 in Pawoti and four in Fasku VDCs) and several 
water turbines. They argued that if water is was taken from the proposed intake of this canal the 
downstream canals and turbines would suffer from water scarcity. This then became an issue of 
prestige and a power struggle between the two groups of people. Ultimately, a delegation of the 
disgruntled people led by the VDC chairmen went to the District Administration Office to stop the 
construction. To resolve the conflict the Chief District Officer organised negotiations involving both 
groups of people of all three VDCs. Finally, an agreement was made between the chairmen of all three 
VDCs and WUC to a) share water by placing a sancho (gate), b) include people from Fasku VDC 
(nonusers) in the WUC and c) divide the three positions of WUC (chairman, secretary and treasurer) as 
well as construction work between the three VDCs. As a result the WUC was reorganised and 
expanded from an 11 to a 19-member committee with the DIO overseer as an advisor. All construction 
work was divided between the three VDCs under the discretion of the VDC chairmen who were also 
added members of the WUC. 
After these negotiations, DIO provided the earlier released 1.5 million rupees to the WUC (not spent the 
previous year because of the conflict) to start the construction. According to the project agreement, the 
users would provide 0.5% cash of the total project cost as a 'security deposit 'and a 15% labour or cash 
contribution. Villagers were not prepared to contribute so large an amount because of the growing 
conflict. The WUC in consultation with the DIO-technician decided to construct one section of the canal 
(which was mainly earthwork) with an estimated cost of 3 millions rupees. They gave the work to 70 
local contractors on the condition that they accomplish all the given work and share the available 1.5 
millions rupees. The local contractors completed the assigned work without knowing that the WUC had 
made a profit of 1.5 million rupees from the work, which should have cost 3 million rupees. In this way 
the WUC could pay for additional work equivalent to 1.5 millions rupees and this was interpreted as the 
user's contribution. By doing so the WUC was able to meet the financial criteria (total 15.5 percent 
contribution of users) of the Irrigation Sector Support Project. After meeting the ISSP financial 
requirement, the DIO technician and the WUC announced that the remaining construction would be 
assigned on a tender130 basis. The small local petty contractors were not able to meet the tender 
criteria and were automatically removed from the construction process. In accordance with the earlier 
negotiated agreement, the WUC divided the remaining construction work into three sections and 
allocated it to the key leaders of the three VDCs. Most of those who got the construction work contracts 
were not beneficiaries of the project and so not very interested in the quality of construction. Hence, the 
quality of the work was extremely poor. Those landowners who had strongly protested placing the canal 
in their land either received a cash payment or were given work in this project. The technology used in 
the UAIS was complicated (cemented structures, masonry, etc.), expensive and local people were 
generally not conversant with the technology. The DIO overseer and the WUC members were able to 
manipulate the quality of work to save money, what Wade (1982) calls 'saving in the ground'. 
1 2 8 According to ISSP criteria, the implementation of the project should be carried out by WUA/C (Dol/ADB, 1997). 
1 3 0 In this tender arrangement only the registered professional contractors with defined minimum experience, having defined 
equipment and technical manpower are eligible to undertake construction work in contract basis where local contractors can 
not qualify. 
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The key informants (mainly contractors) explained that there are open-secrete norms of kickbacks in the 
construction industry. If a project is implemented under a tender arrangement contractors have to pay 
10%, if implemented under a quotation basis they pay 20% and if implemented via WUC they have to 
pay 15% kickback to the concerned irrigation officials. This is the minimum kickback standard based on 
the project's total cost estimate. In this case, the WUC fixed a 22% kickback (15% for higher 
authorities131, 2% for the field technician and 5% for the WUC fund). The technician, generally the 
overseer132, deputised for this project was primarily responsible for extorting the money. The entire 
irrigation development process in this case was systematically interconnected with rake-off, extortion 
and kickbacks. 
There was a water mill right below the intake of this canal. The mill owner, a powerful local elite and 
politician, had strongly protested the construction, citing the problem of water scarcity in running his 
water mill if the water was diverted to the canal. The WUC made an agreement with the mill owner and 
paid 75 thousands rupees from the WUC fund to move his mill to a suitable position on the canal to 
operate by canal water. The WUC also provided money to different people as compensation for crop 
damaged during the construction process. These payments were decided on the basis of personal 
relationship and/or by power exercise. The WUC chairman provided a monthly remuneration to his son 
for working in a government office, keeping account of the project. Final approval from the DIO about 
the accomplishment of the project was required to receive the final payment. To obtain this the WUC 
placed corrugated zinc sheets in some parts of the canal so that water flowed in it at the time of the 
inspection by DIO engineers. At this time the mill owner announced that he was ready to move his mill 
to the agreed location providing there was water in the canal. Unfortunately the canal was still not in 
operation because of several serious problems such as poor structures, structures being damaged in 
several places and landslides in more than 20 places. 
The conflict between two groups (or even many sub groups) still continues in this project and the WUC 
is completely dysfunctional. With all its accompanying conflicts and tensions the 8.12 million rupee 
($119264) project was officially completed in 1996. Immediately after the official declaration of 
completion of the project the technician was transferred to another district. 
Villagers were unhappy with the performance of the WUC. At this time the first communist government 
in Nepal drastically changed the broadcasting programme of Radio Nepal and ran special awareness 
rising programmes against corruption, social inequalities and exploitation. This mass media campaign 
increased the negative feeling of the villagers towards the corrupt behaviour of WUC. 
In the middle of the construction period some disgruntled persons registered a complaint with the 
special police133 authority about the poor quality of the structural work and misuse of money. The 
special police investigated the case but it was dropped after laboratory examination of a sample of the 
structural work. Special relationship between the technicians, WUC members (contractors) and the 
investigator presumably influenced the outcome of the laboratory examination. The investigation report 
was used as evidence by the WUC to take work in this project as a standard. 
There was serious conflict between the existing WUC (which was under the control of the Nepali 
Congress Party supporters134) and the supporters of the CPN-UML. As a result, the disgruntled 
1 3 1 Generally higher authorities use field technicians to extort money from district level projects. 
1 3 2 It is common in Nepal that if an overseer deputised for a particular project is not able to fulfil his obligation (collection of 
specified amounts of money) to his boss he will be transferred to an undesirable place, what Wade (1982) calls 'dumping 
ground'. 
1 3 3 In the district the authority of the special police is assigned to the CDO. In special cases, such as bigger corruption scandals 
the special police department sends their own investigators. These investigations are highly affected by source-force, 
afnomanche and bribery. 
1 3 4 It is very common to include party workers (especially of the ruling party) in all types of users committees. The bureaucracy 
always works for the political interests of ruling party and creates an environment favourable for them. It is very hard to find 
neutral members in most of the user committees in Nepal. 
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supporters of the CPN-UML formed another WUC in 1997 to deal with this non-functional canal135. 
They approached the CDO to dissolve the existing WUC and register136 their new one. The CDO asked 
them to show evidence of the resignation of the existing committee members. As this of course was not 
possible their application to replace the existing WUC was rejected. 
Villagers also expressed their concern and dismay on environmental issues. This project created many 
environmental problems such as several landslides, cracking and shrinking of boggy lands, soil erosion 
and damage of cultivated lands and public paths. Landslides damaged individuals' lands and crops 
during and after the construction period. The victims blamed the WUC for this damage and this caused 
further severe conflicts. Villagers argue that it would be more environmentally friendly, more user-
responsive and less controversial if the canal was constructed from the originally proposed alignment. 
According to the key informants (contractors, technicians, political leaders and users from the project 
areas) the performance of 80% of other ADB/ISSP funded projects in the Dolakha district is similar to 
this case, and all are entangled in severe conflicts. Only two projects (Khanikhola and Buling Irrigation 
Projects) out of ten are properly functioning and the other remaining (Namdu, Saharetar, Mirge, 
Fadkekhola, Ghyang, Marbuiar, and Andheri] irrigation projects are problematic. The common 
problems reported in these projects were misuse of funds, poor quality of structural work, conflicts 
between local members of different political parties, poor performance of WUC, ambiguous role of 
DIO/technicians, extortion of money and political intervention. Earlier studies (IMC, 1990; Sukla ef a/., 
1997) also showed a similar situation in irrigation systems due to formal interventions. The following 
Table summarises the main conflicts and their major causes in this irrigation project. 
Table 6.2 Summary of conflicts in the Upper Andherikhola Irrigation System 
Conflict on Major causes 
Financial resource use • Competition to handle money 
Alignment of canal • Preference differences among the actors 
• Change on original alignment 
Formation of WUC • Competition to be included in WUC 
• Ignorance of voice of people by WUC 
Sharing of water source • Problem raised by people of another VDC 
• Water turbines compete for water 
• Other FMISs objected to use the source 
Use of technology • Expensive and complicated 
• Poor quality of construction 
Land ownership • Farmers protested at digging the canal in their lands 
Working procedure • Non transparent procedure, 
• Top-down and secret decision making 
• Exclusion of local people 
Role of irrigation bureaucracy • Ambiguous, controversial and corrupt 
Source: Primary information from the field, 1998-2000. 
6.3 Issues in conflict: a brief discussion 
This case study indicates that irrigation development and management is based on social relationships 
and negotiated interests. These interests are a combination of physical, technological, institutional and 
infrastructural systems. Irrigation is therefore a social system (Mollinga, 1998) which creates a platform 
(Roling, 1996) in the form of an emerging organisation (i.e., WUC) to deal with conflict related to water 
1 3 5 The interest behind the formation of WUC in the non-functional canal was to obtain the fund to repair this canal. It was 
estimated that almost half of the budget of the original canal construction is required to repair and maintain this project. 
1 3 6 According to the Water Resources Act, 1992 the District Administration Office is authorised to register water users 
committees, if some one wants to make use of water for collective benefit. The registered WUA/C is an autonomous and 
corporate body having perpetual succession. 
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acquisition, allocation, distribution and utilisation in a particular socio-cultural and political setting137. 
Various causes and consequences of the conflict of this irrigation canal are discussed in the following 
sections. 
6.3.1 Catalysts for Initiation of conflict 
Different factors play a catalytic role in the initiation of conflicts in this irrigation system. The conflicts 
were manifested in 3 major categories: i) conflict between the users of different resource systems, ii) 
conflict among the users within the shared resource system and iii) conflict between users of a particular 
resource system and external agencies concerned. All three categories of conflict are observed in this 
case. According to the custom in rural Nepal, outsiders are traditionally treated as guests with special 
privileges and bounded in ritualised social behaviour. This was one of the reasons that at the beginning 
some local people, who were aware of the survey as it was carried out via their lands, did not raise their 
complaints with the irrigation technicians even when they realised their work was unjustifiable. The 
irrigation professionals interpret this treatment as their legitimate privilege. The village elite uses this 
ritualised behaviour of people as an opportunity to manipulate the situation in their favour. However, due 
to ambiguous roles and top-down decisions of a vicious circle of local elite and irrigation bureaucrats, 
local people gradually lost interest, developed apathy, became frustrated and finally became 
antagonistic. The conflict created by such feelings and the underlying causes led to the complete failure 
of this project. Local knowledge, skills and community interests were largely ignored right from the 
beginning of the feasibility study up to the construction period and this worked as a catalyst to initiate 
and escalate conflict. To ignore these local dynamics is to ignore self-supporting mechanisms in the 
development and continued operation of an irrigation system as well as inducing different sorts of 
conflicts (Laurent and Foaguegue 1999; Yoder, 1994; Pant, 2000). 
At the beginning of the construction process gossiping, dissatisfaction, disagreement, haggling and 
protest were widespread. These dissatisfactions were suppressed by the efforts of powerful elite, 
administrators and irrigation bureaucrats. Generally it is observed that many projects often fail on social 
grounds because they neglect the existing social differences (e.g., class, gender and ethnic differences, 
historical legacies, political rivalries, hidden interests, etc.) (Pant, 2000; Shivakoti ef a/., 1996; Upreti, 
2000c). Farmers, local politicians and external interventionists 
JSM belong to different social groups with different interests and 
A <H priorities, experiences, expectations and status quo, which pose 
communication difficulties. In this case a lack of understanding, 
social behaviour and priorities amongst them were the 
bottlenecks of co-operation that became a source of conflict. 
The Increasing number of formal interventions in the NR sector is 
also leading to more conflicts (Pradhan ef a/., 1997; Upreti, 
1998b). One of the major causes of such conflicts is that these 
interventions are implemented without much knowledge of or 
insight into the functioning of existing systems, local norms, rights 
Figure 6.2 People discussing about a n d obligations related to local-level water and land use 
the water source practices. In this context the statement of Benda-Beckmann ef 
a/., (1996:2): "pre-sef technocratic and bureaucratic notions of 
how irrigation systems ought to be managed are forced upon water users, who are lured into co-
operation with the bait of large credit facilities. New organisations, Water Users Associations, have to be 
formed by all potential users within the command area, without considering what this might mean for 
prior users. Large irrigation projects that showed little sensitivity to the existing rights and to the needs 
and wishes among the local population have methodology with overt or tacit resistance" is more 
1 3 7 Vincent (1996) and Uphoff (1986) discuss these issues in detail. Vincent (1996:43) states that "with the societal framework, 
one can study the social outcomes of irrigation systems in terms of the conditions and relationships between direct and indirect 
resources. Struggle between groups can be explored explicitly, as can partnerships in negotiation, and the operation of social 
networks and key actors within them". Irrigation as an organisational system is a product of collective action in terms of 
resource mobilisation, conflict resolution, people's participation, water distribution and benefit sharing (Uphoff, 1986). 
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relevant. However, some local people (mostly village elite and political leaders) invite external 
interventions (the government sometimes comes with various development interventions without a 
request from local elite) for two purposes: i) a genuine reason to improve the village situation, and ii) a 
veiled reason to obtain direct personal benefit (mostly financial) from such interventions. 
6.3.2 Party politics and conflict 
Some key politicians from the main local political parties, some teachers and selected village elite from 
the 3 VDCs have obtained direct financial benefit from this project. Those people who were deliberately 
excluded from the construction process by the WUC led the dissatisfied villagers in protest against the 
work of the WUC. Political leaders in the earlier Panchayat political system created several severe 
problems to the antj Panchayat activists and opponents. After the restoration of democracy these anti-
Panchayat activists and opponents emerged as mainstream political leaders in the village. Due to the 
tension between these two groups the social setting of the village was heavily disturbed. There was a 
deep 'confidence crisis' in the village. Each small non-political issue was deliberately linked with party 
politics for political gain. Different levels of conflict were also observed within members of the same 
political party. Everyone tried to influence people in their favour to the disadvantage of others. This 
irrigation system became a suitable platform for such political maneuvering and served as a catalyst for 
the initiation of conflicts. 
6.3.3 Issue of water rig/ite and water-sharing arrangements 
Water acquisition and sharing were other catalytic forces in the escalation of conflict. People from the 
downstream canals and water turbines complained about scarcity of water right from the beginning of 
the project. The politicians effectively used this issue of water rights to defeat the arguments of the 
initiator and the irrigation officials. The opposing party claimed that the source was big enough and that 
the intake was located far enough from the other canals and turbines so that there would be no 
significant reduction of water. Initially, this issue was just raised as a political issue but during the 
negotiations it became one of the crucial points to be agreed. Placement of a sancho (gate) in the intake 
of this irrigation canal was agreed in a tripartite meeting held to discuss the sharing of water. Water 
acquisition deals with having access and control over water in a natural source (Yoder, 1994). The 
supporters of this canal wanted to acquire water from the highest part of the stream. Water sharing 
implies a fair distribution of the available water and an agreement was reached over this by involving 
non-users in the water users committee to balance the power and negotiate the conflict (political 
dimension). Water rights among users sharing the same source are generally contested (Spiertz, 2000; 
Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1996). The objections of downstream-water users in this case became the 
central locus for conflict when local water-sharing rules were broken. There is an accepted local norm 
that diversions are not asked for or allowed within a specific distance upstream if the available water is 
insufficient for all systems. 
6.3.4 Participation, decision making an transparency Issues 
The situation was interesting in that the general villagers had not demanded this project from that 
alignment nor were they consulted during the feasibility study and implementation process. The canal 
was constructed in the high altitude area (about 7000 feet) where rice cultivation is not common and 
there is no practice of irrigating other winter crops, if they are grown. Villagers argue that if local farmers 
had been consulted during the feasibility study they would have opted for the original alignment whereby 
conflict would have been minimised and the area under irrigated agriculture could have been increased. 
The fact that the farmers' priorities had been ignored, by excluding them from the project planning, 
meant that their participation in implementation was virtually zero and also raised severe conflicts and 
tensions. The farmers' concerns were not taken into account and the process lacked a plan for solving 
conflicts. This resulted in suspicion, hostility and a lack of co-operation. Although a meaningful 
participation of users is clearly stated in the irrigation policy documents, in reality such participation was 
virtually nil in this case. 
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The case demonstrated that participation of beneficiaries and transparent decisions making are crucial 
for sustainable development and management of irrigation systems. The qualitative participation of 
users in decision-making and the implementation process and the need for proper assessment survey 
design and effective monitoring of the irrigation system are the key determinants of success138. This 
case has demonstrated that qualitative participation depends on the interests of local people and other 
actors involved in the irrigation development process such as technicians, bureaucrats and politicians. 
However, interests vary due to differences in power and position. Wealth, caste and ethnicity, status, 
authority and political and ideological preferences also governed interests in participation (Uphoff, 1985, 
Chambers, 1988; Pant, 2000). 
Farmers' participation represents an important part of the larger process of irrigation management 
(Uphoff, 1986). People's participation is more predictable and productive when it is mobilised through 
appropriate organisations of users which was distinctly lacking in this case. A user organisation (as 
structure) is important for successful irrigation development activities (as process). Organisational 
aspects of the project such as planning, decision-making, resource mobilisation, CM and co-ordination 
were performed without involving users, which ultimately created severe problems during 
implementation. In this case both the social and physical structures were very weak. The decision-
making process was top-down and not transparent. The irrigation technicians viewed themselves as the 
supplier and the real implementers and local people were viewed as the passive acceptors of the 
governmental largesse. Both the WUC members and the technicians were aware that involving users in 
the construction process from the beginning addresses local interests and concerns, leads to an 
understanding of the public values associated with these issues and concerns, and ensures the long-
term sustainability of the project. However, they were also equally aware that such involvement could 
reduce much wanted illicit revenue. This was their main reason for not involving people in the decision-
making process construction project. 
The case demonstrated that formal interventions generally use existing social differences (such as 
class, gender, caste, ethnicity, historical legacies, power, occupation and political rivalries) as an 
effective means of accomplishing objectives (hidden and stated) in the direction of their desire. They 
mobilise very few people of the upper strata of a society to achieve that. The village population is 
composed of rich and poor, powerful and weak, educated and illiterate. However, in order to gain 
legitimacy, the external agencies mainly operate in a non-transparent way through politicians and 
traditional power brokers from the higher social strata. This eventually excludes the interests and 
concerns of women, real water users, the poor and people from lower socio-cultural strata. It is also 
interesting to note that such interventions mainly focus on technical concerns, rather than on equity and 
social justice. They consider the interests of just one articulate elite group rather than the 
heterogeneous population. This biased view of the power and social relationships ultimately leads to 
contradictions and conflict in the village community. This case proved that when people perceive that 
bureaucratic decisions are unfair, distrust develops and the any ultimate decision is more likely to be 
rejected. 
The VDC executive members and secretaries explained that increased political interference and social 
conflicts in the village are also due to the lack of a comprehensive irrigation resource inventory in the 
village. This would make it easier to make a choice between creating new irrigation systems and making 
better use of the existing irrigation ones and would minimise arbitrary decisions, if such inventory were 
available. In this case technical and social information was lacking and non-transparent top-down 
decisions were imposed. According to the respondents the major cause of the conflicts in this irrigation 
development process was the lack of transparency. By keeping the process non-transparent, irrigation 
technicians and the WUC members could ensure that any extortion would go smoothly without any 
interference from the general public. A transparent process bestows legitimacy, minimises controversy 
and increase people's participation (Pandey, 1999). Regardless of the importance of the project, a lack 
of transparency results in conflict and opposition, minimises democratic values and nearly always leads 
to the failure of the project. 
1 » Also see Uphoff, 1986; Turrel, 1995; Korten and Siy; 1989; Pradhan, 1989. 
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6.3.5 Communication, Information and conflict 
Lack of communication and information among the villagers was one of the major sources of conflict. 
Most of the villagers did not know about the feasibility study, the source of financial assistance, the 
conditions and procedures of implementation or the responsibilities and authority of the WUC. Many 
people only knew about this project when the resulting conflict became public. Information was 
strategically limited to maintain secrecy and opposition from the villagers was ignored. 
Considering the conflict scenario in this case it should be stressed that communication, information 
exchange, and the use of a common language are very important in making people aware about 
intervention, in seeking their co-operation and in reducing conflict. Keeping myriad villagers uninformed 
or providing distorted information creates confusion, suspicion and disagreement, which virtually always 
leads to more conflicts and the ultimate failure of the project. In section 6.2 it was discussed how conflict 
at the time of implementation was often the result of a communication gap, information distortion and a 
lack of awareness. Providing correct information and having proper communications can enhance the 
development of mutual understanding, clarify misunderstandings and eradicate suspicion. 
6.3.6? The functioning of water users committees and conflict 
Several studies have shown the great importance of social and organisational aspects in enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of irrigation systems (Pant, 2000; Ostom, 1992; Benjamin ef a/. 1994; 
Mollinga, 1998; Parajuli, 1999; Chambers, 1988; Uphoff, 1986). This is clearly reflected in this case. It 
became apparent from the case described in section 6.2 that there was a crisis in confidence, resulting 
in hostility and frustration amongst the villagers. A lack of interest about genuine responsibility of the 
WUC was due to hidden economic interests, which forced the WUC to deviate from the standard WUC 
governing rules. This meant that the role of the WUC became a persistent source of conflict. The WUC, 
which was the hub of the whole irrigation development process, was brought into being to serve the 
objectives of two groups of actors (i.e., irrigation technocrats and local elite). Entire procedures, 
strategies and action plans of the WUC were focused on achieving these objectives. It is interesting to 
note that all necessary documents were correctly produced and submitted to the concerned authorities 
for legal evidence. 
The role of the WUC is crucial in managing irrigation systems. Ideally, the WUC is responsible for 
construction, operation, maintenance and repair of canals. It should ensure the equitable distribution of 
water, collect and make use of irrigation service fees, take the necessary action against the 
contravention of rules, resolve conflict if any should arise and develop and execute rules and 
regulations. A registered WUC is an autonomous corporate body according to the Water Resources Act, 
(Khadka, 1997). However, the role of the WUC in this case was controversial and became a source of 
conflict. 
It is widely recognised that sustainability of irrigation is ensured when state intervention promotes 
qualitative involvement of fanners in planning, construction and maintenance is increase (Pant, 2000; 
NPC, 1998). This is recognised in the Water Resource Act, and the Irrigation Policy, 1995. All irrigation 
and water management documents139 emphasise the role of water users associations and committees. 
Now-a-days the use of such rhetoric is becoming the fashion in Nepal. The Department of Irrigation 
emphasises that irrigation projects should be implemented through the WUC working within the given 
framework. However, in reality, these provisions are not translated accordingly. The provision of WUC is 
rather used by irrigation technocrats to manoeuvre as the ultimate responsibility lies with the WUC and 
1 3 9 Irrigation policy emphasises irrigation management transfer to WUA. Irrigation Development and Management Plan of the 
Ministry of Water Resources highlights the importance of management transfer of irrigation system of less than 500 ha in hills 
and less 2000 ha in Terai to enhance the performance of irrigated agriculture. However, it is reported that irrigation 
management transfer is not operating according to ideals in Nepal. Major problems identified by the Central Co-ordination 
Committee of the WUA in this regard are: poor farmers are not able to pay water tax, not sufficient water available, payment of 
tax without getting water, no clear provision of punishment in Water Resources Act to those who damage or break the canal to 
get water illegally, lack of market linkages to sell the agricultural product and misuse of resources. 
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they can escape referring to WUC when problems occur. Powerful people in the village always wanted 
to be included in the WUC in order to gain access to large amounts of money140. So, in fact WUC 
arrangement is more the platforms for manipulation instead to ensure sustainability of the irrigation 
projects. Another important issue in WUC is the application of externally imposed rules. Such externally 
imposed rules force people to alter their normal behaviour to meet the necessary conditions defined by 
rules. For example, a compulsory 15% contribution from users encouraged the WUC members and 
irrigation technicians to manipulate petty contractors (asking them to work double of what they were 
paid for) and the local community. 
Taking all these issues relating to the WUA/C together it can be concluded that local institutional 
arrangement (WUC) becomes weak when ft does not represent the real users and works only to meet 
the criteria of a project (for example, a registered WUC is a precondition to obtain ADB/ISSP 
assistance). Interventions, even when they operate through WUA/Cs, are not sustainable if complex 
interlocking social dynamics are ignored. New institutions created by the external interventions generally 
do not function if they are not compatible with the existing ones (Pant, 2000). 
6.3.7 Technology and conflict 
Technology provides the knowledge and techniques to make water available to irrigate lands and 
physically control its delivery to the fields, influencing plant bio-mass, soil property and the ecosystem 
as a whole (Mollinga, 1998; Chambers, 1988; Parajuli, 1999; Yoder, 1984; 1991). However it also 
creates ample room for conflict and corruption (Wade, 1982; Korten and Siy, 1989; Upreti, 1998b). In 
this respect irrigation can be seen as a resource in two ways. First, it is an input for plant growth and 
development (Vincent, 1996) and secondly, ft is a means of extorting money and other associated 
benefits for bureaucrats and politicians. 
As was already noted in section 6.2 irrigation technology not only greatly influences the sustainability of 
an irrigation system but also serves as a source of conflict. The main focus of the design (high 
technology based expensive structures) is often to increase the cost of the project so that technicians 
and WUC members can increase their profits. To increase the costs of this project the site for the canal 
alignment was chosen so that a large numbers of complex concrete structures were needed. Local 
people argued that the same canal could be constructed with far fewer structures if the originally 
proposed alignment was accepted. Many structures were severely damaged because they were not 
constructed according to the design, what Wade (1982) calls 'saving on the ground'. Farmers prefer to 
construct canals without heavy cement structures, arguing that canals constructed with low cost 
measures run for longer periods with fewer problems than those constructed using high technology like 
this canal. However, irrigation technicians mostly prefer to design canals with many structures. These 
require more investment for construction so increasing the opportunities for extortion (Upreti, 1998a). 
This also necessitates a regular maintenance budget, which is also at their disposal. 
Obviously high technology and structural work should not be ignored. However the quality of the 
technical construction work is basically the responsibility of irrigation engineers and this needs to be 
controlled honestly. Wherever possible local technology should be used to sustain the system after 
external intervention has ceased. Quality assurance of the physical structures depends upon execution 
of the project according to the design specifications (for example, the ratio of cement used). It is a well 
accepted fact that irrigation systems require locality-specific technical designs (e.g. canals have to have 
the material strength and spill facilities to cope with hydraulic forces, and appropriate control structures 
to deliver water, etc.). However, the problem is how these designs are translated into practice. Location 
specific inexpensive designs and incorporation of local knowledge and experience in designing irrigation 
systems would minimise conflict, address local people's need and help in operating and maintaining 
them later. However, kickback extortion and 'savings on the ground' are becoming guiding factors in 
choosing technology and design structures in construction projects in Nepal, rather than the principles 
1 4 0 Of all the sectoral village level development activities, irrigation is the first one to bring large amounts of money to the village 
from outside sources. 
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involved and the technical merits. The Report of the Nepal's Administrative Reform Task force, 1999 
explicitly mentioned the widespread existence of organised corruption in irrigation, road and drinking 
water projects from village to national level141. DIO engineers need to be accountable to the users to 
ensure the quality of work. All details of the particular project need to be transparent to the beneficiaries 
of that project to ensure 'getting the process right* (Uphoff, 1986). Based on the above discussion, it is 
logical to conclude that technology in itself is neither good nor bad but its context specific application is 
very important. This can be used as a source of extortion, manipulation and conflicts, if applied wrongly. 
6.3.8 Corruption and conflict 
Corruption is a framework that helps in understanding how public roles and private interests of 
technocrats and politicians are in conflict and how power relationships and cronyism influence irrigation 
development process. It gives answers to the questions of how illicit revenue collection and rake- off 
work in bureaucratic and political circles accomplishes and how village leaders and local politicians are 
mobilised in this extortion process in any projects that are externally funded and implemented under the 
guidance of irrigation technicians. As noted by Wade (1982) in his study on canal irrigation in India, it is 
also common in Nepal for irrigation bureaucrats to collect illicit revenue and pay senior bureaucrats and 
politicians to secure them transfer to high-earning projects and so buy advantageous positions again 
and again. During the tenure of any irrigation technician they need to recover the amount they paid to 
obtain the position, the extra money used to pay142 the superiors and politicians to keep them continue 
in high earning projects, as well as needing to make a lucrative profit for themselves for taking risks (for 
example potential corruption charges and protests from public for extorting money from the project). The 
Report of the Nepal Administrative Reform Task Force, 1999 and 'Good Governance' a Quarterly 
Bulletin of the ProPublic143 (a NGO) have provided evidence consistent with the issues raised in this 
book on corruption. 
Power in this case was mainly used to achieve personal financial gain, distinctly against the interest of 
the majority of villagers. The formally recognised positions and associated power of the WUC members, 
the DIO technicians and the VDC members legitimised the irregularities in the construction process. In 
this case position and authority (e.g. the decision of the WUC to collect 22% commission, that of the 
DIO to remove local contractors), personal relationships and links (e.g. the relationship between the DIO 
engineer and the initiator) and interests (e.g. negotiation of two groups for their own economic benefits) 
were used to achieve personal gains. These all were abuse of different power forms. 
The irrigation technocrats (mainly the head of office) have wider discretionary powers to allocate, 
reallocate and cut-off a budget of a particular irrigation project, appoint contractors, transfer subordinate 
technicians and make decisions in favour of politicians who support them. Irrigation bureaucrats use 
such power skillfully to create an environment favourable for extorting money from irrigation projects. In 
the case described above the WUC was compelled within that discretionary power to provide 17% of the 
1 4 1 See the draft report of Nepal's Administrative Reform Taskforce 2055 Chaitra (1999) Page 49, clause no 5.3.3 for the strong 
existence of organised corruption in Nepal. 
1 4 2 It is interesting to note that irrigation professionals (particularly assistant engineers and overseers) express their feelings, 
and talk about how they extort money, how much and when they gave money to seniors (to obtain particular work or to get 
support from politicians and seniors by extortion) or what problems they faced from seniors when they failed to fulfil their 
expectations, when they are drunk. It is common practice that their own group (generally they do not include people other than 
overseer/engineers in their drinking, gambling or casino group) goes to relatively expensive and good restaurants of that area 
(mainly district headquarters) to drink and share secrete issues with each other. Sometimes they also ask politicians to drink 
with them to develop and finalise extortion strategies or to ask them to force concessions from the senior technocrats in the 
particular project where they are working. I visited such restaurants several times as an ordinary customer sitting in separate 
comer and listening to their conversations. This helped me to gain insights into these issues that I was not able to get from 
other research methods. 
1 4 3 ProPublic (2000:9) found that corruption persists in the following layers of construction works in Nepal: a) While making the 
estimate of the construction works, b) Bargaining on the rates of commission while awarding contracts, 
c) Compromises on the quality of works d) Claiming more work than actually carried out, e) Lack of adequate competition, f) 
Contractors fixing who tenders for the project by having deals amongst themselves, so avoiding competition g) Claiming extra 
payments under the pretext of price increases or other excuses, h) Extending projects unnecessarily and in a pre-planned way, 
i) Corruption through consultancies, j) Corruption under the pretext of maintenance or other reasons. 
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total budget as a kickback144 and therefore the quality of the work deteriorated. Technicians responsible 
to construct this canal should have fulfilled their responsibility (to pay to seniors) to retain in the project. 
As noted in section 6.3.4 technicians use technical jargon and administrative procedures to manipulate 
resources for their benefit, things about which villagers have little idea. 
In general, villagers, politicians and technocrats have different reasons for taking part in an irrigation 
project. Interests of bureaucrats are related to obtaining money and promotion whereas politicians want 
to gain more power. Neither group is interested in the issues of irrigation per se. However, the interest of 
the farmers is mainly to have regular water available from the canal to irrigate their land. The patronising 
attitude of irrigation professionals leads to conflict and hinders the building of relationships with the 
community. Irrigation technocrats have often developed idiosyncratic feelings of superiority due to their 
social status145 and education, power and contacts. They see local fanners as a part of the problem and 
themselves as the source of the solution. They always want to maintain special close relationships with 
local power brokers in accomplishing construction projects. Therefore, their official contacts in the 
village are the head of the village, political leaders and power brokers, who it is hoped can minimise 
potential trouble from them146 later. 
Politicians are interested in new irrigation projects since such projects are a means of gathering financial 
resources147 and consolidating political support at elections as well as strengthening the influence of 
their party at the local level (ProPublic, 2000; Pandey, 1999; Upreti, 1998b). This powerful motivation of 
politicians is strategically utilised by technocrats and contractors148 to extort money. As a result the 
1 4 4 It is a common practice in Nepal to collect money from development projects for the senior bureaucrats and politicians. The 
collected money has to be distributed to different layers of concerned authorities (bureaucrats and even politicians if the 
amount is large). These different layers of people are collectively known as 'above'. 
1 4 5 In recent years it is almost impossible for the children of poor people to get access to Engineering colleges because of 
extremely large amount of additional (capitation) fees and the inability to compete in entrance examinations with those students 
who come from expensive high quality boarding schools. Even if they succeeded in the entrance examinations they are not 
able to invest in 5-6 years of expensive engineering colleges. In the few cases where someone from a poor background 
completed an engineering education, it is extremely difficult for them to find appropriate and relevant work without 
afnomenchhe, source force or the use of bribes. 
1 4 6 Technicians develop special relationships with local power brokers mainly by paying for hospitality. Only those brokers, who 
have a good relationship with the chief of their office can hope for some of the share from the project implemented in their 
villages. Technicians also give work on the project to the favourites of power brokers to maintain their special relationships. 
Technicians regularly send money to senior politicians and more especially to senior bureaucrats. They also send crockery, 
furniture, goat, ghee or material for dowries to their married daughters to ensure their compliance in any extortion or to prevent 
their transfer to a bad posting such as the Maoist influenced area. I talked with one engineer, who was school friend of mine, 
about this issue. He said "extortion of money and corruption is an inevitable part of the professional life of engineers in Nepal. It 
is necessary to fulfil the demands of senior officials and politicians if any engineer wants to survive professionally (to get better 
opportunities in terms of training abroad and education, posting in big earning projects, and not being posted in the Maoist area 
or other dumping groundf. It is also interesting to note that those people who are the master of corruption always say that the 
practice of extortion is wrong and morally reprehensible. The engineering profession is dominated by corruption despite the 
public expression (more especially by politicians rather than bureaucrats) of their remorse and shame at the situation. 
However, their speeches have no credibility with the general public. 
1 4 7 Media Service International under the support of the Westminster Foundation carried out a comprehensive study in 
Nepalese corruption practices for Democracy. Findings of this study show that 21% of the surveyed respondents thought the 
most corrupt officials were civil servants, 20% indicated politicians, 19% ministers, 18% police and 11% judiciary. The 
remaining 11 % see other people such as workers of corporations and NGOs as the most corrupt. Among the respondents 30% 
see politicians as being primarily responsible for such corruption followed by civil sen/ants (28%) and traders (15%). Thirteen 
percent of the respondents considered the political system itself is primarily responsible for such rampant corruption. Of the 
total 1197 respondents consulted, 75% gave bribes to accomplish their work. 23% said that they had never accomplished any 
work without bribery and 44% said they ccasionally resorted to bribery to accomplish work. Some 61% respondents excused 
the use of bribery by explaining that it is not possible to accomplish work without its use. Research findings indicate that the 
most corrupt offices are the LRO, Custom Office, Police Office, courts, District Administration Office, Tax Office, Forest Office, 
Electricity Office, Telecommunication Office, Municipalities, Road Office, Drinking Water Office, Irrigation Office, Hospitals, the 
army and the Land Measurement Office (Nepal Samachar Patra Dailly, April 25,2000). 
1 4 8 Contractors are one of the major perpetrators of corruption in construction projects in Nepal. They increase their net benefits 
by paying bribes to government officials and politicians. Technocrats assist them by saving on the estimates, saving on the 
ground (Wade, 1982), revising estimates to increase the amount needed and adding extra money. Engineers generally become 
involved in increase the benefit from contractors for themselves, their bosses and politicians. In some cases, even if the project 
needs to be approved by the Cabinet the minister concerned makes sure this is achieved promptly. Many engineers also work 
with these contractors in an anonymous partnership to increase the shared benefits. Large contractors have strong immediate 
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institutional and technical performance of such projects deteriorates. In contrast, FfvllS perform better 
and function properly, mainly because they have well recognised principles supported by social 
sanctions and flexible criteria (Pradhan, 1989). As noted by Uphoff, (1986) improving irrigation 
management requires critical thinking about farmers' organisations, political neutrality, and active 
participation of local people and implementation of a transparent process. This is generally lacking in 
projects implemented and designed with the interests of politicians' and bureaucrats' in mind. 
Lack of co-operation, weak social relationships, mistrust, and even recrimination were the product of this 
irrigation development process. Villagers blamed DIO officials and politicians for their corrupt role in 
abusing the available resources. On the other hand irrigation officials argued that farmers themselves 
have to take responsibility for the failure of the project. They further stressed that it is necessary to 
educate and control the villagers to follow the technician's instructions. 
Based on the empirical evidence it is realistic to say that the interests of many external interventions in 
the development of irrigation systems are not for the better performance of irrigated agriculture149 but 
rather to raise larger amounts of illicit revenue from the project for irrigation bureaucrats and politicians. 
All in all, irrigation bureaucracy together with politicians capture a large portion of the resources 
allocated for irrigation development at the cost of social conflict and the resulting failure of the project in 
question. 
6.4 Learning from conflict 
From the foregoing discussion it has become apparent that statutory, administrative and technocratic 
authorities are the major factors in irregularities and corruption. These authorities in this case modified 
rules and procedures, to exploit the local situation and create a favourable environment to extort money. 
Their personal interests and behaviour play a significant role in (mis)use of resources and (ab)use of 
power, irrespective of governmental laws, rules and regulations, and professional ethics150. In this case, 
a comprehensive and well illustrated operational procedural manual and its recommendations and the 
irrigation department's policies and guidelines were deliberately manipulated. Hence the construction 
process was used for the self-interests of bureaucrats and WUC members. The important question of 
how these greed-based behavioural changes can be directed towards shared goals based on socially 
learned understanding remains unanswered. 
Farmers-managed irrigation systems function better in Nepal than the jointly managed irrigation systems 
(JMIS) because farmers in FMIS themselves make' locally interwoven rules and monitor and effectively 
enforce. It has become clear from this case that farmers do not feel any ownership in JMIS because the 
irrigation systems were built, financed and regulated by outsiders to serve their own interests rather than 
the need of local people. Differences in interests hindered co-operation, raised conflict and virtually 
assured the failure of the irrigation project. A lesson we can learn from this conflict case is that the 
degree of failure of externally funded projects is directly correlated with local people's feelings of 
exclusion. 
Taking all the raised issues together it can be argued that conflict can be minimise if the activities of 
irrigation professionals and water-users committees is kept transparent and away from local politics, 
following a bottom-up approach to planning and construction of irrigation projects. If WUC is politically 
influence over senior politicians and ministers or senior government bureaucrats. For this reason engineers, unless they also 
have bargaining powers, are wary of such contractors incase they organise their transfer to non-earning projects or remote 
areas. 
1 4 9 The improved performance of irrigation systems enhance the wellbeing by increasing benefits from irrigation, such as 
productivity, equity and productivity in terms of costs, and adverse social, health, environmental and other effects (Chambers, 
1988) 
1 5 0 In relation to that the statement of Benda-Beckmann et al., (1997:229) is illustrative. They state: "socio-legal studies in the 
field of law and behaviour have generally demonstrated that the mere existence of legal rules and principles, whether 
originating from government legislation, tradition or contemporary local law making, do not justify to draw direct conclusions 
with respect to behaviour of people. They only become significant when people- farmers, government officials, project 
managers- orient their behaviour towards these rules...". 
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unbiased it would be possible to mobilise local human resources and social capital to improve the 
performance of irrigation systems, increase accountability and reduce conflicts. One of the most 
important lessons learned for effective management of irrigation systems is the development of a feeling 
of ownership among the users which gears them toward responsibilities and rights (Shivakoti et al., 
1996). If they consider the system is theirs they become involved in its care and management. To 
ensure accountability is to actively involve people in the whole process. 
Strengthening the capacity of villagers by providing accurate information, giving awareness training on 
departmental financial regulations related to irrigation projects, giving advice on the most vulnerable 
points for extortion, and developing their skill and confidence to deal with irrigation engineers would 
perhaps help to improve the performance of irrigation projects. Furthermore, regular monitoring and 
periodic evaluation, timely auditing by the concerned authority could minimise the conflicts created due 
to financial irregularities and corrupt practices. Proper application of financial regulations and the fair 
use of a reward and punishment system coupled with a code of conduct, rights, duties and obligations of 
civil servants as defined by the Civil Servant Act could help to reduce bribes and extortion. 
In conclusion, it may be generalised that an integration of both the soft-side of irrigation (institutional, 
managerial, and organisational issues; CM, resources mobilisation and utilisation, people's participation) 
to get the social process right and the hard-side (hydrological and hydraulic issues, construction 
technology, structural designs) to get the technical engineering process right (Uphoff, 1986) is essential 
to improve the performance of the irrigation sector. From the scenario of the Nepalese irrigation 
situation presented elsewhere in this chapter it is clear that irrigation is not only a major input for 
agricultural productivity and a significant source for personal income but also a major source of conflict 
that alters the existing social relationships. 
This case illustrates the general characteristics of the Nepalese socio-political system and functioning of 
government bureaucracy in general, and in particular makes it possible to understand the development 
process of irrigation systems through formal intervention. The causes of under performance of the 
project include technical (design and implementation), institutional (WUC), political and bureaucratic 
factors. It is clear from the case that corruption is not only an inseparable part of the irrigation 
development process in Nepal but also a major source of conflict. Most often, human relationships are 
ignored in irrigation development and management, which undermines institutional, managerial, 
technical, socio-political and economic dimensions with hard core engineering. Unless the human 
dimension receives due consideration conflicts and ultimate failure of irrigation system will common. 
Formal interventions do not always operate according to written irrigation policies, procedures and 
guidelines. Rather negotiations take place at local level to meet different interests. Powerful elite and 
politicians change the established pattern of development processes by negotiation and restoring 
administrative, regulatory, political and bureaucratic connections and links. Power relationships, social 
linkages, resource mobilisation and the actions of WUC are all shaped and legitimised by the self-
interests of the actors. In this context it is not surprising to see that corruption is a distinct feature of 
formal intervention which characterise the general scenario of operation of the Nepalese administrative 
and political system. One can further argue that an irrigation system executed by outsiders in the name 
of users, which does not assist in the development of their institutional and organisational abilities leads 
to conflict and undermines local human potential (Upretl, 1998a). 
From the empirical findings it is appropriate to say at this point that successful irrigation development 
depends on to what extent farmers are organised in participation, resource mobilisation and decision 
making. The principal objective of implementation of irrigation projects is to increase production and 
productivity of crops, to improve economic conditions of farmers and raise their livelihood. But the case 
studied indicates that all irrigation projects, in reality, are not implemented to achieve this novel 
objective, but are guided by hidden objectives such as an individual's monitory earnings, political gain, 
extortion and the accumulation of power. 
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External development interventions provide avenues for illicit practices through construction, 
maintenance and extension of irrigation systems. In this process, farmers, government agencies, and 
village elite are directly and or indirectly involved in their own ways by using technological means, 
customary norms, scientific jargon and formal laws and rules. As a result, in many cases, intervention in 
irrigation has been counterproductive. On the whole, it can be emphasised that irrigation is not only an 
on-farm activity, crop water management and hydrology but also has a whole dynamic of culture, politics 
economy, customary practices, people's perception, government's actions and learning and mis-
learning. 
A significant implication of this irrigation development process is the raised awareness of the villagers. 
After this project, villagers learned the potential ways to minimise misuse of externally obtained 
resources. Their level of confidence to deal with such issues has been increased. Due to this case 
people are now aware of the implications in the implementation of externally supported projects in their 
area. They actively wish to know the details about such external projects (budget, benefit, effects, etc.) 
before taking any decisions. 

Chapter 7 
From Litigation to Compromise: Negotiation in a Land Conflict (Case five) 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter six examined the social implications of external interventions in irrigation development. It was 
shown how external development intervention has become controversial, promoting conflicts in the 
complicated web of power, political party strife and socio-economic relationships in society. The need 
has been recognised for a more facilitative and supportive role of formal interventions in NRfvl, which 
gives more attention to cultural, economic and political issues and is completely impartial (Warner and 
Jones, 1998: Buckles, 1999). However, much still remains to be done to carry this out in practice. This 
chapter examines the dynamics of land conflict within the broader framework of land reform, land rights 
and power struggles taking as an example a case of Guthi land conflict. The case study in this chapter 
deals with the conflict between tenants and landlords to control ownership rights. The case highlights 
the process of how the parties in the conflict responded to it, why they approached the courts and why 
they returned from court adjudication to local compromise. This chapter starts with the introduction and 
description of the conflict. This is followed by a short analysis of the dynamics of conflict and 
negotiation. Finally, specific conclusions are drawn about the extend to which negotiation is possible 
even in a situation of an unequal power relationship. 
Guthi land tenure grants right over land to religious or charitable organisations. According to the Trust 
Corporation (Guthi Sansthan) Act, 1976 Guthi \s defined as 'endowment made by any philanthropist 
through relinquishment of their title to movable or immovable property or any income-yielding fund for 
the construction, operation or maintenance of any temple, rest-house, road-side shelter, inn, well, tank, 
bridge, school, house, or institution, in order to run a monastery or celebrate a religious occasion, 
ceremony or festival or any religious and philanthropic purpose' (Oli, 1998: 41). The same act divides 
Guthi lands into 3 categories viz.: Raj Guthi (owned by the Guthi Corporation), Chhut Guthi (a 
concession made by the government to individuals over Guthi property) and private Guthi (Guthi owned 
by individuals). Such endowments were made with the specific purpose of maintaining these 
organisations. The people who manage Guthi are called Guthiars. Guthi grants were safer from 
confiscation by the state than other forms of land tenure because of concessions to their religious 
nature. Both state and individual landlords have established Guthi. Individuals established Guthis 
because of the protection against confiscation and the restriction on alienation. Birta holders kept part of 
their lands for the Guthi as a means of protecting portions of their holdings from possible confiscation or 
preventing future generations from selling them. Often the earning from Guthi lands was in excess of the 
amount needed to fulfill the religious or charitable purpose. In such cases the excess was simply 
appropriated by the individual Guthiars for their own use (New Era, 1988). The case described in this 
chapter belongs to the categotry of private Guthi. 
7.2 The Deurali Guthi land conflict 
Deurali village is situated in the Pawoti VDC. It is relatively densely populated. The population 
composition of the study area is Sarki (cobbler), Kami (blacksmith) Chhetri, Newar, Tamang and 
Bramin. However, more than 60% of population is Brahmin and Chhetri. The socio-economic condition 
of the village is poor, most inhabitants being poor tenants. Until 1990 social relationships were skewed 
with a patron-client mode of power structure in the village. A few Brahmin and Chhetri landlords own 
more than 70% of the different categories151 of agricultural land in this area. Many farmers are tenants 
1 5 1 The local categories of land classifications reported in the study area were 1. Khet land (low land) - a) bagar land (land 
reclaimed from stream/river), b) kholakhet (located by the river/stream), c) simkhet/gairikhet (poorly drained fertile land), d) 
tarkhet (usually dried and located on slopes above river/stream terraces), e) kanlekhet (khet consisting of small terraces), and 
f) surke khet (long narrow strips of terraced land located on steep slopes). 2. Bari land (upland) - a) ghar-bari (ban land located 
around the house), b) Patabari (large broad terraces), c) Kanle bari (fairly narrow terrace), d) Surke bari (very narrow strips of 
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and some Brahmin, Chhetri and Sarki people are landless. Food insecurity and forced agricultural 
labour are common. However, in recent years, the power structure in the village has begun to change 
as democratic change has allowed the poor a voice. 
More than 150 years ago a high cast Hindu Brahmin family allocated about 350 ha of the Deurali village 
as a private Guthi to run rituals, to worship god and maintain the temple. At that time, several well-off 
devotees (mainly landlords) donated lands to gods and goddesses because of their religious faith. Land 
was not scarce, and the Guthi owner rented out the Guthi land to 40 tenants of the Deurali village. The 
fixed rent was generally collected in the form of grain, an arrangement that had been running for 
generations without major problems. As well as paying rent, tenants also provided free agricultural 
labour and artisan services to the Guthi owners. 
After the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951 initiatives were taken to reform the feudal system of land 
accumulation. As part of this reform process, in 1959 the leader of the Guthi owners (administering the 
Guthiland on behalf of the present 50 Guthi owner families), collected money (equivalent to the rent of 
five years) from all the tenants to transfer the ownership rights of the Guthi land to them. However this 
was not carried out due to reluctance from the Guthi landowners. This became the first cause of conflict 
between the Guthi owners and the tenants. Although the tenants became dissatisfied the conflict did not 
escalate mainly because of the influence of the landowners. Tenants provided wood and trees from the 
Guthi land to the Guthi owners hoping for a future settlement of the pending issue of ownership transfer. 
Later, together with the emergence of the Panchayat political system in 1962 some Guthi landowners 
became powerful, obtaining a lot of statutory powers, when they were nominated as members of the 
village council and head of the Village Panchayat. By using these statutory powers the landowners were 
able to suppress the dissatisfied tenants, who continued to give free labour and koseli (presents). The 
majority of the Guthi landowners had many times more land than the ceiling made in the Land Act and 
tenants have to give free labour to cultivate these large areas. 
The newly established Panchayat political system brought the Land Act under the Land Reform 
Programme in 1964. The government made an inventory of the existing ownership arrangements and 
tenancy status all over the country. All landowners and tenants should have registered their association 
on particular land to claim ownership rights over that land later. The role of the village council and its 
head was crucial to facilitate the registration process. During the process of registration the leader of the 
Guthi owners again collected money from the vast majority of tenants to register the land under their 
ownership. Because of the failure of the earlier promise some tenants did not pay, and only those who 
gave additional money were able to register the land. However, the tenancy arrangement was continued 
and transferred to the tenants' offspring. Guthi landowners wanted to keep the tenancy arrangement 
unchanged and tenants wanted to establish their rights over the tenanted Gguthi lands. After some 
years tenants stopped paying rent, arguing that they had already paid money twice to transfer 
ownership rights and should not have to pay rent any more. The Guthi landowners first tried persuasion 
in an attempted to collect rent locally, but this failed due to resistance of the tenants. After this the Guthi 
owners mobilised force152 to collect the rent. They threatened to take tenants to the CDO office, and 
bought in the police to threaten them. However, all these strategies did not work. Finally, they made an 
appeal to the Guthi Corporation Office against the tenants. The Guthi Corporation Office is a special 
office set up by the government to administer the Guthi property, to settle disputes related to them and 
conserve these properties. The Guthi Corporation Office pronounced in favour of the Guthi owners. As a 
result, an agreement was made, according to which the Guthi owners would transfer ownership to the 
tenants immediately after receiving 60000 rupees from the tenants to run the Guthi rituals. The tenants 
immediately paid the money but again the ownership was not transferred. Although the tenants had 
already stopped paying the land rent they were still providing free agricultural labour to Guthi owners in 
terraces), e) Khoriyabari (shrub/forest land cleared to make ban), f) Kharbari (steep land where thatch grass is grown), g) 
Dandabari (land located on the top of a hill) and Dhungyan ban (ban with stony soils). The disputed land represents all these 
categories. 
1 5 2 Use of force in Nepal is manifested in the mobilisation of police to influence conflict in their favour. People having access 
and good relations with officials of the District Administration and Police Offices instantly mobilise the police to pressure 
(physically and psychologically) another party to drop or alter their claims irrespective of whether they are right or wrong. 
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the peak agricultural season. The social relationships in the village were too important for either side to 
ruin them. The landowners needed tenants as agriculture labour to run their agriculture and tenants 
wanted to borrow money and agricultural products from the landlords. 
When the CPN-UML led minority government ruled the country for 9 months in 1995, Radio Nepal 
started to broadcast "pro-poor" programmes and urged Nepalese people to organise against socio-
cultural exploitation and to protest their rights over feudal elite and landlords. This media propaganda 
significantly strengthened the determination of villagers and tenants and they became more organised 
to legally fight the Guthi owners to establish their land rights. 
The conflict between the two groups was in a stalemate for several years. Meanwhile, a 5-km 
Ghangkhola Irrigation canal was constructed under 'royal decree153' by the central government investing 
6.7 million rupees to irrigate the 200 ha of adjoining area of Deurali. The canal did not cover the 
disputed Deurali area. The villagers from the Deurali village interpreted that as a deliberate attempt of 
the leader of the Guthi owners to exclude them from irrigation. They protested strongly to the engineer 
as well as the leader. Professional troublemakers (some people in the village were always willing to 
create and be involved in conflict for their own personal benefits) used this as an opportunity to start 
additional conflicts between the two villagers arguing that Deurali villagers opposed the irrigation of their 
lands. This resulted in conflict between Deurali Villagers and other people of the irrigation command 
area. The conflict became serious when the engineer rejected a request from the Deurali villagers for 
the extension of the canal, based on technical, economic and political reasons. Realising the complexity 
and the gravity of the conflict some people from the irrigation command area discussed the problem with 
the Deurali villagers and made a verbal agreement to unofficially extend the canal after completion of 
the project. 
When the canal was completed and running under the management of a users committee154 another 
serious conflict emerged. The Chairman of the Water User Committee installed a water mill, which used 
water from the canal. Users then asked him to contribute a small part of the profits he earned from the 
mill to the users' committee fund. When he refused to pay, all users unanimously removed him from the 
post of the users' committee's chairman. He then started to urge the Deurali Villagers to extend the 
canal and helped to escalate the latent conflict between the two villages. 
Relatives, local traditional leaders, purohit, elderly people and political workers have all made several 
attempts to resolve the Guthi land conflict, especially after the leader of the Guthi owners collected 
money for a second time and tenants stopped paying rents. These efforts made before the leader of the 
Guthi owners filed a case in the court. But they were unsuccessful in resolving conflict. Guthi owners 
were confident about the legal verdict in their favour because the Guthi Corporation Office and Land 
Survey Office had earlier made decisions in their favour. They had legal documents, and also had 
influence with bureaucrats and powerful politicians. Tenants strongly organised themselves under the 
leadership of one of the local tenants of the Guthi land (Lai Bahadur Budathoki) to get title of the land, 
because their survival had been dependant on that land for five generations. During the entire period of 
conflict Lai Bahadur organisied tenants in protesting against landlords and developing links with different 
1 5 3 This practice is called hukumpramangi (royal decree). Before restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990 the King was above 
the constitution and promulgated such directives frequently. In 1955 one Brahmin elite member attempted to construct a canal 
(2 km above the present Ghangkhola Irrigation Canal) but local people disagreed and complained to royal palace to stop the 
construction of the canal stating that if this irrigation canal was constructed it would affect two villages by increasing the 
likelihood of landslides. So this project was not approved earlier. One person from the same village working in the Royal Palace 
submitted a second application (Bintipatm) as follow-up. Ultimately it was approved with change in the intake of the canal and 
construction was completed in 1980. 
154 v\fhen the irrigation system came under the management of users, local politicians claimed credit for the canal as a means 
to win local support. There was competition to be involved in the WUC. Few elite members dominated the WUC and obtained 
more benefits from the canal (e.g., operation of the water mill). There was also conflict on rehabilitation and maintenance. 
Maintenance of the canal intake by all the users was agreed, as it was considered Budhiwol (as parental property where all 
have common right and responsibility) and the remaining canal length was divided into segments and allocated to sub groups 
in their area. However, this arrangement did not function. There were also no written rules for water distribution and 
maintenance. 
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people, party leaders, and organisations. By using his leadership skills he was able to keep tenant 
groups intact and united, to argue, counter argue and effectively and convincingly present their 
problems. As a result the tenants virtually succeeded in establishing their ownership rights over the 
tenanted Guthi land. 
In 1990 the Panchayat political system was overthrown and local power relationships changed again. In 
1991 the government in the Dolakha district implemented the cadestral survey for preparing land-related 
information. The survey was very important to reconfirm ownership rights according to the government's 
land reform programme. Both parties therefore made utmost efforts to measure the disputed lands 
according to their own interests. This situation gave plenty of scope for surveyors to manipulate the 
situation. However, the political situation was not favourable to the Guthi owners due to their strong 
affiliation with the recently overthrown Panchayat political system. The majority of the tenants were 
active supporters of the 1990's democratic movement. As a result, the Guthi owners were not in the 
position to influence land surveyors and 120 tenant households were able to include the Guthi land in 
their own ownership in the registration book. Nevertheless, some of the main leaders of the Guthi 
owners gradually became affiliated with a big right-wing political party and regained their lost power. The 
majority of the tenants gained the support of another left-wing political party. As a result, after 1990 the 
disputants were clearly divided into two major opponent political parties and the conflict became a 
bipartisan political one. Guthi owners then filed a case in the Land Survey Office (Napi Goswara) 
claiming that the tenants had encroached the Guthi land. The Cadestral Land Survey Office ruled in 
favour of the Guthi owners and the tenants responded by filing a petition in the district court against the 
Guthi Sansthan, the Cadestral Survey Office and the Guthi owners. The situation now became very 
complicated due to a strong organisation of tenants, a power struggle between two powerful political 
parties and the involvement of governmental organisations such as the Guthi Corporation and Land 
Survey Offices. The Guthi owners, realising that it would not be possible to evict 120 households from 
the village even if they did win the court case, expressed their willingness to negotiate with the tenants. 
Ultimately, the negotiations resulted in an agreement being made between the two groups. According to 
the agreement, all 120 household tenants, in addition to the amount already paid by them, would have 
to pay one hundred thousands rupees to the Guthi owners. This was to establish a trust fund 
(akchheyakosh) to run the rituals and maintain the temple. For their part the Guthi owners would have to 
permanently transfer ownership of the land to the tenants. Accordingly the litigation case was withdrawn 
from the court and negotiations were returned to a local level. Tenants paid the agreed amount of 
money and the ownership of the disputed lands was permanently transferred. This transfer of the land 
was legalised by the district court. In this way the long lasting conflict was settled in 1998 after 39 years 
of conflict. However, conflict among the Guthi owners erupted when the money received from the 
tenants was not deposited in a bank account, so that the interest would allow the trust fund to cover the 
costs of worshipping as agreed. 
Due to this land conflict power relationships in the VDC were changed. The general public gained 
confidence to defend their rights against the powerful elite. The exploitation of the tenants by village 
landlords and powerful elite was reduced and a new form of social relationship was established. 
To create a favourable environment to bring the Guthi conflict to the negotiation table the chairman of 
the VDC (who was also a leader of the Guthi owners) extended the disputed Ghangkhola Irrigation 
Canal in 1996 up to the stream called Chandanekholatmrn where small irrigation canal connects to the 
Deurali area. This canal extension strategy helped to reduce the tension between villagers and bring 
tenants to the negotiation table. 
Though the extension of the irrigation canal was a by-product of the land conflict it had a very positive 
impact on both villages. As a result of the canal the cropping pattern changed (maize-fallow to rice-
wheat), the cropping intensity increased (1 crop a year to 2-3 crops a year), the existing land use pattern 
changed (upland to rice field) and new varieties of cereals and vegetables were introduced. The water 
use pattern was also changed. The availability of irrigation water directly provided drinking water 
facilities for villagers (for 35 households in head section of the canal) and indirectly served to recharge 
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several drinking water sources located below the canal155. Use of irrigation to kitchen gardens is now 
common. The use of water for sanitation (cleaning clothes, houses, bathing, use in toilets, etc.) and for 
animals was increased. Respondents also informed me that the village air is cooler since the canal has 
been open and the intensity of diarrhoea and cholera has been reduced. Sufficient vegetables are being 
produced in the dry season to increase the villager's income level and health condition. Farmers are 
producing more food, vegetables and milk and are looking for external markets and the Local 
Governance Programme is trying to develop new market linkages. The value of the land has increased 
considerably and out migration has decreased. According to the respondents, parents of other villages 
are eager to marry their daughters to boys of their area. The villagers' workload, especially that of the 
women has increased due to the increase in crop intensity. This is especially true for rice cultivation 
where only women transplant rice seedlings. The water mill has also changed woman's working 
patterns. Before the canal was operational women had to work at night to dehusk rice {dhan kuine) and 
grind the flour (pitho pidhne). These jobs are now carried out in the water mill and women are engaged 
in other activities. 
7.3 Dynamics of conflict: brief discussion 
After 1951, together with political change a number of significant changes occurred in the theory and 
practice of land ownership in Nepal. These changes include the abolition of the Brita and Jagir tenure 
systems and initiation of the land reform programme. Such changes reflected a new, more democratic 
spirit in the land reform efforts. This new democratic spirit brought several consequences to land tenure 
arrangements and ownership patterns. The Deurali land conflict is a direct product of these changes. 
The following section presents a brief analysis of the conflict dynamics. 
7.3.1 Conflict transformation: dynamic process of change 
The case description pointed out that the historical context is important in land conflict in general and 
guthi land in particular. As discussed above the land dispute began in 1959 and continued unabated for 
39 years. It was only settled in 1998 after a long and bitter battle both in the village and the court. During 
these 39 years the guthi land conflict was extended and transformed or linked to several other issues 
such as extension of irrigation, water use, land inheritance and other social and political conflicts. 
From the standpoint of conflict transformation the 39 years of the guthi land conflict can be looked at as 
having different phases. The socio-political system in the village was more feudal when the land conflict 
erupted for the first time in 1959. Conflict was suppressed during the realm of the feudal landlords. The 
situation in terms of balance of power was not much changed even after the emergence of the 
Panchayat political system. The tenancy rights of the Guthi tenants were raised but not strongly enough. 
Landlords influenced the voice of tenants over tenancy rights by strategically giving them hope of 
gaining their rights later. They used the tenants as free agricultural labourers on their farms. During this 
phase two processes were at work, one the hope and wisdom of the tenants and the other the elite's 
manipulations. These tenants also rented other lands from the Guthi owners and village landlords. 
Meanwhile conflicts between landlord groups over power sharing were observed within the village. This 
situation allowed the Guthi tenants to raise their voice and politely protest the exploitation of the 
landlords. This became clear in 1980 when a national referendum (to change or reform the then political 
system) gave the tenants an opportunity to have their voices heard. Opponents of the existing political 
system effectively raised the issue of exploitation of tenants and poor farmers by local landlords under 
the protection of the existing political system. This situation helped the tenants to stop paying rent to the 
Guthi owners. 
The 'national democratic movement1 in 1990, which aimed to restore democracy in Nepal was an 
important time for the tenants. During that period tenants and poor people were organised under the 
leadership of anti-Panchayat activists and started to protest the manipulation of the Guthi owners and 
When water is flowing in the canal in the dry season the volume of water in the downside spring sources was increased. 
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village landlords. After this people's movement the power relationships in the village was changed and 
landowners became softer towards tenants and decreased their exploitation. 
During the 39 years of conflict the parties concerned had opted for several forums to help in its 
resolution. Among them the Village Panchayat, the District land Reform Office, the Guthi Corporation 
Office, the District Police Office, District Court and the Land Measurement and Survey Office, were 
some of the major formal organisations. The Purohit, Mukhiya and local social networks of friends and 
relatives as well as political parties were other forums used to settle the conflict. Both groups used both 
formal and informal procedures and both used formal laws as a resource to resolve the conflict in their 
favour. 
7.3.2 The role of social/power relations 
The owner/tenants relationship in the Guthi land conflict is characterised by cleavage and 
interdependence. The split between the groups has extended and expresses the social and legal 
confrontation over Guthi land; it is evident in the attitudes of hostility and is reinforced by the deep 
political divisions between the two groups. Interdependence derives from the separate but 
complementary roles the two groups play in the community. The interrelationship between the 
landowners and the tenants is therefore primarily understood in terms of their differential rights and 
interests in the land as well as the socio-political configurations created by land conflict. These rights 
and interests and so the relationships between the two groups have altered mainly in the course of the 
past four decades. During the period of the Guthi land conflict a variety of economic and political 
changes occurred leading to a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the two groups. 
The willingness of the leader of the Guthi landowners to negotiate by offering an extension of the 
irrigation canal is an example of the change in social relationships. As the leader of the Guthi owners 
had been a very powerful person in the VDC for more than 3 decades, it was less likely for him to give 
up his claims if the social relationship in village was unaltered. The Deurali land conflict indicates that 
the local power structure has changed over time from a land-centred feudal system to party based 
politics and knowledge centred power relationships. 
In as much as a struggle of the tenants for the land undoubtedly changed group relationships, we might 
ask; 'why didn't the land struggle erupt into violence'? The answer is the 'accommodative', 
'interdependent' and tolerant behaviour of the disputants. Although the disputants were dealing with 
land conflict their social relationships had not ceased. Tenants were working on agricultural farms 
belonging to the Guthi owners and the Guthi owners were providing loans and mediating in other local 
conflicts between tenants. Such interdependence helped to bring them to a negotiated settlement. 
Despite the widespread conflicts, a certain sense of accommodation and social harmony was still 
prevalent in the village. One can argue that as a result of the tolerant and accommodative behaviour of 
tenants and the unchallenged social relationships, powerful elite people were able to exploit them by 
collecting money several times without transferring ownership rights. This is against the spirit and legal 
provision of the Nepalese Land Reform Programme and is unfair to the tenants. Nevertheless, 
irrespective of the legal provisions, tenants would not have got ownership rights over Guthi land if they 
had not organised a continuous peaceful struggle. 
The case clearly indicated that land conflict should be finally dealt with in court, to ensure recognition 
and legitimacy, even if it is negotiated locally. The reasons cited by respondents for an inability to 
resolve land related conflict at the community level were that the complicated land related conflicts must 
be decided by courts in order to receive formal recognition. Similarly, anecdotal evidence of 
respondents, local leaders, lawyers, judges and the Supreme Court's annual report (Table 4.1) confirm 
that a higher percentage of land related cases goes to court than of other NR-related conflicts because 
of the issue of their legitimacy. This case also demonstrated that land conflicts are generally dealt with 
in court irrespective of the size of landholding of individual households. This is in contrast to other 
conflicts where rich people and those with a reasonable standard of living commonly take conflict cases 
to court. Poor people mentioned that VDC level conflict resolutions are cheaper and quicker than 
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outsider organisations. Sometimes poor people also use the court strategy to legitimise their claim over 
land. 
In the existing practice, acquiring a registered title on land by poor and landless people seems in 
practice extremely difficult and costly. The concern here is not only the issue of Gum/ land but also the 
credibility of government bureaucracy and public administration. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter 
the powerful elite, in consultation with governmental bureaucrats deliberately manipulated the GufWIand 
conflict. The decision of the Guthi Corporation and Land Reform Offices in favour of the landlords is an 
example of the influence of power in such a conflict. Such manipulation favours the local elite, who has 
higher political connections, in getting benefits from land conflict, taking advantage of the poor 
knowledge of tenants about legal provisions related to land. 
7.3.3 Rules v/s behaviour: Difference in rhetoric and reality 
Does a rule or legal framework govern the behaviour of individual people? Are there discrepancies in 
what ought to be done (rhetoric) and what is happening in reality? These questions are particularly 
important in this Guthi land conflict. The state provides legal measures through the Guthi Corporation 
Act and regulations to govern Guthi land and to resolve associated conflicts. The Land Act, 1964, Land 
Survey Act, 1962, Land Administration Act, 1967, Soil and Water Conservation Act, 1982, fvluluki Ain 
(Civil Code), 1963 Land Acquisition Act, 1977, Land Revenue Act, 1977 and the Agriculture 
Development, Act 1966 also deal with Guthi \and related conflicts. However this case shows that these 
laws and regulations are not able to secure the rights of tenants. Landlords and the village elite class 
have largely controlled the Guthi land property regime. The exploitation of the tenants by the people 
who were close to political power centres, who were well informed about the legal provisions and able to 
influence bureaucracy, either in an open fashion or in a more indirect and subtle way is evident in this 
case. Private appropriation of income from Guthi lands by powerful politicians and privileged local 
landlords, which were traditionally allocated to run the rituals of the lord Mahadev is an example of how 
powerful elite manipulate common resources. 
In this case the provision of a ceiling156 on land holdings made in the Land Act, 1964 was not effectively 
executed because the majority of the Guthi owners had more than the ceiling. The Guthi owners also 
did not respect tenancy rights, the amount of rent and family limits on ownership of agricultural land 
defined by the land act. Those tenants who were renting land from landlords were not granted tenancy 
rights. The right of tenurial security and rent control to tenants of Guthi lands defined in the Land Act 
was also not applied in practice. These were all negotiated locally between tenants and landlords. The 
old provision of Mukhiya (taluk-it responsible to collect tax of upland and Jimwal-if responsible to collect 
the tax of low lands) made by the act to collect land revenue was exploitative. One of the Guthi 
landowners was the Mukhiya in that area and this fact legitimised the actions of the Guthi owners. 
Though section two, article 3 of the fourth revision of the act abolished the provision of Mukhiya, this 
arrangement was still operating in the village and significantly affected this conflict. Section 7 article 
25(1) ensured tenancy rights (50% of the tenanted land) to the tenants, but the Guthi land tenants were 
not able to demand their tenancy rights because they were not able to get receipts for payment of the 
rent157 from landowners. According to the Land Act, 1964 tenancy right should be granted to those 
tenants who are actually cultivating lands if they register as tenants and these rights should include 
security of tenure so long as they pay the stipulated rents. Earlier studies (Zaman, 1973; Regmi, 1976; 
1 6 6 The section 3, article 7(1) of the land related Act, 1964 has made provision for a ceiling on land ownership. The ceiling 
made for Terai households was 25 bigha (for cultivation) + 3 bigha (for homestead) (1 bigha = 0.67 ha) per family, 50 ropani 
(for cultivation) + 8 ropani (for homestead) (1 ropani = 0.05 ha) per family in Kathrnandu valley and 80 ropani (for cultivation) + 
16 ropani (for homestead) per family in Hills. All landlords have far more than the defined ceiling. Sons from the age of 16 and 
the unmarried daughters from the age of 37 can have such rights. Therefore all landlords registered their excess lands to other 
members of family to prevent confiscation of land above the ceiling. 
1 5 7 Earlier the tenants have to pay 50 percent of the total produced, but later it was lowered to the 50 percent of the main 
harvest only. The tenants had some obligations to the tenanted land. They should not damage or decrease the value of rented 
land. Landowners who have no other residence and wish to build house on the land which (s)he will occupy and cultivate, are 
permitted to resume a portion or all of the rented land from tenant. In such a case the land owner has to compensate the 
tenants at least 25 percent of the market value of the cost of the land (New Era, 1988) 
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1987a; 1978b Malla, 1997) and the case study show that these provisions are not effective to ensure 
tenancy rights. Rather, they are frequently altered, manipulated and locally negotiated. Therefore, land 
related acts are not able to guarantee the right of the Guthi tenants. They only give an ideal framework 
in which people have to negotiate. In practice, rhetoric (even precisely written legal texts) is changed, 
modified, and/or ignored by powerful actors. Tenants also attempted to use acts and regulations as 
resources for their land right but with less success. 
It is interesting to note that even if the land acts and regulations were not fully translated into practice, 
these provisions made a difference, affecting the behaviour of both Guthi owners and tenants. Both 
groups tried to use the law as a resource in their struggle and to legitimate their claims. Although it took 
a long time, the tenants eventually had success in getting their ownership rights based on their legal 
claim. The tenants would not have had ownership rights without the legislative provision. 
7.3.4 Role of time and context in conflict 
From the narrative description of the Guthi land dispute it is clear that the role of time and context was 
crucial to the emergence and transformation of the conflict. Whenever there is a flexible situation, be it a 
time of National Referendum of 1980 or the Popular Political Movement of 1990, poor farmers in general 
and the Guthi tenants in particular raise their voices against their exploitation. Similarly, the Guthi land 
conflict escalated and became the issue of bargaining at the time of local elections where the leader of 
the Guthi owners was a candidate for the post of the Head of the VDC. At that time he was more soft 
towards the Guthi tenants, made several promises to resolve the Guthi land.conflict and even committed 
himself to support Deurali villagers to obtain a loan from the Agricultural Development bank. However, 
after the local election such promises and commitments were not fulfilled and the villagers also became 
less assertive in raising these issues later. 
When the leader of the Guthi owners failed to collect rent even mobilising the police force and using 
threatening tactics, the landowners filed cases in the Guthi Corporation Office and Land Reform Office. 
He approached these formal organisations because his position was weak at that time in the village due 
to recent political change. If and when the influence of elite people in the village is strong they suppress 
their opponent villager's activities and do not allow them to seek a formal resolution of any conflict. But if 
the local situation is not in their favour due to specific circumstances (such as organised protests from 
the opponents, backed up by another powerful political party, political movement, etc.) they themselves 
take cases to a formal conflict resolution process. In most of the cases formal process are resolved in 
their favour as they are able to mobilise networks and use their special relationship with bureaucracy. 
The land survey and measurement became crucial in escalating as well as resolving conflict. The 
survey in the study district was conducted during the politically sensitive time when the former political 
system had just been overthrown. The stable (though unequal) power relationships in the village had 
been changed and mainly inexperienced, ambitious younger people were dominating the political scene. 
These politicians supported the tenants out of revenge against allies of the former political system. 
Tenants themselves overwhelmingly supported the multiparty democracy of the popular anti Panchayat 
movement and felt a strong stake in the new political system. Government staff from the land revenue 
and land survey offices felt insecure due to this political change because they had actively exploited the 
villagers, collecting bribes under the protection of politicians of the Panchayat. They wanted to ingratiate 
themselves with the new politicians by showing their loyalty and keeping their distance from the 
politicians of the past political system (though most of the government officials were strong supporters of 
Panchayat). The traditional locally based revenue officials like Mukhiya, Jimuwal were unhappy with the 
political change. They felt they were being humiliated, shown no respect and even threatened by the 
political leaders and workers of the new system and therefore their influence in the village at that time 
was insignificant. All these related factors worked in the tenant's favour in acquiring their ownership 
rights. However, supporters of the former political system soon joined one of the powerful parties and 
regained part of their lost power. Political change redefined the local power relationships and social 
system of the village. 
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It is interesting to note that an increasing number of conflicts were observed after the abolition of the 
partyless Panchayat political system. This was probably due to more freedom of expression in the new 
political system and ideological differences of the political parties. This shows again the importance of 
particular context and time factors in escalation or settlement of conflict. 
Cultural and social shaping of Nepalese society in general, and society of the study area in particular, 
especially up to the end of the Rana regime period (1950) and to a lesser extent up to the end of the 
Panchayat regime (1990) was guided by the process of Sanskritisation158. Essentially, it was a means 
whereby a subordinate group in society recognises the superiority of Hinduism by emulating its cultural 
practices. After changes occurred in the political context such influence decreased. 
Political attitudes and activities within the study area are influenced by the wider national political 
context. Therefore, not only disparities between the country's legal and regulatory framework related to 
land, but also political and power relationships are manifested in this conflict case. The complicated 
nature of negotiation, local initiation to resolve it, preference of disputants to go to litigation in court and 
finally return to a local level compromise were all shaped by the political nature and social power 
relationships. 
7.3.5 Issues of property rights 
When the Guf/w'land was tenanted earlier, there was no population pressure and therefore the land had 
less economic value. Therefore, the Guthl owner gave land to tenants to prevent loss of efficiency, as 
he was not able to cultivate it himself. In those circumstances, the issue of property rights was not as 
strong as when it was raised later. When government passed the Land Act, 1964 the property right 
issue became highly contested and debated (NPC, 1998). Nepal's present socio-economic structures 
show that land is the main property and source of income of Nepalese people. Due to the vertical social 
structure and a highly stratified economic condition local elite had earlier accumulated large portions of 
land. Some elite members, who were more spiritual and religious in nature, allocated part of their lands 
as Guthi using the earnings of the land in worshiping god and providing land for tenants to cultivate. 
Later, when the amended Land Act, 1964 was passed to eliminate dual land ownership manipulation 
was drastically increased. There are several loopholes and weaknesses in the land related acts and the 
Deurali Guthi land conflict is rooted in their manipulation. The whole dynamics of the Deurali land 
conflict, its spread to other conflicts and final resolution is centred on legal ambiguity, local power 
relationships and political manoeuvring. 
7.3.6 From litigation to compromise: Search for pragmatic alternatives 
In this case, the tenants were organised, better informed about each other's behaviour and were in 
constant interaction about the problem. They had effective communication and information networks, 
which helped them to organise strongly. The effective communication between them facilitated collective 
understanding and gave a feeling of group identity because of their common interests and intertwined 
relationships. The tenant group was strongly organised because it was absolutely impossible to go 
against the powerful elite on an individual basis163. It illustrates that the collective effort started within a 
social group in response to a collective need to regulate the allocation of land resource under conditions 
of scarcity. It is still a general tendency in rural Nepal that villagers are inward looking and suspicious of 
outsiders and outside involvement160 (New Era, 1988). Such an influential role of local leaders to resolve 
community level conflict is gradually changing with changing circumstances. 
, 5 8 Sanskritisation is the process by which a 'low" caste or tribe or other group takes over the customs, rituals, beliefs, ideology 
and style of life of 'high' and in particular, a twin-born caste (Caplan, 1970). This also gained constitutional support when Nepal 
was declared a Hindu State as the Hindu religion is strongly based on Sanskritisation. 
1 5 9 This is also reflected in the study of Wade in a South Indian village. He states "villagers will deliberately concert their actions 
only to achieve intensely felt needs which could not be met by individual responses" that is "they will straightforwardly come 
together to follow a corporate arrangement" (Wade, 1988:185-188). 
1 6 0 This situation is clearly reflected in the book entitled 'Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters' written by Bennet where she 
discusses the importance of local village leaders in conflict resolution. She states that "such internal solutions seem to be 
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One old tenant deeply involved in this Guthi land conflict said, "up to a certain extent I wanted to avoid 
going to court to resolve the conflict because of the complicated and expensive process and non-
objectivity. It is meaningless to go to a formal process because it is almost not possible to get justice 
there due to the heavy influence of money and favour, political loyalties, and personal relationships". His 
statement clearly reflects the suspicions and reluctance towards formal organisations involved in conflict 
resolution. Other villagers also frequently expressed similar suspicions and distrust. This is the reason 
that disputant villagers first approached certain respected local leaders and elderly people to mediate. 
This is a clear example of the forum shopping' strategy used by local people and the preference and 
mobilisation of certain institutions to resolve conflict. It is interesting to note that such mediators are 
always male or groups of men and generally from higher caste or social strata. They are locally called 
Panchbhaladmi (literally five gentlemen), Budhapaka (elderly men), Ganyamanya (counted among the 
honoured), and Gurupurohit (teachers and priests), etc. Earlier, most conflicts in study area were 
mediated informally by men who are regarded as notables (Bhaladmi). Bhaladmi achieve notability with 
age, wealth, and increasingly with education and are expected to be fair and impartial when hearing 
disputes, and to possess the influence to make the decision acceptable to all the disputants (Caplan, 
1970). 
The simple nature of land conflicts means that people firstly seek resolution at a local level and 
complaints and decisions are generally oral. If a disputants feel that they cannot get a fair hearing from 
the traditional local leaders or they are from the same political party as the VDC head and hopes for 
favour then they approach the VDC. If the parties in conflict suspect the decision of the VDC or the 
decision is not in their favour, then they approach the police, CDO, Land Revenue Office, and finally if 
all else fails the court. It was revealed that the VDC chairpersons and executive members were ignorant 
of the details of their official or formal authority and jurisdictions. They were not well informed about 
conflict resolution provisions envisioned in the Local Self-Governance Acts, 1998 and regulations. 
However, VDC secretaries were more informed and aware of these provisions compared to the elected 
representatives of VDCs. Only in conflicts concerning serious crimes and complicated land conflicts do 
people approach judicial bodies directly. 
In all common land related conflicts such as land inheritance and partition, boundary encroachment, title 
irregularities such as fraudulent sales, competing claims to the same land and registration of the title, 
local VDCs and institutions are not able to settle the conflict legally. The reasons for this inability, 
according to the lawyers and the judges, are the complex nature of land issues, on which these local 
organisations could not give a legal recognition. Many times the Land Revenue Offices themselves are 
actively involved in the land fraud and irregularities. One example of such a dispute is the registration of 
public land under the ownership of Balgram- (Children Park) in Pokhara to the name of an individual 
based on bribery (later the court ordered to cancel the registration). 
7.4 Conclusion 
Land conflict also embodies water, forest and agriculture, three of the most contentious issues in 
contemporary NR-related conflicts. Land in general and Guthi land in particular, in the study area is 
becoming an effective means to alter the feudalistic power relationship and effect wider social change. 
Land conflict is also a good source of illegal earnings for those people who have the authority to deal 
with it, as is clear by the prevailing corruption and bribery. 
Legally regulated land management under the Guthi Corporation Act was expected to promote socially 
beneficial effects, increase efficiency and effectiveness of Guthi land, give tenural security and increase 
incentives for investment in land improvement. However, this case demonstrated that Guthi land 
management measures are not able to meet these expectations and such optimism is still diluted by the 
powerful lust for land. 
common-indeed the elder men in the village say they can't remember a single case were villages actually went outside Narikot 
(a village close to Kathmandu) to the police or the government courts" (Rennet, 1983:8). 
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From the foregoing discussion, the picture emerges that a land reform programme provides 
mechanisms for the political and technocratic manipulation of lands for economic and political benefits. 
Given the economically and socially highly stratified Nepalese society, extremely skewed land 
distribution and the ambiguous role of bureaucracy it is very difficult for the poor and marginalised 
people to get benefits from such a land reform programme (Ghimire, 1992; Badal, 1999; Karki, 1999; 
Bista, 1991; UNDP, 1998, New Era, 1988). Rather it increases conflict and gives advantage to powerful 
people. The influencing of powerful people on the bureaucratic and judicial decision making process is a 
common phenomena where land-related conflicts have to be resolved. This means that it is unlikely that 
poor people will get justice or gain a feeling of security. Such a failure increasingly defames the 
credibility of the legal system of the nation state. 
The outcome of the adjudication process, especially the decision of the Guthi Corporation Office created 
insecurity and caused a feeling of injustice to develop among the tenants leading to their alienation. 
However, this is not only the responsibility of the surveyors or the Guthi Corporation Office. Surveyors 
had also faced difficulties such as excessive land fragmentation with ownership of numerous very small 
parcels of land, multiple claims and disputes, direct and indirect pressure from politicians and local elite. 
It would be therefore inappropriate to conclude that discrepancies and conflicts arise only as a result of 
the actions of surveyors and bureaucrats. The socio-cultural context, politicians and local people are 
equally responsible in promoting conflicts and discrepancies. None of the actors acted according to the 
legal system. Contradictions between the provisions relating to private Guthi land made in the Guthi 
Corporation Act, Land Act, Land Acquisition Act and Tenancy Right Acquisition Act created the core of 
the conflict in this case. These provisions were open to different interpretation, which led to various 
uncertainties and a failure to resolve the conflict. The land laws themselves fail to gain popular support 
and became another source of conflict. Institutional mechanisms were unresponsive in addressing the 
issues involved in the conflict. In summary, the impact of the formal legal system and administrative 
measures for the fair settlement of land-related conflict is minimal and they are even becoming a source 
of further conflict themselves. It is therefore not surprising that thousands of land disputes are pending 
in courts. It is relevant in this context to remember the popular saying in the law discourse 'justice 
delayed is justice denied' to the poor and marginalised section of society. 
Despite the availability of various acts and regulations, state instituted organisations and the focus of 
government policies and programmes on land reform in general and Guthi land management in 
particular, conflicts over land are increasing. It is safe to say at this point that conflicts related to land 
resource arise due to the disrespect or violation of an individual's jurisdiction in order to take over the 
rights and duties of others (Oli, 1998). One of the major sources of land conflict in Nepalese society 
stems from institutionalised massive corruption perpetrated by politicians and bureaucrats and inequality 
caused by widespread mass poverty (Ghimire, 1992; Oli, 1998). Despite the legal mandate of different 
organisations to effectively manage conflict, lack of commitment, competition among themselves to 
maintain their supremacy, bribery and corruption are ruining their performance. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that these organisations themselves are becoming the source of NR-related conflicts, instead of a 
means of their resolution. The Deurali land conflict is an example of such inefficiency. 
On a wider level the most desired political change of 1990 in Nepal has also done little to bring about 
much needed land reform for the vast majority of Nepalese people. Since 1990 all major political parties 
either in the form of majority, minority or coalitions have led the government but there has been very 
little change in the land reform and management system. There is a wide spread agreement that more 
effective land reform is urgently needed to reform agriculture and to transform society (to achieve the 
goal of social justice, poverty alleviation, gender and equity concerns) (UNDP, 1998; Ghimire, 1992). 
However, the lack of political commitment and willpower of the politicians and the poor performance of 
bureaucratic institutions threaten the prospects of land reform. 
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PART THREE: EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS 
AND LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE 

Chapter 8 
Learning about the Dynamics of Conflict in Natural-Resource Management 
8.1 Introduction 
In the second part of the book (Chapters four to seven), I discussed the empirical findings about 
conflicts, their interrelations and transformation patterns, uniqueness of NR-related conflicts and 
resolution measures. The empirical chapters in the second part of the book demonstrated that conflict 
resolution practices in Nepal are becoming increasingly inadequate and expensive to address NR-
conflicts. In this chapter I will analyse the reasons for this in reference to the objectives and research 
questions posed in Chapter one and the analytical framework discussed in Chapter two. In my 
theoretical and methodological approach to the research, I based myself on perspectives developed in 
legal anthropology and communication and innovation studies. A legal-anthropological perspective 
focusing on legal pluralism is used to analyse the diverse effects of laws in conflicts and a conceptual 
roadmap "derived from the social learning perspective is used to explore the scope for their 
improvement. 
I put forward the thesis in Chapter One that NRM in Nepal is facing several conflicts and challenges due 
to a lack of conducive policies and institutional arrangements, weak implementation of existing policies 
and regulations, rampant corruption, abuse of power and political interests. The economic motive of 
powerful people for irrational exploitation of natural resources (specifically land, water and forest 
resources) is another issue in promoting conflict in the community. In the context of this problem several 
efforts have also been made from both the formal and informal sectors to address these conflicts. This 
study has attempted to analyse these conflicts and the efforts to manage them. To explore NR-conflicts 
and their management practices, the research was carried out under a complex, multi-actor NRM 
problem context where multiple governmental organisations, NGOs and local powerbrokers were 
engaged in dealing with NR-conflicts by using various state, customary, religious and normative rules. 
The purposes of this study were threefold. Firstly, to understand and analyse the dynamics of conflict 
and its management practices. Secondly, based on the outcome of the first objective, to develop an 
alternative approach for community-level CM, if appropriate. Thirdly, to initiate a debate on conflict as a 
source of learning in NRM and agrarian change. To achieve these aims, three broad sets of mutually 
interrelated and complementary research questions were formulated. The first set of questions focuses 
on understanding the genesis, transfer and management of conflict. The second set particularly focuses 
on understanding the implications of conflict in NRM and society. The third set of questions attempts to 
develop an alternate CM approach, for future improvement of the NR sector, based on the findings of 
the first two. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the NR-conflicts and their management practices adopted in 
Nepal and provide the synthesis of the study. In this chapter I argue that most of the formal and informal 
CM practices, while resolving NR-conflicts, mainly favour powerful and resourceful people (cf. New Era, 
1988; Oli, 1998; Kaplan, 1995). In the following sections I analyse specific causes of conflicts, their 
management practices and specific factors affecting the process of conflict management. 
8.2 Understanding causes of natural resource-related conflict and their transformation patterns 
8.2.1 Role of temporal and spatial forces in the transformation of conflict 
From the analysis of conflict presented in the second part of the book I realised that conflict occurs in 
various stages. All five cases indicated that conflict starts with a stage of personal and social 
antagonisms over an issue (e.g., extension of canal, encroachment of communal pastureland, sharing 
of water source, location of intake and resource-use and establishment of water right over land). The 
same conflict enters into a latent stage at some point in time (e.g., lesser degree of antagonism). It 
enters an ignition stage at some particular time (such as the visit of the government's mobile 
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administrator in the pastureland case, the start of pipe laying in the spring water source case or release 
of money from the DIO in the ADB-funded irrigation case) and then escalates to the active manifestation 
stage. At some point in time it enters a stage of termination and reconciliation (as discussed in the 
spring-water source conflict, negotiation of the Guthi land conflict). Transformations of conflict from one 
issue to other issues (e.g., transfer of ownership right to extension of irrigation in the Guthi land conflict, 
political conflicts between local political parties) are common. Conflict can be transformed from one 
stage to another (latent to ignition to escalation to termination) in a cyclic fashion (e.g. in the Guthi land 
case) but most of the time its interlinkages do not follow a clear cyclic pattern. Analysis of causes of 
conflict show that their intensity and transformation potentials differ with different circumstances. Based 
on the discussion of the second part of the book, I have summarised the major causes of conflict. They 
are: a) opposing interests and divergent beliefs (in forest-pastureland conflict), b) lack of basic 
understanding or ignorance of interdependence between people and natural resources (as discussed 
with respect to general conflicts in Chapter Four), c) ignorance of relations of solidarity, sense of identity 
and belonging, relations of trusts, common rules and sanctions (in all five conflict cases) d) influence of 
social, political, cultural, technological and economic interests (ADB-funded irrigation case), e) 
differences in perceptions, work styles, attitudes, communication problems and social exclusion (general 
conflicts in Chapter Four), f) contradictory legal provisions and ambiguity over responsibility and 
authority, and g) vested political interest and monetary greed (both irrigation cases). In NR-conflicts, one s 
party wants to influence or control the behaviour of another party whose actions and counteractions are 5 
mutually opposed. NR-conflicts are endemic in every day life in Nepalese society where social < 
structures and power relationships play a crucial role. Though these social structures and power 
relationships favour powerful people they, in turn, are more disrupted by the escalation of NR-conflicts 
than ordinary people (cf. Sidaway, 1996). 
NR-conflicts are not only involved with the use of NR but are also directly related to or originated from 
policies, new technologies, laws and socio-political interests. Therefore, it is difficult to demarcate the | 
boundaries of NR-confllct. Nevertheless, a sociological approach of analysis of conflict (from the I 
knowledge of collective behaviour, social structures and institutions) combined with a psychological way ! 
of analysis (from the behaviour of individuals) greatly helps to understand the dynamics of NR-conflicts, 
even if there is no clear demarcation. 
8.2.2 Common interests as a basis for negotiation in natural-resource conflict 
All the cases presented seem to suggest that the elite's manipulation of NR-conflict has resulted in an 
increased ability of tenants and villagers to defend their rights, to protest against manipulations and to 
negotiate. An essential prerequisite for defending their rights and bargaining at negotiations was 'a 
common interest" framed under a specific context and time. Therefore, NR-conflicts are not necessarily , 
always socially irrational and dysfunctional and contribute to changing local social relationships and I 
helping to build the capacity of local people. 
8.2.3 Access and control of resources 
Chapter Three and all empirical chapters (four to seven) illustrate that access, allocation and distribution 
of NR were some of the major issues in conflict. Differential access and control, changes in access 
patterns and inequitable access frequently caused conflicts. Conflicts also arose about the fulfilment of 
obligations (application of rules and implementation of policies, resource mobilisation, and participation). 
Similarly, regulations and responsibilities of government organisations involved in NRM and 
manipulation by powerbrokers were central issues in creating conflict. The irrigation and Guthi land 
conflicts confirmed that bureaucratic inefficiency and manipulations had greatly helped to accelerate 
conflicts. Chapter Four also indicated that NR-conflicts between users themselves and between users 
and government agencies were frequent. These conflicts were linked to gender concerns, resource 
degradations, value differences (staff/bureaucrats v/s communities), insecurity (seasonal scarcity of 
resources), etc. New and expanded NRM projects (such as irrigation and drinking water systems, 
demarcation of forest boundaries, land measurement, etc.) have altered the existing resource use 
patterns and given rise to numerous additional conflicts. 
Chapter 8 138 
8.2.4 Interdependency and Identity 
All five cases have shown that complex 'interdependency1 and 'identity" are unique features of NR-
conflict. For example, tenants residing on the Guthi land had a special identity and economic base and 
therefore they engaged in a peaceful struggle with the powerful elite group to maintain this identity. The 
powerful elite members used locally available natural resources as a means to establish a stronghold in 
the village. Ordinary people in a community also use NR as a means for identity and survival. Therefore, 
the relationship between natural resources and people was shaped and reshaped by interdependent 
relationships in a particular context. Polarisation of economic and political interests between privileged 
classes and poor people and rapid changes in political and economic activities in Nepal has resulted In 
competition for, conflict over and encroachment of natural resources by various interest groups. It has 
also led to corruption. Whether it was a Guthi land conflict or spring-water source conflict or conflict on 
the extension or new development of an irrigation canal, ignoring this interdependency ultimately 
promoted conflict. The farmers-managed irrigation conflict, the forest-pastureland conflict and the Guthi 
land conflict cases illustrated that historical background, time and space were other important aspects of 
NR-conflict. During special periods of time such as an election or the restoration of democracy, conflict 
suddenly increases or in some cases conflicts may be resolved instantly. This indicates that the time 
factor and the specific context affect the intensity of conflict. This means that the life cycle of a conflict 
determines the management or resolution strategies. 
8.2.5 Property rights and ownership 
Ownership and property right issues were, among others, central concerns in NR-conflict. Contradiction 
of legal provisions, differences in legal arrangements and their actual applications, ambiguity over 
responsibility and authority of government organisations and unequal resource distribution greatly 
enhanced conflict over natural resources. With some justifications (such as historical or religious 
association and linkages) people may claim their rights over common natural resources. The 
pastureland conflict case shows that forest and pastureland was managed as a common property 
resource161 according to community norms and values. Members of a particular community exclusively 
shared the right of access, allocation and exclusion. The spring-water source case also illustrates that 
ownership, access and control of a particular natural resource lies with community members. The issue 
of rights to prior appropriation and riparian rights were strongly raised at the time of the extension of the 
farmers-managed irrigation system (construction of the new canal and the encroachment of forestland) 
(cf. Khadka, 1997). People also construct rights on the basis of their historical association (in farmers 
managed irrigation case) and cultural basis (spring-water source case). For example, the claim of the 
source-owner over water rights was based on the argument that the source was located on his land. 
Similarly the community's claim on ownership over pasture and forestland was based on historical 
association. In the farmers-managed irrigation system, forest and pastureland and spring-water cases, 
property rights were also claimed based on prior use. In the forest-pastureland case, it was also based 
on the investment of resources. In the fifth case property was established by payment of money. 
Changes in resource-use patterns (change in cropping pattern/systems, irrigation schedule, rotational 
grazing, etc.), changes in the mode of operational arrangements (land transfer to descendants, FUG, 
WUA, etc.) and changes in infrastructure (availability of new canals, forests, etc.) are all contributing to 
changing the rights of different groups and are bringing new conflicts in NR. 
The case described in Chapter Seven clearly indicates that the demand of farmers to register individual 
title emerged from their feeling that such titles would secure their right of ownership and give pride, 
dignity, identity and a source of livelihood. Such feelings are interconnected with local rituals, 
cosmovision and religious and spiritual meanings (cf. Regmi, 1978a). This continuous struggle of the 
tenants to establish their ownership was based on these feeling of security, rituals, and identity. For the 
tenants acquiring ownership rights over the Guthi land was the principal form of insurance against 
1 6 1 See Steins (1999), Berkes and Tanghi (1989), Ostom (1990), Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (1996), Torton ef. 
a/., (1998); Berkes (1996) for a detailed discussion about common property resources. 
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economic hardship and financial crisis as it was their only valuable asset, which they could sell or 
mortgage to get some money162. 
8.2.6 Ignorance of local specificity 
Natural resource management is the key interface between local knowledge/interests and scientific 
knowledge. Local knowledge and experiences are manifested in the day-to-day actions of villagers. 
Local knowledge can only be properly integrated with knowledge brought by external actors when NRM 
is accomplished in a collegiate pattern (Shfvakoti ef. al, 1996). As discussed in Chapter Six barriers to 
the incorporation of local knowledge/interests into the irrigation project implemented by DIO includes 
their social and political agendas and the professional and cultural background of the staff. The failure of 
this project is evident, irrigation technocrats having designed it on the basis of behavioural factors 
without allowing the involvement of local people. Needs, interests, knowledge and experiences of the 
local community were mainly ignored. This case also indicates that outsiders are often not adequately 
trained to recognise and deal with unacknowledged professional and cultural agendas, which may 
underlie interactions between outsiders and a community. The formalised, mandatory process of co-
ordination between the actors involved in the irrigation project was lacking. Formal intervention in the 
farmers' managed irrigation case has increased conflict because local rules and regulations were 
ignored and even replaced. Development interventions give rise to conflicts when villagers/users believe 
that their prior rights are overridden. Misappropriation of project assets intended to benefit the general 
public, was another point of contention in the study area. When the consequences of intervention are 
not carefully considered by development organisations and when local ideological factors are not 
respected a subtle form of hostility increases, ultimately leading to conflict. There is a growing 
consensus that the creation of enormous NR related conflicts, related either to land, forest, water or any 
other natural resource, are due to external interventions based upon the hidden agenda and vested 
interests of external actors (Kaplan, 1995; New Era, 1988; Oli, 1998). As has been observed from the 
farmers managed irrigation, ADB-funded irrigation project and the Guthi land conflict cases, privileged 
classes take more advantage of government initiated NRM programmes and this often creates social 
conflict. For example, the ADB-funded irrigation project created a vicious spiral of discord and initiated 
several conflicts in the village. In the Guthi land case, it is not surprising that the relationship between 
the land registration/reform process and conflict is indisputable and that land-measurement favoured 
powerful people. 
8.2.7 Technological intervention 
Technology is one of the important causes of natural-resource related conflict especially when external 
development interventions introduce new and sophisticated technologies, incompatible (in terms of 
skills, knowledge, financial resource requirement, etc.) with the local situation. The technology used in 
the ADB-funded irrigation system was one of the major sources of lasting conflict in the community 
because it was expensive, required a lot of external input such as cement, construction tools and local 
people had no knowledge or skills to work with the new technology. Properly designed/created 
structures and institutions (either by resource users themselves or external intervention) and a 
combination of new technology with local knowledge and experiences encourage people to work 
together. Physical structures (such as a intake of a canal, canal damaged by flood and landslides, etc.) 
not only create conflict but also inspire people to work together and encourage them to carry out regular 
monitoring. The faulty design of NRM projects is a strong source of conflict. There is a strong 
relationship between the technical design and the organisation of users to create and or resolve NR-
conflicts. 
1 6 2 Nevertheless, this insurance function of land is making the vast majority of poor people landless (Ghimire, 1992; Blaikie ef 
a/., 1983) because landlords give money for a mortgage with extremely high interest rates. When the borrowers cannot repay 
the loan the landlords foreclose and take possession of the land. There is not sufficient protection from such foreclosure by rich 
and powerful people because the judicial system is under the influence of the political establishment. It is too costly for poor 
people to access and more importantly they have no faith in the fairness of the judicial system (Kaplan, 1995; Ghimire, 1992; 
Bhatiya, 1997). A land-related study in Africa by Platteau (1996) also demonstrated a situation similar to that in Nepal. This 
means that such manipulation of the land is a common characteristic of developing countries. 
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8.3 Understanding conflict-management options and procedures 
Unless the conflict is linked with other destructive structural causes people involved in NR-conflict do not 
opt for violent action. The degree, intensity and violent effects in NR-conflict are less than in ethnic and 
other violent conflicts. People involved in NR-conflicts, especially conflicting parties from the same 
community, are generally accommodative. Wherever possible they adopt a tolerant strategy rather than 
one of confrontation and therefore demonstrations, active sabotage and violence are not common in 
NR-conflicts in villages. They first opt for accommodative methods (bargaining, negotiation, etc.) and 
make the utmost efforts to prevent confrontation. If the conflict remains unresolved, then they approach 
their preferred political parties before seeking legal measures. In the study area conflicts were mainly 
resolved locally. Religious ceremonies and festivals such as marriages, worshipping, and public 
gatherings in Dashain and Tihar, Chautari and hatbazars, etc. were common forums to discuss 
problems and in most of cases reach a consensus or majority decision on specific options. Outcomes of 
these resolutions could be both permanent and temporary. NR-conflicts also resulted in creating new 
institutions (e.g., mediation groups, protection committees, tripartite committees in UAIS, etc,) and 
physical structures (e.g., construction of other small irrigation canals, alternate grazing provision, etc.). 
Local people have several options to settle conflicts, and they pursue a particular one based on their 
faith and knowledge about them. Settlement of NR-conflicts (especially land-related conflicts as most of 
the lands are occupied by landlords) is shifting to the formal legal system and official litigation 
proceedings, which are more advantageous to resourceful people. 
From Chapters five to seven it became clear that endurance (wait, let things mature, gain value and 
resume negotiation) was a common feature in NR-conflict. Such endurance replaced stagnant inaction 
with constant, persistent and creative efforts to resolve the conflict (cf. Pendzich, 1993). The spring-
water source conflict case shows that parties involved in conflict have creative ingenuity rather than 
passive complacency. Such ingenuity and endurance also generated local mechanisms (e.g., 
Sangarsha Samiti, Mediation Group) and enabled local people to work together in order to manage NR-
conflict. Willingness of users to develop the forest, get drinking water and irrigate their fields were 
important motivating factors to initiate collective action. They have generated mechanisms for firm and 
persistent efforts to make the best from the conflict situation. Their adaptive management strategy to 
learning from the process was successful in seeking new ways of managing natural resources (cf. Lee, 
1993). 
The analysis of conflict management practices adopted by formal (operating according to government's 
regulatory provisions) and informal (operating according to local arrangement with or without following 
government regulations) organisations/individuals brought an important question about their 
effectiveness and credibility. Empirical chapters clearly indicated that both practices are 
methodologically inadequate, economically expensive, administratively difficult, pro-elite (biased) and 
structurally inaccessible to poor people. Nepalese formal CM practices (except VDCs) are biased in 
favour of power centres and entangled in pervasive corruption. They are the product of a long history of 
social stratification, cultural tradition and undemocratic political processes and tend to discriminate 
against powerless and vulnerable people. However, some hope can be placed upon the emergence of 
local organisations such as the FUGs, WUA, local NGOs to deal with growing community level NR-
conflicts in Nepal. The redefined role and willingness of VDC is another emerging area of hope. Poor 
people have started to raise their voice in VDCs. Since 1990, VDCs are becoming more responsive to 
the concerns of local people in order to win their vote in periodic elections. In managing community level 
NR-related conflicts these local organisations have demonstrated that they can mediate, negotiate and 
manage conflict far better than the state machinery. 
It is observed that in an informal CM process disputants first go to local negotiators (generally local 
leaders) to make an oral complaint naming the wrongdoers and presenting evidence. The negotiators 
then summon both parties to present their evidence and witnesses in the presence of villagers at a 
public hearing. The negotiators then render an "on the spot" decision based on the testimony and other 
evidence. Such decisions may be compensation in cash and kind, a fine, a public apology or a warning 
or referral to the CDO, police or court. In some conflict cases there may be no concrete evidence linking 
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the defendant to the wrongdoing and only tenuous circumstantial evidence which may not work in court 
proceedings. Legal procedure and rules of evidence do not restrict local negotiators, who know the past 
behaviour and present actions of the conflicting parties, to make local negotiation ways. From a 
pragmatic point of view, even though evidence is obviously important in investigating truth in a conflict, it 
should not be the single determining factor for its fair resolution. 
In formal CM practices the decisions made by the formal bodies are, at least in principle, enforceable 
through legal provisions. However, as shown in Chapter Four most of conflicts that are resolved through 
informal processes are not always enforceable by legal provisions. They are however subject to 
daunting social sanctions to those who disobey the resolutions. The cost of disobedience could be 
social disapproval or ostracism or a threat to testify against that party in future proceedings. When the 
conflicting parties realise that villagers will testify against them they generally comply with the local 
resolution. This arrangement is helping society to manage several conflicts locally. To give importance 
to local relationships and accommodate differences, villagers used a cultural legend "Des ko deuta 
bhanda gaon ko bhut kamlagchha" (Ghost of own village is more useful than the god from far distance). 
When external intervention occurs, new rules, regulations and procedures, which replace, ignore or do 
not give sufficient attention to local norms, values and rules ultimately create conflict in society. 
Societies have developed procedures based on local values and beliefs to resolve conflict. Local 
conflict-management practices (Chapter Four), which are accessible to all members of the community 
and in which local people have confidence are based on these procedures. Nevertheless, such local 
community based practices have some inherent weaknesses because their resolutions generally favour 
powerful people in the village. Weaker sections of societies (women, minorities, powerless, etc.) in 
many cases get fewer benefits from the solutions offered by these practices. Written documentation is 
also lacking in these practices and they are not able to deal with conflict related to new technological 
issues. Therefore, conflicting parties engaged in NR-conflicts do not depend only on local CM practices. 
They approached both informal and formal forums if they were favourable. Political forums are actively 
used in conflict. Local political parties want to be involved in conflict resolution so as to convince 
conflicting parties that they should vote for them in any election. All five cases demonstrated that parties 
in conflict used several formal and informal forums instead of relying on a single forum and a unitary 
method of conflict resolution. In the recent past, the frequencies of middle level people going to district-
based formal forums for the resolution of conflict is increasing. Poor people are still reluctant to 
approach district-based forums. Ordinary people only opt for litigation when the conflict is serious and 
has lasting consequences such as land inheritance or when one of the parties in the dispute wants to 
take revenge on their opponents. To take a conflict to the courts or to any formal legal process is mainly 
interpreted in the village as being for revenge, rather than seeking justice. This is because more affluent 
people often take the conflict to a formal process in order to force their opponents to surrender to them. 
Powerful people often start a formal process (or threaten to do this) to justify their importance in the 
community and validate their act in the village. In most villages there are professional troublemakers 
who start legal proceedings in false cases just to punish those who do not respect or satisfy them. The 
aim of these professional troublemakers is to gain financial rewards (cash or kind), to punish to those 
who do not follow them and to raise/maintain their social status. They have good networks and 
relationships with politicians and government officials in the district, and are well aware of the legal rules 
and procedures as well as having strong personal relationships with lawyers. By using these privileges 
they are able to manipulate conflict cases to their benefit. 
Several conflicts in the study area are not completely resolved, but are managed to keep the situation 
working. After some time many such conflicts transform to other forms (e.g., the Guthi land case conflict 
was linked to irrigation, the forest and pastureland case conflict was linked with the spring-water source 
and exploitation of Mukhiya). Chapter Four demonstrates that transformation of a conflict from some 
specific issue to a more general form is more common (e.g., water to land to social conflict) than the 
reverse (broad social to specific NR-related conflicts). Most of the conflicts begin with resources use 
(access to, control over and exclusion) and become linked with other social and political conflicts. 
Vested political interests overwhelmingly influence them. They are also occasionally linked with issues 
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such as; lending and borrowing, family feuds, wifch-hunts, molestation, alcoholism, crops damaged by 
animals, and casting of votes to a particular political party. 
The organisational culture of organisations working in NRfvl has contributed to creating and or resolving 
NR-conflict (e.g., culture of irrigation technicians, foresters, land surveyors and contractors, culture of 
organisations in treating political leaders differently than the general public, etc.). It is observed that 
there is no proper interaction between the authority deciding the conflict case and the parties involved in 
the conflict because of a feeling of supremacy and associated authoritarian behaviour. These 
organisations have their own preconceived ideas, interests, priorities and procedures that govern the 
conflict resolution process and ultimately the outcome. 
All five cases indicated that conflict management involves various diagnostic processes, decision 
making procedures, interpersonal efforts, argument tactics and negotiation options (cf. Hellriegel ef a/., 
1999). Emotional behavioural responses of people engaged in NR-conflict do not generally ignore any 
negative consequence while dealing with conflict. Potential negative consequences become secondary 
when conflict becomes severe as in the farmers managed irrigation case. In such a case, distributive163 
bargaining (competitive, zero sum, win-lose) is more common than integrative negotiation. The decision 
making process and its outcome also affects the behavioural responses of the parties involved in 
conflict. As discussed in Chapter Four local conflict resolution decisions are more socially endorsable in 
a community. People were less assertive in endorsing decisions made by formal organisations 
compared to local decisions. Similarly, powerful people are less likely than the general public to respect 
decisions of formal litigation. The major options used by actors to manage conflict in the study area are 
summarised below. 
8.3.1 Compromise 
Compromise was one of the most common options used in managing NR-conflict in the community. 
Compromise is a trade-off between disputants to manage conflict. Disputants feel that they have to 
relinquish something but socially their position is strengthen (Warner and Jones, 1998). In this option 
the continuing relationship with the other party is valued. Compromise in the forest and Guthi land cases 
demonstrated that when there are normal relationships between the disputants the outcomes of conflict 
resolution are mostly win-lose. Requesting, manoeuvring, pressuring and demanding are commonly 
used strategies in this option. This option can enable disputants to be advantaged if no agreement is 
reached. 
8.3.2 Collaboration 
Collaboration was one of the options used in resolving NR-conflict in the community. The spring-water 
source case is an example of collaboration where people's behaviour became assertive at a later stage 
to bring about a win-win situation and maximise joint outcomes (cf. Warner and Jones, 1998). In this 
case conflict was utilised to create better resolutions (e.g., collection of wastewater in the tank at night, 
exploration of alternate sources for larger drinking-water scheme, etc.). Parties in conflict using this 
option perceive that both groups are benefiting. Sharing, examining and assessing the causes of the 
conflict is a prime action in this option to create alternative resources/solutions. Psychological feelings to 
maintain the interpersonal and social relationships push the disputants to collaborate (spring-water 
source case). The degree of collaboration was less in the resolution of the grazing land, AFfvllS and 
Guthi land conflicts. 
m In a distributive situation there are fixed resources to be divided so that the more one gets, the less the other gets, therefore, 
one party's interests opposes the others. The concern in this case is to maximise one's own interests by manipulation, forcing, 
and withholding information. In contrast, in integrative bargaining (collaborative, win-win or creating value) the main concern is 
to maximise joint outcomes through co-operation, sharing information, mutual problem solving and creating resources (develop 
feelings that they have greater value than before). 
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8.3.3 Withdrawal 
Withdrawal is basically an avoidance option for those parties who prefer to avoid confrontation. Chapter 
Four shows that disputing parties mainly used the withdrawal option, to prevent the worsening of 
personal relationships. Powerful people use this option over powerless people to maintain the existing 
status quo. They benefit more by withdrawing their claim and showing they can be humble to poor 
people. Powerless people often use this option because they fear defeat, as they feel unable to 
compete with powerful people (feeling of helplessness). Pressuring, threatening, and entreating are 
common methods used in this option. 
8.3.4 Force 
Force was one of the options used in the study area, which is coercive by nature and largely based 
upon power, linkage and afnomanche. In the pasture and forest conflict the powerful Mukhiya used 
physical force to threaten protesters and in the Guthi land conflict the landlords used the police force 
against their opponents. Both cases indicated that the use of force develops deep feelings of injustice 
that prevents co-operation and disputants look for revenge when the power relationships in the village 
change. However the amount of force used was limited and in most cases people were tolerant and 
opted for other options such as withdrawal, collaboration and compromise. 
8.4 Understanding the factors influencing conflict management practices 
In this study I found a myriad of factors that contributed to the creation or resolution of conflict. They 
were: political interests, power relationships, bureaucratic influences, laws and regulations, 
government's policies and strategies, corruption, the influence of local social structures, customary 
norms and values, leadership quality, gender relationships and differences in understanding/perception. 
I also observed the intimate connection between conflict and communication, information and their inter-
linkages in the resolution or escalation of a conflict. Among them the following factors are identified as 
the most crucial in NR-conflicts and their management practices: 
8.4.1 Top-down linear perspective 
From the beginning my thesis maintained that NRM in general and conflict management in particular, in 
Nepal are mainly looked upon by government, policy makers, planners, donor agencies and politicians 
from a reductionist and linear perspective. I have argued throughout the book that NRM is neither linear 
nor single discipline based. Rather it is complex and requires new practices and processes, which 
provide forums for collective learning and concerted action (Roling and Wagemakers, 1998). My 
arguments on the failure of Nepalese NRM policies and strategies are a lack of understanding of local 
perspectives, lack of coherence in policy and legislative provisions, lack of commitment and devolution 
of power (cf. Pandey, 1998; Dahal era/., 1999). These weaknesses are the important sources of NR-
conflicts. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that integration of local perspectives and learning from 
local experiences is weak in contemporary CM practices in Nepal. All the cases detail that conflicts 
between community and external interventions in NRM projects were exacerbated by the ignorance of 
local interests and manipulation by powerbrokers. Chapters Three and Four put forward evidence that 
the existing formal CM practices in Nepal are mainly relied on by the police, local administration and 
courts and they are lengthy, slow, costly and inaccessible to poor and marginalised people. 
8.4.2 Formal and informal laws 
The role of law has been a central concern in CM practices and its fair execution in Nepal is a highly 
debatable issue. Law in the context of conflict is used as a fundamental resource to negotiate conflict 
(Benda-Beckmann etal., 1997). Exercise of laws and regulations dealing with conflict takes place in a 
specific context and they are only one among many conflict resolution measures. The contradictions 
and inconsistencies between different formal legal and policy provisions have caused several problems 
in implementing NRM projects (Chapters Three and Four). Therefore, the co-existence of different legal 
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forms has diverse implications for NR-conflicts. The fifth case showed that though a formal land-related 
legal arrangement had good intentions, its abuse by the influence of power at the time of its execution 
caused insecurity to tenants instead of providing security. Powerful people (forth and fifth case) were 
able to manoeuvre formal regulations. This stresses the point that whatever promises are made in 
legislation they have to actually be transformed into practice to give justice. Both irrigation conflict cases 
show that development interventions were based on a formal legal framework and they either ignored or 
undermined the local context. This not only enhanced conflict in the village but also promoted misuse of 
resources as shown in the farmer-managed irrigation and Guthi land cases. It can be seen from the 
spring-water source conflict case that people make local rules themselves, modify existing ones and 
maintain these rules with specific interests, what Moore (1973) describes as a 'semiautonomous social 
field'. In the context of conflict, laws therefore should not only be understood as those laws, which are 
recognised and enacted by the state, but also as the rules operated in a semiautonomous social field. 
This demonstrates the important role of legal pluralism in studying conflict in society. 
Legal CM practices were often based on the belief that legal mechanisms are the only appropriate 
means to resolve conflict. Formal CM practices commonly view local people as conflict creators and the 
legal institutions as the solutions of these conflicts. As indicated by both the forest-pasture and Guthi 
land cases implementers of legal intervention assume that legal enactment forces people to resolve (or 
hide) conflict by threatening punishment. They also interpret law as an ultimate instrument for social 
engineering, an effective means for homogenising a heterogeneous society and resolving all conflicts 
(cf. Nader and Todd, 1978). However, the important question is how laws are translated in reality. For 
example, irrigation regulations in Nepal grant legal recognition to water-users groups as autonomous 
entities and envisage the rights and duties of users. In reality, as discussed in Chapter Six, these 
provisions are not properly translated into practice. Similarly, implementation of a full cadestral survey in 
Nepal was aimed at developing effective land related information system and minimising potential land 
conflicts. Empirical evidence suggests that conflicts were increased by the survey. Enacting more laws 
and imposing more regulations does not always change people's behaviour. Such legal engineering is 
only one aspect in shaping people's behaviour. The Irrigation Sector Support Project had clear criteria, 
rules and norms to implement ADB-funded irrigation projects. But they were interpreted and modified by 
implementers based on their own interests. 
From this study it can be argued that the existence of legal rules and principles does not necessarily 
always shape the behaviour of people. These rules and principles can be relevant only when people 
respond and behave accordingly (Benda-Beckmann ef a/., 1997). Many people rely on legal rules or 
look for a legal basis to legitimise their claims when NR rights become problematic or contested. In this 
situation disputing parties generally look for different options. Either they want to justify their claims with 
formal authority (i.e., the court, police, and local administration), who usually decide such complaints by 
reference to legal principles, rules and procedures. Alternatively, disputing parties move to a more 
informal but socially recognised institution or forum such as the Mukhiya, Jamindars, and priests and 
village headmen, who negotiate such disputes on the basis of customary norms and local practices (cf. 
Spiertz, 2000). The interpretation of laws by authoritative experts (for example, judges, administrators, 
project personnel, etc.) was different from local people. Such differential interpretations become a 
powerful means for promoting or defeating specific interests. From the discussion with lawyers and 
observations of case proceedings in court it became clear that the Arbitration Act is not contributing to 
NR-related CM. Section three of the act severely limits the scope for making arrangement that any 
disputes under contract or agreement are resolved through arbitration. Community level NR-related 
conflicts are not falling under any bilateral or multilateral agreement. Therefore this act is practicably 
inapplicable to dealing with NR-conflicts. 
From the analysis of the empirical material in Chapter Four (which deals with general conflicts and their 
management practices in the study area) it is realised that costly, lengthy and unfamiliar procedures are 
a disincentive to pursuing disputes in the formal system. This is further exacerbated by political bias and 
source-force (Khadka, 1997). The picture that emerges from this argument is that a broader reform is 
needed of the legal system to make it more flexible, accessible, cheaper and faster to ensure fair 
justice. 
Learning about the Dynamics of Conflict in Natural Resource Management: 145 
8.4.3 Caste, ethnicity and social relations 
Caste/ethnicity is an important factor in conflict. People from a higher caste and social strata (e.g., 
Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar) prefer to conceal conflict (created by their vested action) instead of going 
to the court or semi- judicial organisations. They opt for a formal process only when they are sure that 
the outcome will be in their favour. People from low caste/ethnic groups and from lower social strata 
generally prefer not to go to the formal process because it costs money, hampers work, requires time, is 
an unfamiliar procedure and they doubt the fairness. Even when lower caste people occasionally want 
to approach formal organisations for conflict resolution, they are not able to do so independently. They 
have to take help from political leaders of their party, local teachers, etc. If both conflict parties are 
similar in their status but they are from different political parties, conflict is more likely to become 
intense. Comparison of the influence of caste/ethnicity and socio-economic status of people involved in 
conflict, shows that people from lower socio-economic status, irrespective of caste/ethnicity, suffer more 
from exploitation and manipulation. Even poor people from a higher caste suffer more from manipulation 
by rich and powerful people of a backward ethnic status. In a conflict, the socio-economic status is more 
important than caste/ethnicity in manipulating the situation. 
Local social relationships have great bearing on conflict and its management in a community. As 
discussed in the Chapter Three, there are some exclusionary social institutions164 in Nepal, which 
promote unequal social relationships and the partitioning of specific cultural, economic and political 
processes in relationship to particular social groups. They even inhibit democratic values and the 
enhancement of human capabilities and constitute a social liability. The empirical evidence indicates 
that there is distinct lack of interaction between government staff working in offices responsible for 
handling NR-conflicts and poor people. However, these staff have strong relationships with powerful 
people, local elite and politicians. Staff of these organisations (including staff of DDC and VDC165) play 
crucial roles in resolving conflict and such resolutions are greatly affected by the aforementioned social 
relationships (Chapter Seven). The farmers-managed irrigation system, forest-pastureland and Guthi 
land conflict cases show the mode of interaction and relationships between power brokers and poor 
people. These cases indicate that there is a better interaction between VDC members and poor people 
as compared to the bureaucrats. Poor people have no access to government bureaucracy. If poor 
people want to establish a relationship with bureaucrats they mainly have to go via power brokers or use 
other means (bribery, afnomanchhe, etc.). In such cases manoeuvring by bureaucrats and power 
brokers is common and they consider such relationships as normal. However, such relationships and 
influence uphold, recreate or even exacerbate social deprivations and maintain unequal power 
relationships. 
When the state established several NR-related agencies equipped with authority and responsibility and 
armed with a diversity of policies, rules, and regulations an unequal patron client relationship was 
generated. As examined in Chapter Four several conflicts emerged due to the contradictory roles of 
government organisations and ambiguous boundaries, which differed between traditional ones and 
those drawn up by government agencies. 
Conflict management in natural resources, as observed in the empirical chapters, takes place within a 
context of social relationships. Some groups gain more benefits using political and economic power, 
physical force and use of knowledge and networks in a conflict situation. A reciprocal relationship is 
found to be very important in resolving conflict. This reciprocity is a strong characteristic of local level 
CM when the parties in the conflict are equal in their strength. Horizontal social relationships are more 
favourable in resolving conflict than vertical social relationships. Economic relationships help resolve 
1 6 4Social institutions express the organisation of social, economic and political activity, which is followed by the majority of the 
members of a society. They include the family, the education system, a system of religion, a political and economic system and 
the more general patterns of community norms and values (Furtze and Stafford, 1994). 
1 6 5 DDC and VDC are the organisations headed by elected political leaders but with a strong influence of the government 
appointed bureaucrats. However, the role of bureaucrats in these organisations is not decisive, they manipulate the conflict 
situation using legal-procedural jargons, regulations and norms of government which are beyond most poor people's 
understanding. 
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conflicts but deals are made in a trade-off manner. Rich people provide cash and kind to poor people to 
influence the decision/outcome. Political relationships (voter-winner and party leader-member 
relationships), political structures (party units, positions as heads of wards, VDCs, etc.) increasingly 
dominate CM after 1990. A party specific ideological bias and political interpretation of all local issues 
are overwhelmingly creating wider gaps between individuals affiliated wit hdiff political parties and a 
confidence crisis in the village. The quality of the relationship, interpersonal relations, communication 
and information and social networks play crucial roles in CM. These relationships are based on a 
common set of expectations (e.g., to gain) a shared set of values (e.g., elite's characters), and a sense 
of trust between the actors (e.g., approach one's own party for the resolution of conflict). Even rural 
people use conflicts as opportunities to develop new relationships or strengthen existing relationships 
with political leaders, local elite and landlords to obtain financial and social benefits or to obtain public 
support in their favour. Local people also use conflict as an opportunity to bargain with political parties166 
for their nomination as a candidate for local election. The willingness of people to be involved in CM or 
to keep their distance depends on social relationships and the effects of conflict to them. 
Political relationships in the study area, which have a great impact on the negotiation process, now 
replace traditional social relations. The general public (except supporters of particular political party) 
suspects the role of political leaders in solving conflict fairly because of the differences in what they say 
(generally right things) and what they do (generally guided by vested/political interests as discussed in 
the farmers-managed irrigation, forest-pastureland and ADB-funded irrigation cases). The establishment 
of a political balance is now a new way of managing relationships in a village (this is reflected in all 
village level activities such as forming water and forest users groups). Some government staff are 
increasingly involved or are being forced to become involved in conflicts. Many village level conflicts 
related to NR were evolved as bilateral conflict (involvement of only two parties) but when professional 
troublemakers intervene these conflicts became multi-lateral and complicated. When this happens the 
real causes of the conflict are often sidelined. 
8.4.4 Power and politics 
Political ideology is a powerful variable in any social conflict, which influences the whole CM process at 
different levels. Power in a conflict can influence the outcome by the efforts of a few actors, contrary to 
the interests of the majority of actors (Liebert and Imershein, 1977). When power is mobilised in conflict 
resolution the result is mostly win-lose. The farmers-managed irrigation, ADB-funded irrigation and 
Guthi land cases clearly indicated that the use of power often creates a resentful, fearful and 
unfavourable attitude in a conflict situation. At present Mukhiya, Purohit, Pandit, Dhami-Jhakri have no 
formal authority and are not recognised by the formal law as such but in practice they still have an 
influential role in the escalation or resolution of a conflict at the local level. However, after 1990, the 
influence of feudal power has decreased and the patterns and forms of domination are being 
transformed to the party political process and being taking over by the newly emerged neo-elite group. 
Earlier, local elite people were rich and their domination was mainly based on economic parameters, 
socio-cultural values and religious status but now domination and manipulation are based on 
knowledge, information and political ideology. The resolution and escalation of conflict are greatly 
influenced by these power forms. Earlier cultural and religious power was stronger in the community. 
Conflict resolution was based on a religious framework. This was changed to an economic power base 
and negotiation and renegotiations of social actions were mainly guided by economic power. At the time 
of political change in 1990 the existing power base was heavily disturbed and physical force became 
more prominent in shaping relationships in the village. People were very afraid of possible revenge and 
physical action against them as a result of the freedom obtained from the restoration of democracy. This 
form of power base did not last long and changed to knowledge, information and political ideology 
based power forms (cf. Dahal etal, 1999). 
1 6 8 According to the election procedure in Nepal, 47 candidates for each VDC have to be first nominated by concerned political 
parties, if the candidate wants to contest the election on the behalf of a political party. There are strong interests of political 
leaders within the political party to nominate candidates of his/her favour, as the nominee, if elected, entertains resources and 
authority. When the political party issues the letter of nomination then the candidate can register his/her application to contest 
for the particular post in the election with the election commission. 
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In my discussions with Members of Parliament, Chairpersons of DDC and VDC and senior political 
leaders of various political parties, they accepted the increasing level of politicisation of conflicts and 
political interference in CM. They claim that intervention in a conflict by political parties/leaders is 
essential to ensure justice to poor people due to the failure of government organisations to give this 
justice. The forth and fifth cases have also illustrated how politicians influence bureaucracy to work in 
, their favour. Technocrats and bureaucrats are forced to consider that rural people are unimportant 
compared to powerful politicians167. Such a psychological perception in bureaucracy leads to a 
weakened functioning of organisations. Comparatively, political interference is reported to be less in 
courts and therefore the performance of courts in resolving conflict is said to be better than other 
organisations involved in dealing with NR-conflict. Regarding the political interference in conflict, an 
environmental activist from a local NGO explained that: "Political interference in development activities 
is a common feature. Local political leaders always interfere even in minor issues and manipulate for 
their political benefit. Many times leaders of different political parties forced us to direct our activities 
according to their interest but that was not possible for us. Then they blamed our organisation and staff 
as supporters of communists168 and created a very hard environment in our working area. Always 
politicians interfere in both GOs and NGOs to work in their favour". 
When people engage in conflicts in study area, they usually have allegiance to a political party. They are 
affiliated to one of the major political parties and are therefore protected from the potential risks. If by 
any circumstance, conflicts arise in the village, local political workers of major parties intervene for their 
political benefit, particularly to win the local election. Even many small issues become the source of 
conflict simply because the individuals involved belong to different political parties. Chapter Four 
outlined that many such conflict cases were resolved by local leaders before the local election on the 
condition that the contending parties vote for their candidates. 
8.4.5 Network and linkage 
Networking is an exchange of knowledge, information and experiences between different people to build 
an alliance to develop and implement specific work. Networks are both formal and informal and durable 
relational patterns that emerge as a result of these exchanges (Engel and Salomon, 1997). As 
discussed in Chapter Four people lacking networks and linkages suffered more than the people having 
a strong circle of afnomanchhe. The Guthi land owners, who had a strong network of powerful people 
and bureaucrats succeeded in bringing the decision of the Guthi Corporation and Land Reform Offices 
in their favour even when the tenants had already paid for the land twice. Networks became effective in 
handling the spring-water source conflict. Local networks also help to minimise betrayals, develop adjust 
to changing circumstances, enhance reciprocity and trade-offs and bring the conflict to the negotiation 
platform. The feeling of belonging to a particular category in the community psychologically helps people 
to make an alliance. As observed in the pastureland conflict case when interests and objectives of 
people came close to their common grazing problems a concerted alliance developed to collectively 
protest the pastureland encroachment. When stalemates or escalations of conflict occur, progression is 
achieved by establishing networks and linkages (spring-water source case). 
8:4.6 Corruption and irregularities 
Corruption is becoming an increasingly important factor in resolution of conflict in Nepal (cf. Kaplan, 
1995). Table 4.7 in Chapter Four clearly indicates that corruption is an integral part of formal conflict 
1 8 7 It is a very common practice in Nepal that when political leaders (especially from the ruling party) feel that bureaucrats are 
not respecting their instructions and not supporting them they approach a higher authority and transfer them to a remote area 
or a less beneficial sector. If bureaucrats are from the families or relatives of senior politicians they could prevent such transfer. 
Otherwise, they have to bear a sort of punishment for not working in favour of politicians. Hence almost all civil servants work 
according to the instructions of the politicians from the ruling party irrespective of the rules and regulations. 
1 6 8 A sweeping generalisation commonly prevailing in the political sector in Nepal is that poor people and the tenants belong to 
the communist category. This is because the manifesto of the communist parties is aimed at poor people and tenants who 
make up the vast majority of Nepalese people. These people generally cast their votes for the communist parties. 
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management practices. The use of bribes, mobilisation of afnomanchhe, use of political power and a 
combination of all of them were common methods used to win the conflict cases. Out of 50 respondents 
96 percent had used these three means to win the conflict cases. The lack of faith of local people 
towards the staff dealing with conflict management was reported to be caused by their arrogant, 
indifferent and corrupt behaviour (Chapter Four). The lack of collaboration of local people with the 
personnel of government agencies in the ADB-funded irrigation case was due to a lack of faith. No 
matter how professionally and academically competent they are, if they are entangled in corruption a fair 
resolution of the conflict is unlikely. The present widespread corrupt behaviour of a large majority of staff 
working in governmental NRM organisations has undermined the few co-operative, proficient, ethical, 
hard working, scrupulous and sincere bureaucrats and technocrats. The extension of the farmers-
managed irrigation system, invasion of pastureland, change of originally proposed intake in the ADB-
funded irrigation project and manipulation of Guthi land were all the reflection of corrupt behaviour. 
Chapter Four analysed the lack of trust, exacerbated corruption, the mobilisation of afnomanchhe, 
dualism and an absence of abiding by the law by powerful elite as common features of formal conflict 
management practices in Nepal. An important Inference I made from the observation of NR-conflicts is 
the risk of degradation of the natural resource base, social imbalance and inequality, if the state does 
not prevent corruption and abuse of rules and regulations by powerful people. 
8.4.7 Communication and conflict 
The media played a crucial role in escalating conflict. The first CPN-UfvIL government broadcasted an 
awareness programme against corruption and social inequalities from Radio Nepal. This programme 
caused the development of a strong negative sense towards malpractice observed in both the ADB-
funded irrigation project and the Guthi land conflict cases. It is widely said that the media in Nepal are 
not autonomous and operate under the political camps wiping out credibility, integrity and 
professionalism ((UNDP, 1998)). UNDP Human Development Report-Nepal 1998 shows that Nepalese 
media distorting communications by reporting biased news items to justify the actions of their political 
camps and to contribute to the survival of their patrons which ultimately promotes confusion, suspicion 
and conflict in the community. However, though biased towards the UML policy and programme, at that 
time the media played an important role in organising users and tenants to protest against the 
manipulative actions of Guthi landowners and WUC. 
Scholars of conflict have long acknowledged the central role of communication in conflict management 
(Folger and Johns, 1994). In case of the ADB-funded irrigation project, communication became 
ineffective in understanding the interests and objectives of the villagers and finally the communication 
system became dysfunctional. Similarly, specific language for communication (words, jargon, etc.) and 
discourses used by technicians in both irrigation and land conflict cases isolated villagers and became a 
source of conflict. By using such discourses politicians and bureaucrats established their strong hold in 
a conflict situation. The spring-water source conflict case clearly demonstrated that networks, regular 
meetings and discussions improved communication between parties involved in conflict and led to a 
win-win resolution. From the experiences of the cases it can be said that establishment of an effective 
interpersonal communication among the users is crucial to settle conflict because it promotes 
understanding, mutual interests and co-operation. Listening to others, understanding the views of 
others, identifying needs, interests, concerns and fears of disputants, getting agreement on rules, 
constructive discussions, creative problem solving and building relationships were important elements in 
the resolution of the spring-water source conflict (cf. Tearfund, 1998). As shown in the spring-water 
source conflict, interaction is an effective tool to seek common ground for negotiation. Regular 
interaction in specific issues often creates new ideas to resolve conflict, enhances self-assessment of 
local people and external actors, their roles, status and ability to generate solutions and promote social 
learning. This is the alternative way of managing conflict based on communicative rationality. When 
there is proper communication and information sharing, doubts, uncertainties and misunderstandings 
become clear and even if the outcome does not meet their expectations they are more likely to accept it. 
Conflict due to confusion and misunderstanding can be resolved by putting all the relevant information 
to the actors involved in the conflict. Distrust and feelings of exploitation and injustice can be minimised 
by improving communication. 
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8.4.8 Use and abuse of information 
Strategic use and abuse of information serves as a basic starting point for escalation or resolution of 
conflict. In the spring-water source conflict, the effective use of information served to develop a 
constructive relationship between the parties involved in the conflict. In contrast, in the ADB-funded 
irrigation conflict people fell into a pattern of mutually aggressive behaviour, hiding or twisting 
information to minimise the opposing party. As all the cases demonstrate the lack or misuse of 
information was one of the prime factors in creating conflict. From the analysis of all the five cases it can 
be generalised that one of the major causes of creation or escalation of conflict is a lack of correct 
information and manipulation of information by well-informed people. Similarly, language (technical 
words and jargon) is an important factor in conflict. 
8.4.9 Emergence of new local organisations 
On a small scale, local level community organisations are evolving as important forums and are working 
in participatory principles to organise people for their own benefit. These 'new institutional arrangements 
are emerging as community-based grass-root organisations such as forest users groups, water users 
associations, women's self-help groups, mother's club (Ama Samuha), small farmers' groups, etc. and 
providing a mechanism, whereby local people can participate in resolving NR-conflicts. Some of these 
local organisations are even expanding to the national level through their networks such as the 
Federation of Community Forest Users Group-Nepal, Himalayan Grass-root Women' Natural Resource 
Management Association, National Federation of Water Users Association, etc. Such community-based 
arrangements could provide local forums, promote accountability and a feeling of security to local 
people and create a safe and continuous space for negotiation. They could also play an important role 
in minimising political and legal manipulations, reducing fear and anxiety and avoiding the 
marginalisation of poor people. They demonstrate that institutional arrangements can emerge through 
institutionalisation of actor's practices when they become patterns of action and interaction. These 
institutional arrangements are the outcome of networks in which several people and users groups are 
organised for the common interest. It is a process of building relationships and creating interactions 
among users. These organisations are actively involved in managing NR-conflicts in their community 
and so far they have proved to be far better than formal CM practices. Even national networks of these 
organisations are dealing with governmental ministries and departments to establish their rights and 
identity. The roles of external organisations, in this context, have to strengthen such initiatives, instead 
of expanding their own regime, to provide sustainable and long-term conflict resolution mechanisms. 
8.4.10 Leadership 
Leadership seems to be a crucial factor in resolving NR-conflicts in the community. The role of elderly 
people in the second case to organise and guide the Sangarsha Samiti and the unanimous leadership 
role of the chairman of this forum as well as the successful leadership role of Mr Lai Bahadur 
Budhathoki in the fifth case distinctly exemplified the paramount importance of leadership in conflict. 
People who are willing to contribute as much as possible to resolve conflicts in favour of majority will 
evolve as leader (Chapter Four). Styles and strengths of leadership determine the quality and 
relationships between the conflicting parties. In the study area older, respected and trust-worthy persons 
mediated conflict effectively. Contending parties called upon them and in return they were honoured and 
their status was confirmed. Their judgements were usually followed, but they had no recourse except to 
moral persuasion of their fellow villagers. The capacity of local leaders to resolve conflict depends upon 
how group members listen and support them. The fifth case shows that to win the faith of the members, 
leaders have to be able to secure their interests and create a positive environment for interaction and 
collective action. The fourth case of irrigation conflict exemplified that if there is no strong leadership 
escalation of the conflict is more likely and it becomes more difficult to resolve. The spring-water source 
case demonstrated that leadership emerges from the context and local situation. It depends on the 
degree of organisation of users through appropriate facilitation by the support of neutral organisations. A 
carefully built interactive learning and action process facilitated by local NGOs became effective in 
resolving the conflict in the spring-water source case. When parties in a conflict perceive that their 
Chapter 8 150 
current problems cannot be solved without collective action, then this psychological feeling encourages 
them to engage in meaningful interaction and concerted action that eventually increases the possibility 
of resolution (for example, the Guthi land conflict). Basically motivation, behaviour and the context are 
responsible for escalating or resolving conflict in society. Change in the extension of the irrigation canal 
(context) affected the existing pattern of use of irrigation water in the head section and developed 
feelings of injustice and cognitive distrust that led to an aggressive response such as stopping the water 
flow in the tail section. Leadership plays an important role in such a hostile situation to keep conflict 
under control. 
8.4.11 Gender relationships In conflict 
My review of the literature revealed very little documentation on the role of gender in CM. However, in 
practice women play a crucial role in NR-related conflict resolution at the community level (cf. Upreti, 
1998b). Women's heavy involvement in NRM activities encourages them to become involved in NR-
conflicts and their management. User groups appear to be generally a more promising avenue for 
women's involvement in CM. Nevertheless, it is critical to consider the workload (increase or decrease) 
of women when participating in conflict resolution as women are already overloaded compared to men 
(Ghale and Gurung, 1998; Upreti, 1995). The gender relationship in a community is not, by any means, 
static. Gender relations in general and gender roles in CM in particular are often tightly associated with 
political, cultural, social and economic changes taking place in society. The spring-water source case 
has demonstrated that even when men have significant scepticism and resistance to resolve conflict, 
women take the initiative to enter into negotiations. The accommodative nature of women and their 
problems of fetching water were the motivation and interests of such an initiative. Little or no 
involvement of women in conflict management in the farmers-managed irrigation, ADB-funded irrigation 
and Guthi land cases indicate that men generally do not acknowledge and support women's 
involvement in CM, as the decision-making authority of rural women is limited. But women as members 
of society cannot be isolated from the wider social environment. However, it is hard to generalise the 
profound role of women in effectively managing conflict based on the success story of only one case. It 
needs further research. Based on the role of women in the spring-water source case, it can safely be 
argued that women's involvement in local CM practices provides ample opportunities and advantages to 
negotiate conflict locally. 
Women's involvement in local CM offers important advantages. These advantages are: a) women's 
active involvement provides a cheap and flexible means of conflict resolution to those women who have 
no resources to invest in a formal process; b) it helps to give justice to those women who are not able to 
express their feelings and problems to men due to cultural and other social reasons (Chapter Four) and 
c) equity and justice to poor and backward women increases if the problem is dealt by women as they 
are more familiar with the problems of women. Responsive CM needs sensitivity to gender aspects. 
Conflict can be effectively managed only when the CM process acknowledges the importance of the 
gender role. The low level of involvement of women in managing conflict in all cases (except the spring-
source case) indicates that rural women are socially constrained. Pervasive and deep exclusion of 
women has a direct bearing on their active involvement in social activities such as CM. Women were 
found to be more accommodative in negotiating conflicts locally than men in all socio-economic groups. 
The role of women in effective negotiation is mixed, effective in small and simple conflict but indifferent 
in big and complex ones. Building social trust and mutual understanding are important elements in CM. 
To answer the question why women are not actively involved in CM, one has to analyse the socio-
cultural construction of gender relations. A woman's life, according to the Hindu tradition, is incomplete 
without entering into a lifelong relationship with a husband (this is a very dependent relationship) and 
the separate independent identity of woman is not acknowledged by the Hindu cultural and religious 
framework (UNDP, 1998). Women are taught this from their childhood, which severely limits them 
having an image of the future as independent and equal members of society. In recent days, however, 
gender relations are gradually being reconstructed due to the constitutional assurance of equality, 
external pressures such as donors conditions and the influence of technology, access to information, 
NGO advocacy and women's initiation. 
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8.5 Wider implications of conflict 
Considering conflict as an opportunity in NRM helps to reduce existing conflicts, presents ways to 
prevent new ones emerging and provides for crisis management as and when conflicts arise (Walker 
and Daniels, 1997). Conflict over the role of external interventions gave lessons on social inclusion of 
beneficiaries in project planning and the CM process. It also indicated the need to bring disenfranchised 
actors and marginal people into the interaction for collaborative negotiations. By having 'pro-poor" NRM 
practices less exploitative forms of negotiation can be promoted at the local level. Finally, it can be a 
means to bring about an equitable NRM and responsive CM approach. After experiencing conflicts 
brought about by formal interventions in NRM, villagers became more aware of the misuse of resources 
and started to become actively involved in externally funded new development projects. Such 
awareness and participation of local people increased accountability and a feeling of ownership to 
achieve sustainable NRM. 
Conflict has also important impacts on land management and tenure systems in the study area. For 
example the intensity and frequency of conflict is more in the tenanted irrigated lands. Tenants with an 
insecure claim to the land they cultivate are generally unwilling to contribute to permanent capital 
investment in irrigation systems and land management as the landowners expect or even force them to. 
Due to such a conflict the proper exploitation and management of the land resource and ownership 
feelings over tenanted land are lacking. A conflict situation in natural resources forces local people to 
utilise the existing resources optimally or efficiently, create new resources or search for different 
alternatives. Some farmers after the irrigation conflict in the farmer-managed irrigation case started 
rainwater harvesting, off farm activities within the village and the majority of them seasonally migrated to 
other areas for employment. In the second case, people looked for an alternate management option to 
develop the community forest and protect it from encroachment, practised rotational grazing and set up 
an effective surveillance procedure. In the spring-water source case collective efforts were made to 
bring a large drinking water project in that area and effective rules were made to utilise water at night. In 
the forth case people explored several alternatives for irrigation such as the use of local small streams, 
collection of running water from natural water taps, change in cropping patterns and nature of crops 
grown and an alteration in the land use pattern. In the fifth case efficient utilisation of water available 
from the extended canal and a change in land use systems was observed. Productivity of the Gutfw'land 
was increased after the transfer of ownership rights. Because of conflict local people have developed 
coping strategies (e.g., stall feeding of animals after protection of forest area, exploration of alternate 
irrigation source and construction of small canal, change in farming systems, etc.). This also enhanced 
the resources use efficiency. All these are the innovative NRM practices adopted by farmers due to 
conflict. 
Every society establishes, maintains, or even changes its social values, principles and procedures. It is 
observed that significant correlation exists between performance of existing socio-cultural structures and 
conflict in society. Social differences such as ethnicity, economic status, positions have influenced the 
conflict situation. Before political intervention only males were overall decision-makers in NRM but later 
women also started to participate in CM and played important roles in decision making related to NRM. 
The ability of women to participate in meetings, sharing their opinions, expressing their concerns and 
putting forward arguments was increased (spring-water source case). In this way gender roles and 
relations started to change. Conflict had also created scope for interaction in articulation of goals and 
seeking solutions of the problems. In this process people examine existing social structures, 
organisations, power relationships, legal complexity and their own role within the society. This ultimately 
helps to develop their capacity and redefine their roles, leading to constructive resolution of conflict. 
Many of the NR-related conflicts are not possible to solve by independent individual efforts and require 
collaborative action. That gives opportunities to work together as seen in the farmer-managed irrigation, 
spring-water source and Guthi land cases (cf. Roling, 1996). That also helps to establish new 
relationships and modify behaviour. 
Grassroots organisations are evolving in the NRM sector together with NR-conflicts to address these 
issues. They are raising their voice to reform/democratise governmental organisations working in the 
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NRM-sector. The issues of corruption, transparency, accountability and efficiency are being frequently 
raised. In recent years VDCs are increasingly involved in conflict management. Poor people are 
approaching and starting to raise their voice with VDCs. Alternate resource generation (obtaining 
different NRM-projects such as drinking water, irrigation from outsider agencies, plantation of forests, 
rain water collection, etc.) is increasing in the study area. The capacity of the general public to raise ifs 
voice against exploitation by powerful elite is increasing. People are organising in different forums such 
as Shangarsha Samiti, Mediation Groups, and users' groups and participating in different capacity 
building activities whereby their level of confidence is increased. People directly involved in conflict 
developed a fairly good legal knowledge and confidence to deal with courts, the police and the district 
administration. Very exploitative economic relationships between local elite and villagers manifested in 
the form of Koseli (free gifts from their farm products) and Mukheuli (free labour service) to be given to 
Mukhiya have been stopped. The Patron-client type of social relationship in the village has changed. 
The pattern of communication and sharing of information is moving towards party lines and used as a 
means for political gains. In this way after these conflicts some quite substantial changes were observed 
in the study villages. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this section I am concluding the gist of the whole study. The central focus of this study has been to 
examine natural resource-related conflicts and their management practices in Nepal and their effects on 
NRM and society. This study started with a certain confusion, frustration and ambition. The confusion 
was how to research the complex and problematic issue of NR-conflicts. The frustration was for the poor 
performance of the conflict management system in Nepal. The ambition was related to achieving some 
pragmatic solution to effectively address community level NR-conflicts. From the outset, I have 
emphasised that conflict is increasing in natural resources and their management practices are 
becoming problematic in Nepal. Through taking an ethnographic approach, I was able to examine NR-
related conflict and local people's perception within a wider socio-political context. 
It can be concluded that the dominant formal legal conflict resolution processes widely practised to 
resolve NR-confiicts in Nepal do not recognise the local capability to resolve or manage conflict and that 
integration of new innovations in their conflict resolution process are lacking. A regulatory and legal 
framework narrowly guides them. Relationships of people involved in NR-conflicts with their biophysical 
and socio-economic conditions are important aspects but they are ignored in the formal resolution 
process. Technical knowledge and aspects essential to fairly decide the cases are lacking. If conflict in 
natural resources is to be managed in a more equitable and egalitarian way, the approach should be 
more flexible, diverse, not relying only on regulations, but also focused on collaborative action and 
experiential learning (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). Conflict resolution requires special mediation and 
arbitration skills and negotiation techniques for a higher degree of success. The effectiveness of CM 
and the achievement of sustainability of NRM depend crucially on the active involvement of actors in the 
CM process. To achieve that a people-centred, action oriented, learning-based locally available 
alternative approach is essential 
By looking at the dynamics of conflict, I came to the conclusion that there is no single form and model 
for handling NR-related conflict in the community. Rather it is a broad, dynamic and complex process 
constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances. So long as the present dominant 
methods of addressing conflict in the country continues, conflict will increase more in the future together 
with the expansion of development interventions. It became clear from both the empirical evidence and 
theoretical background that conflict is ubiquitous. Conflict, far from being static, is evolving under the 
pressure of growing resources scarcity, faulty execution of policies and procedures, excessive political 
interference and political, bureaucratic and administrative corruption. Conflict in NRM can be positive 
because its management or resolution often leads to creative options and innovation. When people are 
entangled in conflict they search for ways and means to change the situation. Protection of pasture and 
forest land, proper utilisation of the spring-source of water, exploration of alternate irrigation sources and 
rain water harvesting, the increased motivation of people to participate actively in externally funded or 
implemented development activities, securing entitlement and ownership of land in a non-coercive way 
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in this book demonstrated that conflict can be a stimulus for positive change and a source of learning. 
Such changes are more durable and acceptable in terms of resource management, social relationships 
and community organisation. Nevertheless, conflicts can also have serious negative effects. If not 
addressed timely and appropriately, it may deplete resources, affect psychological wellbeing and can 
result into anxiety, tension and resentment that ultimately damage social relations, promote violence 
and disintegrate society. 
By critically examining the existing Nepalese CM methods and practices, by exploring the weaknesses 
and areas of improvement i have provided some food for thought to reform the existing conflict 
management practices. The empirical chapters sufficiently demonstrated that accountability, 
transparency and effectiveness of the formal practices of CM are seriously undermined by their inherent 
characteristics such as feudalistic, elite-biased expensive and authoritarian modes of operation. Informal 
practices also favour powerbrokers. These are the most important reasons for their administrative and 
ideological reform. The ability of this exploration to generate discussion and debate among the 
Nepalese actors is for the future. I am aware that by critically examining the formal CM practices, I will 
be criticised. People who gain from these practices will be threatened and reactive. I believe, however, 
that constructive criticism generates discussion and debate and provides ample room for reformation. If 
such reaction and debate is generated one of the objectives of this research is met. 
I want to emphasise that management of NR-conflicts reflects complex dynamics that must be 
understood in order to design successful NRM interventions. Therefore, policy makers must look 
beyond existing policy and regulatory prescriptions to successfully manage NR-conflicts. If CM efforts 
are to be effective in managing natural resource and helping poor people to reduce poverty, then it is 
axiomatic that the CM approach needs to reconsider the structural and procedural limitations (e.g., 
access, time, legal complexity, etc.) and include powerless people in the mainstream CM process. 
Given the limited access to legal services and relevant information available to most poor people, the 
existing conflict management practices can not ensure fair justice to all members of community. There is 
a danger in assuming that the poor are getting justice by enacting laws and regulations. Clearly, giving 
effective justice to poor and powerless people requires great sensitivity to and respect for their voice, 
background, objectives and circumstances. CM practices to give justice to powerless people need to 
avoid imposing solutions developed in an ivory tower. 
The empirical cases show that NR-conflicts are complex in nature with enormously high transformation 
potentials (cf. Warner and Jones, 1998; Walker and Daniels, 1997; Yordan, 2000). The forest-pasture 
and the Guthi land conflict cases demonstrated that they- are also powerful catalysts to change 
established patterns of interactions, power relationships and social structures in the community. These 
conflicts influence social, economic and political aspects in a rural community (cf. Jandt and Pedersen, 
1996). NR-conflict were reflected in disagreement (spring-water source conflict case), hostilities (AFMIS 
case) and social or personal dislocations (ADB-funded irrigation project). NR-conflicts frequently 
switched to latent and active phases. Conflict management is a mixture of balancing political, social and 
legal power relationships (e.g., the Guthi land case) characterised by trade-offs and negotiations where 
weak groups of people generally encounter obstacles and difficulties. 
I conclude that Nepalese existing CM practices are not able to address growing NR-related conflict. 
Political influence and monetary power (corruption) have greatly contributed in making formal processes 
and practices fail to give justice to the general public (Chapter Four). Therefore, the existing formal 
conflict management practices can not be taken for granted, as an excuse not to analyse their 
weaknesses and contextual factors affecting their performances. The empirical cases in the study 
provide ample evidence for this. The question is how to make the inaccessible accessible and 
ineffective effective. It needs greater reform of administrative and procedural aspects of adversarial 
forums (e.g., police, NRM administration, courts, etc.) at the national level and promotion of the role of 
collective learning-based, context specific, locally operated alternative forums (e.g., local mediation, 
interactive negotiation, etc.) at the community level (actual practices). The administrative and procedural 
issues at the national level rest with the state. However, those who are intimately involved in dealing 
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with conflicts can implement the promotion of alternative practices at the community level. The final 
chapter deals with the role of ICM. 
Chapter 9 
Interactive Conflict Management: Future Directions 
9.1 introduction 
In the First Chapter I explained that one of my objectives in carrying out this study was to develop an 
alternative methodological approach to address community level NR-conflicts. The analysis of NR-
conflict presented in the empirical chapters demonstrates that conventional CM practices, both formal 
and informal, are inadequate to address community-based NR-conflicts. Due to their inherent 
weaknesses they are unable to resolve the ever-growing NR-conflicts. In this chapter I present my 
attempts to develop a learning-based and action-oriented method called 'Interactive Conflict 
Management (ICM)' to address community-based NR-conflicts in more accessible and practical ways. 
An account is given of ICM; its ideas and logic, need and relevance, implementation strategy and step-
wise procedure. I identify potential actors promoting ICM, its institutionalisation procedure and 
opportunities and challenges. In this approach I propose a three-tiered strategy to address NR-conflicts 
(preventive measures, actual management of conflict after occurrence and referral to legal options). I 
identify the determinants of success and failure of ICM and propose areas for future research in 
relationship to conflict management. 
There are two strong interconnected bases for proposing ICM as a practical method to address 
community-level conflicts related to NR. The first basis is the successful implementation of an ICM style 
of conflict resolution procedure by local NGOs in third case (and other similar success stories of local 
organisations such as FUGs). In the spring-water source conflict I have discussed how people gather 
together to discuss problems, how they trained to deal with conflict, what they did to develop mutually 
acceptable rules, how they sought the solution collectively and how they were able to manage conflict 
effectively. The second basis is my practical experience-based confidence in implementing such 
procedures. I have intensively used similar procedures in community-level rural development and NRM 
project planning. Mechi Hill Development Programme (MHDP), a community development project has 
implemented pro-poor focused and gender-sensitive development activities in three remote hill districts 
in eastern Nepal. The working area was very much power-skewed and economically and socio-
politically highly stratified. With the participatory need assessment, joint project planning and 
implementation, and process monitoring, community development/ NRM activities succeeded in 
bringing rural poor and backward people and women into the mainstream development process. By 
doing so, their needs, concerns and interests were properly incorporated into the project activities 
implemented in their communities. Well-trained community facilitators have implemented this process in 
more than one hundred villages. Targeted community members actively participated in various activities 
such as community planning, local resource management, conflict resolution, non-formal education and 
users group training. The important aspect of this process was collective learning from joint planning 
and action. The feedback and the lessons learnt from the first cycle were integrated in the next cycle. 
The contents, methods and process itself were continuously revised, based on the experiences and 
knowledge people gained from the action process. Although powerful people resisted at the beginning, 
they were ultimately supportive in promoting this process because they were also mobilised in the 
process. From these successful experiences, I am fairly confident that this type of people-centred, 
learning-based and community-led method can be one of the pragmatic alternatives to improve the 
performance of community-based NRM and effective management of conflict. 
9.2 Weaknesses of existing conflict resolution practices: basis for interactive conflict 
management 
It is not sufficient to state that formal practices are expensive and inaccessible especially to the weaker 
section of society and informal practices mainly favour powerful people (Chapter Four). The next step is 
to critically examine the practical bottlenecks, which make these existing practices expensive, 
inaccessible and power-biased before proposing an alternative. The important question is why are the 
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present methods not able to properly address community-based NR-conflicts and how do they differ 
from normative ideological bases to actual practices. One of the main causes of exploitation noticed in 
the field was related to the lack of knowledge of rural people about legal provisions and their legal 
rights. This knowledge gap led to an increase in ineffective enforcement of laws and misuse of legal 
provisions by elite and powerful people. If local people had proper knowledge about their rights and 
legal protection there would be less manipulation by the elite. In this sense legal knowledge is one of 
the important resources in dealing with conflict. Mediation, negotiation and facilitation skills were lacking 
in existing conflict resolution practices. The provision of proper information and communication with 
local people especially at the time of planning of externally funded NRM projects in their area was 
lacking. The willingness of the VDC, community based organisations (such as WUA, FUG, mothers' 
clubs, small farmers' groups, etc.) and local NGOs in resolving NR-conflict in collaboration with local 
people was constrained by a lack of practical CM methods. Interaction between district-based 
organisations working in NR-conflict and village-based resource users was lacking because of 
methodological limitations such as non-involvement of local people in any decision process related to 
CM. Positive aspects of local CM practices were not integrated in mainstream CM practices. People 
involved in traditional CM practices expressed a willingness to engage in interactive conflict 
management but they lacked the appropriate skills. The ability and willingness of women to resolve 
community level NR-conflict was shown in their active involvement in the resolution of the spring-water 
source conflict. The existing conflict resolution methods do not permit them to become actively involved, 
so excluding a large segment of society from CM practices. Formalities and technicalities of judicial 
processes are unfamiliar to ordinary people. The bottlenecks or constraints can be grouped into two 
categories when deciding the intervention strategy to resolve NR-conflicts. They are: a) Broader 
structural, legal and political constraints for which actions are needed at the national level. Reformation 
of bureaucracy, revision and enactment of laws, national policies and procedures are essential to 
overcome these bottlenecks. ICM has only little role in overcoming these constraints (although as 
people gain confidence they may demand the reform of these structural and legal constraints at national 
level) and b) Specific, locally based limitations and constraints in the management of NR-conflicts where 
ICM has a greater role to play. Many of the above mentioned bottlenecks are directly related to methods 
and can be improved through application of appropriate methods at the local level. Therefore, ICM aims 
to provide a method for community-level management of NR-conflicts. Nevertheless, this method may 
not be able to address all conflicts caused by different externalities or conflicts caused by the legally 
structured situations in a community. However it can certainly minimise a large number of conflicts 
caused by procedural and methodological difficulties. 
9.3 Conceptualising interactive conflict management 
Basic elements of ICM are derived from social learning (Roling and Wagemakers, 1998), conceptual 
basis of collective cognition (perception, emotion and action) (Capra, 1996) and adaptive management 
(Lee, 1993), as discussed in Chapter Two. Chapters Five and Seven clearly indicated the importance of 
collective learning169 and mobilisation of collective power of people to resolve NR-conflicts in their 
community. Their collective action led to the protection of grazing land, generated forest and established 
their rights against power-based exploitation. The forest and pasture and spring-source cases are also 
examples of collective actions for effective management and prudent use of local natural resources to 
meet the needs of the present, without affecting the needs of future generations. To scale-up such 
success stories, a learning based approach is essential. Interactive conflict management is a repeated 
'69 Collective learning is a new concept to deal with NR-conflicts, which draws on what is called soft systems methodology 
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990), an alternate way of learning and action. Collective learning encourages villagers and experts 
to learn issues in conflict and explore alternatives together to address them. Collective learning is transformative in nature and 
there is more emphasis on a process to make incremental improvements to mutual understanding for concerted action (Rôling 
and Wagemakers, 1998). Collective learning promotes effective listening and dialogue amongst all the parties. It essentially 
seeks to empower them and helps to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, to understand and 
analyse problems and use the outcomes to make informed collective decisions. Parties involved in the collective learning 
process acknowledge their strengths and limitations, goals and interests and construct solutions around their common 
understanding. 
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cycle of learning and action jointly undertaken by concerned actors170 such as VDCs, users groups, 
local NGOs, community leaders and the general public. The focus of ICM is to make conflict 
management forums easily accessible to rural people and to minimise dependence on adversarial forms 
of conflict resolution. Both the pasture and Guthi land cases demonstrated that when the stakes (e.g., 
interdependence, common threats, etc.) are high, collective efforts are increased. Success and failure of 
resolution of conflict depends on a fuller understanding of interdependence by people. The focus should 
be on the process of interaction to recognise such interdependence. Interactive conflict management is 
based on the realisation of interdependence. If this interdependence is not appreciated then 
interventions need to focus on enhancing the feeling of mutual interdependence (Leeuwis, 2000). As 
observed in the case of the spring-water conflict when people started to consider potential solutions for 
their problem, arrays of potential alternatives were formulated. The interaction process led to an 
agreement on rules for managing conflict. Such interaction in the spring-water source conflict helped to 
remove the sources of conflict before they escalated to severe disputes. The important bottom-line in 
CM is to manage conflict in an effective and efficient way, not to suppress conflict and not to let it 
escalate out of control (Smith, 1997; Drew et a/., 1997; Vayrynen, 1991). 
Table 9.1 General differences between informal, formal and interactive conflict management 
S.n Characteristics Informal practices Formal practices ICM 
1 Underlying 
assumptions 
Local culture and 
values shape 
behaviour and 
action 
Formal legal rules 
shapes behaviour 
and action 
Negotiations shape 
behaviour and course 
of action 
2 Perspective 
orientation 
Positivist Reductionist/ 
Positivist 
Constructivist 
3 Role of (in)formal 
law/ legislation 
Customary rules 
dominant 
Formal law dominant Both supportive and 
contextual 
4 Role of learning Contextual Minimal Fundamental 
5 Mode of learning171 Single loop Single loop Double loop 
6 Methodological 
orientation 
Semi-flexible Structured Flexible 
7 Enabling forces Social sanction 
Local rules 
Laws, regulation Interaction dialogue 
8 Responsibility 
allocated to 
Local elite 
Powerbrokers 
Government 
apparatus 
Joint (external 
facilitators and local 
people) 
9 Gain Mostly powerful Mostly one party Both parties 
10 Resource view Negotiable Fix pie Expandable 
11 Main actors Local elite and 
powerbrokers 
Government officials Facilitators and local 
people 
12 Value to relationship High Low High 
9.3.1 Focus on learning, interaction, communication and concerted actions 
From the analysis of the conflict cases in the preceding chapters, it became clear that interaction, 
communication172, learning and facilitation were some of the crucial factors lacking in existing conflict 
1 7 0 Actors are individuals or collective groups (both formal and or informal) who are intentional (engaged to realise an 
objective), sense makers (construct their life world) and having agency (capacity to make difference in a context) (Long and 
Long, 1992) 
1 7 1 In the learning theory 'learning to learn' draws attention to single loop and double loop learning. In single loop learning 
people learn from experiences to adjust their actions. In double loop learning negative feedback from experience leads to 
adapting and examining the underlying assumptions and rational behind behaviour. Through double loop learning people learn 
how to learn, and begin to understand the process of learning itself and the behaviour and strategies which inhibit or facilitate it 
(Ramirez, 1997). 
1 7 2 Communication facilitates meaningful dialogue among people to address their problems by linking messages and 
discourses and exchanging views on a problem. Influence, manipulation, exploitation, persuasion, threats, all are accomplished 
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management practices. Therefore, ICM aims to improve them. From the ICM process, actors generate 
knowledge, skills, confidence, trust, resources and insights to deal with community-level NR-conflicts. 
Distorted communication or wrong information, as discussed in Chapter Six, helps to develop a negative 
sense. Regeneration of forest in the disputed pastureland has shown that people learn to take 
corrective measures through concrete experiences. In this case they assessed the advantages, risks 
and opportunities in opting to act conceitedly for afforestation173. The case of the ADB-funded irrigation 
project demonstrated that inappropriately facilitated external NRM interventions can lead to mistrust 
resulting in increased non-compliance. The reasons for mistrust in this case were a lack of 
communication and sharing of information and a lack of proper facilitation of the planning process so 
that local people could make informed choices on mutually acceptable irrigation options. The spring-
water source conflict demonstrated that people involved in conflict not only create the rules and 
opportunities by which they organise their relationships with one another but also effectively utilise these 
rules and opportunities to maximise any resources for a common benefit. 
The Deurali Guthi land as well as the grazing-land conflicts highlight that when one group of people 
place a high value on their own interests ignoring others' concerns then conflict often results. In contrast 
the spring-water source case indicated that when people also value the interests of other people then 
the outcome is 'collaboration'. Chapter Four clearly pointed out that the pro-elite biased, legal centric 
and learning-ignored conflict management practices can not resolve NR-conflicts appropriately. 
Therefore, a learning-based, issue-specific and democratic approach is needed to minimise these 
weaknesses while resolving community level NR-conflicts. 
Analysis of all conflict cases shows that managing conflict involves managing social relationships. ' 
Conflict management therefore should not only be visualised as a regulative idea but also as a means I* 
of developing the ability of people to improve social relationships. The empirical information has j 
demonstrated that conflict is both a negative as well as a positive social phenomenon. It can be 
constructive as well as destructive, depending on how it is dealt with. Therefore, conflict is both an input 
to enhance social change if managed non-violently and a 'liability1 to society if it is allowed to go out of 
control (Walker and Daniels, 1997; Drew etal., 1997). 
9.3.2 Focus on capacity building 
The efforts of NGOs in making the Mediation Group capable of resolving the spring-water source 
conflict in a consensual way proved that if local people are helped to develop their knowledge and skills 
they can effectively manage community level NR-conflict. Local capacity building in conflict 
management starts with participatory conflict analysis. It seeks the synergy and creativity among actors 
and ensures the full implementation of commitments made in a negotiated agreement, based on joint 
conflict assessment. Local peoples' integration into decision making in NRM itself results in less conflict 
because of the developed feelings of ownership and incorporation of local knowledge and experiences. 
Interests of local people can be insured and their experiences can be integrated in CM procedures by 
involving them in the conflict management practices. External interventions must instigate a partnership 
based on mutual co-operation. Though capacity building is a lengthy and continuos process, it 
enormously helps to settle conflict in a positive way. 
From the cases presented in chapters four to seven it is clear that the lack of peoples' ability to defend 
their rights causes exploitation by powerful people. Capacity building mainly focuses on developing 
confidence of community members through various training, improved communication, legal awareness 
and shared learning practices. As observed in the third case peoples' confidence was developed by an 
through communication. Communication between conflicting parties widens understanding of each other's needs, drains 
frustrations and transforms negative stereotypes and images to learning opportunities. 
1 7 3 Concerted action is based on collective interests and mutual interdependence to manage complicated natural resource 
related conflicts for the collective benefit. Concerted action is a result-oriented concept, which emphasises the collective 
agency in tackling complicated conflicts that can not be solved by individuals. It includes formation of common forums for 
collective decision and action. Rôling's notions of 'soft side of land' (1999b) and 'platforms for management of collective natural 
resources (Rôling, 1996) provides a conceptual basis to resolve conflict through concerted action. 
Chapter 9 159 
exchange of information and ideas as well as regular dialogues and interaction processes. In this case 
people discussed problems intensively to come to a negotiated agreement. This is also an adjustment 
process in which options are exchanged and explored according to the logic of acceptance and 
consequences. 
9.3.3 Focus on skill training 
Appropriate training on negotiation, facilitation, communication, conflict analysis, mediation skills, legal 
awareness, etc. help to develop peoples' ability to be actively involved in conflict management to 
resolve conflict locally. Such training can be used to strengthen the useful existing customary, 
institutional or legal approaches or to help establish new mechanisms (Warner and Jones, 1998; 
Warner, 2000). Agencies working in local NRM projects and programmes are investing huge resources 
in training and planning. The issue is only how to integrate content and method of conflict management 
in their regular training programme. The best way to incorporate skill training in their training/planning 
activities is through co-ordination of organisations working in the village by the VDC. The training 
content, methodology and design are out of the scope of this chapter. 
9.3.4 Focus on integration of experts' skills and community experiences 
One of the main focuses of ICM is to integrate positive aspects of external knowledge/skills and local 
knowledge/experiences in dealing with conflict. Such integration leads to increased effectiveness and 
accountability of conflict management. In the ADB-funded irrigation project villagers were treated as just 
a crowed of people to be manipulated. The decisions of the authority were imposed. It was expected 
that people would Iegitimatise and endorse what the irrigation authority had already decided. This 
paternalistic attitude caused serious conflict in this case. If irrigation bureaucrats had acted as 
facilitators, designing the project together with the community, serious conflict could have been avoided 
and the canal would now be functional. 
9.3.5 Is interactive conflict management a complete alternative to the formal system? 
Interactive conflict management is not a complete alternative to the formal organisations working in NR-
conflicts. It is only an alternative method, which could even be integrated into their CM practices. It 
helps formal organisations to legitimise their decisions by incorporating the perspectives and opinions of 
local people into their CM resolution practices. Neither is it a "tip-of-the-iceberg" forum to which conflicts 
are brought after all other attempts to manage them have failed. Instead, it reduces the burden of the 
increasing numbers of conflicts dealt with formal organisations based in district headquarters. It should 
not be seen as a sort of Hying doctor* having a magic remedy to solve all NR-conflicts. It is a pragmatic 
method to ensure accessibility to local people, which allows community-level NR-conflicts to be resolved 
locally and minimises the large number of lawsuits in court. With this approach the local community, 
VDC, users groups, local NGOs, and projects working in the area themselves decide on interventions 
when the actual conflicts occur or the potential for a conflict is seen to be present. Hence, ICM can not 
solve all the concerns, issues and problems raised in this book. 
9.3.6 Three-tier strategy in interactive conflict management 
ICM adapts a three-tier strategy to deal with community-level NR-conflicts. 
1) Preventive mesures: Minimise potential conflicts through facilitation, raising awareness and 
cognitive realisation. Interaction among the community members and external intervening agencies 
is the basis of minimising potential conflicts. 
2) Addressing actual conflict at community: Manage or resolve actual conflict locally after its 
emergence. The procedure stated in section 9.4 is used to manage or resolve conflicts. 
3) Referral to legal resolution: Refer to judicial (legal) regulatory (government NRM offices) options 
with proper counselling only if unable to resolve conflict locally by alternate ways. Local people 
have already developed their capacity by being involving in the procedure stated in section 9.4, so 
fewer manipulations are expected when formal legal options are needed. 
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9.4 Interactive conflict-management procedure 
To translate ICM as a methodological concept into practice, a clear procedure is essential. From the 
analysis of conflict cases in chapters four to eight and the ideas of different scholars working in conflict 
issues (e,g, Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Pruitt and Camevale, 1993; Ury etai., 1989; Gray, 1989; 
Buckles, 1999; Leeuwis, 1999 and 2000; Warner and Jones, 1998; Warner, 2000; Warner, 
forthcoming), I proposed the following 4 step procedure to facilitate ICM. In all these steps all parties 
(e.g., VDC, NGO, users groups, local people, etc.) involved in CM bear responsibilities. However, 
facilitators of the process (be they staff of NGOs, GOs, VDCs, members of user groups or villagers) 
have a crucial role to play in every step. When specific responsibilities are assigned, then in the second 
step particular persons have specific roles to play. The four-steps are interrelated with each other. The 
activities outlined in one step may be necessary to undertake the following step and all listed activities 
may not be necessary in every conflict case, they are content specific and may need to be adapted 
according to the specific situation to settle a particular conflict. 
These four steps are: 
Step 1: Joint conflict assessment/analysis 
Step 2: Intervention strategy and action plans design 
Step 3 Actual implementation of action plans 
Step 4 Reflection and modification 
9.4.1 Joint conflict assessment/analysis (step 1) 
As observed in the spring-water source conflict case, entering into participatory conflict analysis begins 
with the critical process of building rapport with the community. This underpins any successful CM. 
Effective negotiation is only possible when sufficient trust and effective communications have been 
developed among the conflicting parties, and/or between facilitators and these parties. Participatory 
conflict analysis needs to continue until a plan is finalised that outlines the way in which the conflict will 
be managed (process design). This process design considers the overall strategy of CM by combining 
various options. Understanding what constitutes the essence of the negotiation process is a major 
concern in this step. Socialising skills and ability, knowledge about local context, experiences of 
handling conflict situations, communication skills and the ability to handle emotions are some of the 
important qualities of the facilitators (negotiators/mediators) to accomplish these tasks. To assess the 
conflict the following actions needs to be taken. 
1. Raise issues 
2. Discover interests 
3. Generate opinions 
4. Develop agreements 
Complete analysis of a conflict situation (whole complexity of socio-political relations and their effects on 
natural resource conflicts) before engaging in implementation of any agreements is essential. From the 
joint conflict assessment, people understand the fundamental causes of conflict and potentials and 
limitations for its resolution. As observed in the third case, conflict assessment is fundamentally about 
the assessment of people, their aspirations and relationships based on investigation of all related 
issues, gathering all relevant information from all sources, analysis, synthesis and reintegration 
(creation of new constructs and patterns) (Ramirez, 1997). Findings of the assessment bring alternative 
choices for concrete action to settle the conflict. 
Based on this study and the literature the following points should be considered while conducting 
conflict assessment: 
1. Establish rapport with disputants/villagers and develop understanding of the local system. 
2. State the objectives of conflict assessment. 
3. Prepare conflict map exploring the following: 
• Identify the people involved in conflict (who is affected, who can influence outcomes, past 
history of the parties in conflict, etc.), people having leadership quality, willingness and faith of 
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people (they can be mobilised later in the implementation stage) and interdependency between 
contlicting parties. 
• Identify incompatibility of goals, values, feelings, interests and underlying needs and fears of 
people, determine whether the disagreement represents underlying assumptions, values, and 
attitudes. Separate feelings from facts. 
• Identify substance/content and nature of problems, their boundaries and look how the conflict is 
developing and transforming (historical background, sparking issues), identify magnitude and 
connectivity (linkage.of conflict with other social issues). 
• Identify risks, potential social impacts, costs of conflict, scope and incentives for co-operation 
and immediate issues that reduce conflict. 
• Identify relevant governmental policies and legal arrangements (jurisdictional and legal 
constraints and potentialities). 
• Explore cultural differences, power relationships, knowledge and information gaps, 
communication barriers and geographical distribution of conflict. 
• Find commonalties between parties in a conflict. 
• Explore potential to mobilise available local resources. 
• Distinguish between procedural, substantial and relational conflicts and prioritise them based 
on severity. 
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA), appreciative inquiry, focus group discussion, key informant 
interviews, brain storming, observation, etc can be used to accomplish this step. All these explorations 
give ideas on how to design the intervention strategy and action plans. An extremely important question 
in analysing conflict is "why?" Why do disputants feel so strongly about this? Why do they have such 
serious arguments over this issue? Why do they think in that particular way? These "why" questions 
clarify the reasons and thinking of the parties in conflict. Such conflict maps assist in revealing 
fundamental reasons for the conflict and the range of possible options174 and relevant choices for 
intervention. Conflict mapping is a kind of learning based soft method, which promotes structured 
dialogues to improve the conflict situation in natural resources (Walker and Daniels, 1998). Through the 
conflict mapping process facilitators and villagers acquire a means to deal with substantive, relational 
and procedural issues in conflict. Joint conflict assessment helps to examine their goals, positions, and 
underlying interests and explores the best alternatives and a fair and reasonable deal. It explores what 
is the minimum one party can accept and what is the maximum another party can offer. A joint conflict 
assessment exercise lets villagers engage in interactive dialogue to generate creative ideas and explore 
acceptable options. This is also a vision building process of how to transform various interests to gain 
common benefits. 
9.4.2 Design of intervention strategy and action plans (step 2) 
The second step is to narrow down the problem into a workable scope and define specific activities for 
conflict management. The jointly developed objective criteria based on principles and the result of 
analysis helps both parties to come to an agreement (spring water source case in this book). 
Due consideration of CM planning based on participatory conflict assessment leads to effective CM. It 
is important to realise that failing to plan is planning to fail in CM. While developing CM strategy, 
intervention priority should be given to one of the 3 integral components of conflict i.e., substance, 
procedures and relationships (Walker and Daniels, 1998). I suggest the following activities in the second 
step in shaping the ICM trajectory. 
• Identify the key actors (who can do what) for the prioritised conflicts and assign responsibilities. 
• Jointly define criteria (inclusion or exclusion) for resolution. Establish ground rules on procedures, 
role of individual actors, time frame, dealing with sensitive and confidential issues, recording and 
documentation process, etc. 
• Decide and agree on various training activities and associated agreements. 
1 7 4 Such options are generally innovative, flexible and may go beyond a legalistic approach to settle their differences and 
develop future orientation (Warner, 2000; Warner, forthcoming). 
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• Decide particular intervention options (withdrawal, force, accommodation, compromise, and/or a 
combination of them), which options in which conditions. 
• Identify favourable governmental policies, rules and local customs, which support the intended 
resolution, if relevant. 
• Decide a specific time frame (when) and forums/places (what and where). 
• Develop a concrete agenda for action and forge agreement with actors on the prepared action 
plans. 
• Make arrangements for external inputs (knowledge, skills, etc.), if needed. 
The same methods mentioned in the first step can also be used to accomplish the second step. One of 
the major challenges for ICM practitioners in this step is to facilitate the convergence of the different 
knowledge processes of the actors involved in disputes by bringing them to common platforms for 
collective action (Roling, 1996) and joint learning (Pretty, 1994; Roling and Wagemakers, 1998). 
9.4.3 Implementation of action plans (step 3) 
Based on the outcome of the second step, implement the activities defined to manage/resolve the 
conflict. In this stage mainly selected actors are involved in the conflict management process. While 
implementing intervention plans, separate people from problems, address problems not personalities, 
look for an integrative solution (possibility to create additional resources), which allow disputing parties 
to co-operate and promote interaction. Implement various training activities to develop capacities of 
people to manage conflict. Consider the following points while implementing a CM process: 
• Put rigid issues to one side and start with simple issues to brainstorm for other ideas while starting 
the process. Often conflicts arise when people think that there is only a limited solution. A break 
through happens when people discover alternate ways to resolve conflict (Susskind and 
Cruikshank, 1987; Warner, forthcoming). 
• First deal with principles and concepts. Sometimes people in conflict who do not agree about the 
details can agree on a concept or goal. The details can then be sorted out later. Look for a multi-
step process to resolve conflict, if it cannot be resolved straight away (Urey et a/., 1989). 
• Discuss issues in relation to a wider policy environment to enhance feelings of interdependency by 
introducing external and internal examples. 
• Link resolution and reconciliation between religious, cultural values, norms and customs, if needed. 
• Deal with relational problems first and focus on concerns and interests rather than positions and 
personalities. 
• Involve trusted people (may be outsiders or community members) to monitor the progress and 
ensure compliance. 
• Start with low cost, simple procedures. 
• Exchange proposals, counter proposals and their revisions where both parties are expected to 
make offers and concessions. 
• Communicate (verbally or non-verbally) effectively to exchange information related to the process 
and share information about the success stories and causes of failure from other areas. Use 
argumentation tactics. Make messages simple and understandable. Also make language patterns 
(discourse style, question-answer sequence, timing of message, symbolic and ritualistic 
dimensions, degree of consequences of verbal and non-verbal communication, etc.) simple 
because it is the vehicle for exchange of meanings to positively influence conflict management. 
• Stress holistic improvement (situation) rather than a short-term solution of the specific problem and 
emphasis progress if it is not possible to achieve a specific outcome. 
• If the CM discussion is exhausting adjourn the meeting temporarily for relaxation. This helps people 
to rethink through an issue and come up with new ideas for agreement. If discussions go in the 
wrong direction, stop the discussion. Create a special group meeting environment where people can 
argue, disagree (break meetings into smaller discussion groups). 
• Ensure active participation of all people involved in meetings. If the personal behaviour of particular 
people is creating problems, it is a good idea to communicate privately. Avoid putting the blame on 
individuals. 
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• Document all achievements (what agreed so far) during the meeting. 
• Refer to higher formal authorities (e.g., district administration, police, court, etc.) with proper 
counselling, if not able to resolve/manage conflict locally. 
Parties involved in conflict either do not wish to resolve/manage conflict or do not realise it is in their 
best interest to achieve an agreeable solution. During the CM practice sometimes the atmosphere 
becomes charged with anger, frustration, resentment, mistrust, hostility, and a sense of futility. 
Communication channels close down or are used to criticise and blame the other and the original issues 
become blurred. New issues are added as the conflict becomes personalised. Even if one side is willing 
to make concessions often hostility prevents agreement. In such a conflict, perceived differences 
become magnified, each side gets locked into their initial positions and each side resorts to lies, threats, 
distortions, and other attempts to force the other party to comply with their demands. In such a situation 
take the following corrective measures: 
• Divert hot issues for the time being by starting games, jokes and story telling, which reduce tension. 
• Increase the accuracy of communication and provide extra information. 
• Depersonalise the conflict-separate the issues from the people. 
• Establish commonalties (look for greater common goals and focus on what people have in 
common). 
• Find ways to move forward (by mobilising close allies, supporters, friends, relatives, etc.). 
• Make an acceptable proposal, refine and reformulate, assess potentiality for trade offs. 
In general, the implementation process starts by identifying the best and worst possible outcomes and 
exploring trade-offs for the key issues. Try to create additional resources or options (if possible) to 
satisfy both parties and offer non specific compensation (one side gets what it wants and the other side 
is compensated on another issue). This is an adaptive dynamic learning and a joint decision making 
process to find common agreement to resolve conflict. It is also a psychological process, which 
influences perceptions and expectations of people in conflict. 
Another important aspect in the implementation stage is the use of influence and persuasion. The 
implementation process tries to change the belief of conflicting parties. A persuasion strategy should be 
used to achieve an acceptable agreement. While doing so consider personal conditions (personality, 
risk taking personality, self esteem, co-operative response, authoritarian behaviour) information 
conditions (information on the situation, the context, what is at stake, other party's needs, goals, means 
of actions, personality and value) and structural conditions (networks of issues and relationships, legal 
and socio-political complexity of the process) (Buckles, 1999; Walker, forthcoming). 
9.4.4 Reflection and modification (step 4) 
This step constructively reviews the corresponding activities undertaken, process and procedures 
followed and outcomes achieved so far and explores desirable and feasible changes in next cycle of 
conflict management. This process looks forward, considering the desirable changes to make an 
improvement next time (Wilson and Morren, 1990; Walker and Daniels, 1998). Mutual gains are the 
prime concern in this step. 
9.5 Who carries out interactive conflict management 
As discussed earlier, all NRM-related organisations working in the community are dealing with conflicts. 
Governmental offices, NGOs, CBOs, users groups and federations or local political bodies such as 
VDCs and Wards are all actively engaged in community CM. Some of them have mandatory legal 
provisions to address local conflict and others are active due to their own interests. They are using 
methodologies to resolve these NR-conflicts. However, the issue here is that these methodologies are 
not responsive enough to deal with conflict in fair and effective ways and learning-based, action-
oriented and people-centred methods greatly help to improve their performance. Interactive conflict 
management is not a separate package to be implemented in addition to normal procedures. It allows 
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concepts and stepwise procedures of ICfvl to be integrated into CM practices. All organisations and 
individuals involved in CM at the community level could use an ICM approach. Discussions with 
reference groups while collecting information in the field, showed that all of them were eager to 
implement new methods in dealing with conflict. Forest-users groups and NGOs are already engaged in 
new innovative types of learning-based conflict management practices. 
9.6 Issue of institutionalisation of interactive conflict management 
One of the major challenges of any new method is the issue of institutionalisation. How is to be 
sustained and by whom? What sort of legal, institutional and financial arrangements are available to 
operationalise ICM? To answer these questions, among others, we should refer to the Local Self-
Governance Act (LSGA). The LSGA in Article 34(1) and Section 8, article 70 and 71 provide legal 
authorities and functional responsibilities to VDCs to deal with community level conflict cases. 
Therefore, the first condition is to incorporate ICM method under the conflict resolution procedure of the 
VDC. This act also made provision for manpower and financial resources. VDCs have already started to 
work according to these provisions. Separate legal enforcement is not needed when ICM is 
incorporated into the VDC conflict management procedure. The avenue provided by LSGA is perfect to 
facilitate ICM in villages to develop the capacity of local people, to improve communication and to share 
information, etc. LSGA gives a mandate to the VDC to co-ordinate and monitor those organisations 
(NGO, GO, CBO, etc.) that are implementing development projects/activities in that VDC. In that aspect 
ICM can be incorporated into all the activities of organisations working in NRM issues in a village. As 
the VDC is a permanent political structure there is no risk of donor or project dependency, once 
incorporated into the VDC system. As indicated in Chapter Four, VDC is a local organisation based on 
the support (vote) of the general public. It is more concerned with local people and therefore actively 
engaged on several local platforms, working together with the public to resolve conflicts. All those who 
are engaged in CM practices are investing money, resources and time. In this respect there is no need 
for a separate budget, manpower or the creation of new organisations. What is needed is the training of 
facilitators engaged in conflict resolution issues. Several NRM projects are interested in supporting such 
a single-investment capacity building aspect to develop local capacity. Therefore training facilitators 
should not be the major constraining factor in promoting ICM. 
9.7 Problems and prospects in the use of interactive conflict management 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the existing framework of NR-related conflict management 
needs to be widened. There are several options as to how the performance of existing practices can be 
improved. Interactive conflict management is one of them. There are some challenges and opportunities 
in the use of ICM as a local means of management of natural resource related conflict. 
9.7.1 Opportunities (prospects): 
VDC is recognised by the state as one of the effective decentralised bodies to deal with local conflict. 
Therefore, VDC has legally defined conflict management roles to play at the local level. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, although the performance of VDCs in conflict management is not satisfactory, they are far 
better than other formal options in terms of accessibility, cost and time. Elected representatives of the 
VDCs are more accountable to the local people and more likely to listen to the views of poor people. 
VDC has also given financial resources175 to implement various activities under the arrangement of 
LSGA. There is a willingness by VDCs to engage in dealing with NR-conflicts as stipulated by the 
LSGA. All NGOs, CBOs and projects working in the particular VDC have to work in co-ordination with 
the VDC. This means that there is self-regulated provision to deal with conflict in a village. The part 
lacking is the appropriate methods to carry this out. ICM provides a badly needed alternate method. 
1 7 5 For the first time in the history of Nepal, the UML government gave three hundred thousand rupees to VDCs in 1995 to 
implement development activities. Since then the central government provides an annual budget to VDCs to implement various 
activities in villages. The amount of the annual allocation has now been raised to half a million rupees. After this budgetary 
provision VDCs are actively involved in local development/NRM activities in their villages. 
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The study has clearly demonstrated that there are several local methods and practices to deal with NR-
conflicts. Some of them are more useful and practical and some favour local power relationships. There 
is tremendous potential for using these positive aspects of locally available experiences, methods and 
repertoires of conflict management by adapting ICM at the community level. In formal methods there are 
some legal limitations to incorporate these local practices, but in ICM these practices are an integral 
part of the process. 
The emerging civil society organisations are advocating the promotion of capacity building of local 
people as advocated by the democratic constitution of kingdom of Nepal, which endorses people as the 
ultimate source of power. Many laws and regulations contradictory to the constitution are being revised 
to ensure the spirit of the constitution. In several cases civil society organisations and local communities 
are working collaboratively to minimise conflicts in the community. 
Even within the government's legal sector there is growing concern over the need for a locally based 
decentralised conflict management approach rather than relying on legal systems. Some aspects of 
ICM can also be applied to court proceedings. When mediation is part of the legal proceedings then 
ICM could play an important role. 
In recent years several local users organisations such as the forest and water-users groups, FECOFUN, 
HIMWANTI, mothers' clubs, etc. have emerged at community level to deal with NRM and related 
conflicts. They are very useful forums accessible to all users and working to ensure fair resolution of 
conflict. NRM projects are also giving support to institutionalise them. Such decentralised organisations 
need appropriate methodology to deal with conflict. 
9.7.2 Challenges and problems 
There are not only good prospects for the use of ICM in the community, it also raises several challenges 
and problems in translating the concept into practice. The most important challenge is the power-based 
social structures and elite influence in a village. Generally the village elite want to maintain the patron-
client relationship in resolving conflicts. Interactive conflict management wants to break such a 
relationship by empowering local people and organisations. People's empowerment is enhanced when 
people actively participate in conflict analysis, interaction, discussion and legal arguments to solve 
conflicts. Therefore, local powerbrokers will not co-operate in promoting ICM. Even if it is not possible 
for them to stop ICM being incorporated into the activities of all organisations working in conflict, they 
will try to create barriers. 
Translation of ICM as a methodological principle into a specific operational activity remains highly 
circumscribed by skills in conflict analysis, communication, negotiation/mediation and facilitation as well 
as the conceptual clarity of the actors involved in the CM process. 
Scaling up ICM to a wider level is another challenge and largely depends on the success or failure at 
the community level. There is good chance of countrywide scaling up if it works properly under the 
procedural framework of VDC. If ICM is only applied by a few NGOs and grass-root organisations it may 
be difficult to promote it at a wider level. The legitimacy of ICM is another concern. As it is a 
methodology framed under the legal arrangement of LSGA, there may not be problem of legitimacy as it 
does not challenge the legal arrangement of the state. It rather helps to improve performance and 
increase their efficiency. 
9.8 Determinants of success and failure of interactive conflict management 
Conflict management is a sensitive issue and dealing with it requires special skills. There are always 
risks of ICM being applied in a mechanistic fashion when its methodology provides a stepwise 
procedure. If facilitators fail to understand the underlying principles of ICM, success is less likely. ICM 
as a methodology has to address context specific conflict with continuous adaptation. Therefore, ICM 
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itself is not a mechanical package to be uniformly used in all conflict situations. Success or failure of 
ICM depends on the facilitation process. Facilitators should have an active strategy, good skills, 
credibility, trustworthiness, resources and willpower to make ICM successful. Effective facilitation 
enhances flexibility, adaptation, information gathering, utilisation and interactive learning to resolve 
conflict. 
During the ICM process several unpredicted and unintended consequences may arise. At that time 
facilitators have to be able to tackle such a situation. The four-step methodology proposed here should 
not be used as a blueprint to be strictly adhered to. It should be adapted, modified and used as a 
methodological outline. Only proper facilitation and context-specific adaptation ensures resolution of 
community-based NR-conflicts. If facilitated properly it develops the capacity of local people to 
effectively manage NR-conflicts. 
Power brokers and village elite may feel threatened because of the empowerment led procedure of 
ICM, which challenges their manipulation of the conflict situation. Therefore, they could create obstacles 
to implement ICM. In such a situation weaker actors have to be strengthened by forming coalitions, 
using conventional policy instruments such as legal rules and communication campaigns (Warner, 
2000; Leeuwis, 2000). Success of ICM is also based on interaction and effective communication. If this 
is hampered there is less chance of success. Mobilisation of local resources is another important 
determinant of success or failure of ICM. 
9.9 Conclusion 
ICM is based on a social learning perspective. It is a community-focused, learning-based and action-
oriented methodological approach to resolve/manage conflict to improve the performance of NRM. It 
moves beyond the structurally designed, compartmentalised blue print approach of conflict resolution. It 
is an approach that steps back from the NR stand and focuses on the continuous interaction between 
people, between people and NR and their position in the broader socio-cultural setting, in order to 
integrate socio-political and biophysical dimensions of NRM. ICM acknowledges the knowledge, skills 
and experiences of the community as social capital to help manage conflict. Diversity embedded in the 
local community can be mobilised to resolve/manage conflict. While discussing ICM with different 
people, especially with my supervisor Professor Franz von Benda-Beckmann, I faced one question "how 
realistic is ICM when it is applied in practice"? From my own experiences and the success stories of 
implementation of ICM procedures by local organisations, I believe that this approach is realistic, if 
implemented according to its principle. 
9.10 Suggestions for further research 
Exploration of the dynamics of NR-conflicts and their broader socio-political impacts is a continuous 
process. Nevertheless, my study has to be brought to the end. It is time for me to conclude this study by 
highlighting some specific areas for further research. These should be based on the study of complex 
and dynamic conflicts and their management practices adapted in Nepal to provide inputs for broader 
policy reform in NRM and conflict management sectors. 
• In-depth study of actual functioning of court systems in relationship to NR-Conflict resolution and its 
implications to poor people, the wider scoio-political system and NRM. 
• In-depth research on operation (transparency, accountability and efficiency) of governmental 
organisations working in NR-conflict management and potential areas for the improvement/reform 
of the functioning of these organisations. An important question would be "does their hierarchical 
nature and rigidly defined procedure allow them to play a supportive/facilitative role"? What areas 
need more focus in the process of reorientation and how can these be reformed? 
• More investigation is needed into the potential, actual functioning and limitations of newly evolved 
local organisations such as FUGs, WUCs, mothers clubs, small farmers' groups, local NGOs, etc. 
in managing conflicts. 
• Another important area of research would be to explore the problems and prospects of VDCs in 
taking a leading role in dealing with community conflicts. 
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• Research on the implement ICM procedure in the community is another area of attention, which I 
hope, will be undertaken by some NGOs, VDCs and projects. 
• Another area of interest could be the study of relationships between legal complexity, socio-cultural 
system and CM practices. 
• Investigation of the interlocking relationship of newly evolved institutions and people (how people 
interact, learn, act and reform) may be useful to understand the dynamics of conflict overtime and 
contribute to refining CM policies and practices. 
• Contribution, potential and limitations of involvement of women in managing NR-conflict needs to 
be explored in detail to promote gender-sensitive CM practices. 
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Summary 
Conflict Management in Natural Resources: A Study of Land, Water and Forest Conflict in Nepal 
This book is based on the research into natural resource (NR)-conflict carried out between 1997 and 
2000 in the Dolakha district of central Nepal, and in several reference sites around the country. The 
study focussed especially on land, water and forest/pasture conflicts and their resolution/management 
practices. Five inter-connected conflict cases related to irrigation, GufW-land' spring water source and 
forest-pasture land were examined and compared with eleven reference groups. The study was 
conducted mainly using qualitative research methods. Conflicts in natural resources are an inevitable 
part of the social process and this study has embraced them as a source of learning to create 
opportunities for social change in a community. In this study I have used legal anthropological and 
social learning perspectives to analyse the dynamics of conflict. The performances of existing formal 
and informal conflict management approaches have been analysed. Inter-linkages of NR-related 
conflicts with broader social contexts are examined. Based on the findings an alternative approach of 
conflict management is proposed. Access and control and political, environmental and economic 
motives were found to be the driving forces in creating NR-related conflict. An uneven distribution of 
resources created scarcity, competition and conflict and these were common characteristics of NRM in 
Nepal. This book argues that such situations are increasingly due to the lack of a conducive national 
policy and legal and institutional arrangements, and a top-down approach to NRM. 
The aims of the study were to understand and analyse the dynamics of NR-conflicts and their 
resolution, and to seek alternatives to improve community-level conflict-management practices. It is 
hope that it also stimulates debate on embracing conflict as a source of learning to reform the NRM 
sector and bring broader social change in the community. The study was framed under three main 
research questions. What are common conflicts concerning natural resources and their management 
practices at the community level, and why do they occur? What are the implications of the conflict for 
natural resources and the community? Finally, how can natural resource-conflict be effectively managed 
at the local level? 
This book is arranged in three parts and nine chapters. In the first part the problem context, the 
theoretical framework, methodological tools and general overview of Nepal are discussed. Theoretical 
concepts such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, adjudication, litigation, legal pluralism, property 
rights, forum shopping, constructivist perspective, soft system thinking, cognitive system, 
communicative rationality, platforms for negotiation and adaptive management are discussed to derive a 
conceptual model to analyse natural resource-conflict. A brief socio-economic, cultural, political, and 
historical overview of Nepal are presented. The political economy of natural resources is discussed, a 
brief review of Nepalese NRM policies, laws and regulations is presented and finally the general 
characteristics of the study area are described. 
In the first part of the book I have argued that the behaviour of people towards natural resources is 
shaped and reshaped by a specific context and local power relationships. The existence of plural legal 
systems in the community itself was a source of conflict in NR. Different and even conflicting 
perspectives, values, objectives and knowledge of local people about a particular natural resource were 
manifested in the specific context and shaped by social relationships. Any particular conflict is linked 
with historical, cultural, political, economic and institutional issues, as well as the social context and is 
affected by norms, values and daily practices. 
Four chapters in the second part of the book are devoted to empirical investigations. In this part general 
NR-related conflicts and their characteristics found in the study area are documented. Most common 
formal and informal conflict management practices are discussed. The first case relates to conflict 
between old and new users on an old farmers-managed irrigation system. The second case highlights 
the conflict between a powerful elite group and general villagers to control a part of forest-pasture land. 
The third case deals with the conflict between two groups of people to access and control a spring water 
source for drinking water. In all these three cases local social relationships, ownership issues, the 
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ambiguous role of external development organisations, effects of time and space, and gender issues 
have greatly contributed to escalating and managing the conflict. The forth case investigates an ADB-
funded irrigation project where severe conflicts erupted in the process of its planning and construction. 
This case shows that formal intervention, if not implemented properly, not only fails to appropriately 
develop and manage local natural resources but can also cause severe conflict in a community. The 
conflict issues in this case were analysed in terms of participation, decision making, transparency and 
corruption, working practice of the water users committee, the role of technology, communication and 
information. The fifth case presents the conflict between landowners and tenants over Guihi land to 
control ownership rights. The effects of socio-political change, practical applications of state rules and 
laws, effects of time and context, peoples' initiatives and the importance of social relationships are 
analysed in relation to escalation, transformation and resolution of conflict. 
Identification of users, the sharing of benefits, access to the forest products, payment of royalties, illegal 
exploitation of NTFP, participation and contribution of users in managing forests, and leadership were 
the most common issues in forest-conflict. In water source disputes, sharing the water for different 
purposes, contributions for maintenance of irrigation and drinking water systems, ambiguous roles and 
responsibilities of water users committees were the common sources of conflict. In the case of land 
inheritance, demarcation, ownership and rights, tenancy issues, encroachment, payment of land tax and 
rents were all frequent contentious issues. In all types of NR-related conflicts, significant roles were 
played by bureaucracy, corruption and misuse of resources and the abuse of power and authority. In 
addition to these NR-related conflicts in the study area, there were also other conflicts related to 
borrowing and transactions, external development interventions, family matters, party politics, character 
defamation, prostitution and sexual abuse and religion. However, all these conflicts crosscut and linked 
with natural resource conflicts and in practice it is not possible to draw a clear demarcation between 
them. The study shows that conflict is more common if the parties involved belong to different political, 
caste/ethnic and economic groups and these associations may be the triggering force in conflict. When 
the conflicting parties realise the cost of the conflict is too high and the benefits too low it can often be 
shortened. 
The third part of two chapters mainly focuses on analysis of conflict, and presents an alternate method 
of CM at local level as well as drawing conclusions from the issues discussed. In Chapter Eight overall 
analyses of the conflict cases are made based on the theoretical references discussed in Chapter Two. 
Dynamics of NR-conflict are analysed and common conflict management options used in the study area 
are presented. The analysis is framed under property rights issues, the role of formal and informal laws, 
caste, ethnicity and social relationships, power and politics, external interventions and issues of 
corruption, communication, information and networking, leadership and gender issues. Based on the 
overall analysis, Chapter Nine presents an alternative approach called interactive conflict management. 
This alternative methodological approach provides some ways to overcome the weaknesses of existing 
CM practices and proposes a learning-based and action oriented procedure. Based on the analyses of 
opportunities, challenges and limitations for its institutionalisation, 1CM provides a step-by-step 
procedure to accomplish conflict resolution. Finally, the area for future research is identified. The 
analysis of the conflict found in the third part of the book is summarised below. 
Management of conflict is not only limited to linear, legal-focused conflict resolution procedures. Conflict 
management is a dynamic process of adaptation and action, resolution of conflict depending on the 
effectiveness of interaction and actions governed by values (willingness to resolve conflict), context 
(possible challenges and difficulties) and perspectives. 
The study demonstrated that government sponsored NRM systems do not adequately value local NRM 
practices and therefore create numerous conflicts. State laws, regulations and legal principles were 
contradictory, inadequate, expensive or inappropriately applied and therefore not effective in properly 
addressing natural resource conflicts. A legal-centric interpretation of government's NRM policies and 
procedures (treating them as the only solution of all natural resource conflicts) gave rise to several 
conflicts instead of resolving them. The politicisation of conflict, elite domination, inaccessibility of formal 
conflict resolution procedures to poor villagers and complications accompanying these procedures were 
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very common. The general public questioned whether tormal CM practices played a fair role in settling 
NR-conflict. These procedures themselves became a source of further conflict. The Deurali land conflict 
is an example of such inefficiency and bias. As shown by both the forest-pasture and Guihi land cases 
the legal approach assumed that legal enactment forces people to resolve conflict by threatening them 
with punishment. The legal approach interprets the law as the only ultimate instrument for social 
engineering and effective means of homogenising a heterogeneous society and for resolving all 
conflicts. Staff of formal organisations commonly viewed local people as conflict creators and 
themselves as the best means of solving of these conflicts. These feelings mean that the formal conflict 
resolution approach widely practised in Nepal does not recognise the local capability of resolving or 
managing conflict. There is also a lack of integration of new innovations in the process of conflict 
resolution. Allegiance to political parties in Nepal is an important factor in the enhancement and/or 
inhibition of conflict resolution processes. Political ideology is a powerful variable in NR-conflict, which 
can influence the whole CM process at different levels of social aggregation. When power is mobilised 
in conflict resolution it usually results in a win-lose situation. Political power exerts substantial influence 
in any conflict. If a conflict arises in a village, local political workers of major parties intervene for their 
own political benefit, particularly to win a local election. 
I have discussed in this book that resolving a conflict is also a means of establishing power and 
influence in a community. In the study area the majority of the conflicts were resolved locally in informal 
ways. Redirection of behaviour, mobilisation of networks, linkages with power centres, differential 
interpretation of laws and regulations and the use of force were some of the major strategies used by 
local people to negotiate or resolve conflict. Local people use various locally existing forms of social 
networks, shopping forums and platforms to deal with conflict issues. People first use local forums to 
discuss conflict issues at the community level rather than opting for a legal solution. This was because 
such platforms and forums are accessible, cheap and based on local knowledge and experiences. Local 
negotiators use cultural, religious and political proverbs (highlighting the importance of resolving conflict 
locally) to convince conflicting parties. At the local level, women are directly and actively involved in 
conflict and its management. In several community-level conflicts, children were the source of conflict as 
well as an effective means of its resolution. An intimate connection was observed between conflict and 
communication, information and their inter-linkages in its resolution or escalation. Transformations from 
NR-related to socio-political conflict, temporal manifestation and intensity of conflicts varied depending 
on political interference and power relationships. As the cases show power relationships determine 
success or failure of management of community level NR-related conflicts. Local political processes, 
values and the differential power base influenced conflicts in all cases. Time and space were very 
important determining factors for escalation of resolution of the conflict. During special periods of time 
such as elections and the restoration of democracy, conflicts suddenly increased but several conflicts 
were also resolved instantly. The intensity of the same conflict changes over time and its life cycle 
determines the management or resolution strategies. Having a conflict concerning natural resources 
forced local people to, utilise their existing resources optimally or efficiently, create new resources or 
search for different alternatives. 
All the cases seem to suggest that elite's manipulation of land, water and forest conflicts has increased 
the ability of tenants and villagers to defend their rights, to protest and negotiate in situations of conflict. 
Generally, the degree, intensity and antagonistic effects were less marked in NR-conflict. Local people 
as far as possible follow accommodative strategies rather than confrontation. Although many conflicts 
remain unsolved for extended periods the existence of a workable relationship between parties involved 
in the conflict is common. In NR-related conflict the situation is usually, less antagonistic because of the 
accommodative nature of the people involved. Villagers consider social relationships as an important 
factor in managing community level NR conflicts. People use their own criteria to classify conflict based 
on the socio-cultural context. The major criterion is the effect of the conflict on social relationships and a 
conflict is only categorised as severe when it cause these to be disrupted. Compromise was a 
commonly used strategy in managing community-level conflict and this was based on trade-offs 
between disputants. Analysis of all conflict cases shows that managing conflict is managing social 
relationships. Empirical information demonstrated that conflict is both a negative as well as a positive 
social phenomenon. 
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The focus of ICM is to make conflict management forums easily accessible to rural people and to 
minimise dependence on adversarial forms of conflict resolution. Developing local capacity in conflict 
management starts with participatory conflict analysis. Appropriate training on negotiation, facilitation, 
communication, conflict analysis, mediation skills, legal awareness, etc. help to develop the ability of 
people actively involved in conflict management to achieve a local resolution. ICM acknowledges the 
knowledge, skills and experiences of a community to manage conflict. Diversity embedded in a local 
community can be mobilised to resolve/manage conflict. The success or failure to resolve a conflict 
depends on a fuller understanding of the interdependence by people. With the ICM process actors 
generate knowledge, skills, confidence, trusts, resources and insights to deal with NR-conflicts on a 
community-level. Conflicts that arose due to confusion and misunderstanding can be resolved by putting 
all the relevant information to the actors concerned. A complete analysis of a conflict situation (whole 
complexity of socio-political relations and their effects on natural resource conflicts) is vital before any 
negotiated agreements are implemented. Assessment of such an analysis gives people an 
understanding of the fundamental causes of conflict and the potential and limitations for resolution. 
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Samenvatting176 
Conflictbeheersing In het Gebruik van Natuurlijke hulpbronnen: een Studie van Conflicten over 
Land, Water en Bos in Nepal. 
Dit boek is gebaseerd op oriderzoek naar conflicten over natuurlijke hulpbronnen, uitgevoerd tussen 
1997 en 2000 in het district Dolakha in Centraal Nepal en op diverse andere locaties in dat land. De 
Studie rieht zieh vooral op conflicten over land, water, bos en weidegrond en de praktijken van 
conflictbeheersing en-beslechting. Daarbij werden vijf onderling verbunden conflict-casussen met 
betrekking tot irrigatie, guthi-\anü, waterbronnen en bos- en weidegrond onderzocht en vergeleken met 
elf referentiegroepen. De Studie werd uitgevoerd met gebruikmaking van vooral kwalitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden. Conflicten in het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen zijn een onvermijdelijk 
onderdeel van het sociale leven. In deze Studie worden conflicten gezien als een bron van kennis die 
kan worden ingezet om sociale verandering in gemeenschappen te bewerkstelligen. In deze Studie heb 
ik rechtsantropologische en 'sociaal leren' perspectieven gebruikt om de dynamiek van confikten te 
analyseren. Daarbij werd het functioneren van bestaande formele en informele benaderingen van 
conflictbeheersing geanalyseerd. Tövens werden de relaties van conflicten over natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
met de bredere sociale context onderzocht. Op basis hiervan wordt een altematieve benadering van 
conflictbeheersing voorgesteld. Toegang tot, en contrôle over hulpbronnen, alsmede politieke, 
ecologische en economische motieven bleken de drijvende krachten te zijn achter conflicten over 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Een ongelijke verdeling van hulpbronnen veroorzaakte schaarste, competitie 
en conflict. Dit waren de gemeenschappelijke kenmerken van de praktijk van het beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen in Nepal. In dit boek wordt betoogd, dat dergelijke situaties in toenemende mate het gevolg 
zijn van het gebrek aan relevant nationaal beleid en juridisch-institutionele arrangementen, alsmede van 
een 'top-down' benadering van de de beheersproblematiek van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. 
Het doel van deze studie is het begrijpen en analyseren van de dynamiek van conflicten over natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen en hun oplossingen, en het zoeken naar altematieven die kunnen bijdragen aan een 
verbetering van praktijken van conflictbeheersing op gemeenschapsnfveau. Hopelijk kan deze studie 
ook een Stimulans vormen voor het debat over conflict als een bron van kennis die als basis kan dienen 
voor de hervorming van het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en processen van sociale verandering 
in bredere zin. De studie is opgezet rond drie onderzoeksvragen: ten eerste, wat zijn veel voorkomende 
conflicten over natuurlijke hulpbronnen en praktijken van beheersing op gemeenschapsnfveau, en 
waardoor worden deze conflicten veroorzaakt? Ten tweede, wat zijn de implicaties van deze conflicten 
voor de natuurlijke hulpbron en voor de gemeenschap? Ten derde, hoe kunnen conflicten over 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen effectief worden beheerst op locaal niveau? 
Dit boek bestaat uit drie delen, tezamen negen hoofdstukken. In het eerste deel worden context van de 
problematiek, theoretisch kader, en méthodologie besproken. Ook wordt een algemeen overzicht over 
Nepal gegeven. Theoretische concepten als bemiddeling, onderhandeling, arbitrage, adjudicatie, 
procesvoering, rechtspluralisme, 'property rights', forum shopping', constructivistisch perspectief, 'soft 
system thinking', cognitief systeem, comunicatieve rationaliteit, onderhandelingsplatforms, en adaptief 
management worden behandeld om tot een conceptueel model te komen voor de analyse van 
conflicten over hulpbronnen. In het overzicht van Nepal wordt een kort sociaal-economisch, politiek en 
historisch overzicht van het land gegeven. Verder wordt aandacht besteed aan de politieke économie 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, een kort overzicht gegeven van het Nepalese beleid, recht en 
reguleringsvormen met betrekking tot natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Tenslotte wordt een beschrijving 
gegeven van de algemene kenmerken van het onderzoeksgebied. 
In het eerste deel van het boek betoog ik dat het gedrag van mensen met betrekking tot natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen mede wordt bepaald door de specifieke context en locale machtsverhoudingen. Het 
bestaan van meerdere rechtssystemen in de gemeenschap zelf is een belangrijke bron van conflict over 
Sincere thanks to Dik Roth for translating this summary into Dutch language. 
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natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Verschillende, soms zelf conflicterende zienswijzen, waarden, doelstellingen 
en kennis van de locale bevolking over een bepaalde hulpbron manifesteerden zieh in de specifieke 
context, en werden mede gevormd door sociale relaties. leder conflict heeft een relatie met historische, 
culturele, politieke, economische en institutionele kwesties, alsmede met de sociale context. Tevens 
worden conflicten beinvloed door normen, waarden en dagelijkse praktijken. 
De vier hoofstukken in het tweede gedeelte van het boek beslaan het empirische deel van net 
onderzoek. In dit gedeelte worden in het onderzoeksgebied algemeen voorkomende conflicten over 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen en hun kenmerken beschreven. Ook worden de meest voorkomende formele 
en informele praktijken van conflictbeheersing besproken. Het eerste geval betraft een conflict tussen 
oude en nieuwe gebruikers in een oud, door boeren beheerd irrigatiesysteem. Het tweede geval betreff 
een conflict tussen een machtige elite-groep en de dorpelingen over de contrôle over een stuk bos- en 
weidegrond. Het derde geval behandelt het conflict tussen twee groepen mensen over toegang tot en 
contrôle over een bron voor drinkwater. In alle drie de gevallen hebben de locale sociale verhoudingen, 
kwesties over eigendom, de ambiguë roi van externe ontwikkelingsorganisaties, tijds- en ruimtelijke 
effecten, en 'gender'-kwesties een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd aan de escalatie en beheersing van het 
betreffende conflict. Het Vierde geval betraft een door de ADB gefinancierd irrigatieproject, waar hevige 
conflicten uitbraken tijdens het procès van planning en constructie. Deze casus laat zien dat formele 
intervertie, indien niet juist uitgevoerd, niet alleen niet bijdraagt tot de ontwikkeling en het beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen, maarzelfs hevige conflicten in een gemeenschap kan veroorzaken. Het conflict 
werd in dit geval geanalyseerd in termen van participatie, besluitvorming, transparantie en corruptie, 
werkpraktijken van het comité van watergebruikers, de roi van technologie, en communicatie en 
informatie. Het vijfde voorbeeld betraft een conflict tussen landeigenaren en pachters over zgn. Guthi-
land en de contrôle over eigendomsrechten. De gevolgen van sociaal-politieke verandering, de 
toepassing van staatsregulering in de praktjjk, effecten van tijd en context, initiatieven van mensen, en 
het belang van sociale relaties worden geanalyseerd in relatie tot escalatie, transformatie en 
beslechting van het betreffende conflict. 
Identificatie van gebruikers, het delen van de baten, toegang tot bosprodukten, afdrachten van de 
opbrengst, illegale exploitatie van bosprodukten, participatie en contributies door gebruikers in het 
beheer van het bos, en leiderschap waren de belangrijkste kwesties in conflicten over bos. In geschillen 
over waterbronnen waren het delen van water voor diverse doeleinden, bijdragen voor onderhoud van 
irrigatie- en drinkwatersystemen, en de ambiguë rollen en verantwoordelijkheden van comité's van 
watergebruikers de meest voorkomende bronnen van conflict. In het geval van land, ging het meestal 
om verervingskwesties, demarcatie, eigendoms-en andere rechten, pacht, wederrechtelijke toeëigening, 
betaling van grondbelasting en pachtsom. In alle typen van conflicten rond natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
speelden bureaucratie, corruptie, het misbruik van hulpbronnen en van macht en autoriteit een 
belangrijke roi. Naast deze conflicten rond natuurlijke hulpbronnen in het onderzoeksgebied waren er 
ook nog andere conflicten die te maken hadden met leningen en transacties, caste, externe 
ontwikkelings-interventies, familiezaken, partijpolitiek, kwaadsprekerij, prostitutie en sexueel misbruik, 
en religio. Al deze conflicten waren echter gerelateerd aan conflicten over natuurlijke hulpbronnen; het 
is dan ook in de praktijk niet mogelijk om een duidelijke scheidingslijn tussen deze typen van conflict 
aan te brengen. De studie laat zien dat conflict vaker voorkomt als de betrokken partijen behoren tot 
verschillende politieke -, caste -, ethnische - en economische groepen. Deze factoren kunnen de 
conflicten op gang brengen. Als de conflicterende partijen beseffen dat de kosten van het conflict te 
hoog zijn en de baten te laag, kan de duur van het conflict beperkt worden. 
In het derde deel (twee hoofdstukken) rieht ik mij met name op de analyse van conflicten, en presenteer 
een altematieve méthode van conflictbeheersing op locaal niveau. Tevens trek ik conclusies met 
betrekking tot de besproken onderwerpen. In hoofdstuk acht worden algemene analyses van de 
conflict-cases gemaakt, gebaseerd op de theoretische grondslagen besproken in hoofdstuk twee. De 
dynamiek van hulpbronnenconflicten worden geanalyseerd en in het onderzoeksgebied veel 
voorkomende opties voor de beheersing van conflict worden gepresenteerd. De analyse is opgezet 
rond 'property rights', de roi van formele en informele vormen van recht, caste, ethniciteit en sociale 
relaties, macht en politiek, externe interverties en kwesties rond corruptie, communicatie, informatie en 
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netwerken, leiderschaps- en gender-kwesties. Op basis van deze analyse, wordt in hoofdstuk negen 
een alternatieve benadering van 'interactieve conflictbeheersing' (interactive conflict management; ICM) 
gepresenteerd. Deze alternatieve methodologische benadering levert manieren om de zwaktes van 
bestaande benaderingen te overwinnen. De méthode is gebaseerd op leren en actie-gericht. ICM is 
gebaseerd op de analyses van kansen, uitdagingen en beperkingen voor institutionalisering van deze 
méthode, en levert een stapsgewijze procedure voor conflictbeslechting. Tenslotte wordt het terrein 
voor toekomstig onderzoek geidentificeerd. Hieronder wordt een samenvatting gegeven van de analyse 
van het conflict in het derde deel van het boek. 
Beheersing van conflict is niet beperkt tot linéaire procedures met een juridische invalshoek. 
Conflictbeheersing is een dynamisch procès van adaptatie en actie. Oplossing van het conflict hangt af 
van de effectiviteit van de interactie en actios die worden bepaald door waarden (bereidheid om een 
conflict te besiechten), context (mogelijke uitdagingen en problemen), en perspectieven. 
Deze Studie laat zien dat in de door de overheid gesteunde Systemen van beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen niet voldoende waarde wordt gehecht aan locale praktijken van hulpbronnenbeheer. Deze 
creeèren daardoor vele conflicten. Staatswetgeving, regulering en rechtsprincipes waren vaak onderling 
tegenstrijdig, inadequaat, duur, of werden niet juist toegepast en waren daardoor niet effectief in hun 
benadering van hulpbronnenconflicten. Een rechts-centrische interpretatie van beleid en procedures 
van de overheid (waarbij deze werden beschouwd als de enige oplossing voor alle conflicten rond 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen) bracht ve le conflicten teweeg in plaats van deze op te lossen. De politisering 
van conflict, dominante posities van elites, ontoegankelijkheid van de formele kanalen van 
conflictbeslechting voor arme dorpelingen and allerlei bijkomende complicaties kwamen veelvuldig voor. 
Daarbij werd door het publiek vaak de vraag gesteld of zulke formele praktijken wel een bevredigende 
rol spelen in het beslechten van conflicten over hulpbronnen. Deze procedures werden zelf de bran van 
verdere conflicten. Het Deurali landconflict is een voorbeeld van een dergelijke inefficiëntie en 
vertekening. Zoals zowel de bos-weidegrond casus als de Guthi land casus laten zien, was de 
juridische benadering gebaseerd op de assumptie dat toepassing van de wet mensen dwingt om hun 
conflict bij te leggen onder dreiging van sancties. Deze benadering interpreteert het recht als in laatste 
instantie het enige instrument voor 'social engineering', en een effectief middel voor de homogenisering 
van een heterogene maatschappij en voor het oplossen van alle conflicten. De staf van formele 
organisaties had vaak de neiging om de locale bevolking te beschouwen als de veroorzakers van 
conflicten, en zichzelf als de beste manier om deze conflicten op te lossen. Dit betekent dat in de 
formele benadering van conflictbeslechting die wijd verbreid is in Nepal, de locale capaciteit voor het 
beslechten of beheersen van conflicten niet wordt erkend. Er is tevens een gebrek aan integratie van 
innovaties in het procès van conflictbeslechting. Loyaliteit aan politieke partijen is een andere 
belangrijke factor die zowel beperkend als stimulerend kan werken ten aanzien van het procès van 
conflictbeslechting. Politieke idéologie is een belangrijke variabele in conflicten over natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen, die het hele conflictbeheersingsproces op verschillende niveaus van sociale aggregatie 
kan beïnvloeden. Als macht wordt gemobiliseerd in conflictoplossing, dan resulteert dat meestal in een 
'win-lose' situatie. Politieke macht beïnvloed ieder conflict in aanzienlijke mate. Als een conflict ontstaat 
in een dorp, dan intervenieren locale politici van belangrijke partijen uit politiek eigenbelang, in het 
byzonder om locale verkiezingen te Winnen. 
In dit boek stel ik dat conflictbeslechting ook een manier is om macht en invloed te verwerven in een 
gemeenschap. In het onderzoeksgebied werd de meerderheid van de conflicten locaal en informée! 
beslecht. Verandering van gedrag, mobilisering van netwerken, relaties met machtscentra, 
verschillende interpretaties van recht en reguleringsvormen, en het gebruik van machtsmiddelen waren 
de belagnrijnkste strategieën die door de locale bevolking werden gehanteerd in onderhandelingen over 
en het oplossen van conflicten. De locale bevolking gebruikt diverse locaal bestaande sociale 
netwerken, 'shopping forums' en podia om conflicten te beslechten. In plaats van te kiezen voor een 
juridische oplossing, gebruiken mensen eerst locale fora om conflicten op gemeenschapsniveau te 
bespreken. Dergelijke podia en fora zijn toegankelijk, goedkoop en gebaseerd op locale kennis en 
ervaringen. Om de strijdende partijen te overtuigen maken locale onderhandelaars gebruik van 
culturele, religieuze en politiek geladen spreekwoorden die het belang van locale conflictbeslechting 
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benadrukken. Op locaal niveau zijn vrouwen direct en aktief betrokken bij conflicten en de beslechting 
ervan. In diverse conflicten op gemeenschapsnfveau waren kinderen zowel de bran van een conflict als 
een effectief middel ter beëindiging ervan. Er bleek een nauw verband te bestaan tussen conflict en 
communicatie, informatie en de relaties ertussen in oplossing of escalatie. Transformaties van 
hulpbronnen-conflicten naar sociaal-politieke conflicten, manifestatie in de tijd en intensiteit van 
conflicten varieerden afhankelijk van politieke inmenging en machtsrelaties. Zoals de cases laten zien, 
zijn machtsrelaties bepalend voor succès of mislukking van pogingen om op locaal niveau hulpbronnen-
conflicten te beheersen. Locale politieke Processen, waarden en machtsverschillen beïnvloedden het 
conflict in alle gevallen. Tijd en ruimte waren erg belangrijke determinanten van escalatie of oplossing. 
In speciale perioden, zoals verkiezingen en het herstel van de démocratie, namen conflicten plotseling 
in aantal toe, maar diverse conflicten werden ook direct opgelost. De intensiteit van hetzelfde conflict 
verändert in de tijd, en de levenscyclus van het conflict is bepalend voor de beheersings- of 
beslechtingsstrategie. Mensen die verwikkeld waren in een conflict over natuurlijke hulpbronnen, waren 
gedwongen om bestaande middelen optimaal en efficient in te zetten, om naar nieuwe middelen of 
alternatieven te zoeken. 
Alle cases lijken erop te wijzen dat manipulatie door elites van conflicten rond land, water en bos het 
vermögen van pachters en dorpelingen om hun rechten te verdedigen, te protesteren en te 
onderhandelen in conflictsituaties deed toenemen. In het algemeen waren de intensiteit en 
antagonistische effecten minder groot in conflicten over hulpbronnen. Mensen volgen zoveel mogelijk 
strategieën van aanpassing in plaats van confrontatie. Hoewel vele conflicten lange tijd onopgelost 
kunnen blijven, is het bestaan van een aanvaardbare relatie tussen de betrokken partijen in het conflict 
gebruikelijk. Dorpelingen beschouwen sociale relaties als een belangrijke factor in de beheersing van 
locale conflicten over hulpbronnen. Mensen gebruiken hun eigen criteria gebaseerd op de sociaal-
culturele context om conflicten te classificeren. Het belangrijkste critérium is de invloed van het conflict 
op de sociale relaties; een conflict wordt alleen dan gecategoriseerd als emstig als het er de oorzaak 
van is dat de sociale relaties worden verstoord. Een veel gebruikte stratégie ter beheersing van 
conflicten op het niveau van de gemeenschap was die van het compromis. Deze was gebaseerd op 
"trade-offs' tussen de partijen in het geschil. Analyse van alle gevallen van conflict laat zien dat 
conflictbeheersing hetzelfde is als de beheersing van sociale relaties. Empirische gegevens laten zien 
dat conflict zowel een negatief als een positief sociaal verschijnsel is. 
De kern van ICM is om fora voor conflictbeheersing makkelijker toegankelijk te maken voor mensen op 
het platteland, en om de afhankelijkheid van deze groepen van antagonistische vormen van 
conflictbeslechting te minimaliseren. De ontwikkeling van locale capaciteiten met betrekking tot 
conflictbeheersing begint met de participatieve conflictanalyse. De juiste training op het gebied van 
onderhandelen, facilitering, communicatie, conflict-analyse, vaardigheden op het gebied van 
bemiddeling, en bewustwording op het gebied van recht dragen bij aan de ontwikkeling van de 
capaciteit van mensen die zieh aktief bezighouden met conflictbeslechting om een locale oplossing te 
bereiken. ICM erkent de kennis, vaardigheden en ervaringen in een gemeenschap die relevant zijn voor 
het beheersen van conflicten. De diversiteft van een locale gemeenschap kan worden gemobiliseerd om 
conflicten te beendigen of te beheersen. 
Het succès of falen van pogingen om conflicten tot een oplossing te brengen hangt af van een 
vollediger begrip van de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van mensen in een locale samenleving. Door het 
procès van ICM genereren actoren kennis, vaardigheden, vertrouwen, middelen en inzichten die nodig 
zijn voor het omgaan met conflicten over hulpbronnen op gemeenschapsnfveau. Conflicten die 
ontstonden door verwarring en misverstanden kunnen worden opgelost door alle actoren van de 
relevante informatie te voorzien. Een complete analyse van een conflictsituatie (de hele complexiteit 
van sociaal-politieke relaties en hun effecten op conflicten rond natuurlijke huulpbronnen) is van vitaal 
belang, voordat enige overeenkomst op basis van onderhandeling wordt uitgevoerd. De beoordeling 
van zo'n analyse geeft mensen een beter begrip van de fundamentele oorzaken van de conflict en van 
de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van oplossingen. 
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Glossary 
Actor: An individual or group of people who carry out human activities (Wilson and Morren, 1990). 
Adaptive management: The release of human opportunities that requires flexible, diverse and 
redundant regulation and monitoring that leads to corrective action (Holing, 1978, Lee, 1993). 
Collective action: Action taken by a group or a community in pursuit of their perceived shared interests 
(adapted from Stein, 1999). 
Common Property: User rights to common pool resources attached to a specified user 
group/community (adapted from Stein, 1999). 
Communication: Communication is the process of transmission and reception of ideas, facts, 
opinions, attitudes and feelings through one or more information media that produce a response 
(Hellriegelefa/., 1999) 
Communicative rationality: The realisation of an individual goal when the action plan to achieve that 
goal is harmonised with other goal-oriented actors on the basis of a common understanding of a 
situation (adapted from Stein, 1999). 
Conciliation in conflict: It is a process where a neutral third party communicates separately with 
conflicting parties to reduce tension and agree on a process to resolve the conflict (Pendzich, 1993). 
Conflict: Antagonism caused by a clash of cultural, social, economic and/or political interests between 
individuals and groups (Furtze and Stafford, 1994). 
Conflict management: Guiding conflict towards constructive rather than destructive outcomes. 
Corruption: Behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private 
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains or which violates rules as a result of 
certain types of personal influence. 
Culture: The shared products of a given society including its values, knowledge, norms and material 
goods (Furtze and Stafford, 1994:29). 
Ethnography: Process of recording and interpreting another peoples' way of life, through intimate 
participation in a community and observation of modes of behaviour and organisation of social life. 
Facilitation: Providing help and guidance through experiential learning, adaptive management and 
knowledge system management. It guides people through the process of learning to create common 
knowledge that can be used to improve problematic situation (adapted from Boer, 2000; Wilson and 
Morren, 1990). 
Human Activity System: Conceptual construct that represents purposeful human action used in a 
debate about possible changes to improve the problematic situation through human action (adapted 
from Wilson and Morren, 1990; Boer, 2000).. 
Learning: Process whereby individuals or organisations acquire and internalise experiences, language, 
social and institutional behaviour, responses, understanding, meaning, knowledge actions, plans, etc. 
(adapted from Boer, 2000). 
Local knowledge: Knowledge possessed by local people about ecosystem processes, community 
organisation and structure. 
Legal pluralism: This is a concept which focuses on the co-existence of multiple legal and normative 
arrangements such as state laws, religious and customary laws, unwritten local rules, etc. 
Mediation: Mediation is the intervention in conflict situation, of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third 
party who has no final decision making authority but who will assist to negotiate an acceptable 
settlement of conflict. 
Negotiation: Negotiation is a voluntary process that deals with the conflict situation between the 
negotiating parties where two or more people meet face to face and communicate with each other. 
Platform: A group of social actors involved in a process of social learning, building new institutions and 
facilitating joint innovations, resources-use negotiation or any collective decision making and concerted 
action. (Roling, 1996; Boer, 2000) 
Power: The ability of individuals or groups to further their own interests. This is the key concept in water 
resource management. Societies and communities are not homogenous entities. They are hierarchical, 
where individuals and groups have influence over others. This influence can be legitimate or illegitimate, 
traditional or a result of non-traditional forces. It definitely exists and may impact on the working of 
external intervention. 
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Property regime: A decision making arrangement that defines the condition of access to, allocation of 
and control over a range of benefits arising from a resources (adapted from Stein, 1999). 
Property rights: Social institutions that have evolved as a means of enforcing claims to a flow of 
benefit (adapted from Stein, 1999). 
Social institutions: These express the organisation of social, economic and political activity, which is 
followed by the majority of the members of a society. These usually include the family, the education 
system, a system of religion, a political and economic system and the more general patterns of 
community norms and values. 
Soft system: This is formed when social actors become collectively engage to form a system through 
jointly agreed and negotiated goals and activities (Checklands and Scholes, 1990). 
System thinking: It conceptualises the complexity and dynamics in terms of holism, means of 
measurement and control, emergent properties, structures, communication, etc. (adapted from Boer, 
2000; Wilson and Morren, 1990). 
Values: Ideas individuals have about what is good and bad, right and wrong, important and 
unimportant, harmful and safe, just and unjust, etc. 
Meaning of some commonly used Nepali terms: 
Afnomanche: Term commonly used for influencing decisions by using strong network (relatives, 
friends, political allies, etc.) 
Ailani Jagga: Land owned by government 
Akshyakosh: Trust fund 
Ama Samuha: Mothers' club 
Batabandha: A Hindu ritual where male people get sacred thread to be eligible for marriage 
Bibaha: Marriage 
Birta: A land tenure system derived from the ancient practice of assigning non-taxable land to the 
political and ruling elite 
Budopako: Elderly people 
Chauhadhi: Command area 
Chautari: A public place where people gather to take rest and discuss common issues and concerns 
Darta: registration 
Dewani: Civil 
Dharmabhakauni: Sacred test 
Faisala: Decision 
Faujdari: Criminal 
Gaiherne palo: A turn to act as cowherd 
Ganyamanya: Counted among the honoured 
Ghans-daurajandha: To go to collect grasses and firewood 
Goanko malik: Boss of the village 
Guthi: Religious and philanthropic trust 
Hakim saheb: Head of office 
Hat-bazar Periodic open market 
Hukumpramangi: Royal decree 
Insaf: Justice 
Jaribana and chhetipurti bahraunl: Fine and payment of compensation 
Jat: Caste group defined according to Hindu religious system 
Jhakri rakhne: Exploration by faith healers 
Jhakri: Faith healer 
Jand: Fermented liquor 
Khet: A low land area used for irrigated agriculture 
Kipat: A type of non-taxable land tenure system granted to particular Kirat ethnic groups in ancient 
time. 
Koseli: Free gift to the Mukhiya in kind 
Kulo Prabandha Samita: Canal Management Committee 
Kulo: Irrigation canal 
193 
Lalpurja: Document with red seal issued as sign of their legitimacy 
Madhesthata Samuha: Mediation Group 
Mafi magne: Public apology 
Malpot Adda: Land Revenue Office 
Mela-parma: Exchange of labour to perform agricultural work in peak agricultural seasons 
Mukhiya: Non-official land-tax collector in early period 
Muluki Ain: Civil Code 
Mukhiyoli: Free labour to be given to the Mukhiya at every agricultural season. 
Napi Goswara: Land Survey office 
Napi: Land measurement 
Pakho: General term used for uncultivated area. 
Pale/Chaukidar: Watchmen 
Panchabhaladmi: Five notables among the villagers who resolve conflict in the community 
Panchayat: Autocratic political system, which was overthrown by 1990 popular movement, which 
established a multiparty democracy 
Pan! kadne: Ostracise 
Pathi: Local measuring utensil 
Pradhanpancha: Head of the village during the period of the panchayat political system 
Raikar: Private land tenure system 
Sabik: Old 
Sagun game: Reconciliation 
Sangharsha Samiti: Protection committee 
Sarbasampana Daudaha: Powerful mobile officer appointed by the government to settle conflict on the 
spot. 
Village Panchayat: Lowest political unit of elected body during the panchayat political system, which 
has now been replaced by the VDC 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. About the reference groups 
Dhungeshowri Forest User Group, Kavre VDC, Dolakha District: 
This is one of the most active groups involved in community resource management activities in 
Dolakha. The Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project (NSCFP) supports this group. The majority of 
the members are farmers, from Brahmin and Chhetri caste groups, economically better off, literate to 
highly educated, have more awareness on the legal issues and their rights and responsibilities, and are 
politically sensitive. This group was more homogenous in power, resources and status. Though 
originally organised for forest-related activities, this group is now involved in several economic activities 
and conflict management. It is led by a schoolteacher and has both male and female representatives. It 
is actively involved in all land, forest and water related conflict management. 
Ghorthali forest group, Bhimeshwor Municipality, Charikot, Dolakha District 
This group is based in the district headquarters and has the most privileges. The group was supported 
by NSCFP. Most of the members are rich and educated and are involved in business and professions 
other than agriculture. Their activities are limited only to community forestry and they are involved in 
forest-related conflict management. Several members are not active in this forest group. The population 
composition of the group is Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar, more heterogeneous in power, resources and 
status. 
Kafal Forest Users Group, Ramechhap VDC, Ramechhap district 
This group is supported by the NSCFP and is involved in several community-resource management 
activities in addition to forest-related work. It is mainly dominated by the Chhetri caste group, and is 
economically poor with only a few literate members. It is led by a schoolteacher and is not very sensitive 
to legal procedures and rights and responsibilities. It is active in settling local conflicts particularly in 
managing forest-related conflicts but also land-related conflict issues. 
Kaseri Agricultural Group, Arba-Visayapur VDC, Kaski district 
This is a Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN) supported agricultural group of homogenous composition. 
All members are from Gurung ethnic community. The majority of them are economically better off, 
literate and involved in agricultural and other NRM activities. Women leaders actively manage conflicts 
in the community. Women made all decisions but male members actively supported the group. 
Tiklang Farmers Group, Bharatpokhari VDC, Kaski district 
This is a more homogenous group in terms of their economic condition, literacy and social status. The 
majority of the members are from the Brahmin and Chhetri caste groups. It is mainly engaged in 
agricultural activities, and management of drinking water and land conflicts. Group members are active 
in dealing with local conflict management. 
Piple Farmers Group, Piple VDC, Chitwan district 
This group is composed of new settlers and immigrants from different parts of the country and therefore 
quite heterogeneous in its socio-economic and educational status. The majority of the members are 
poor and illiterate. It is dominated by a few powerful and resourceful people. They are especially 
involved in NR-related conflict as they are close to the buffer zone of the Park and People Project. 
Although they are highly involved in conflicts they are not able to resolve many of them. 
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Bhandara Farmers Group, Bhandara VDC, Chitawan district 
This is a loosely organised but active group involved in many economic activities with support from the 
RRN. Members are economically and literally better off and are homogenous in their resources and 
power. They are aware of their rights and well informed about the legal process. They are active in 
community level conflict management. 
Shanti Mahila Banchat Samuha, Kanchanpur district 
This group is a solely female group, supported by the Women Empowerment Project (WEP) of the 
USAID and the Park and People Project (PPP) of the UNDP. The group is mainly involved in the saving 
and credits programme. The majority of members are from the Mangolian ethnic group and a few are 
Chhetri. The group is more homogenous in its member's socio-economic condition, but heterogeneous 
in their literacy, ranging from just literate to the possession of a Bachelor degree. All members migrated 
from the western hills and are involved in resolving community level conflict. 
Jaya Durga Mahila Banchat Samuha, Mahendranagar, Kanchanpur district 
This group is also composed of only women supported by WEP and local NGOs and is involved in 
several community-level resource-management activities, in addition to the saving and credit 
programme. Members are more homogenous in terms of their economic situation and literacy. All 
members are from Chaudhari, an indigenous ethnic group of Terai. They are actively involved in 
community-level conflict management. 
Jeevan Jyoti Mahila Samudyik Bank, Kohalpur, Banke district 
This is very active women group involved in several community-level, resource-management activities 
including the saving and credit programme. This group is supported by WEP and a local NGO called 
Han't Shanti Abhiyan. Members are more homogenous in their economic status and literacy but different 
in ethnic and caste composition. Chhetri, Chaudhari and Brahmin are the major constituent of the group. 
The group is actively involved in conflict management. 
Pragatisil Samudayik Bank of Banke district 
This is an active group supported by WEP and Nari Vikash Kendra, a local NGO. It is involved in the 
saving and credit programme. Members are more homogenous (in resources and access to power, 
education, etc.) in composition as all are Bramin and are very active in managing conflict in the 
community. 
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